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Abstract
The Breakdown of Elite Ideological Consensus: 
The Prelude to the Disintegration of Yugoslavia
(1974-1990)
The disintegration of Yugoslavia was the result of many factors, not of a 
single one, but the main one was the breakdown of the ideological consensus 
within the Yugoslav political elite during an extended period of 15 years 
preceding the actual disintegration of Yugoslav institutions. The thesis 
examines the emergence, implementation, crisis and the breakdown of the 
fourth constitutive concept of Yugoslavia (1974-1990). Since the role of the 
political elite in this period was crucial, it is only by focussing on elite 
perceptions of reality that one can understand Yugoslav politics. More than 
any other work in the field, this thesis emphasises the link between elite and 
ideology (i.e., Kardelj's interpretation of Marxism). Using interviews with 
dozens of key political actors in this period, documents and other primary 
sources, the thesis reconstructs the elite's motives and reasons for first 
accepting then abandoning both Kardelj's interpretation and a fragile but 
viable compromise reached during the 1967-1974 Constitutional debate. The 
thesis is a historical case-study of the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia, but it 
makes contribution to other fields, such as: theories of state disintegration; the 
comparative politics of communist states; elite politics; the debate on 
ideology; politics in multi-ethnic societies; methodology of social sciences, etc. 
Its main novelty is in presenting new sources and offering an original 
interpretation of the events which happened in the analysed period. It also 
corrects some misconceptions in the debate on the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
such as the 'ethnic hatred' argument and various mono-causal explanations 
focussed on economic crisis, international politics, ethnic structure, etc. Their 
main fallacy is in neglecting the subjective, i.e., the perceptions of political 
actors in politics. The thesis demonstrates that institutions that were created 
on ideological grounds found it ultimately impossible to survive the collapse 
of the ideological narrative whose products they were.
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Introduction
0.1. Aims and justification
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first book-length attempt to analyse the breakdown of 
the ideological consensus within the Yugoslav political elite in the last period of relative 
stability in Yugoslavia (1974-1990) before its disintegration. There have been a few articles and 
chapter-length analyses on this subject (Goati, 1997; Dyker, 1996; Pavkovic, 1997). There are also 
several analyses of the structure and decision-making processes within the Yugoslav political 
elites in previous periods (Burg, 1983; Cohen, 1983; Cohen, 1989) and of its transformation in 
post-Yugoslav states (Lengyel, 1996). However, this is the first detailed account of the extremely 
complex and controversial relations between the various sections of the Yugoslav political elite 
in the last two decades of the Yugoslav federation.
As Chapter One of this thesis analyses in detail, most of the recent analyses of the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia Eire focused on either the long-term macro-structural factors that 
made this country unstable ever since its creation in 1918 (Lampe, 1996; Ramet, 1992; Sekelj, 
1993; Vuckovic, 1997; Pavkovic, 1996; Denitch, 1994; Irvine, 1997; Dyker, 1997, etc.), or on the 
role of personalities (such as Tito and Milosevic) in the last two decades before disintegration. 
M any books have focused on the actual disintegration of the Yugoslav institutions and the 
causes of the post-Yugoslav wars in the 1990s (Woodward, 1995; Samary, 1995; Silber and Little, 
1995; Van den Heuvel, 1992; Cmobrnja, 1994; Glenny, 1992 and 1993; Cohen, 1993; Magas, 1993; 
Stojanovic, 1997; Meier, 1999, etc.). Some of them analyse the role of international politics in the 
Yugoslav crisis (Gow, 1997b; Williams, 1998; Owen, 1995; Rose, 1998; Zimmermann, 1996; Bildt, 
1998; Holbrooke, 1998, etc.). This thesis, however, focuses on the elite perceptions of reality 
which evolved in the period analysed here. I hope to explain the reasons (1) for the emergence 
of the last political compromise (of the 1974 Constitution), (2) for the crisis of this constitutive 
concept and -  finally -  (3) for the break-down of this ideological and political consensus in the 
late 1980s. The three parts of this thesis follow the emergence, crisis and break-down of the elite 
ideological consensus between 1974 and 1990.
Politics of Yugoslavia in the analysed period was the politics of its elite. Although Marxist 
ideology was in its letter anti-elitist, the communist regimes were in reality constructed on the 
Leninist notion of the Party being the vanguard of society. The Party was guaranteed a ruling 
(leading) role because of its vision of the future, that was built on its ability to understand the 
General Laws of History, to see further into the future and thus to construct reality according to
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this vision. The Party (i.e.., its leadership) was the main interpreter of the aims of social 
development. Its mission was to lead society towards a true communist (classless, stateless) 
form of social organisation. Thus, while in theory the socialist societies were anti-elitist, in 
political reality it was only the (Party) elite that mattered. The main political conflicts in socialist 
Yugoslavia were intra-elite conflicts.
The basic contradiction between the declared goals (in the Yugoslav case, self-management as 
the form of direct democracy) and political 'necessity' in the transitional period (displayed in the 
guaranteed role of the Party as vanguard) was a source of permanent contradictions in all 
socialist states. On the one hand, the elite occupied the main locus of power, while on the other 
it declared direct democracy to be its main aim. The contradiction was resolved by the notion of 
the transitional period between the old regime (of political, party democracy) and the communist 
society in which the ideals of direct self-government would be fully implemented. The socialist 
period was a period of permanent reform of the political system, aimed at reducing the role of 
the institutions of the old regime, in the first place of the state, which was to 'w ither away7 at the 
end of this process. In this process of the withering away of the state, the Party (as the elite) had 
the leading and irreplaceable role.
The period I analyse in this thesis was the last attempt to reform the Yugoslav political system 
towards these goals. The ideological and political consensus within the Yugoslav political elite 
was based on the Marxist notion that the state should be weakened and direct democracy 
strengthened in the transitional period. This general conclusion was formulated primarily in 
various books, articles and speeches by Edvard Kardelj, the main ideologue of Yugoslav self­
m anagement (Chapter Two) and was adapted to Yugoslav reality through major debates in the 
1967-1974 period (Chapter Three). The members of the Yugoslav political elite, being Marxists 
themselves, agreed on Kardelj's interpretation of reality and social aims. The 1974 Constitution 
was an expression of this agreement. The 'constitutive concept' of post-1974 Yugoslavia 
transformed the ideology of Marxism, i.e., its Yugoslav interpretation, into legal provisions and 
political actions. It de-centralised the institutions of the federal state not only to resolve the 
national question (of which the Yugoslav communists were aware) but also to make a further 
step forward towards the withering away of the state and its replacement by self-management as an 
alternative to the state.
Most of the recent literature on the collapse of Yugoslavia underestimates both the ideological 
essence of this attempt and the extraordinary role of the political elite. On the contrary, they 
focus on long-term macro-structural factors, such as economic problems, the geopolitical 
position of Yugoslavia, changes in international politics, and -  especially -  the enormous 
cultural and ethnic diversities within the country. I do not deny the importance of all these 
elements, nor do I underestimate the contribution made by authors who rely on them.
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However, I argue that it is with the perceptions of the political elite and primarily with their 
ideological beliefs that an analysis of the disintegration of the Yugoslav state should begin. 
Despite the ever-existent long-term problems, the Yugoslav political elite in the 1967-1974 
period found a way to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia, while fifteen years later in 
circumstances which looked much more promising they were not able to secure its further 
existence. My aim is to explain why these long-term problems were in one period successfully 
sidelined while in another they formed an unsurmountable problem. I argue that the main 
difference was in the break-down of the elite ideological consensus, which was based on 
Kardelj's interpretation of Marxism. The ideological vision of objectives and the shared 
interpretation of reality that existed in 1974 were no longer there in 1989. The constitutive concept 
that linked the elite consensus on ideological issues with their legal and political actions 
gradually collapsed as the vision became blurred.
Although this is not a work of comparative politics, nor a theory of states, but a historical study 
of the collapse of one state, I hope to make a contribution to several broader debates within the 
fields of history and political (social) science, such as: (1) the reasons for the collapse of states; 
(2) the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe; (3) the debate on the role of elites; (4) the 
debate on ideology; (5) the complexity of politics in multi-ethnic societies; and (6) the debates 
on the methodology of analysing political change and political action in general. The case I 
analyse indicates that ideological states are extremely vulnerable to a collapse of ideology that 
forms the basis of their identity. Not only in this particular case, but also in similar cases of 
ideologically-based states, the institutions are not independent of the narratives whose 
products they are. Although, once created, institutions have their own impact on political 
events, in ideological societies they are functions of the ideology which created them and which 
gave them their aim and purpose. Unlike in societies based on the representation of existing 
political interests, in societies in which the elite presents a vision of the future, institutions are 
not neutral and bureaucratic (in the Weberian sense) instruments of common interests. The 
central role of ideology in communism was the main reason for the weakness of state 
institutions, and -  ultimately -  for their collapse in the late 1980s. Institutions that were created 
on ideological grounds (such as the Army, police, media, the whole apparatus of power, etc.) 
found it difficult and -  ultimately -  impossible to remain intact once this ideology had 
collapsed.
This was especially the case with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, two communist countries 
with their own ideological narratives. Unlike in other East European countries which followed 
Soviet ideology, the Yugoslav political elite had created its own narrative, which was in its 
essence anti-Soviet. The entire project of Yugoslav socialism was based on criticism of Soviet 
statism and of its hegemonic role within the world of socialist states. In its essence, the Yugoslav 
project was anti-statist. The anti-statist character of Yugoslav ideology, however, posed a
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question - how to construct a state on an anti-statist narrative? Although the Kardelj concept 
offered some answers to this question, it ultimately failed to resolve this basic dilemma.
Treating Soviet socialism as revisionism, the Yugoslav (Kardeljist) interpretation of Marxism 
linked elements of the national tradition with strict implementation of the Marxist notion of the 
withering away of the state. The new Yugoslav identity was, therefore, linked to a new 
interpretation of Marxist ideology. Subsequently, once the ideology collapsed, it carried with it 
the very national identity of Yugoslavia. Unlike other East European countries, whose elite 
followed ideological interpretations made by somebody else (the Soviet communists), the 
Yugoslavs had no one but themselves to blame for the failure of their own project of 
communism. They could not abandon communism and remain Yugoslavs at the same time. 
But, they could even less construct a Yugoslav (political) nation without abandoning 
communist doctrine.
Unlike, for example, the Polish or Hungarian anti-communist movements, which were in their 
essence anti-Soviet but not anti-Polish or anti-Hungarian, anti-communism in Yugoslavia was 
to a large extent anti-Yugoslav. But, at the same time, the Yugoslav version of communism was 
not Yugoslav either: it was based on denial of the existence of the Yugoslav nation, not only in 
an ethnic, but in a political sense too. Furthermore, as explained in detail in Chapter Two of this 
thesis, it regarded Yugoslavia as a state that would perhaps become a 'core of a wider 
integration', as Kardelj himself said in 1970. Being based on its own interpretation of Marxism, 
Yugoslavia was more, not less ideological than Poland and Hungary. It is for this reason 
primarily that Yugoslavia could be compared with the Soviet Union, not with the other East 
European countries. The fall of the Soviet and Yugoslav ideologies led to the collapse of the 
Soviet and Yugoslav states. It is also in the anti-statist ideological narrative of self-management 
that one may find the seeds of the later fascination with statehood by the anti-communist 
movements and parties in the post-Yugoslav states. As opposed to self-management as an anti­
statist doctrine, the anti-communist movements were often pro-statist. As opposed to the anti­
nationalism of the Yugoslav political elite in the last communist period, they were often pro­
nationalist. The collapse of 'communism' and the emergence of 'nationalism' were, therefore, 
not two separate lines of events. It was not that 'communism' collapsed because of nationalism, 
or that nationalism emerged on the ruins of communism. The relationship between the two was 
more complex: they always existed separately, yet they constructed themselves by reacting to 
one another. By doing this, both doctrines (communism and nationalism) in Yugoslav 
circumstances contained elements of the other. Once the 'turning point' happened in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, only those who had disregarded the complexity of Yugoslav politics in 
its last 20 years, were taken by extreme surprise. This is why I have argued that it is impossible 
to understand what happened after 1990 without analysing what happened before the collapse
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of Yugoslavia. It is only within the existing political context that one can understand political 
events, which were the result of the long process that I follow in this thesis.
0.2. Analytical approach
In the methodological sense, this thesis aims at underlining the importance of analysing events 
within their context. I propose that political change be analysed by focusing on the political 
actors and their (subjective) perceptions of the (objective) factors which constitute the context in 
which they act. Here I am interested in political leaders' perceptions. In order to explain 
political action, I argue, we need to take the actors, their beliefs, intentions, motives and 
explanations, seriously. Political actors, especially in communist politics, do not simply act as 
representatives of various social groups (nations, classes, etc.) but also (and even primarily) as 
'representatives' of their perceptions. In order to reconstruct their perceptions I have relied on 
Quentin Skinner's (1988) instructions on how to analyse political action as I argue in detail in 
Chapter One. Being interested in past political actions, I occupy the middle ground on the 
somewhat artificial divide between political science and history. Being sceptical about the 
usefulness of various political science models in explaining this particular case of state-collapse, 
I take a historical approach in analysing political events. The fact that my study is not a 
comparative analysis, but a single-country study also indicates my closeness to the historical 
approach. On the other hand, I am in full agreement with Skinner when it comes to his warning 
about the potential dangers in the way of historical analysis. As Skinner argues, one of the most 
frequent mistakes that historians are tempted to make is a result of analysing past events from a 
comfortable position of the known outcome of these events. By attempting to draw  the veil of 
ignorance about the final result of events that I analyse in this thesis, I have aimed at avoiding 
the 'prolepsis mistake' and the 'coherence myths' that in many analyses of Yugoslav history 
nullify the benefits of hindsight. Although aware that one cannot fully exclude personal 
attitudes or simple knowledge of what happened after the period analysed in this thesis, I have 
tried to aim at following and analysing the events as they happened in their own context, not in 
the context of their 'consequences'. The main focus of my interest was the perceptions of the 
political actors and their reasons for action at the moment they acted, not what either I or they 
today think they should or should not have done in order to achieve certain goals. The purpose 
of political analysis is not, I believe, to condemn or justify but to explain why political actors 
acted as they did. Not much more and no less. Personal judgements about how sensible the 
actions taken by them were are left to every reader. Having no universal grounds for 
condemning or justifying political actions, political analysts and historians, I believe, have no 
monopoly in judging them.
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0.3. Methodology
The main aim of this thesis dictated the methodological approach and the range of sources I 
relied upon. Since the archives for the period analysed in this thesis will remain inaccessible for 
a decade or two, I relied on semi-archival sources, such as published and unpublished Party 
documents, minutes from the sessions of the Party and state leadership, analyses of political 
events prepared for various sessions of party institutions, speeches of leading Yugoslav 
politicians, public statements, newspaper reports from the sessions of the Central Committee 
and other Party institutions, interviews with members of the political elite conducted by 
journalists and published in the period in which the actions had taken place, video-recorded 
minutes of Party meetings, etc.
A large proportion of my thesis relies on the memoirs and recollections of the leading members 
of the Yugoslav political elite in the 1974-1990 period. Political leaders, especially in Serbia and 
Slovenia, have provided the analyst with substantial help by publishing their speeches in the 
period analysed, and have given many interviews explaining their role.
As a journalist in the last period analysed in this thesis, I interviewed some of the key 
participants in Yugoslav politics for various newspapers I had been writing for since 1984. My 
early career in journalism enabled me to attend many Party meetings, to collect minutes and to 
have direct access to the main politicians. For this thesis, I used my personal archive as well as 
the personal archives of dozens of politicians who kindly permitted access to their personal 
correspondence and other documents, such as, for example, the minutes of the main debates 
conducted behind closed doors (some of which had -  not long ago -  been classified as state 
secrets). I also used notes in my diary, which I had occasionally taken to record my informal 
conversations with politicians, journalists and other analysts of the events as they were 
unfolding.
In addition, in the last four years, I have conducted dozens of interviews with leading members 
of the Yugoslav political elite in the 1970s and 1980s. The transcripts of these interviews are 
almost of equal size to this thesis itself. The interviews I conducted have enabled me to cross- 
reference their statements with documents and other sources from the time when the events 
took place. It is only with reference to archival documents and their own statements in the 
actual context (i.e., at the time of the action) that I use political actors' present recollections as 
relevant in this thesis.
In addition to political participants, I have interviewed some of the leading experts in areas 
related to my subject and some of the international participants in the Yugoslav drama. Several
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public lectures, mostly at the London School of Economics and Political Science, have also been 
a useful source for reconstructing the views of experts, academics, and participants.
Being limited by the official requirements about the size and structure of the thesis, I was able 
to use only excerpts from various interviews and documents I have collected in the last several 
years of my research. Most of my sources are presented in footnotes as evidence for and 
illustration of my argument, which is stated in the main body of the thesis. Although somewhat 
longer than one would normally expect them to be, they make a substantial part of my 
argument. In addition, the footnotes in this thesis tend to guide the reader through the various 
streams of arguments that I am presenting throughout the thesis.
It is my hope that one day, when the archival sources are fully available, the actors' 
explanations of their own motives for certain actions will represent a valuable contribution 
towards an even more complete picture of Yugoslav politics in the last fifteen years preceding 
the disintegration of the state. Taking into account the nature of communist regimes, in which 
many decisions were taken informally, without any written trace to constitute evidence or a 
source for future historians, one can assume that the archival sources alone would not be 
sufficient to map out the extreme complexity of intra-elite relations. The reconstruction of the 
elite thinking that I aim at in this thesis would then prove to be not only an additional, but also 
an unavoidable source of historical research. Bearing in mind the age of the main participants 
(and the fact that some of those interviewed have passed away) this research hopes to represent 
a unique source for further studies of this period.
0.4. Key concepts
Before moving to the main text of this thesis, a few words should be said about the use of some 
key concepts in the text. Based on the conclusion that we should always approach political 
actors themselves, their way of thinking and their motives, I could not and did not want to 
avoid using certain key words in the meaning they shared, not in the one we would share 
today, in a different ideological and temporal context. The mistake of m isunderstanding the 
actions of other people has often been committed when analysts assumed there was only one 
correct meaning of key words. The misunderstanding between East and West, and especially 
between Yugoslavia and both East and West, was to large extent a consequence of an 
unwillingness to accept that terms used in two different contexts had different -  sometimes 
even opposed -  meanings. My position here is based on rejecting the universalist notion that 
there is one single correct meaning of terms. As I demonstrate throughout this thesis, the main 
political conflicts in Yugoslavia often took the form of an ideological and even linguistic 
struggle about the correct meaning of certain words. Behind these struggles was the belief that
the Party was the legitimate ruler since it knew the truth about history and the future of society. 
The Party was the only interpreter of the truth, which was also -  by definition -  the only truth. 
The exclusion of any other interpretation of reality, both outside the Party (in the form of 
political parties) or within it (in the form of factions or revisionist views) was the result of the 
monistic principle. But, some post-communist critics of communism repeat the same mistake 
when arguing that the communists were simply wrong in using terms such as democracy, 
socialism, etc., in the way they did. They assume that there is only one true democracy, and that is 
the one developed in the Western world. It is needless to mention, however, that this same 
belief -  mutatis mutandis -  was cultivated in the former communist countries. For Yugoslav 
communists, the only real democracy was one that included the full self-determination of nations 
and the self-management of working people, not one 'reduced' to mere political and voting 
rights.
As much as I cannot deny my preference for the Western understanding of democracy over the 
one developed in the former communist countries, I do not think that political analysts and 
historians should be arbiters between the two conflicting understandings of the same term. 
What we should do is explain the reasons for action as seen by those who acted in a certain 
way. We shall never be able to do so if we simply dismiss their own way of thinking as 
irrational and therefore not logical. On the contrary, only if we approach the actors' way of 
thinking as closely as possible, will we be able to explain their reasons for their own actions.
This is why in this thesis I do not attempt to correct Yugoslav political leaders when they use 
certain concepts in a different way from how either I myself or a Western reader would 
normally use them. One should, however, be aware of differences when it comes to the main 
concepts. A detailed exposition of the key concepts used by Yugoslav communists is developed 
in Chapter Two, in which the Kardelj 'constitutive concept' is analysed. We shall therefore limit 
our explanation here to only a few key concepts in order to prevent initial confusion.
In the Yugoslav communist vocabulary, for example, the word nation ('nacija1, 'narod') signified 
the constitutive nations ('konstitutivne nacije') of Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, 
Montenegrins and Macedonians). Nationality ('narodnost') was term used to describe the 
special status of the Albanians, Hungarians and other non-constitutive nations, in order to 
distinguish them from both nations and national minorities ('nacionalne manjine'), as they used to 
be nam ed in the inter-war period. The Yugoslav state is often referred to as a federation, since 
the w ord federative was in its name ever since 1943. However, one may notice that in the period 
we here analyse Kardelj's conclusion that Yugoslavia was neither a classic federation nor a 
classic confederation was accepted by all political leaders. The word state (’drzava1) and 
concepts of statism ('etatizam') were used with a negative connotation -  as something opposed 
to self-management ('samoupravljanje'). A statist ('etatist') was an enemy of self-management.
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Among other words that were used as labels of anti-socialist behaviour were: bureaucracy 
('birokracija'), nationalism ('nacionalizam'), liberalism ('liberalizam'), techo-managerialism ('tehno- 
menadzerizam') and (as perhaps the most dismissive) counter-revolution ('kontrarevolucija'). 
Since Yugoslav self-management was opposed to Soviet state-socialism and inter-war Yugoslav 
unitarism, words such as unitarism ('unitarizam'), hegemonism ('hegemonizam'), centralism 
('centralizam'), Great-State tendencies ('veliko-drzavne tendencije'), Greater-Serbian domination 
('veliko-srpska dominacija'), Stalinism ('staljinizam'), etc., were also high on the list of political 
disqualifications.
The Yugoslav politicians, like those of other East European countries, named their political 
system socialist, but often emphasised that their socialism was not statist, but self-managing 
('samoupravni socijalizam'). The word communism ('komunizam') was used rarely, and only 
when related to the Party, which was in 1952 renamed the League of Communists ('Savez 
komunista', SKJ) to emphasise both its roots in Marx's ideas and a difference with the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. While the state was socialist, the party was communist, 
because the Party was representative of the future of society (i.e., 'full' communism), not of its 
present. Communism remained a goal of the Party's activities. The real communism, at least at 
a symbolical level, existed only within the Party: its members addressed each other as equal 
regardless of their ranks and positions. Even to Tito, they used to use the familiar Ti, rather 
than the official Vi, emphasising that one day, when communism came, this perfect equality 
would be extended to the whole of society. The Party was a vanguard ('avangarda'), and its 
members were morally and politically suited ('moralno politicki podobni') to educate others and 
guide society towards communism. Although the earlier phrase people of a special mould ('ljudi 
posebna kova') was not used in the period I analyse here, the Party members were the politically 
conscious ('politicki svjestan') part of society. The Party itself (together with four other official 
organisations: the Socialist Alliance of Working People; the Alliance of Socialist Youth; the 
Veteran Association and the Alliance of Trade Unions) was the subjective force ('subjektivna 
snaga') of society. By definition, to be a member of the Party meant not only to be admitted to a 
privileged club of those who are 'conscious' and 'suitable' to educate others, but also to be 
recognised as a 'subject' (i.e., an active element), rather than an object of practical politics. 
Hence, on the other hand, expulsion from the Party, meant not only that one would lose such 
privileges, but also that one would be demoted from 'subject' to 'object'. H e/she would be 
publicly stripped of recognition of being 'conscious' and 'suitable' and would therefore be 
hum iliated and excluded from public life. The socialist societies (including Yugoslav) were 
divided between those included and those excluded from politics along the lines of Party 
membership.
In the vocabulary of Yugoslav socialism, the word ideology was used mostly with a negative 
connotation, as false consciousness ('lazna svijest'). The Party was not professing an ideology, but
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a scientific world-view ('naucni pogled na svet'). Marxism was not ideology either - it was 
scientific socialism ('znanstveni socijalizam'). Instead of being called ideological, party 
commissions in charge of ideology were named ideo-political commissions ('idejno-politicke 
komisije'). Terms like commissars were also avoided as too closely reminiscent of Soviet practice. 
In the Army, the commissars were replaced by officers for ideo-political education. In the state 
structure, neither commissars, nor ministers were used - the federal (republican, provincial) 
secretaries were members not of government but of the Executive Councils.
The construction of a new reality (as socialism defined its objective) demanded the replacement 
of old terms linked to the existence of the state with new ones that belonged to the self­
management glossary. Some of these words are almost impossible to translate into any West 
European language since they were invented to describe institutions uniquely linked to a new 
form of social organisation. Terms such as the basic organisation of associated labour (BOAL or 
OOUR in Serbo-Croat) and self-managing community of interests (SIZ) soon became trademarks of 
Yugoslav anti-statist socialism. The term nationalism was used as a synonym for separatism and 
chauvinism, while unitarism meant Yugoslav state-nationalism -  a doctrine and practice that 
denied the federal character of Yugoslavia a n d / or the existence of its constitutive nations and 
their republics (states). In the official vocabulary of Yugoslav communism, nationalism and 
unitarism were to be defeated. Although in public rhetoric all nationalisms were treated as 
equally dangerous, in intra-party debates Serbian nationalism was somehow naturally 
identified as the closest possible ally of unitarism and a potential ally of Soviet 'hegemonism' 
and was, therefore, considered to be the most dangerous. Unless it is obvious from the context 
or explicitly stated, these terms are used here in their original meaning, i.e., as they were used 
by the Yugoslav political elite.
In this text I introduce several new concepts which need to be explained here. By 'constitutive 
concept' I mean a set of ideas and beliefs about the nature of the state on which a basic 
consensus is created within the (ruling) political elite, which forms a more or less internally 
consistent whole and which is then transformed into political and legislative action. As 
explained in Chapter Two, I identify four major constitutive concepts in the whole period of 
Yugoslavia (1918-1992), the last of which (here called the fourth, or the Kardeljist, or -  sometimes 
-  the Brioni concept) is the main object of my analysis. The constitutive concept is a term that 
links ideology (here Marxism), its dominant interpretation (in this case Kardelj's interpretation) 
with the main initiatives by which the political elite attempted to implement it through 
legislation (the 1974 Constitution) and political action. The constitutive concept forms, therefore, 
a linkage between ideology and practice -  it is a means of the transformation of ideology into 
legal regulation and political action. The formulation of the constitutive concept occupies a 
central place in the politics of highly ideological societies. As the case of socialist Yugoslavia 
illustrates, major political conflicts took the form of constitutional debates. In highly ideological
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societies, the wording of social aims is the main substance of politics. Yugoslav domestic 
politics was almost exclusively organised around constant constitutional debate which resulted 
in four constitutions (1946,1953,1963,1974) in the four decades of its existence, while in the last 
two decades it was in a permanent process of reforming its last constitution. Such a situation of 
perm anent 'reforms' and 'changes in the constitution' was only an expression of the belief that 
socialism is a transitional period in which institutions and political culture are in perm anent 
'transition' from their old, pre-socialist forms towards new -  communist - ones. Although 
constitutional changes were not independent of the pressures placed on political leaders by 
internal and external political factors, they were also initiated from within the elite in an 
attem pt to further push reality towards communist ideals. The changes of the period I analyse 
here were, therefore, equally a pragmatic response to the existing challenges that the elite faced 
from within and from outside the country and an effort to further improve the socialist 
character of Yugoslavia.
This thesis is about political elites, and thus the meaning of this term should also be explained. 
There have been several attempts to identify who constitutes the elite in Yugoslav and other 
socialist societies (Burg, 1983; Cohen, 1983 and Cohen 1989, etc.). In socialist societies it is 
sometimes difficult to identify the members of the elite, since politics often took place as an 
informal activity, while the criteria for inclusion in or exclusion from the real decision-making 
process were very different from those established in representative democracies. By elites I 
understand the not very strictly structured body of party, state and military leaders, who had 
real influence over the formulation and implementation of political decisions in Yugoslavia. For 
the entire period between 1945 and 1980, Josip Broz Tito was the key member of the Yugoslav 
political elite. After the dismissal of Tito's deputy Aleksandar Rankovic (1966), and until his 
death in 1979, Edvard Kardelj was clearly the main creator of the constitutive concept expressed 
in the 1974 Constitution and the political action that followed it. In this period, the leaders of 
the republics and provinces increased their influence, playing a much more independent role 
than ever before. After 1974, the influence of the Army in Yugoslav politics also increased. On 
the other hand, the importance of state functionaries, such as the head of the Yugoslav 
government, the various state secretaries (except those directly linked with Tito), and even the 
members of the Yugoslav Central Committee (except its Presidency, which represented their 
republican/provincial organisations) decreased. In the post-Titoist period, as explained in 
Chapter Four, the Yugoslav government unsuccessfully tried to occupy the central locus of 
power, but it was the Party that remained the most important institution until its actual 
disintegration in January 1990. The main political conflicts in Yugoslavia were intra-party 
conflicts. Finally, the disintegration of the Party led directly to the disintegration of the state. By 
the political elite here, therefore, I understand the inner circle of the Yugoslav leadership, 
whose core was the Party leadership at the federal level and in the republics/provinces.
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0.5. Structure
Finally, the structure of the thesis follows its main objective. In Chapter One I analyse the 
current attempts to explain the disintegration of Yugoslavia, relating my analysis to their main 
conclusions. I identify seven different sets of explanations, six of which (with exception of the 
'ethnic hatred' argument) contain elements of truth and are helpful to our understanding of the 
problem. Yet, they all somehow underestimate the element that I am focussing on here -  the 
link between ideology and elite, which I consider to be the key to understanding the reasons 
why Yugoslavia collapsed in the 1990s.
The core of this thesis is structured in three parts, each containing two chapters. The first part 
(Chapters Two and Three) analyse the rise, the second part (Chapters Four and Five) - crisis, 
while the third part (Chapters Six and Seven) focuses on the decay and fall of the Fourth 
Yugoslavia.
Chapter Two identifies four different constitutive concepts in the whole history of Yugoslavia: 
(1) the national unity concept; (2) the agreement ('Sporazum') concept; (3) the socialist Yugoslavism 
concept and (4) Kardelj's concept. These four constitutive concepts were based on different 
interpretations of the Yugoslav idea and /o r of other basic ideologies (such as liberalism and 
Marxism). A brief overview of the first three concepts is given at the beginning of Chapter Two.
The main focus of this thesis is on the fourth constitutive concept, here called Kardelj's concept or 
the concept of Brioni Yugoslavia. This concept was in constitutional terms formulated during the 
Constitutional debate of 1967-1974, which was -  to a large extent -  a genuine attempt to 
accommodate the differences between the various segments of the elite within a system that 
would still remain socialist in its character. Chapter Two analyses the main aspects of Kardelj's 
concept in detail, while Chapter Three examines the reasons why Kardelj's concept was 
accepted by the various groups in Yugoslavia, and especially by the Serbian leadership. The 
Fourth Yugoslavia, just like the three previous constitutive concepts, was a complex compromise 
between the various segments of its political elite. I argue that the constitutive concept was not 
forced on the elite or on society by a dictatorship but was the result of complex negotiations 
amongst those included in real politics, i. e., the members of the political elite.
Chapters Four (on economic crisis) and Five (on political crisis) examine the political actions 
taken in order to implement the constitutive concept agreed upon in the 1967-1974 
Constitutional debate. It is in these two chapters that politics as the struggle for the real meaning 
of Kardelj's concept is analysed in detail. During the period 1974-1986 Yugoslav politicians 
interpreted the text of the Constitution and the intentions of its authors in such different ways
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that the fragile compromise reached in 1974 became seriously endangered. It was also in this 
period that the supreme arbiters (Tito and Kardelj) died, leaving Yugoslavia to its divided 
regional elites. The context in which the Constitution was to be implemented was gradually 
becoming very different from the one in which it was agreed upon. The objective factors had 
changed as a result of economic crisis, foreign involvement and the first signs of organised 
opposition to the regime.
Chapters Six and Seven analyse the emergence of alternative constitutive concepts in Serbia and 
Slovenia in the last four years of Yugoslavia (1986-1990), and the reaction of the political elite to 
this. The division of the elite into 'defenders' and 'reformers' of the Constitution polarised the 
Yugoslav political elite, whose Slovenian and Serbian parts moved closer to their electoral 
constituencies. At the end of this process, Kardelj's concept of Yugoslavia, terminally wounded 
by the disintegration of the LCY in January 1990, ceased to exist. Many participants in Yugoslav 
politics, ousted in the mid-1960s for their opposition to Kardelj's concept, now came back, 
playing a significant role in its overthrow. Detailed analyses of Slovenian and Serbian 
nationalism and of other alternative concepts (such as civil society in Slovenia, anti-bureaucratic 
revolution in Serbia, etc.) may be found in these two last chapters of the thesis.
The structure of the thesis in its main lines follows the central message: that the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia ought to be analysed through the interaction between the constitutive concept 
and the context in which it was implemented.
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Chapter One:
Analytical Approaches to Studying 
the Disintegration of Yugoslavia
1.1. A Critical Assessment of Existing Approaches in Analysing the Disintegration 
of Yugoslavia
Why did Yugoslavia collapse? Was its disintegration unavoidable? Was it the result of 
impersonal (objective) factors such as economic crisis, social cleavages, complex ethnic 
structure, changes in the international environment, processes of modernisation and 
globalisation, etc.? Or was the collapse of Yugoslavia in the first place the outcome of actions 
taken by political elites in Yugoslavia itself, thus, of personal (subjective) decisions, beliefs and 
intentions? And if the latter, what were these beliefs and intentions? How did they emerge and 
why did they prevail over the forces of integration?
Broadly, recent literature on this subject identifies seven major types of arguments on the 
reasons for the collapse of Yugoslavia: 1) the economic argument; 2) the 'ancient ethnic hatred' 
argument; (3) the 'nationalism' argument; 4) the cultural argument; 5) the 'international politics' 
argument; 6) the 'role of personality' argument and (7) the 'fall of the Empires' argument. With 
the exception of the ethnic hatred argument, which I reject in its entirety, all other approaches 
offer useful elements for explaining the reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, 
they sometimes tend to reduce its complexity to a single cause. They also neglect the subjective,
i.e., the perceptions of the relevant political actors, as expressed through ideology. I argue that 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia had many causes, not a single one and that only by analysing 
the perceptions of all these elements by the relevant political actors, can one understand the 
events that followed. Before I explain my own approach, I will analyse these groups of 
arguments, relating them to the main argument of this thesis.
1.1.1. The Economic Argument
The economic argument is based on the assumption that the economic crisis that occurred in 
the late 1970s and the widening gap between the developed and under-developed regions 
(republics, provinces) made the further existence of Yugoslavia impossible. The most developed
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republics, such as Slovenia and Croatia, demanded independence for reasons of their further 
development. They also opposed attempts to limit the achieved level of economic autonomy, as 
provided by the 1974 Constitutional compromise. The economic theory is based on the 
assum ption that political decisions are influenced by the interests of political participants, 
which are primarily economic. Kosovo and Slovenia, although being at the two opposite poles 
on the scale of economic development, both came to the point of seeing no incentive for 
remaining further in Yugoslavia. In 1987, for the first time, Slovenian public opinion indicated 
that Slovenia would have better economic chances outside than within Yugoslavia (Tos, 1987). 
Kosovo, on the other hand, saw no economic benefits for its further remaining in Yugoslavia 
when its GDP, although permanently increasing in absolute terms, when measured per capita 
had fallen from 47% to 26% of the Yugoslav average in the post-war period.1
This thesis accepts that economic factors played a significant role in creating the context to 
which the narratives of political leaders were forced to respond. As W oodward (1996) argues, 
the economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s triggered constitutional conflict, which 
resulted in the crisis of the state itself. We follow this chain of events by analysing the response 
of the political elite to economic crisis (Chapter Four) and constitutional issues (Chapter Five) to 
arrive at an analysis of the emergence of alternative political concepts in Serbia and Slovenia 
(Chapters Six and Seven). Yet, it is here argued that economic crisis in itself would not 
necessarily have resulted in state disintegration, had it not been used to destroy the old 
Kardeljist constitutive concept and to replace it with several others. As Bojicic argues, 'the 
intensity of collapse in the Yugoslav region does not follow from the scale of the economic and 
political troubles in which they found themselves at the end of the 1980s' (1996:77). Contrary to 
the arguments of the economic-based explanations of the collapse, Yugoslavia in fact 
disintegrated at the moment when the economic reforms of Ante Markovic's government were 
showing their first positive results, accompanied by the elimination of inflation and a sharp 
increase in the personal income of Yugoslav citizens.2 As Plestma points out, the resignation of 
an ineffective government in December 1988, and the selection of a new market-oriented Prime 
Minister Markovic in January 1989 were signs of hope for the future of Yugoslavia.
'The inflation rate, which for the month of December [1989] had climbed to 56%, had by the 
end of January [1990] fallen to 17.3%; by February it was down to 8.4%, by March to 2.4% 
and for April it registered only 0.2%. Foreign-currency reserves which at US$ 5.4 billion in 
December [1989] were strong enough to permit the convertibility of the dinar, had
1 For the economic argument see Zizmond (1992), Zdunic (1994), Vojnic (1994), Ferfila (1991), Uvalic (1992), Gapinski 
(1993), Horvat (1992) and Horvat (1993).
2 As Denitch (1990:XIV) says, Yugoslavia's international debts were reduced from 24 to 16 billion dollars under the 
government of Ante Markovic (1989-1991). The last US Ambassador to socialist Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann says 
that in less than a year in office the Prime Minister quadrupled Yugoslavia's foreign exchange reserves, bringing down 
inflation from 25,000% p.a. to zero (1996/1999: 49). However, as Djilas points out (1993:139), Markovic overestimated 
the importance of economic factors in 'saving' Yugoslavia. He did not have a clear political vision (a 'constitutive 
concept') and believed that everyone would realise that it was 'irrational' to separate from Yugoslavia. Political 
decisions, however, did not follow the logic of economic 'rationality'.
23
increased by January [1990] to US$ 6.5 billion and by May [1990] to US$ 8.5 billion. 
Industrial productivity has also increased and foreign loans have been secured to aid the 
restructuring of the economy... Markovic has managed to galvanize a degree of support 
and energy after a decade characterized by cynicism and apathy7 (Plestina, 1992:166).
At the same time, political reforms were also gaining their momentum. Yet, what seemed to be 
'hopeful like a new beginning was but a very brief lull before the proverbial storm7 (Plestina, 
1992:155). It was at this moment, when the first hopes for a democratic and economically stable 
society emerged, that the state collapsed. The economic argument has failed to explain this 
paradox.
As will be argued in Chapter Three, the political reforms of the federation in the 1967 - 1974 
period were even less motivated by economic failure. On the contrary, to a large extent they 
were boosted by economic success which promoted Yugoslav self-management as a possible 
alternative to both 'state socialism' of the Soviet type and 'capitalist societies', which both faced 
deep crises in 1968. In the same way, the economic factor did not play the main role in the last 
phase of negotiations about the future of the country, when the three main leaders of the 
Yugoslav republics (Milan Kucan, Slovenia; Franjo Tudjman, Croatia and Slobodan Milosevic, 
Serbia) declined an offer by the European Community to find a political compromise in return 
for substantial economic support by the European Community.3 Instead, they decided to 
continue their uncompromising policies, which resulted in the economic failure of all the post- 
Yugoslav states, with the partial exception of Slovenia. Although this dissertation does not 
focus on the post-Yugoslav situation in the region, it is fair to say that in an economic sense as 
well as in the sense of modernisation processes, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was, as 
Hobsbawm says, a "purely negative event7.4 In terms of modernisation, despite the significant 
setback of economic and political crisis, socialist Yugoslavia was neither a disastrous failure nor 
did it have to collapse. Economically, and also politically, it was the most advanced case of all 
East-European societies. The importance of economic factors for the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia is not per se, but in the context they provided for political leaders, who used them 
to argue that their ethnic o r/an d  political group was disadvantaged in Yugoslavia. The 
economic element, true, played an important role in causing differentiation between different 
parts of Yugoslavia which, ultimately, resulted in growing demands for changes both from 
within the political elite and from the population. However, economic reductionism can never
3 In an interview with me in June 1996 Macedonian President Gligorov confirmed that Jacques Delors, then the 
President of the European Commission, offered 5,5 billion US dollars in order to support the transformation of 
Yugoslavia towards a looser Union of Yugoslav States, which would be admitted to the European Union. 'Milosevic and 
Tudjman were angry and mad. 'You cannot buy us with promises. We don't need your money'. Milosevic was even 
more angry: 'You, Europeans want to cheat history. There are big and small nations,' he said. 'You better keep your 
money. We are capable of deciding about our future." Gligorov repeated this conversation in his interview with the 
Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, see Vjesnik, 20 January 1997.
4 Interview with author, 1996.
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explain political phenomena completely, because it leaves out hum an agency, i.e., the 
perceptions and actions of political actors.
1.1.2. The 'Ancient Ethnic Hatred' Argument
The 'ancient ethnic hatred' argument is very popular in not-strictly-academic debates, such as 
in the media,5 with politicians, soldiers,6 writers,7 et al. It is perhaps best summarised by US 
President Clinton, who justified the military intervention against the FR Yugoslavia (March -  
June 1999) by saying:
'Under communist rule, such nations projected a picture of stability, but it was a false 
stability imposed by rulers whose answer to ethnic tensions was to suppress and deny 
them. When communist repression lifted, the tensions rose to the surface, to be resolved by 
co-operation or exploited by demagoguery.'8
This thesis strongly rejects the 'ethnic hatred' argument in any form. The Yugoslav conflict, I 
argue, did not begin as an ethnic conflict. Ethnic hatred was not 'ancient' and ever-existent, but 
had to be created before what started 'very far from the level occupied by the average citizen of 
any of the nationalities' was transformed into an ethnic war'.9 Although the lack of openly 
expressed nationalist views in the first part of the period I analyse here was certainly the result 
of tight control of the media by the elite, it is still not accurate to say that Yugoslavia was held 
together by a brutal political dictatorship or pure suppression of national sentiments.10 But, 
once the constitutive concept of the Fourth Yugoslavia started to disintegrate, there was a 
tendency (initiated primarily by nationalist groups within both the intellectual elite and the 
population) to revert to stereotypes and behaviour characteristic of an earlier period, i.e., WWII
5 For example, Patrick Bishop in the Daily Telegraph, 20 January 1999 says: 'Folk memories are long, and an inability to 
forget the hatreds of the past has condemned successive generations to perpetuate them... The countries which make 
up the former Yugoslav federation are split by deep political, religious and ethnic fault lines, left over from the days 
when the region was divided between the rival empires of Turkey and Austria-Hungary' (Bishop, 1999).
6 See Michael Rose (1998).
7 Kaplan (1994).
8 The Sunday Times. 18 April 1999.
9 Oklobdzija (1993:92); cf. also Pavkovic (1997) and Woodward (1995).
10 For example, a research on social distance between members of Yugoslav ethnic groups (Pantic, 1987) indicates that 
Albanians were the only group which preferred not to enter marriages with members of other groups, and vice versa, 
that members of other groups had a problem in marrying an Albanian. In relationships between members of Yugoslav 
constitutive nations, the largest social distance was of Slovenes towards Muslims (not vice versa). In all other cases, 
more than 50% of respondents expressed the view they would not have a problem in marrying a member of other 
ethnic groups, though in all cases respondents preferred a member of his/her own group. Most importantly, 74% of 
Serbs said they would not mind marrying a Croat person, while 72% of Croats said the same for a Serb. Significantly, 
neither Serbs nor Croats expressed much problems about marrying a Slovene (76% and 72% respectively), while 
Slovenes hesitated more towards these two groups (59% and 60% respectively). The research certainly does not confirm 
any conclusion about high levels of social distance between members of Yugoslav nations, with the noticeable exception 
of Albanians.
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and before. Once the previous 'others' to which the elite referred (such as 'class enemies' within 
the country, and both East and West outside the country) disappeared as a realistic danger, 
other 'others' had to be invented.
As numerous public opinion surveys conducted in the last years of the 1980s demonstrate 
(analysed in the last two chapters of this thesis), political protests in Serbia and Slovenia were in 
their first phase primarily concerned with 'injustice' and the 'bureaucratisation' of the political 
elite. But the elite successfully redirected them against the new 'others'. The Serb demonstrators 
were worried about the 'disintegration of the country7, for which the others (Slovenes, Croats, 
various international institutions, etc.) were made responsible. The Slovenian intellectual elite 
and media also argued that 'the others' were responsible for 'Greater-Serbian' expansionist 
demands, for the economic exploitation of Slovenia and for 'unitarist' suppression of the 
national identity of the Slovenes.11 By re-directing popular protests towards the others, the 
political elites in Serbia and Slovenia survived at the cost of undermining Yugoslavia.
The 'ethnic hatred' argument, therefore, perhaps can explain some of what happened in the 
post-Yugoslav wars, when the nationalist political elites succeeded in promoting hatred among 
the population. However, as an explanation of the actual disintegration of Yugoslavia it is as 
irrelevant as it is inaccurate.
1.1.3. The Nationalism Argument
While the 'ancient ethnic hatred' -  although popular in current debates -  can be easily 
dismissed as inadequate, it is certainly more difficult to object to the 'nationalism' argument, 
widely present in academic debates on the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Nationalism, here 
defined as the primacy of the national over any other interest in political activities and as a 
doctrine which at its core has the creation of a nation-state, as homogeneous as possible, does 
not always develop into ethnic hatred towards the other. While 'ethnic hatred' between 
Yugoslav nations did not exist to any extent greater than within other multi-ethnic states, 
nationalism was always present as a political doctrine in its many forms. As Djilas (1995) 
argues, nationalism in Yugoslavia was stronger than liberalism, and hence the main alternative 
after the fall of communism. Occasionally, such as in the 1967-1972 period with the 'Croatian', 
or -  as Burg names it -  the 'Yugoslav' crisis; or with the 1968 and 1981 protests in Kosovo, 
nationalist doctrines and actions caused ethnic tensions and the instability of the country. 
However, it is difficult to accept the somewhat fatalistic conclusion that nationalism and hatred 
had to prevail over other doctrines, once communism was defeated. Along the lines of many
11 Relations between Slovenian and Serbian intellectuals and the political elites in these two republics are analysed in 
Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis, and in Dragovic Soso (1999).
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other authors, I argue that in its most dangerous form in which it emerged in the late 1980s, 
nationalism was created by the intellectual elites and then accepted by certain elements within 
the political elite, primarily in Serbia and Slovenia.
The causes of nationalism in Yugoslavia were indeed many: historical, economic and cultural 
differences being among the most important. Yet, in the analysed period, it was the ideological 
narrative that made the nationalism of Yugoslav nations (including of the Kosovo Albanians) 
both weak and strong at the same time. The weakness of (Yugoslav) nationalism in the period 
we analyse in this thesis (the Kardelj period) was the result of the anti-statist ideology on which 
Yugoslavia was re-structured following its 1974 Constitution.12
Kardelj's concept (explained in Chapter Two) projected self-management as an alternative to 
the state. More than other socialist states, the Yugoslav state was -  at least at the ideological 
level -  in the process of 'withering away'. The anti-statist rhetoric had enormous consequences 
for the (de)construction of Yugoslav institutions and of Yugoslav 'high culture' (to use Gellner's 
term). As shown in Chapters Four and Five, the complex system based on the anti-statist 
ideology of Kardelj made Yugoslavia economically and politically atomised. It prevented a fast 
and decisive response to economic and political crises when they appeared in the early 1980s.13
12 In this thesis, I present data on very low cross-Yugoslav mobility, especially among students and workers, who 
almost exclusively remained in their own republics, unless they were members of minority ethnic groups in this 
republic. Institutions were created in such a way that no all-Yugoslav political force could emerge: there were no 
Yugoslav-wide elections, no Yugoslav media, etc. Officially, Yugoslavia did not have even a national anthem, since the 
republic and provinces could not agree on its words. An interesting debate on this issue was conducted in Yugoslavia 
in the 1980s. The Albanian representatives opposed using the word 'SlaV in the first verse of the text, while Slovenia 
and Croatia did not agree to change it to 'Yugoslavs'. Economic systems were clearly built to suit the self-sufficiency of 
the republics and provinces. Terms such as national working class were coined to describe the national (not Yugoslav) 
character of the main political substance of Yugoslav society. In general, the failure to construct a Yugoslav political 
community indeed could be explained by the lack of a 'centralised educational system supervised by and often actually 
run by the state in question, which monopolises legitimate culture almost as much as it does legitimate violence, or 
perhaps more so' (Gellner, 1983:141). The Fourth Yugoslavia was an example of having neither a 'central culture' nor a 
'centred state', two conditions Gellner pointed out as crucial. As Lendvai (1991) argues - in political sense, Yugoslavia 
was left without Yugoslavs.
13 All three multi-ethnic communists federations proved incredibly weak and incapable of protecting themselves once 
their constitutive stories collapsed in 1989. But it was precisely Yugoslavia that went the furthest of the three in its 
attempt to implement an anti-statist ideology, inventing 'self-management' and de-centralising the whole system. By 
doing this, Yugoslavia's communists aimed at denouncing the Soviet version of socialism as 'dogmatic', 'statist' and 
practically 'revisionist'. They claimed a monopoly over the right interpretation of Marxism, denouncing the others as 
'revisionists'. Ideological commitment to Marx led them to eliminate the state to a larger extent than was the case in 
both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union -  in fact, perhaps more than in the Western world of liberal democracies as 
well. Apart from ethnic structure, historical and geographical circumstances, it was also for this reason that Yugoslavia 
collapsed in a more dramatic way than the two other former socialist federations, especially Czechoslovakia. Unlike 
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia linked its identity more closely to its own, and original constitutive concept. Consequently, 
the collapse of this concept made the existence of Yugoslavia much more difficult. Finally, in Yugoslavia there was no 
one else to blame for the failure of a concept which was created by the Yugoslavs themselves. Other East European 
countries had a perfect scapegoat in the existence of the Soviet Union, which was perceived as the oppressive other. But 
in all cases the collapse of the constitutive concept was the main reason for the disintegration of even the strongest 
institutions (such as the Army, or secret services) of what seemed to be among the most powerful states in the world. 
The institutions collapsed once they were left without the constitutive concept that kept the system together. For the 
differences between the Yugoslav and Soviet understanding of the state see Lapenna (1964) and Ferdinand (1991).
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At the same time, however, in real terms, Yugoslavia was still united by its ideological 
narrative, formulated by Kardelj and accepted by other members of the political elite. It was 
Kardelj's narrative, not the ethnic similarities among the Yugoslavs (South Slavs) or the political 
equality of its citizens which the elite saw as the glue which bound Yugoslav differences into 
one whole. Paradoxically, therefore, the Yugoslav state itself was based on an anti-state 
ideological conception. This paradox lies at the heart of the crisis of the Yugoslav state in the 
post-1974 Yugoslavia.
By treating Yugoslav constitutive nations as 'completed' (as Kardelj formulated it in 1970), and 
their republics as 'sovereign states' (as formulated in the 1974 Constitution, the ideological 
narrative of Yugoslav communism in practice shielded and promoted nationalism in its 
constitutive nations. At the same time as Yugoslav nationalism and the Yugoslav state were 
being weakened, the nationalism of the constitutive nations was getting stronger. The same 
concept that kept Yugoslavia together by consensus between its leaders, held in itself also a 
destructive and disintegrative potential. This trend was in fact also the result of the Kardelj 
concept, which was constructed as a radical alternative to both inter-war Yugoslav unitarism 
and Soviet statist centralism. Being based on a fragile political compromise between segments of 
the elite, Yugoslav unity after 1974 depended more on the interpretation of the real meaning of 
this concept rather than on formal procedural rules and effective representative institutions. It 
is within the Yugoslav political elite, therefore, that one needs to look for the seeds of the 
collapse of Yugoslavia.
In addition to this, by promoting a non-ethnic base for Yugoslav unity, the elite made 
nationalism the main rhetorical antipode to the dominant ideology of the regime. At the same 
time, by declaring everyone who opposed the regime a nationalist, the regime in fact promoted 
such nationalism as the main alternative to itself. By excluding it from the public sphere 
Kardeljists both weakened it in public and made it stronger 'underground1. The weakening of 
the state made nationalist demands for a strong state (whether Yugoslavia, or separate nation­
states of constitutive nations) plausible. This is how one can explain why nationalism (and not, 
for example, the liberalism of the minimal state) grew as the main alternative to the 'self- 
managing' system. Contrary to popular interpretations which link the existence of 'strong 
states' run by Communists with people's demands for strong (nationalist) states after 
Communism, this dissertation argues that it was the weakness of the state that provoked an 
alternative. Post-Communism (as anti-Communism) was about establishing the state that was 
missing, not about preserving one that already existed. In the case of ethnically homogenised 
states (such as, for example, Hungary, Poland etc.) the 1989 'revolution' meant establishing 
themselves as states by liberation from the Soviet patronage. While the Hungarians and Poles 
perceived the Soviet Union as the main obstacle to creating a proper state, the Croats, Slovenes 
and Albanians in Kosovo perceived Belgrade as this obstacle. Yugoslav independence from
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Moscow thus proved to be a disadvantage for preserving the country's unity, since there was 
no possibility of blaming an external power for the crisis.
The demand to establish a 'proper state' that did not exist (due to the 'anarchic'14 self-managing 
society) was what the Serbs, Slovenes, Croats (and others) in Yugoslavia shared. But they 
disagreed on the definition of the constitutive nation that should create this state. Since its 
creation in 1918 the same question had appeared in Yugoslavia again and again: Were the 
Yugoslavs one (political) nation or not? Were the (ethnic) Serbs one (political) nation or not? 
Were the Croats a nation or not? And the Albanians? The lack of a single Yugoslav cultural 
space and of Yugoslav political institutions that would represent the citizens of Yugoslavia 
(especially in the post-1974 period) was the main obstacle to creating a Yugoslav nation. The 
separate cultural systems recognised and further developed after 1967 in the six Yugoslav 
constitutive nations naturally resulted in creating six political nations and - ultimately - their 
independent states.
In its new form, as public protest, open nationalism at the end of the 1980s was a result of the 
country's democratisation. The minority rights of the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins united 
the democratic and nationalist segments of the Belgrade opposition, the strongest in the 
country. The elite was facing massive protests from the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, as 
well as public demands for political reforms from the Slovenian and Serbian 'critical 
intelligentsia'. At the same time, fear of becoming a minority in Yugoslavia, in which they had 
been treated as a 'constitutive nation', united Slovenian public opinion. These fears were the 
result of the country's democratisation, which demanded a new set of rules and a new 
'constitutive concept' for Yugoslavia. The leaders in Slovenia and Serbia decided not to use 
force against the demonstrators and intellectuals, but to accommodate their demands. This is 
how they -  despite their originally anti-nationalist intentions -  became tolerant of nationalism, 
causing a split in the LCY and the Yugoslav state. Although neither Milan Kucan nor Slobodan 
Milosevic were originally ethnic nationalists, their political pragmatism and the context in 
which they acted led them to act like 'someone who has jumped on to the tiger of nationalism 
and is finding it difficult to get off again without the tiger eating him ' (Owen, 1995:129).
Of course, it did not have to happen this way. For as long as they remained committed to the 
Kardeljist concept, political leaders in Yugoslavia rejected coalition with ethnic nationalists and 
sought an intra-party compromise. They even hesitated to criticise the members of the elite in 
other ethnic groups and republics. Once this rule was abandoned, another set of rules had to be 
invented to keep Yugoslavia united. But it was difficult, if not impossible in circumstances in
14 In his speeches during the 1984-1989 period, Slobodan Milosevic insisted that Yugoslav society was facing anarchy. 
More on this in Chapter Six.
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which the political elite developed entirely different notions of democracy and of the political 
unit to which it should be applied. While the Slovene option in the late 1980s argued in favour 
of democratisation within republics, but not at the federal level, the Serbian option argued for 
democratisation at the federal level too. Consequently, if successful, the Serbian demands for 
democratisation of Yugoslavia would have led to the emergence of a Yugoslav (political) 
nation. Additionally, the two options also differed on how they understood 'democratisation', 
and on how to secure a link between 'socialism' and 'democracy' in the new circumstances. 
These insurmountable differences divided the Yugoslav political elite and the country in 
general.
Finally, w hat the 'nationalism' argument fails to explain is the growing sense of 'Yugoslavism' 
among the population at the same time as ethnic nationalism was increasing. The two parallel 
processes which characterised the period are analysed here: (1) the (re)-emergence of a 
Yugoslav culture15 and the first demands to establish institutions of representative democracy, 
which would result in the creation of a Yugoslav political nation; (2) the reaction of ethnic 
nationalists to this. The struggle between the forces of integration and those of polarisation was 
what the Yugoslavs witnessed in the period I analyse here. This new Yugoslavism was in the 
first place a reaction against the general trend of fragmentation in the last 20-30 years of 
Yugoslavia. A Yugoslav culture was emerging in the young, and more educated generation.16 A 
direct result of this was a significant growth of declared ethnic Yugoslavs in the decade 
between 1971 and 1981: from, 273,000 to 1,219,000. The share of 'Yugoslavs' in the total 
population increased from 1.3 to 5.4 percent in this decade, while the share of all 'constitutive 
nations' (except Bosnian Muslims) decreased: Serbs from 39.7% to 36.3 %; Croats from 22.1% to 
19.8%, Slovenes from 8.2% to 7.8%, etc. The Croatian historian and politician Dusan Bilandzic 
estimated that the share of the 'Yugoslavs' would further increase in the decade between 1981 
and 1991 to approximately one fifth of the total population -  a trend that displeased and 
worried ethnic nationalists in all the Yugoslav nations.17 The (realistic) chance of Yugoslavia 
becoming a member of the EEC in the foreseeable future, in which case national identities
15 The real bearers of the Yugoslav culture of the 1980s were people such as film director Emir Kusturica, rock- 
musicians Goran Bregovic, Johnny Stulic, Vlatko Stefanovski, Bora Djordjevic, etc., who in fact opposed the official 
doctrine of semi-confederalism, often clashing with politicians and ideologues. Ramet (1992/1996) offers a good 
analysis of the Yugoslav rock-scene. Both Bregovic and Stulic left the country after its disintegration in 1991. So did 
Kusturica and some of the most popular Yugoslav film actors and actresses, such as Rade Serbedzija and Mira Furlan 
(all from Zagreb and Sarajevo). Bregovic and Kusturica supported Ante Markovic's party at the 1990 elections in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Serbedzija took part in anti-war protests a few days before the war in this republic in 1992. 
Many Yugoslav writers (such as Dubravka Ugresic, Slavenka Drakulic, Filip David, Bora Cosic, David Albahari, etc.) 
found themselves in exile.
16 As Cohen (1993/1995:49) points out, the five-fold increase in the number of declared Yugoslavs, especially in 
ethnically mixed areas (Vojvodina, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and among the younger, urban and more educated 
generation, was in sharp contrast to an increasing aversion to the LCY in the same segments of the population. Surveys 
conducted by Flere (1988) and Katunaric (1988) showed that by 1985 the level of Yugoslav identification had further 
increased, as a form of protest against the political fragmentation of the country.
17 An interesting debate on the real meaning, causes and significance of Yugoslavism occurred in Yugoslavia following 
the 1981 census (see Matvejevic et al.).
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would have found themselves under two supra-national lids (Yugoslav and European) 
additionally mobilised the sense of being endangered among the ethnic nationalists.18 In its 
essence, the nationalism that emerged in various Yugoslav countries was largely anti-urban,19 
anti-European and to a certain extent motivated by romantic and anti-rationalistic ideas. It was 
based on fears (primarily among the intellectual and political elites) that the status of their 
ethnic groups would be decreased from one of Completed constitutive nations' (as recognised 
by the 1974 Constitution) to one of a minority in the new democratic structure of the country.20 
Consequently, the nation-states were seen as not only desirable, but necessary protector against 
this trend.
Although it correctly points out the importance of nationalism for the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia, the nationalism argument often overlooks the ambivalent relations between 
communism and nationalism. It also tends to underestimate the complexity of the situation in 
which the members of the political elite found themselves in the late 1980s. Finally, it neglects 
the importance of personal beliefs and perceptions by the elite and the population. Arguing that 
it has always been present, only somewhat 'frozen' during the times of socialism, the nationalism 
argum ent denies the importance of the subjective. This is what this dissertation aims to correct.
18 Globalisation theory, as expressed by Giddens, argues that ethnic separatism is a reaction to the processes of 
globalisation. Applied to the Yugoslav case, separatism was a reaction to the growing sense of Yugoslavism and the 
emergence of a Yugoslav culture, as explained above. However accurate globalisation theory is in pointing out the link 
between the two trends, it fails to explain the existence of nationalism in earlier phases (before the end of the Cold War). 
In addition, the collapse of multi-ethnic Yugoslavia does not support the optimistic vision of future, promoted by 
Giddens. Globalisation theory is a typical social-scientific attempt to explain the General Laws of History, which are based 
on objective factors. Being universalist and revolutionary, the globalisation theory tends to underestimate the 
importance of cultural and contextual elements and to subsume all nationalisms under one type of anti-globalisation: 
'fundamentalist traditionalism'.
19 For the anti-urban character of nationalism (especially of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina) see Vujovic (1996). The 
destruction of Dubrovnik and Sarajevo from the hills above them, Vujovic argues, was a symbol of the hatred 
developed by Karadzic's Serbian nationalists against the cities. One of the reasons was the large number of ethnically 
mixed marriages in the urban centres, as compared with rural environments. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1981,15 percent 
of all children were from mixed marriages, while in Sarajevo 40 percent Karadzic himself wrote a poem about the 
burning of a city (presumably Sarajevo) and obsessively advocated the division of the Bosnian capital. 'Our vision of 
Sarajevo is like Berlin when the wall was still standing,' he told the American ambassador Zimmermann (1995:20). The 
anti-urban character of Croatian nationalism is best represented in the literary works of Ante Pavelid, the head of the 
Ustasha Independent State of Croatia and his education minister Mile Budak. In more detail, these discourses are 
analysed in Colovic (1997) and Zanic (1998).
20 For ethnic status see Horowitz (1985). The sense of losing an already existing ethnic status was permanently present in 
the discussions of Slovenian intellectuals in the late 1980s, but also among the Albanians in Kosovo, following the 1989 
change in the Serbian constitution. It also emerged among the Serbs and Croats outside Serbia and Croatia respectively 
(with almost equal strength), who feared they would become a minority, not a constitutive nation, especially in Bosnia 
after the declaration of the independence of this state, and also due to demographic trends. This is also why the ethnic 
nationalists blocked Markovic's initiatives to organise federal elections and re-construct federal institutions in order to 
represent the citizens of Yugoslavia. The making of (political) Yugoslavs would be the decisive step towards making 
Yugoslavia instead of separate nations and states. As will be clearly demonstrated on several occasions in this thesis, 
ethnic nationalists of the Yugoslav nations rated democracy second to issues of national identity. On these grounds, one 
can also explain why the critical intelligentsia emerged more strongly in the late 1970s in Serbia than in Croatia or 
Slovenia whose nationalist intelligentsia were less critical both of the lack of a Yugoslav-wide democracy and the 
ideology of decentralisation via self-management than was the case with Serbian dissidents.
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1.1.4. The Cultural Argument
The cultural argument on the disintegration of Yugoslavia is an applied and broader version of 
the ethnic argument. In various attempts to explain the collapse of Yugoslavia, it has been 
argued that the diversities of the traditions and cultures of the Yugoslav nations (based on the 
ancient divisions between Eastern and Western Christianity, as well as between Christianity 
and Islam) played the major role in the failure to constitute a Yugoslav culture, nation and state. 
The argument relies on John Stuart Mill's discussion of nationality in his Considerations on 
Representative Government (1865). Representative government, Mill argues, is best established on 
'the sentiment of nationality', whose existence is 'a prima facie case for uniting all the members 
of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart'. Thus 
cultural diversities (primarily religious and linguistic differences) made nations and promoted 
their desire to live separately from others in their own states. Cultural, religious, economic, 
linguistic and historical differences between the Yugoslav nations were simply too large to 
allow the creation of a Yugoslav nation, which permanently destabilised the Yugoslav state. 
Fragmentation of the country was hence inevitable and somehow natural.21
In its recently most famous version, the cultural argument has re-appeared in Huntington's the 
clashes of civilisations thesis. Although his book focuses on international politics after the end of 
the Cold War, it was much used by nationalist politicians in the post-Yugoslav states (especially 
by Croatian President Tudjman)22 to legitimise and justify not only the break-up of Yugoslavia 
but the more recent conflicts between Croats (Catholics) and Bosniaks (Muslims) in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina.23
Even if one were to accept this argument, one would not have immediately explained why the 
Yugoslav mosaic of diversities survived for at least 45 years after WWII, only to collapse so 
suddenly after the end of the Cold War, when cultural diversities in the world, including in 
Yugoslavia, were decreasing, rather than increasing. Yet, the cultural argument proves to be 
closer to the main thesis of this dissertation than many other approaches. This thesis examines 
the breakdown of the ideological consensus within the Yugoslav political elites. Ideologies are 
part of what can be broadly called culture. In the current literature on the subject, the
21 A good overview of cultural theories of nationalism (Herder, Schleiermacher, etc.) is given by Kedourie (1993:48-52).
22 See Tudjman's interview with Vjesnik. 13 September 1997.
23 On several occasions during 19% and 1997 Tudjman quoted Huntington in connection with the Croat-Bosniak 
conflict. In his interview with Feral Tribune on 10 November 1997, the former Bosnian Ambassador to the UK Filipovic 
said it was 'by no means accidental that Tudjman should appeal precisely to Huntington... The theory about a clash of 
civilizations suits Tudjman, because it justifies his actions... He cannot find (justification for the war) in either the realm 
of politics or that of international law, but only in the sphere of ideology -  which is why Huntington's thesis about the 
clash of civilizations serves his purpose'.
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importance of people's beliefs, which were largely created by opinion-makers and ideologues, 
is largely under-estimated.
A different type of example of relying on cultural factors in explaining the collapse of 
Yugoslavia is Wachtel's study of the relationship between the Yugoslav idea and the creation 
and disintegration of the Yugoslav state (1998). Wachtel's analysis is based on the same 
assumption as this thesis: that the collapse of Yugoslavia (like the collapse of states in general) 
m ust be analysed primarily through the collapse of the 'constitutive concept' (as I call it here) or 
'the concept of a Yugoslav nation' (as he says in his book). I share Wachtel's view that:
'the collapse of multinational Yugoslavia and the establishment of separate uninational 
states... were not the result of the breakdown of the political or economic fabric of the 
Yugoslav state; rather, these breakdowns, which manifestly occurred and have been 
copiously documented, themselves sprang from the gradual destruction of the concept of a 
Yugoslav nation' (1998:4).
To a certain extent, one can accept his conclusion that the 'various causes that have been cited 
for the collapse of Yugoslavia were secondary to the disintegration of the very concept of the 
Yugoslav nation, and it is to that cultural process we m ust turn if we wish to see how existing 
deep-seated rivalries and hatreds were at various times overcome and encouraged and how 
they re-emerged triumphant' (1998:17).
Yet, Wachtel's exclusive reliance on cultural factors resulted in underestimating the contextual 
framework in which the concepts (including the concept of Yugoslavism) emerged defeated or 
triumphant. While he, correctly, points to the importance of the 'text' of his narratives, at the 
same time he neglects the fact that many factors in real life strongly influenced the narrative. 
Constitutive concepts (or, as Wachtel would prefer, narratives) are not once-and-for-all fixed 
sets of beliefs and ideals, but flexible compositions of elements. It is for this reason that one 
cannot take the concept alone in attempting to explain action. One always needs to see w hat 
(other) 'objective' factors influenced it. In Skinner's words, one needs to 'exhibit the dynamic 
nature of the relationship which exists between the professed principles and the actual practices 
of political life' (1988:108) by asking what the actors were doing while they were saying 
something. One always needs to situate ideas in their practical context. My argum ent here is 
that it was precisely because the existing constitutive concept (as interpreted by its main 
representatives) was incapable of providing an adequate response to the challenges of the 
'objective factors' that Yugoslavia ultimately collapsed. Consequently, new 'constitutive 
concepts' were created in reaction to both economic and political crises in the 1980s.
It is, therefore, inadequate to analyse these two (the concept and its context) separately. True, 
the economic and political crises were to a large extent the results of attempts by the political
33
elites to see their constitutive concepts implemented at any costs. But they were also catalysts 
for the further revision and, indeed, abandonment of certain elements of the ideology. It is the 
dynamics between the two that we examine in this thesis. It is because of these dynamics 
between ideas and practice that it is somewhat difficult to accept Wachtel's idealist conclusion 
that a nation is 'not a political entity but a state of mind'. This thesis accepts that the narrative 
indeed ultimately defines a nation at any given moment, but this still does not imply that 'no 
m atter how heterogeneous a group of people might appear to an observer, there is a level at 
which its members could choose to see each other as belonging to one nation' (1998:2). Nations 
are neither fixed communities defined once and for all by linguistic, anthropological, political, 
economic, etc., factors, nor are they simply 'imagined' from nowhere by intellectual and 
political elites. If anywhere, then this is obvious in the Yugoslav case. The attempts in 
Yugoslavia to 'create' or 'imagine' a nation despite the reality, by neglecting or underestimating 
the importance of already existing differences, generated political tensions, and -  within a 
certain context -  set up  a framework in which the break-up of the state was possible.24
The cultural analysis is a good basis for the analysis of the Yugoslav collapse but only when 
certain elements of other explanations are also applied in order to explain the context in which 
culture operates.
1.1.5. The International Politics Argument
The international politics explanation of the collapse of Yugoslavia insists on the importance of 
one or several factors on the international arena in the rise and fall of Yugoslavia. It is argued 
that Yugoslavia was created (both in 1918 and in 1945) with significant help or even as the 
creation of the great powers, whose balance of power substantially helped Yugoslavia to 
preserve its existence and independence.25 Yugoslavia's strategic position between the two 
military-political blocs in post-war Europe, and its politics of equidistance in both ideological 
and political terms could not survive the collapse of bipolar structures at the end of the Cold 
War. Yugoslavia was the victim of the fall of the Berlin Wall. In a strategic sense, it lost its 
importance when compared with other areas of the world, and -  consequently -  was no longer
24 In saying all this, one can entirely agree with Wachtel on several other points that he made in such a convincing way. 
For example, with his opposition to the 'inevitability' conclusions, which -  as Wachtel says -  'assume that the outlooks 
of individuals and groups are immutable' (1998:17). Wachtel's historical classification of the attempts at nation building 
in Yugoslavia as: (1) Serbian, (2) multicultural and (3) supranational models is among the best short accounts of 
different approaches to the Yugoslav national question. However, Wachtel - typically for a representative of a cultural 
approach that neglects the context - does not explain why Yugoslavia collapsed precisely in the 1980s, when Yugoslav 
identity was getting stronger in the cultured, but weeiker in the political sphere.
25 In the communist interpretation of history (see chapter Two), the first Yugoslavia was 'the creation of Versailles'. 
Croatian historians of the communist past (like Tudjman and Bilandzic) are still committed to this interpretation. 
Tudjman argues that international factors played an absolutely crucial role in the creation of Yugoslavia and its 
development. For a debate on the Yugoslav question within the CPY in the inter-war period, see Vlajcic (1978, 1984, 
1989) and Djilas (1991).
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able to attract economic and political support from the West. The insensitivity of the Western 
world to the new position of Yugoslavia was evident, as W oodward (1995) and Zimmermann 
(1996/1999) argue, in its failure to support the economic reforms of the Markovic government 
(in 1988-1991). Even worse, the pressure on Yugoslavia from the IMF, already in the early 1980s, 
made the Yugoslav reformist elite incapable of performing its functions and opposing growing 
social disorder. The economic hardship produced constitutional crisis, which in turn helped 
ethnic nationalists to undermine what was -  even by Western standards -  a rather stable and 
plausible project. As W oodward argues, Yugoslavia collapsed neither because of 'ethnic 
hatred', nor because of the break-up of some 'political dictatorship', but because of the 
disintegration of the international order by which Yugoslavia was 'strongly influenced'.
'Critical to its breakdown was change from the outside, in the foreign economic and 
strategic environment on which the country's stability had come to depend. Contrary to the 
myth that has formed since Yugoslavia's demise, the cracks in the system were not the fault 
lines between civilizations that came together in the Balkans, but those that defined the 
country's domestic order and internal position during the socialist period' (1995:22).
W oodward's argument is echoed in Yugoslav domestic debates on the causes of the 
disintegration. The former Yugoslav Defence Secretary General Kadijevic (1993) argues that the 
collapse of the Soviet Union left Yugoslavia vulnerable to pressure from the West, which 
encouraged anti-communist and nationalist forces in traditionally Western-oriented areas 
(Slovenia, Croatia) to increase their demands. The failure of communism in the USSR and 
Eastern Europe underm ined the country's (and especially the Army's) ideological basis. 
Kadijevic saw the 'new  world order' as the ultimate danger for Yugoslavia's independence and 
survival.26
Although international factors always played a significant part in Yugoslav politics, one should 
not exaggerate their importance in the last phase of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was not a member 
of either of the two military-political structures. Promoting 'self-managing' rather than 'statist7 
(Soviet) socialism, its leaders saw perestroika and glasnost as a victory, rather than a defeat for 
their own model of socialism.27 With very few exceptions, the Yugoslav communists welcomed 
the policy of detente between East and West, seeing it even as yet another recognition of the 
success of the Yugoslav road to socialism. The reforms in Eastern Europe were not seen as a 
threat, and by no means did the Yugoslav leaders feel endangered by these changes. Neither
26 On these grounds the Yugoslav Army led by Kadijevic supported the failed August 1991 military coup d'etat by the 
Soviet generals. They hoped that the overthrow of Gorbachev would help re-establish a bipolar structure which would 
-  consequently -  make the fragmentation of Yugoslavia impossible. There were also ideological reasons for this 
support.
27 See Milosevic's toast to Gorbachev in March 1988 (Milosevic, 1989:198-200), the opening speech at 2nd Session of the 
CC LC Serbia (12 January 1990) by Tomica Raicevic (IB CKSKS, 1/1990) and Stambuk's article in Nin, 29 January 1989. 
A more cautious approach to the consequences of perestroika for Yugoslavia is expressed by Bebler (1989).
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did the Yugoslav political elite exactly follow the IMF instructions. As demonstrated in Chapter 
Four, the Party leadership was successful in blocking the attempts of four successive federal 
Prime Ministers (Djuranovic, Planinc, Mikulic and Markovic) to implement a programme of 
serious economic reforms, as demanded by the IMF and other foreign creditors. The Prime 
Ministers, not the Party leaders, regularly lost these intra-elite battles, being either marginalised 
(Djuranovic and Planinc) or forced to resign (Mikulic).28 Being a leader of the non-aligned 
group of countries, Yugoslavia had a fairly independent foreign policy. While this proved to be 
the main reason for the country's favourable position during the Cold War, in the late 1980s it 
somewhat blinded the political elites, making them unaware of the immediate and long-term 
consequences of political changes in Eastern Europe.
Instead of seeing the collapse of East European socialism as a danger for its own international 
position and internal cohesion, the Yugoslav leaders and citizens concluded that with the 
collapse of the Brezhnev doctrine the most serious threat to Yugoslavia's security was 
eliminated. The Western states certainly did not want Yugoslavia to disintegrate, and even less 
did they wish to see instability in the turbulent region. Yugoslavia was considered to be the first 
East European country which would join the European Community and already in the late 
1970s it had signed the first documents on co-operation with the EU. At the moment of its 
disintegration Yugoslavia had very few, if any enemies in the international community. It is, 
therefore, inadequate to argue that the intervention by the Western states and organisations 
was the main reason for the collapse of the country. True, when it reacted, the international 
community demonstrated its incompetence on a large scale, contributing to further disastrous 
developments in the Balkans. But, Yugoslavia was already at a very advanced stage of its 
disintegration when (in July 1991) foreign involvement took place for the first time. Even then it 
was hesitant and, as Gow (1997) has noticed, showed a lack of will. Yugoslavia was, as Perovic 
(1993), Lukic and Lynch (1996:113) and Djilas (1993:109) argue, 'defeated' from within, not from 
the outside.
1.1.6. The Role of Personality argument
Many authors emphasise the role of personalities in the collapse of Yugoslavia. Two 
personalities are often mentioned in this context -  the former Yugoslav President Josip Broz 
Tito29 and the current president of the FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic, since 1986 the leading 
Serbian politician.30
28 This is the main reason for Markovic's legendary comment on the break-up of the LCY: 'This country will survive the 
break-up of the Party. It does not depend on it.' In fact, he saw the break-up as the best opportunity to implement 
economic reforms.
29 Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) was the undisputed leader of Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1980. From 1937 he was the 
head of the CPY (after 1952 LCY), in 1945-1953 the Yugoslav Prime Minister, and 1953-1980 the President of the SFR
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In short, the attempts to explain the collapse of Yugoslavia focusing on Tito's personality 
emphasise that Tito was the only real decision-maker, the real sovereign in Yugoslavia. He 
identified the state with himself, and concentrated all real power in his own hands. During his 
life, Tito was the key arbiter in political disputes. It has often been argued that, despite the 
formal de-centralisation of the country following the 1974 Constitution, Yugoslavia remained 
united and centralised due to Tito's personal role. He was above the law and outside the law. 
This was especially the case after 1974, when the Constitution declared Tito 'President of the 
Republic without limitation of office',31 therefore outlawing any attempt to replace him for as 
long as he was alive. He was no longer just the supreme politician, but the state itself (Tepavac, 
1997). The main areas of state politics (such as defence, foreign affairs and state security) were 
considered to be his personal domains. His cult of personality was never so omni-present as in 
the last couple of years of his life. Furthermore, the Constitution prevented anyone from 
replacing Tito after his death. When he died in May 1980, there was no one to re-connect the 
broken bonds, and to take decisions in the conflicts of interests within the country. Yugoslavia, 
weakened to one person -  Tito himself -  died together with its ruler.32
The other person who decisively influenced Yugoslav disintegration was Slobodan Milosevic. 
Many authors see the Serbian leader as a person who wanted to replace Tito by occupying the 
empty space of power vacated after his death (Vejvoda, 1993). By doing so, Milosevic 
distinguished himself from the other post-Titoist leaders, who continued marching along 
'Tito's path', favouring collective leadership, as constructed by Tito himself. It was Milosevic, 
they argue, who disturbed the newly achieved balance between republics and provinces, and 
who destroyed the tranquillity of Tito's moribund successors. At the same time, Milosevic 
introduced the masses into politics, using them as a source of pressure in the intra-elite 
conflicts. Although many authors share this conclusion, perhaps none have explained it better 
than Lukic and Lynch (1996:114):
Yugoslavia. The most useful biography of Tito in Serbo-Croat is Dedijer (1953 and 1981), and in English those of 
Pavlowitch (1992) and Djilas (1981). West (1994) and Ridley (1995), Gow (1997) and Tepavac (1997) are useful too. Good 
guidance to literature on Tito is offered by Pavlowitch (1992).
30 The full titles of Milosevic's posts since 1986 are: President of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League 
of Communists of Serbia (1986-1989); President of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia (1989 -  1990); 
President of the Republic of Serbia (1990 - 1997), and President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1997-). In the 
thesis shorter versions of these titles will be used. For Milosevic, useful sources are: Cohen (1997), Djilas (1993), Djukic 
(1994), Ramet (1991), Vujadic (1995) and Thomas (1999).
31 An exceptional treatment for Tito was introduced already in the 1963 Constitution. Article 220 of this Constitution 
limits the time in office for a President of the Republic to two consecutive terms, but it adds: "There is no limitation in 
the case of Josip Broz Tito' (Petranovic and Strbac, 1977:111:73).
32 Immediately after Tito's death a slogan was invented by the political elite: 'After Tito -  Tito'. In a joke it read - 'After 
Tito, Titanic'.
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'H ad Slobodan Milosevic not emerged as Duce in Serbia, Yugoslavia might have evolved 
gradually after the end of the East-West geopolitical division of Europe into an asymmetric 
federation or confederation/33
The role of personalities approach is part of a wider argument by intentionalists among 
historians. The two schools developed their arguments during the 1980s when analysing 
Hitler's role in the rise and fall of the Third Reich: while the intentionalists focus their research 
on the mind and intentions of political actors, the functionalists argued that structures and 
institutions, or the system's automatic mechanisms for 'cumulative radicalisation' could explain 
the politics of the Third Reich better than Hitler's personal beliefs and intentions.34 Several 
moderate versions of these two polarised schools emerged in the debate, such as Browning's 
'm oderate functionalism', Burrin's 'conditional intentionalism', etc.
In this thesis an attempt to articulate a moderate intentionalist position is made. I share 
Browning's conclusion that the two contrasting positions are unduly polarised. But, unlike 
Browning, who emphasised institutional factors in his 'moderate functionalism', I stress the role 
of personalities over institutions. I conclude that the subjective (personal) factors are 
enormously important in politics and yet are often neglected. This neglect is the result of 
relying on 'objective factors' and of the 'inevitability' hypothesis, both of which are developed 
within mainstream social science approaches and both of which are rejected here.
Josip Broz was certainly the central figure of Yugoslav post-war history, in the same way that 
Slobodan Milosevic is certainly the most important character in the post-Yugoslav drama and 
the one whom any scholar of this discipline m ust study. Large sections of this thesis are an 
attempt to do so. One needs, however, to be wary of being trapped by the other extreme. 
Yugoslavia did not exist or collapse because of one person only, even if its politics has often in 
the past been largely determined by the will of a single strong man. Both Tito and Milosevic 
(and any other political leader) can be understood only within the context of the political 
processes that brought them to power and enabled them to influence politics in such a powerful 
way. They were just as much 'products' as they were initiators of political trends. They had to 
take into consideration the interests of other participants in politics and to find a compromise 
between their own views and interests and those of others. As this thesis illustrates, it is the 
complexity of intra-elite politics that one must not neglect when analysing Yugoslav politics. 
The role of personality argument often does exactly this.
33 This thesis is also popular in all parts of the former Yugoslavia which seceded, or would like to secede: it was 
Milosevic who made the whole difference. A similar conclusion is now widely accepted by those who argue that the 
removal of Milosevic is a conditio sine qua non of the effective re-integration of the FRY into the world community of 
states. This demand insists that the role of Milosevic in Serbian politics is absolutely crucial. The conclusion is in its most 
direct form expressed by Wheeler (May 1999).
34 The terms were coined by Mason (1981). More about this debate in Browning (1992) and Breitman (1991).
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Milosevic came to power as a representative of the main trends in Serbian politics before him, 
and followed in many respects a policy of continuity with his predecessors. The historical 
context in which Milosevic emerged as the undisputed leader of Serbia is often underestimated. 
This neglect has resulted in the failure to properly understand his intentions, (as demonstrated, 
for example, during the 1999 war in Serbia). In this thesis some suggestions are offered on how 
to read and understand Milosevic and his actions. They are based on reading Milosevic's texts 
within their context. Failure to do so, I argue, is due to several methodological mistakes, such as 
-  for example -  the ideal type mistake, the prolepsis hypothesis, the coherence hypothesis, etc., as 
explained by Skinner (1988).
While focusing on Milosevic, one should also not lose sight of other actors in Yugoslav politics, 
who influenced M ilosevic's own actions. Post-Titoist politics was to a large extent conducted 
on an anti-personality-cult rule. It was an attempt to prevent the emergence of strong leaders. 
As explained in Chapters Four and Five, many politicians attempted to resolve the growing 
economic and political problems before Milosevic. Unlike many other similar attempts to 
explain disintegration of Yugoslavia, this thesis devotes some attention to them too.
1.1.7. The Fall of Empires Argument
The fall of empires argument formulated by Erik Hobsbawm,35 argues that instead of becoming a 
nation state constructed by liberals (as was originally planned, following the idea of the self- 
determination of nations), Yugoslavia developed as a multi-ethnic 'em pire', much on the model 
of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires that had prior to her creation included its main 
regions.36 The concept of an empire was much more successful in the post-war period under 
Tito, 'the last Habsburg' (as A J P Taylor called him) who was much less identified with any 
ethnic group than King Alexander, due to the internationalist ideology he professed. As a 
communist, to whom national allegiance was secondary to ideological affiliation, Tito became a 
supra-national arbiter in inter-ethnic conflicts. Legitimised by the internationalist ideology and 
not in parliamentary elections, Tito was not a representative of any existing group, but of a
15 In an interview with the author, in June 1996. Along these lines, in an interview I conducted in May 1996 (published 
in Arkzin in June 1996), Tolis Malakos argues that the idea of the nation state, imported from the West to the Balkans, 
produced conflicts both in the inter-war period (with the attempt to create a Yugoslav nation-state) and in the aftermath 
of the 1991 disintegration of Yugoslavia. He argues that Yugoslavia had a chance only as a new 'Ottoman Empire', a 
multi-ethnic entity, not as a nation state. Malakos, being a Marxist himself, comes close to Kardelj's understanding of 
the national question in Yugoslavia.
36 Kedourie (1991) points out similarities in the new world (dis)order following the fall of the Austrian-Hungarian and 
'Soviet' Empires. In both cases, Kedourie says, small states emerged as a result of self-determination, but it soon proved 
that not many among them were democratic.
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specific vision of the future.37 The gradual replacement of the ideological leadership with more 
representative leaders of republics and provinces meant the abandonment of this supra­
national position at the top of 'the empire'. Unlike Tito and Kardelj (in the ideological sphere), 
the rulers of post-Titoist Yugoslavia could not be seen as impartial arbiters but more as 
representatives of their segments of society. W ithout an impartial arbiter in both ideological 
and political conflicts, the stability of Yugoslavia was undermined. The transition from an 
empire-like ideological structure to a fragmented semi-confederalist system was 
institutionalised by the 1974 Constitution, which treated Tito as a constitutional exception. The 
1974 Constitution was to large extent the beginning of the de-Titoisation of Yugoslavia, which 
in real terms started only after his death six years later. The system was projected to prevent 
anyone else becoming a new arbiter in the post-Titoist period. Tito was in this respect, indeed, 
not only 'the last Habsburg' but 'the only true Yugoslav'.38 Milosevic's ambition to replace Tito 
in the late 1980s was indeed impossible, since the space of power occupied by Tito was now not 
only empty (Vejvoda, 1994) but non-existent in constitutional terms too. In order to become the 
new Tito (which is how his supporters initially saw him), Milosevic had to change the 
Constitution and destroy the existing political system of semi-confederalism. But unlike Tito, 
Milosevic could not have been seen as impartial. He did not profess an ideology that would 
make him supra-national. On the contrary: identifying himself too closely with only one ethnic 
group (the Serbs), he antagonised the others. Just like King Alexander (but unlike Tito) 
Milosevic was a representative of the Serbian political elite and not a person without links with 
any separate ethnic group prior to his (potential) accession to the Yugoslav throne. Milosevic 
was hence a Tito in reverse. In order to become a real Tito, he needed to turn the whole system 
upside-down. When he attempted to do this, the others decided to leave.
Although the 'fall of the Empire arguments' links various elements of other approaches (such as 
the weakness of nationalism; the role of personality; modernization and democratisation; the 
role of ideology, etc.), it is difficult to see how Yugoslavia can be compared to real Empires, in 
which there generally was a dominant nation and which used colonial expansion in order to 
lower tensions inside the metropole. Yugoslavia was perhaps an ideological Empire, but in this 
approach similarities with real empires of the past are certainly exaggerated.
*  *  *
37 Religious differences were also abandoned among the Communists. Furthermore, unlike King Alexander, Tito was 
not a member of the ruling elite before he became the Yugoslav leader.
38 Reportedly, Tito realised this too late; in 1978 when his wartime general Vukmanovic Tempo told him that there was 
no Yugoslavia any longer, and no Party. The Yugoslav former Foreign Secretary Mirko Tepavac (ousted as a 'liberal' in 
1972) recalls a conversation with Tito in Autumn 1971, when Tito said: 'If you saw what I see for the future in 
Yugoslavia, it would scare you' (1987:73). In 1973 Tito told Dara Janekovic that if all that she had reported to him about 
the situation in the country was rue, then he had 'spent [his] life in vain' (interview with Janekovic, April 1998). 
Publicly, however, Tito never expressed any doubt about the future of Yugoslavia.
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In this thesis, the historical approach to analysing politics, based on analysing the subjective 
within its context is offered as an alternative to various social science approaches, based 
primarily on objective factors (economic, international politics, ethnic divisions, etc.). This 
chapter proceeds to examine the reasons for selecting the historical approach and my own 
position on how to analyse political events in general. This position will then be followed as the 
main analytical framework of this thesis.
1.2. The Analytical Approach of this Thesis
Although all the approaches analysed above (with exception of the ethnic hatred argument) have 
added some valuable contributions to our understanding of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, 
they have sometimes neglected the missing link between the 'objective' factors (such as 
economic crisis, ethnic structure of population, international politics, etc.) and the perceptions 
of these elements by political actors themselves and their resultant actions. It is this missing link 
that I attem pt to establish here. I argue that much of the misunderstanding of the actual events I 
am concerned with is the result of the underestimation of the importance of the subjective in 
politics. Politics is, I argue, a field of human interaction and not just the reflection of some 
external, Objective' elements, such as economic, demographic, geopolitical etc., trends. 
Although political actors normally do not act entirely independently from these objective 
factors, the way they perceive them and how they react to them depends on their beliefs, 
perceptions of interests, values, personal characteristics, etc. These subjective factors are 
exposed to permanent change and are thus unstable.39
Although political change often comes as a surprisingly fast set of events, it is normally the 
result of the accumulation of discontent over the years that preceded it. The Yugoslav example 
illustrates the importance of the interaction between the long-term crisis of the system and 
quick and sudden change ('anti-bureaucratic revolution', actions in declaring independence in 
Slovenia and Croatia, etc.) in the final phase of the crisis. It is for this reason that one needs to 
focus not only on the 'revolutionary' phase, but on its prelude as well.
This dissertation is, in fact, an analysis of past political events but also of political concepts and 
ideas. In Kedourie's terms (1996), it is a political history and intellectual history at the same
39 Pizzomo (1984) points out how common it is that over time one loses interest in something for which one was once 
ready even to die. The Yugoslav example also demonstrates how much people can change their political beliefs: not 
only 'ordinary people' but also (perhaps even more) members of the political, economic, military and intellectual elites. 
The political elites in Eastern Europe were taken by surprise when various 'revolutions' happened in their countries, no 
less than Western observers. Perhaps the best example is Romania's Ceausescu, who convened a public rally to support 
his position, only to find that he had lost all support 'practically overnight'. In fact, revolutions -  per definitionem - 
always take riders by surprise. But, in fact, none of these changes came 'overnight', as the participants and some 
analysts sometimes argue. As this thesis demonstrates, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was only the end result of a 
long prelude in which most of its elements had been 'tested' and fully developed.
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time. Analysis of a communist system is incomplete if it does not include both dimensions. In 
communist systems political actions were attempts to implement a set of ideas in political 
reality. Politics in Communist-led societies was - to use Voegelin's expression (1952:70) - a 
'representation of truth', defined by certain texts and interpreted by the Party (the 'subjective 
force' of socialism) just as much as it was the representation of certain interests or preferences of 
its main participants -  the political elites. Communist politics is about the realisation of the 
truth, in which the Party -  as Kardelj explained -  has the role almost of a scientific institute.40 It 
is a collective intellectual.41
The intellectual debates within the political elite were in fact, if not the main acts of politics, 
then certainly the most suitable medium of real political struggle. As Irvine argues, 'control 
over the actual meaning of language became essential to those regimes' ideological and 
symbolic sources of legitimation' (1997:6). Political conflicts in the socialist societies of Eastern 
Europe had often been expressed as a linguistic debate over the 'correct' interpretation of 
Marxism.42 The main idea behind these conflicts was that there is only one correct way of 
understanding Marx's message and that the Party was entitled to act as an arbiter between 
conflicting interpretations, when they occurred. In reality, however, many interpretations 
emerged, struggling for the status of the official one. The level of liberalisation of a communist 
system was indicated by the presence (or absence) of alternative (non-official) interpretations of 
Marxist ideology. Since no other (non-Marxist) ideology was allowed to compete with 
Marxism, the intra-party debate on the real meaning of Marxism covered a much larger 
spectrum of issues than an observer in a democratic (ideologically pluralised) society would 
expect. In more strict times when liberalisation was in retreat, defeat in the struggle for the 
'correct' interpretation resulted in expulsion from public life, or even persecution, under the 
label of 'revisionism'.
The main question I am addressing in this thesis is - why did political actors act as they did? 
Why did their actions make sense to them? What were their rationale, their motives for action
40 More on this will be said in Chapter Two.
41 As Stipe Suvar pointed out in an interview for this thesis, the leading Yugoslav party ideologues (Kardelj and 
Bakaric) were influenced by Gramsci's ideas and wanted to introduce some institutions derived from the Italian 
Communist Party. It is for this reason that the main conflicts between the elites and dissidents in communist societies 
took the form of a conflict between the politicians and the intelligentsia. This was equally the case in Central and South- 
Eastern Europe, where intellectuals traditionally played a 'messianic' role in nationalist movements. In the Yugoslav 
case, as illustrated in the last two chapters, the new (nationalist) visionaries saw their chance after the death of the 
previous generation of (communist) visionaries. Among them was Dobrica Cosic, who said that the writers and 
intellectuals in non-democratic states had 'assumed die role of the conscience of the nation and society, the role of 
prophet and spiritual saviour as they did in the age of national romanticism'(1992:18). In Serbia, in which Cosic himself 
was firstly the most prominent member of the 'Critical Intelligentsia' and then the first President of the FR Yugoslavia 
(1992-93), they 'have been bringing about the spiritual rebirth of Serbian society' (1992:20). Similar examples could be 
found elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
42 The Eighth Session of the CC LC Serbia (analysed in Chapter Six of this thesis) is an example of this. Excellent sources 
on the importance of language in communist politics are Waller (1972) and Bogdanovic (1988).
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and their intentions? If one really wants to understand the rationale behind the actions of the 
Yugoslav communists, he /she  needs to take their own beliefs seriously. W hat is relevant here is 
not whether these actions make sense to us but whether they made sense to them, to those 
whose actions we analyse and to the relevant segment of the political body upon whose 
approval the stability of the regime depended. It is not the aim of this thesis to judge the actions 
taken by the Yugoslav elite in either favourable or unfavourable terms, but to explain them by 
understanding the reasons the actors had for them. I am attempting to reconstruct and present 
these reasons.
In doing so, I rely on Quentin Skinner's theory of analysing the meaning and understanding of 
words and actions in their mutual interaction.43 It is also in Skinner's warnings about possible 
problems of historical analysis that I find useful guidance for my own research.
Skinner warns about two extremes in analysing intellectual history - one linked to 
overestimating the context in which a text occurs; the other doing the opposite - neglecting the 
context by arguing that the text itself can be understood without much reference to the context. 
When it comes to the context, this dissertation aims at correcting inaccurate interpretations of 
the intentions and actions of the main Yugoslav politicians based on the myth of coherence and 
the myth of the ideal type.
The myth of coherence is an attempt to find a coherence in one's ideas and actions at all costs. 
Coherence may be found 'horizontally' or 'vertically' in time. When 'horizontal', the coherence 
is sought in actions by members of some group, even if they differ in most relevant matters. 
When 'vertical', the coherence is sought in actions of the same actor over time. The myth of 
coherence, therefore, neglects or underestimates changes that occur over time and denies 
plurality within social groups.
The myth of the ideal type is an attempt to reconstruct the meaning of intentions and actions in 
accordance with previously constructed ideal types, categories such as 'nationalists', 
'communists', 'liberals', 'democrats', etc., that have been defined in certain ways by social 
scientists. The ideal types are constructed on more or less exact observations, but can also be 
influenced by stereotypes and prejudice about certain groups and actors.
Both types of myths linked to context in reality use the methodological apparatus of 
mainstream social science (especially of 'scientific naturalists', as Ricci names them, 1984:92) in 
order to construct generally applicable models of analysis. In doing so, they more often than not
43 The interpretation of Skinner's position in this section is based on his essays edited by James Tully and published in 
Skinner (1988).
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blur our understanding of a particular event. For example, once we label a person X as a 
'nationalist', there is a danger of attempting to 'retrieve' the meaning of what he said, or did not 
say, from what one expects a 'nationalist' to say or not say. These two mistakes (the coherence 
and ideal type) are the basis on which controversies or changes of mind are often dismissed as 
yet another 'proof of caution', or as 'just a tactic', while there is a 'real1 (and often hidden) 
agenda that in fact determines people's actions. Therefore, for example, when a person X 
attacks nationalism -  regardless of how strong this attack might be -  many are still inclined to 
believe that this is only because she had to hide her true beliefs, not because she really meant 
what she said. Even if one does something contrary to what is expected from a certain ideal 
type this would be taken just as a 'tactical move', not a real indication of change. Although these 
analysts focus their research on the subjective, they still make the mistake of not looking at 
changes over time and of trying to situate actors within certain ideal type categories.
In this thesis I try to avoid the myths of coherence and of ideal types, arguing that we need to 
take political actors seriously if we want to understand them. To take them seriously, however, 
does not imply we should believe their words only: on the contrary, we should never neglect 
the context in which these words were expressed and actions that preceded and followed them. 
This is why this dissertation is not a pure discourse analysis, but goes further by situating 
discourses in the context of practical politics.
Another methodological mistake that this dissertation warns about is identified by Skinner as 
the myth of prolepsis. This mistake is committed when one relies for one's interpretation on 
events that happened after the political decision was taken, assuming that there was a causal 
link between the action and its result. The assumption here is that the result of somebody's 
action was always intentional, and that once we know the results (or even, more precisely, only 
then) we can fully understand the real intentions, the real meaning of the words and actions 
that 'caused' such results. If the break-up of Yugoslavia was a consequence, then it had to be 
the result of the intentions of the main political actors. Or, to take Skinner's example -  if 
totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century claimed they were based on Rousseau's writings, then 
Rousseau's writing was somehow responsible for totalitarianism. Intentionalists would claim 
that very few, if any, event in history happened unless it was part of someone's intentions.
The analysis here, however, suggests a different conclusion. An in-depth analysis of the 
speeches and actions of the main Yugoslav politicians in the fifteen years before the actual 
disintegration of Yugoslavia shows that not many political actors (and especially not many of 
those within the political elite) really wanted Yugoslavia to collapse. On the contrary, most of 
them intended to 'save' it by either reforming or preserving various elements of its constitution 
and political practice. To most of the political actors, as to many analysts, the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia came as a surprise, not as an 'inevitable' result of their pre-meditated actions. Yet,
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once it happened, many claimed they 'knew7 it would happen, or even that they had wanted it 
to happen. Sometimes, when reminded of historical sources (such as speeches or actions by 
politicians), the radical intentionalists would claim this was only a public statement, while 'real' 
intentions were something else.
Finally, yet another set of methodological mistakes Skinner calls the mythology of parochialism: 
attempts to apply our own criteria to another culture, without sufficient effort to approach the 
meaning of actions from within the context in which they happened. This was perhaps the most 
frequent mistake by Western policy-makers in the Yugoslav crisis. An assum ption that 
Yugoslavia would not disintegrate, because its disintegration would be 'irrational' for the 
interests of the main participants, was based on the pure extension of our understanding of 
rationality to an area in which different criteria of rationality were valid. It is always a mistake 
to neglect the actual context in which an action takes place. And it would be an even greater 
mistake to understand this context incorrectly.
W ithout entering into a debate on meaning and understanding in any more detail than 
necessary to explain the methodology and main thesis of this dissertation, I shall now conclude 
this overview of Skinner's methodology by saying that if we wish to understand action, we 
cannot simply concentrate on the words alone. The analysis of the rhetoric of the main political 
actors is always only a first step -  necessary but not sufficient. One needs to study the situations 
in which the words are used, and what the author was doing in saying an d /o r not saying 
something. Ignoring the practical context of political actions will not help us understand them, 
and this is precisely what this dissertation demonstrates.
This dissertation aims at following the interaction between Kardelj's interpretation of Marxist 
ideology and the political context in which this concept was implemented. As Tully (1998) 
argues, to place the text in its political context means to treat it in interaction with 'the collection 
of texts written or used in the same period, addressed to the same or similar issues and sharing 
a num ber of conventions'. Such interaction will help us to reveal the intentions of the political 
participants when they spoke or acted in a certain way. It is for this reason that in many places 
of this thesis, the main discourses by participants are presented and analysed. It is only within 
their context that one may understand the actions that followed.
In saying this, one m ust be aware that no explanation of people's 'real intentions' can be perfect 
if by 'intentions' one understands the thoughts of the political actors. Political analysts, surely, 
do not hold the key to an actor's mind. But, as Skinner concluded, 'w hen we claim to have 
recovered the intentions embodied in texts, we are engaged in nothing more mysterious than 
this process of placing them within whatever contexts make sense of them.' It is not that we try 
to reach peculiarly inaccessible mental causes operating in the privacy of the mind, but only to
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explain the reasons behind behaving in certain ways, 'to exhibit certain skills and capacities in 
conventional ways'. Unlike Derrida, Skinner points out that 'the intentions with which anyone 
performs any successful act of communication must, ex hypothesi, be publicly legible' 
(1988:279).
'Suppose I come to understand that the man waving his arms in the next field is not trying 
to chase away a fly, but is warning me that the bull is about to charge. To recognize that he 
is warning me is to understand the intentions with which he is acting. But to recover these 
intentions is not a matter of identifying the ideas inside his head at the moment when he 
first begins to wave his arms. It is merely a matter of grasping the fact that arm-waving can 
count as warning, and that this is the convention that he is exploiting in this particular case. 
Nothing in the way of 'empathy' is required, since the meaning of the episode is entirely 
public and intersubjective. As a result, the intentions with which the man is acting can be 
inferred from an understanding of the significance of the act itself' (1988:279).
It is in this way that I understand the meaning of intentions in this thesis. For Skinner, some 
intentions really may be irrecoverable, but this is simply on account of there being insufficient 
information about their context to permit an ascription of intention in a particular case: 'some 
utterances are completely lacking in the sorts of context from which alone one can hope to infer 
the intentions with which they were uttered' (1988:280). In this thesis we believe that most 
intentions are normally identifiable, but only if we make an effort to understand the context in 
which they occur.44
The fact that sometimes we have to admit that there is something we cannot explain since the 
actors themselves often cannot explain their own actions, however, should not prevent us from 
approaching this aim as closely as possible. Not even the most radical positivist approaches to 
the study of politics would claim we can explain everything. The point made in this dissertation 
is that we are more successful when avoiding these methodological mistakes. This is what this 
dissertation is aiming at.
In the next chapter we will focus on the historical and ideological context which influenced the 
development of the Kardelj concept, the original Yugoslav interpretation of Marxism upon 
which the Yugoslav political system was structured in the period we analyse in this thesis. 
W ithout an understanding of this concept, I argue, one would fail to understand the actions 
that followed. In Chapter Three we analyse these actions in relation to the concept itself. Then 
we move on to explaining the failure of Kardelj's concept (in Chapters Four and Five) and the 
emergence of alternative concepts, most explicitly in Serbia and Slovenia (Chapters Six and 
Seven). I argue that the break-down of the ideological consensus within the Yugoslav political 
elite during an extended period of almost two decades was the main reason for the actual 
disintegration of Yugoslav institutions.
44 For a debate on Skinner's position see Skinner, 1988 and McBride, 1996.
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Chapter Two:
The Kardelj concept: 
Constructing the Fourth Yugoslavia
(1974-1990)
The unity of the nation is not possible unless based on a clear platform, on a 
clear outlook for the future development of society.
Edvard Kardelj (1977:263)
2.0. Introduction
From the very beginning of the Yugoslav idea, and in all attempts to create a Yugoslav state, the 
main question was to be asked again and again: What is Yugoslavia? To what extent was it an
association of communities and how far a community in itself?
The entire Yugoslav inter-war multipartism, as well as the main conflicts within the ruling 
Communist elite in post-war Yugoslavia were basically structured along the long-lasting 
division produced on this fundamental issue. The main constitutional question had been 
answered several times, and challenged soon after fragile agreements had been made. Even the 
minor conflicts between political groupings in Yugoslavia had by and large been expressions of 
differences on this cleavage.
There were four different constitutive concepts regarding the main question of (co)existence of
(between) Yugoslav nation(s) between 1918 and 1992: 1) the model of 'national unity1; 2) the
model of 'Agreement Yugoslavism'; 3) the model of 'brotherhood and unity' federalist
Yugoslavism; and 4) the Kardelj model, which could be best described as model of 'associated
labour inter-national Yugoslavism'. In this chapter we first briefly analyse the three earlier
models, only to focus on the last -  fourth constitutive concept of Yugoslavia, formulated during
the constitutional debate of the 1967-1974 period. The three previous constitutive concepts
provided the historical context for the fourth one. Kardelj's concept of the Brioni Yugoslavia was
an attempt to construct reality in a different -  and for most of its content -  opposite way from
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what had been in either of the three previous phases. In Skinner's terms -  one cannot understand 
Kardelj (and Yugoslav communists in general) without knowing the contexts available to him. 
The first step one needs to take in analysing political actions based on ideological concepts is, 
therefore, 'to situate the text in its linguistic or ideological context: the collection of texts written 
or used in the same period, addressed to the same or similar issues and sharing a number of 
conventions' (Skinner, 1988:9). The ideological context for understanding Kardelj is Marxism. 
The concepts against which he constructed his own alternative were: (1) inter-war Yugoslavism 
('national unity') and (2) the Soviet interpretation of Marxism. This chapter addresses the 
question of 'w hat was the author doing in writing a text in relation to other available texts which 
made up [these two] ideological contextfs]'. To a lesser extent we shall also address other 
questions proposed by Skinner, such as 'w hat was the author doing in writing a text in relation 
to viable and problematic political action which made up the political context'. This question will 
be discussed in the following chapters in which we further examine the relationship between the 
Kardelj concept and political action that aimed at implementing it in reality.
2.1. Four Constitutive Concepts
2.1.1. King Alexander's 'National Unity' Yugoslavism (1918-1939)
According to the doctrine of national unity, the Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes were on their way 
to forming a single - Yugoslav - nation. The existence of three tribes ('plemena'j (as the official 
ideology treated Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, but not any other ethnic group within Yugoslavia, 
like the Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins and Slavonic Macedonians), who had lived in different 
empires (Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman) and had different religions, was recognized as a 
transitional fact. Yugoslavia would be a vehicle for the development of a Yugoslav identity and a 
Yugoslav nation. The ideas of separate political identities should be suppressed and eliminated 
from political life. The constitutional structure of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (as 
the first South Slav state was called) was constructed to help the transition of identities: from 
tribal separateness to Yugoslavism. The country was first administrated in 31 units, deliberately 
organised to transmit these identities, then in nine counties (banovine), none of which was named 
after a dom inant tribe (Dragnich, 1995).
This idea basically corresponded to the nation-state vision of Yugoslavia, with a Yugoslav nation
being only in the process of being built. The Yugoslav idea as it emerged among the South Slavs
in Austro-Hungary was a nationalist idea. The emergence of the Yugoslav state in December
1918 was the result of the principle of self-determination, and of the understanding of its main
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creators that the South Slavs (both those within the former Austro-Hungary and those in the 
South-Slavonic regions that belonged to the Ottoman Empire), if not already one nation 
(unfortunately divided between two empires), then were for sure becoming a nation. Once they 
had created their own state, they would have naturally strengthened their oneness. The state 
institutions, and most of all - the King himself - were in the first place constructors of a Yugoslav 
identity. Once this identity emerged, the country could be fully democratic, but in the meantime 
it should be guided towards this goal. Although the very idea of Yugoslav unity emerged among 
intellectual elites in the 19th century, the state -  once created -  became an instrument of the 
Yugoslav idea promoted from 'above'. Its content came to be decided at the top of the social 
pyramid and to be transmitted to the base.
But this idea met with strong opposition from both Croatian and Serbian nationalists, who could 
not simply accept the disappearance of the separate identities of their respective tribes/nations. 
The Croats warned that Serbs were overwhelmingly dominant in Yugoslav institutions between 
1918 and 1941. In the 268 months of the First Yugoslavia, Serbs held the office of Prime Minister 
for 264 months, the office of Minister of the Army and Navy for the entire 268 months, the 
interior ministry for 240 months, that of foreign affairs for 247 months, finance for 216 months, 
education for 236 and justice for 237 months. The Orthodox (Serbs, Montenegrins and 
Macedonians) formed 86.5 percent of the pre-war Yugoslav generals and 70.2 percent of the 
entire number of Army officers. At the same time, their share of the total population was 49.3 
percent. Was it then really an impartial and Yugoslav policy, or only an extended Serbian policy 
under the name of Yugoslavism?
Ultimately, Yugoslavia was unified on terms closer to the Serbian proposals for a new Kingdom, 
which was to be organised on the idea of national unity and therefore centralised to a large 
extent. The readiness of Croats to agree to Serbian ideas was largely determined by fears of 
Italian, Hungarian and Austrian revanchism - and it seemed that they were united more by 
negative considerations (what would happen if they did not unite?) than positive bonds.
The Croat question, therefore, became the fundamental question of the First Yugoslavia. It was 
strengthened by the fact that the Croats were themselves unified within one state for the first 
time in their political history. To Yugoslav integralism they opposed their own Croatian 
integralism; to Yugoslav nationalism - their Croatian nationalism; to the project of Yugoslav unity, 
their own project of Croatian rights to their own state. This was a conflict of two emerging 
polities, which could not grow up together, since they feared that the very existence of the one 
would necessarily endanger the identity of the other.
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On the other hand, many Serbs also had a problem in accepting Yugoslavism. Having a state of 
their own before unification, some of them challenged the very reasons for unification and the 
benefits for the Serbs themselves from it. The political conflicts in the new country split Serbian 
public opinion into pro-Serb and pro-Yugoslav policy orientations. This division was to become a 
constant in the Serbian polity up to the present day.1
Negotiating with both Serbs and Croats, the King Alexander entered into open conflict with both 
sides, though (in view of the nature of their demands and the strength of their manifestation) 
more with the Croats than with the Serbs. His rule became more autocratic than any side 
wanted. His idealistic Yugoslavism conflicted with the reality of strong nationalist support for the 
Serb and Croat hard-liners. All of this only helped to build separate national identities for the 
Croats, Serbs and Slovenes - a goal completely opposite to the wishes of the integralist Yugoslavs.
In such circumstances Yugoslavia went from one crisis to another. Formed as a result of the 
Great War, its very existence was challenged by the revisionist claims coming from neighbouring 
countries, both in Central and Southeast Europe. Powers that were traditionally influential in the 
region but excluded from the Versailles negotiations, Germany and Russia (since 1922: Soviet 
Union), questioned the Versailles structure of Europe, of which Yugoslavia was part and in which 
it played a prominent role. Unable to find an acceptable path of internal cohesion, Yugoslavia 
seemed to be kept together more because of the common fear their constitutive tribes felt in the 
face of external threats than because of internal pressure for unity. However, it should not be 
forgotten that the tradition of Serbo-Croat co-operation, developed first between the Serbs and 
Croats in the former Austro-Hungary, did not completely vanish. Both the opposition and the 
government were of multi-ethnic composition. Though the national question was a serious and 
unifying force (especially for the Slovenes and Croats), the vote for each of the largest parties 
was still derived from various parts of the country (Banac, 1984: 389). Coalitions between parties 
were trans-ethnic as well.
W hen the Croat leader Stjepan Radic died after he had been wounded by a Montenegrin (Serb) 
nationalist MP Punisa Racic in the chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly in 1928, Alexander 
declared a personal dictatorship, abrogated the Constitution, banned political parties and 
announced a new wave of Yugoslavization. The country was finally named Yugoslavia, with an 
Army General as prime minister. Although Alexander intended to further strengthen 
Yugoslavism by banning all separate national parties and renaming the country, his action was
1 For this see Pavkovic (1997), and also Cosic (1992) and Popovic (1985). More on the debate between Serb and Yugoslav 
groups within the Serbian political and cultural elites in Chapters Three and Six of this thesis.
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also an act of recognition that only ten years after the all-embracing unification, the Yugoslavs 
were brought to defend their state unity by a Royal coup d'etat. Being defended by a dictatorship, 
the Yugoslav idea could not expect to win approval among the Yugoslav democrats. Although 
Alexander's authoritarianism was not a unique phenomenon in inter-war Eastern Europe (nor 
should it be compared with the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s) the first 
attem pt to build a democratic Yugoslavia clearly failed. The symbolic death of this the concept of 
'national unity' was to be seen in the assassination in October 1934 of the Unifier King Alexander 
by Croat and Macedonian separatists in Marseilles.
2.1.2. Prince Paul’s Sporazum  Yugoslavia (1939-1941)
King Alexander's cousin Prince Paul reigned on behalf of the late King's son Peter who was still a 
minor from 1934 to 1941. The fear of internal dissolution and the external threat to the security of 
Yugoslavia made him think of a new constitutional arrangement between the country's 
constitutive nations. Since the Croat question was the most important issue and increasingly 
threatened to become an international issue as well as an eternal obstacle to any sustainable 
internal unity, Prince Paul moved towards a policy of a new agreement between the Serbs and 
the Croats.
After several failures, he succeeded in softening both Croat and Serbian radical demands. On the 
Serb side, he had to secure support for a substantial change to the integral Yugoslavism doctrine. 
On the Croat side, ideas of separatism (which were encouraged by foreign forces, particularly by 
Italy) had to be defeated.
The final agreement was reached in August 1939 between the Yugoslav Prime Minister DragiSa 
Cvetkovic (the Prince Regent's personal representative, a leader of the Yugoslav Radical Union), 
and the leader of the opposition, the Croat Vladko Macek. According to the Sporazum 
(Agreement), the Croats were given autonomy within the administrative unit called Banovina 
Croatia. Both the name of the newly established unit, and the competencies that were given to it 
(all but foreign policy, financial policy, the army and transport) indicated that the Crown 
acknowledged Croatian separateness and its right to be defined as a political entity. By this 
recognition, the official Yugoslav project was redefined from one of Integral Yugoslavism to 
Agreement Yugoslavism. Yugoslavia was no longer projected as a country which would nullify 
ethnic differences between its ' tribes' , but as a common framework within which there was one 
(Croatian) separate entity which should be recognised.
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Acknowledgement of the autonomy only of the Croats and not of the others produced new 
political and social antagonisms between different ethnic groups in the country. The Serb 
intellectual and political circles argued that Agreement Yugoslavia was to the advantage of the 
Croats and to the disadvantage of the Serbs (Dragnich, 1983:123-134). It is difficult to agree 
entirely with such a conclusion. F irst because it was still a country in which the Serbs kept the 
most important positions, such as the monarchy, the army, the police and the main political 
posts. Secondly, because the Agreement really made the common institutions stronger. While the 
Croats before had no policy for Yugoslavia, considering Yugoslavia almost to be only an area of 
Croat foreign policy (A. Djilas, 1991:134), they now accepted some responsibility for the future of 
the country.
However, the opposition to the Agreement was sufficiently strong to check its implementation 
wherever possible. There were several sources of criticism. First, the integralists (with strong 
support in the military) argued that it led to Croat separatism and that it was basically 
unconstitutional. Another group of critics was organized within the previously United 
Opposition, which considered Ma6ek's agreement with the ruling party a betrayal of the 
opposition. They were basically right when they argued that Macek was not interested in 
democracy so much as in the solution of the Croat question. Finally, two groups that were not 
very influential at that time (but played an important role later, during the second world war) 
also opposed the Agreement. The Croat separatists, located then in Italy and Hungary under the 
command of Ante Pavelic (later the Head of the Independent State of Croatia) saw the 
Agreement as nothing but a life-boat for Yugoslavia that was to be sunk in the new world order 
promised by the Nazis and Fascists. On the other hand, the Communist Party (the fourth 
strongest Yugoslav party in the 1920 parliamentary elections, outlawed a year later) had an 
ambivalent attitude towards the Agreement. They welcomed the abandonment of integral 
Yugoslavism and Prince Paul's move towards the real politics of ethnic separateness. But they 
considered the new compromise to be only an agreement between two national bourgeoisies, that 
had nothing to do with the real problems of the people. For the Communists, the real problem 
was that of social revolution. The real solution of the national question, Communists believed, 
could come only when exploitation ended. For both problems - the social and the national - there 
was only one solution - revolution (Kardelj, 1939).
All three opponents of the Agreement (separatists, communists, integralists) had been awaiting a 
suitable moment to attack it. When the government signed the acceptance of the Tripartite Pact 
(on rather good terms for Yugoslavia, and only in April 1941, when the rest of Europe had been 
either already occupied or was under severe attack from Germany) (Balfour, MacKay, 1980:215- 
240), they saw their moment. The integralists, led by the Air Force Commander Gen. Dusan
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Simovic, overthrew the Government in a coup d'etat on 27 March 1941. Prince Paul (Pavle) was 
replaced by King Peter II (still a minor) and forced to leave the country. The crowd on the streets 
of Belgrade claimed: Better War than the Pact ('Bolje rat nego pakt'), a slogan which entered the 
Yugoslav (especially Serb) mentality and remained there for years to come. The British Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill declared that the Yugoslavs have found their soul. But soon 
afterwards they lost their country. After 17 days of resistance, the Yugoslav Army surrendered to 
the overwhelmingly stronger forces of occupiers, whose aim was not only to defeat Yugoslavia 
militarily, but also to dismember it.
The other two anti-Agreement forces - the Croat separatist Ustashas and the Yugoslav 
Communists - came also onto the stage. Yugoslavia, a formally non-existent country, occupied 
by four countries, entered on a liberation war, and at the same time (and sometimes with even 
greater intensity) a civil war between these three groups: Croatian separatists (Ustashe), 
Yugoslav integralists (under command of General Mihailovic -  linked with the royal 
government-in-exile) and Yugoslav Communists (led by Josip Broz Tito). Although the divisions 
were to a large extent between ethnic groups too, they often crossed ethnic lines, especially with 
the emergence of the only almost all-Yugoslav military and political force -  the Partisans, 
Yugoslav anti-fascists led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It should be stressed that, 
although they differed in their stands on foreign occupation, the largest difference between these 
three forces was that they had different answers to the main questions: What is Yugoslavia? and: 
Should there be a Yugoslavia at all?
2.1.3. Tito's Brotherhood and Unity Federalist Yugoslavism
Emerging out of the liberation struggle led by the Communists, the New Yugoslavia contrasted 
fundamentally with the Yugoslav Kingdom. As early as 1943, the King was temporarily and 
from November 1945 permanently banned from returning to the country. His troops on the 
ground (the Yugoslav Home Army under the command of General Draza Mihailovic) were 
considered to be the main internal enemies (Djilas, 1981:12; Seton-Watson, 1985:118-131).
In the years immediately after the Yugoslav unification (1918), the Communists had some 
specific difficulties regarding the Yugoslav idea and the Yugoslav state itself. They had changed 
their views on Yugoslavia several times between 1919 and 1936, regularly being a step behind 
the current Comintern policy. On the one hand, they argued that Yugoslavia was a product of 
the Versailles order which was an expression of imperialist intentions. Yugoslavia was a product 
of the anti-Soviet policy of 'containment' and also the 'Great-Serbian' bourgeoisie whose policy 
was driven by its imperial goals of exploiting other ethnic groups and classes in the country. But,
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on the other hand, Yugoslavia was a chance for the working class to unite beyond the ethnic 
borders. The unification of the South Slavs was, therefore, considered as a positive step, 
provided that the 'second phase' of revolution (the proletarian one) followed the first -  the 
bourgeois revolution of 1918. At one time, the Yugoslav Communists saw the future Communist 
Yugoslavia as the core of a future Balkan federation which w ould be a step towards the world­
wide revolution, ending in a world-wide Soviet Union of Socialist Republics.2 Another source of 
controversies was the internationalist orientation of the (Yugoslav) Communists. As defined by 
the 'national unity' concept, Yugoslavia was an instrument of Yugoslav (South Slav) nationalism 
-  its main purpose was to create a Yugoslav nation. Being internationalists and recognising the 
separateness of the various 'constitutive nations' of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav communists 
opposed such a concept. However, exactly because they were internationalists, they also 
supported notion of co-operation and unity between (South Slav) nations within a wider 
framework of Yugoslavia. The controversy between co-operation between Yugoslav nations on 
the one hand and fears of 'unitarist concepts' of creating one single nation out of the various 
Yugoslav ethnic groups on the other, remained present throughout the existence of the post-war 
Yugoslav state.
The other reason for the scepticism of the Yugoslav communists towards the existence of 
Yugoslavia was to be found in the Marxist and Leninist doctrine the state should 'w ither away' 
as communism approached. The very success of the Communist Party could be measured by the 
level of the state presence in reality. Now, if the state was withering away, did this mean that the 
Yugoslav state would disappear as well? How, therefore, could patriotism be reconciled with 
Communism? These dilemmas regarding Yugoslavism caused continual conflicts and purges 
within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia between 1919 and 1937.3
The Communist Party was banned in the Law on the Protection of the State (1921), after which 
the police took severe measures against its members. There was no political group in the country 
that hated Alexander more than the Communists did. Starting as the fourth largest political 
party in the first Yugoslav elections (1920) with 198,376 votes (Banac, 1984:389), they were 
reduced to no more than 700 members in 1924 (Pavlowitch, 1992:119). In the late 1930s the CPY 
had 1,500 members, most of whom were either imprisoned or had emigrated from Yugoslavia. 
However, being internationalists and having their supporters from various parts of the country,
2 Remnants of this thinking could be seen in Tito's policy towards Albania, Greece and Bulgaria in 1945-1948 period, and 
later in the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey in the early 1950s. As Dragosavac says in the interview conducted with 
the author in April 1998, Tito was the key figure in Balkan politics in the whole post-war period.
3 More on this in Vlajfiic (1984). Vlajcic (1978) and A. Djilas (1991) are good sources for understanding the CPY policy 
towards the 'national question' from the first days of the CPY (1919) throughout the inter-war period.
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the Yugoslav Communists were the most ethnically pluralistic political group. But the members 
of the CPY were not really representatives of their national groups. They were united in 
revolutionary action by the international proletariat. For the Yugoslav Communists, the national 
question was the main potential source of revolution. Linked to the 'peasant question' (in the 
policy of the dominant Croat Peasants Party), it became the weakest point of the regime in the 
1930s. In the whole inter-war period, but especially after the assassinations of the CPP leader 
Stjepan Radic (1928) and King Alexander (1934), the national question became the main source of 
popular discontent. Encouraged by Prince Paul's relatively moderate policy towards the 
opposition and by the Comintern Popular Front policy (1936-1939), the Yugoslav Communists 
(from 1936 effectively, and from 1937 officially, led by Josip Broz Tito) strengthened their ranks 
by paying special attention to the national question. At the Fourth Party Conference in 1934, Tito 
reportedly held the view that the Communists 'm ust take the lead in the national-liberation 
movement'. Consequently, in what was seen as 'the inauguration of the course towards creating 
a people's revolutionary party instead of an isolated, sectarian one',4 two years later a separate 
Communist Party of Slovenia and in 1937 the Communist Party of Croatia were created by the 
CPY leadership. This was already a significant change towards recognising the ethnic 
separateness of Slovenes and Croats as a political fact two years before official Yugoslav politics 
moved towards the same recognition in the Serbo-Croat Agreement.
It was no surprise that Tito and Edvard Kardelj, the two leading men of the new CPY leadership 
after 1937, were opponents of 'integral Yugoslavism' and 'Panslavism'. Not only because they 
themselves were a Croat and a Slovene,5 but because -  as Communists -  they had no reason to 
be fascinated by a policy that outlawed their party and imprisoned their comrades and 
themselves. But -  more importantly than anything else -  they saw the national question as the 
main potential starting-point of the social revolution in Yugoslavia. And also, they firmly 
believed that the national question could not be solved without a social revolution. The 'Great- 
Serbian bourgeoisie' was the common denominator for both types of exploitation: it exploited 
the working class as a bourgeoisie and it exploited at the same time the small Yugoslav nations 
for the sake of the 'Great-Serbian ideology'.
By the formation of the two national communist parties within the Yugoslav CP, the leading 
Yugoslav communists demonstrated their belief that the class and national questions were linked 
together. Slovenia, for example, could not be freed unless the 'Great-Serbian bourgeoisie' was
4 This assessment was given by an official document of the 11th LCY Congress in 1978: 'Three decades of the struggle of 
Yugoslav Communists for the socialist transformation of society and for new relations in the world' (1978:107-86).
5 Actually, Tito's father was Croat while his mother was Slovene. He was bom in a village next to the 'border' between 
the two 'countries' and spent the first seven years of his life with his family in Slovenia.
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overthrown. Integral Yugoslavism and Pan-Slavism were not much more than a cover which had 
hidden the great-Serbian nature of the new state. The Slovene bourgeoisie, Kardelj said in his 
speech at the constitutive Congress of the CP Slovenia, were concerned not with Slovene 
interests, but with their own class interests. The best it could offer, Kardelj concluded, was 
cultural autonomy within Yugoslavia. But, the national question was not only a cultural or 
linguistic issue, it was a political issue as well. Consequently, the Slovene question could be 
solved only when the Slovenes formed their own state, with the full right to self-determination 
as whether or not they wanted to be united in a larger multi-national state such as Yugoslavia.6 
And they could remain a part of Yugoslavia only if and when they were not exploited but 
treated as an equal people in their own state. The bourgeois character of the state, Kardelj 
argued, was the main reason why the Slovenes did not have any more positive feelings for 
Yugoslavia than for the former Austrio-Hungarian or Italian state. They were, the Declaration of 
the Founding Congress of the CP Slovenia said, divided between four countries by the Versailles 
peace accord, becoming, therefore, one of the main victims of post-war European imperialism.7
When Yugoslavia was occupied and divided into various administrative regions supervised or 
directly governed by the occupier in 1941, Kardelj's conclusions about 'bourgeois treachery' were 
easily seen as a good prediction. One Royal Government signed a treaty with Hitler, another 
went into exile as soon as the first bombs reached Belgrade.8 There was, of course, no such option 
for the Yugoslav Communists, and when the Soviet Union was attacked on 22 June 1941, they 
invited the Yugoslavs to fight against the occupation.
But the Yugoslav Communists did not fight for just any Yugoslavia, nor did they think the old 
idea of Yugoslavia was worth fighting for.9 They promised a fundamentally new Yugoslavia, one 
in which their constitutive peoples would be equal and free and in which the social justice would 
be achieved. In Tito's words, expressed as early as 1942:
6 This view was upheld by Slovenian politicians throughout the post-war Yugoslavia, and only re-emphasised with 
Milan Kucan (1986). Slovenian membership in Yugoslavia was conditional upon preservation of Slovene national 
identity.
7 The four countries being Hungary, Italy, Austria and Yugoslavia. Slovenian efforts to re-unite their national territories 
within the new Slovenian republic (by including Carinthia and Trieste in it) characterised the whole post-war period 
until the mid-1970s. The resolution of this problem was also linked to the prevalence of Kardelj's concept, which claimed 
that borders between states would eventually disappear, and that Yugoslavia would then become an example of various 
ethnic groups living peacefully together. (See more on this further in this thesis).
8 The accusation of 'treachery' was the reason why the Yugoslav Communists considered Gen. Mihailovic's Chetniks to 
be their most dangerous internal enemy. If successful, Mihailovic's troops would not only bring the old bourgeois system 
back, but would also show that this charge was unfounded. Additionally, Mihailovic's troops were also the most radical 
exponents of the 'Great-Serbian' ideology.
9 This view was repeated in the late 1980s by Josip Vrhovec, the Croatian representative in the Yugoslav Federal 
Presidency and on several occasions by Milan Kucan, the Slovene Party leader. Unlike the day of unification (1 December
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"The words national liberation struggle would be nothing but words, and even deception, 
if they did not have, together with their meaning in the overall, Yugoslav context, a 
specifically national meaning for each people individually, if they did not mean, together 
with the liberation of Yugoslavia, the liberation at the same time, too, of Croats, 
Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, Arnauts [Albanians], Moslems and the rest; if the national 
liberation struggle did not contain the substance of effective freedom, equality and 
brotherhood for all the peoples of Yugoslavia. This is the real essence of the national 
liberation struggle' (Tito, 1942:3).
The new  type of Yugoslavism, the vision of a federation of equal nations, motivated many non­
communists (especially in areas outside Serbia) to join the communist-led Partisans. At certain 
moments, it looked as if the idea of national emancipation was emphasised much more strongly 
than the idea of social justice and revolution. In doing so, the Yugoslav communists 
demonstrated not only political pragmatism, but loyalty to its major allies in Moscow and 
London, who urged them to eliminate or suppress their revolutionary notions for the sake of 
Yugoslavian liberation. For a long period of time, the Yugoslav communists, including Tito 
himself, hesitated to reveal their ideological background, speaking only of Yugoslav patriotism 
(Seton-Watson, 1981:220). The slogan of 'brotherhood and unity' expressed this notion in the 
most graphic way. This notion, as well as open rejection of the 'old Yugoslavia' and its main 
institutions (foremost the Monarchy) seemed appealing to non-Serbian ethnic groups in the 
country. At the same time Yugoslav orientation and the courage of the Partisans demonstrated in 
battle against the occupier attracted many Serbs (especially those from the territories within the 
Independent State of Croatia -  in today's Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) to Tito's Partisans. In 
fact, as Gow argues (1992:54), by the end of the War the Serbs made up  75% to 80% of the 
National Liberation Army, followed by 15% to 20% of the Croats and less than 4% of Slovenes. 
The balance between Serb dominance in its rank-and-file and Tito (Croat) being the Supreme 
Commander, offered certain hopes to all constitutive nations that the new Yugoslavia might 
indeed respect their interests.10
The new Yugoslavia was formed in November 1945 as a federation of six Republics and their 
five constitutive nations (Bosnian Muslims were not at that time recognised as an ethnic group
1918), the day of the Second Session of the AVNOJ (Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia -  29 
November 1943) was the national holiday. It was on this day that the new Yugoslavia was conceptualised as a federation.
10 At the same time, however, the imbalance between overwhelming Serbian participation in the military and their 
'under-representation' in the highest echelons of politics of the Party, sowed the seeds of the future rhetoric of 'Serbs, 
winners in wars, but losers in peace'. The 'imbalance' continued in the post-war period. As Gow argues (1992:54), while 
in 1972 Serbs made up 60.5% and Croats 11.7% of the full-officer corps in the YPA, the structure of the YPA High 
Command was very different: 38% were Croats and 33% Serbs. The Serbs, therefore, concluded that even in the Army 
they were in fact disadvantaged, since their chances of being promoted to higher positions were much lower than those 
of members of other nationalities. Many Serbs thought that Slovenian complaints about 'unbalanced structure of the 
Yugoslav People's Army' in the late 1980s entirely ignored the overwhelming dominance of Serbian fighters in the 
Liberation War of 1941-1945. Furthermore, the arguments about 'Serbian control' over the Army were seen as not only 
unreasonable, but insulting. More on this in Chapters Six and Seven.
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and were treated as 'ethnically undeclared' until the late 1960s). The three 'tribes' (Slovenes, 
Serbs and Croats) were now recognised as nations, as well as two entities (Macedonians and 
Montenegrins) whose separate identity was not earlier recognised. But, closely copying the 
Soviet blueprints, in reality the whole country remained centralised in regard to the most 
im portant functions, such as defence, foreign policy, economic and financial policy, transport, 
ideology and culture. The Communist character of the new Yugoslavia now became more 
obvious. Of course, as a Communist federation it was firmly led by the Communist party 
leadership. Despite its federalist claims, and though the leadership was composed of people 
from different nations, in practice Yugoslavia developed a political system which allowed no 
more than 'regional cultural autonomy combined with the most rigid political centralisation' 
(Seton-Watson, 1981:339).
This fact created a new paradox: in words and indeed in ideological justification, the 
Yugoslavism of the Yugoslav Communists was fundamentally (i.e., revolutionary) different from 
that of the inter-war period. Yet, it was equally centralised and even less democratic (in the sense 
of representative democracy) than the Yugoslavism of King Alexander and Prince Paul.
It is often emphasised (Bunce, 1999) that, unlike most other East European party leaderships, this 
one had the legitimacy of a successful liberation movement behind it. The whole legitimacy of 
socialist Yugoslavia was built on victory over foreign forces and internal 'quisling' forces. The 
bourgeoisie was identified as the source of internal betrayal in the War. Tito used the evils of 
civil war to legitimise and strengthen his power.11 He considered opposition to his rule to be 
rooted either in the 'integralist Yugoslavism' of the pre-war bourgeoisie or in the 'quisling1 forces 
during the war. He justified the one-party system by interpreting the old multi-partism as the 
main cause of the Yugoslav dissolution in the Second World War. In his interpretation 
multipartism  was the road which led directly to fraternal slaughter.12 The new Yugoslavism the 
Yugoslav Communists promised, would guarantee 'no return to the past'.
Yet, despite their opposition to 'Pan-Slavist and Yugoslav illusions' (Kardelj, 1962:138), in the 
first post-war years Tito hesitated to abandon the South Slav dimension of Yugoslav cohesion. 
He believed that the South Slavs should be in one country because they were South Slavs
11 For this purpose, the already high numbers of victims of the War were multiplied for ideological reasons, while the 
memory of the weir was kept alive by state propaganda. This produced a reaction among the nationalists (for example, 
Tudjman) which influenced the events in the late 1980s and the weirs in the 1990s.
12 This was a misinterpretation since, of course, it neglected the fact that the Yugoslav idea did not disappear with the 
occupation of Yugoslavia. Quite the contrary, it proved to be strong enough to launch at least one (and possibly even 
two) significant liberation movement(s). Tito's interpretation also neglected the fact that Yugoslavia did not have a 
proper political pluralism after 1929, since it was a 'guided democracy' with limited possibilities for political association.
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(Dedijer, 1980:76). This idea of South Slav unity motivated him to propose closer links with the 
only South Slav country outside Yugoslavia - Bulgaria.13 Not only did the two counties share 
South Slav ethnic origins, but they were united by the common goal of building socialism. If the 
South Slav concept and the revolutionary idea were the two cohesive elements for the Yugoslavs, 
w hy should Bulgaria remain outside such a country? Yugoslavs and Bulgarians therefore 
entered serious negotiations, signing an agreement on a new federation in 1948 (Kardelj, 1982:94- 
97), which was immediately vetoed by Stalin.
The hesitation of the Yugoslav Communists to entirely abandon the South Slav concept of 
Yugoslavia caused, however, serious problems with the Albanians, the only non-Slav group 
living on the compact territory of Kosovo, a province in the south of Serbia. The Albanians felt 
alienated from any concept of South Slav Yugoslavia. Although in the war and in the first three 
years afterwards the Yugoslav Communists had a very close relationship with the Communists 
in Albania, and in spite of Stalin's proposals that they should 'swallow' Albania to Yugoslavia if 
they liked, it never happened. A federation between Albania and Yugoslavia would definitely 
have disturbed the South Slav concept of Yugoslav unity. The preference that Yugoslav 
Communists gave to their links with Bulgaria over links with Albania was a strong indicator of 
their brotherhood and unity concept, which did not abandon the South Slav dimension.
Being expelled from the community of socialist countries in 1948, the Yugoslavs had to find a 
new road in a complex world situation, and a source of new legitimacy within the country. On 
both fronts, their cohesive ideas were challenged. If they dropped revolution from their 
programmatic agenda, and relied upon South Slav brotherhood and unity only, how different 
were they becoming from Alexander's or Paul's Yugoslavism? If they abandoned the concept of 
South Slav unity for the sake of international revolution, this would have weakened popular 
support for Tito and enlarged foreign support for his opponents.
Hypothetically, there was, of course, a third way, that of a democratic republic, sufficiently 
different from Alexander's authoritarianism on both accounts - as being democratic and as a 
republic. This m eant a complete change of rhetoric and practice on the part of the Yugoslav 
leadership. But this was impossible without a re-institutionalisation of representative
13 In his speech at the Founding Congress of the CP of Serbia on 11 May 1945 Tito said: 'With the Bulgarians we are 
trying, and they are trying as well, to make our relationship of brotherhood and unity firm. We have deeper ambitions 
with the Bulgarians and we have wanted to realise them, but the English and the Americans have not allowed it. Fine, we 
shall not (do it) now. But, no one can stop us in this. We are Slavs, and they are Slavs as well, and they have always been 
in the hands of reaction. It is up to us, the Yugoslav Communists to develop the consciousness that we need to live with 
the Bulgarians in the closest relationship, so that between us and the Bulgarians there should not be any greater 
contradictions than between Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. We shall act so that the Bulgarian people will be happy, as we 
shall be too, when we unite in a country of the South Slavs' (Tito, 1945:214).
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(parliamentary, multi-party) democracy and abandoning of communism.14 Though the first signs 
indicated that some of the Party leaders might have been willing to move towards a partial if not 
a full democratization (Djilas, 1981), and in spite of being overwhelmingly encouraged from the 
West to do so, they never reached the point of a break with the one-party monopoly and 
revolutionary logic. The ideology was for Yugoslav Communists always more than just a formal 
justification of their political actions -  it was the very core of their policy. Instead of abandoning 
it, the Yugoslav Communists tried very hard to show that it was the Soviets and not they who 
had deviated from Marxism. To the accusation of being Revisionists', they replied with the same 
counter-accusation against the Soviets. The Yugoslav identity was now created against not only 
the past concepts of Yugoslavism but against the Soviet concept of socialism. These two others 
(the inter-war bourgeois Yugoslavia and the Soviet type of socialism) became the two landmarks 
against which the Yugoslav mirror-image was to be created. The new Yugoslavia became 
constructed as an antipode to its own past and to the other model that claimed to be the 
blueprint of socialism.15
This Yugoslav nationalism was among the main reasons behind the Stalin -  Tito split in 1948. 
Tito's ambitions to unify and lead all the South Slavs (and one day, if Georgi Dimitrov's 
'incautious' remark about an 'East European Federation' were to be realised - possibly of all East 
European Slavs or even all East Europeans) made Stalin think that Tito was primarily a 
nationalist and a rival socialist leader (Dedijer, 1980:167-8; Kardelj, 1981:104-12). In Tito's 
hesitation to abandon the ethnic dimension in the new Yugoslavia's identity, Stalin recognised a 
deviation from internationalist principles and the remnants of the old world. At the same time, the 
revolutionary dimension of the new Yugoslav identity distanced Tito from the other world 
power 'entitled' (by the Moscow Conference in 1944) to control the region: the British.
A new reading of Marx proved to be extremely fruitful for the new identity-building of the new 
phase of socialism in Yugoslavia. In 1952, the name of the Party was changed to the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia based on the example of Marx's Communist League of 1848. The idea 
of self-management appeared out of this reading in 1950. It was not a finished project, but more a 
slogan for the new, Yugoslav road to Communism. However, it had a relevant symbolic value in 
the early fifties. Finally, as regards foreign policy, Yugoslavia accepted the idea of non-alignment 
(formulated between 1956 and 1960), which gave Tito and his country what he always wanted - a
14 However, one here needs to ask if there was really such a possibility for Yugoslavia in the by then already strictly 
divided spheres of influence within Europe. Would it not have been just another proof that Stalin was 'right' when 
accusing the Yugoslavs of being 'hidden capitalists' under a 'communist mask'?
15 This had enormous consequences for the final years of Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Once the Soviet model ceased to 
represent a real threat, only the fear of a renewal of inter-war Yugoslavia remained. In Milosevic's attempts to re-unite 
Yugoslavia, Slovenian and Croatian leaders saw such an intention. More in Chapters Six and Seven.
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distinctive and prominent role, this time in the world arena. Although the concept of 
brotherhood and unity had not been completely abandoned (Tito, 1975:35), it was replaced step 
by step by the idea of 'Yugoslav socialist patriotism', which emphasised the socialist over the 
South Slav dimension of Yugoslav identity. Now that its borders had become safe due to the 
world power balance and 'internal enemies' had been finally defeated, the existence of 
Yugoslavia was no longer in question. It was a time for social change which would definitely 
eliminate the last vestiges of the national question. What the resistance to the Soviet Union did in 
terms of the external legitimation of Yugoslavia, Western economic and military support did in 
terms of the internal legitimation of its leadership.16 Being boosted by Western loans, and having 
an increasingly important say over the main problems of international relations (Middle East 
Crisis, Cuba, East-West relationships, etc.) Yugoslavia entered its golden age. In the sixties, she 
was the most developed of all the socialist countries, with a promising level of GDP growth. The 
Yugoslavs felt more independent and wealthier than any of their Eastern neighbours, and -  
indeed -  any of their Balkan neighbours too. It seemed that internal conflicts had been pu t aside. 
Tourism, which started in the mid sixties, encouraged limited private initiative and small family- 
enterprises all over the Dalmatian coast. The borders were relatively open. The war was mostly 
forgotten. The repression of the first years of revolution (1945-50) had been stopped. The 
Yugoslavs dream t their dream of prosperity and international influence.
However, economic development reopened questions that - the leadership believed - had been 
answered once and for all. The development of tourism, mostly along the Croatian coast, had a 
crucial significance here. Encouraged by both the main principles of self-management (which 
argued that the workers should decide upon the results of their labour) and by market reforms 
launched in the mid-1960s, many Croats started thinking economically - whose money was 
earned in tourism? How much of it went to Belgrade, and why was it proportionally distributed 
to all republics and provinces? Was this not an unnecessary redistribution? Should not money 
earned in Croatia be distributed from Zagreb, rather than from Belgrade? The same argument 
applied to remittances sent by Yugoslav Gastarbeiter, which also started in the mid 1960s.
The other parts of Yugoslavia had an argument against such proposals. Yugoslavia was one 
country, and without Serbian agriculture and the Bosnian work force, Croatian tourism would 
not be successful. However, twenty years after the socialist revolution, the Croatian question 
seemed to return to the agenda, reminding many of the inter-war disputes between ethnic
16 In the period from 1950 to 1959, the Yugoslavs received more than 1,5 billion US dollars of economic assistance. In 
addition, 724 million dollars was given as 'military aid' (Warner Necil, 1962: 3). Lampe concludes that between 1950 and 
1964 US aid covered up to 60% of the deficits in the Yugoslav balance of payments (quoted by Denitch, 1990:137). For 
more on American assistance to Yugoslavia see Lees, 1997.
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segments of the bourgeois political elite. At the same time, all the developed areas questioned the 
necessity and efficiency of supporting the less developed areas of Yugoslavia - Macedonia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and particularly Kosovo. For the first time after the war, the unity of the 
political elite seemed to be cracking on issues of the further development of socialism. 
Discussion was held on several levels, but the main dimension was that between centralizers and 
decentralizers. On the other side, among those who agreed that Yugoslavia had to be 
decentralised, the argument was whether it should be decentralised to only ethnic or also (and 
primarily) to 'functional' units of various 'communities of self-managing interests'.17
This conflict within the elite was fuelled by the facts that President Tito was approaching an 
advanced age (he was 70 in 1962), and that he had already been in office 17 years (plus the four 
w ar years). Legally, it was no longer possible to elect him President once again. The extensive 
intra-party struggles for at least the 'No.2 position', if not openly for the succession were 
becoming stronger.18 Although nobody openly challenged his undoubtedly exceptional position, 
everyone was thinking of the post-Tito period, trying to secure the best possible starting 
position. As early as 1960 the serious question appeared for the first time: W hat would happen to 
Yugoslavia after Tito?
2.1.4. The Emergence of Kardelj's concept
The first discussions on this issue occurred in 1962, when the Party leadership held a session 
behind closed doors, discussing the situation in the country. The party's long-term ideologist 
Edvard Kardelj was the most explicit, maintaining that the leadership still had too much power, 
that self-management was more or less a paper house without real roots in society, and that 
bureaucratism was growing above the sustainable level. But, his main objections were about the 
illusion that a new ’Yugoslav1 nation was emerging out of the Yugoslav state. Socialism itself (just 
like any other ideology) can neither make nor deny the existence of nations, Kardelj wrote in the 
preface to the second edition of his (1939) book 'The Development of the Slovene National 
Question'.19 In 1961 he warned that ’our federation is not a framework for any new Yugoslav
17 Among issues debated within this dilemma were: whether the Federal Assembly should be composed of two or three 
chambers, the third being 'the Chamber of Associated Labour', and also -  whether the Party organisation should be 
structured along 'functioned' or only 'territorial' lines (see Rade Koncar's amendment rejected by the 12th LCY Congress 
in 1982). The territorial (and thus to large extent ethnic) argument won over the 'functional'. Vladimir Balearic's notion of 
'national economies' within Yugoslavia was an expression of Kardelj's conclusion that Yugoslav nations were 
'completed' and, therefore, they ought to have their own economic systems, including their own 'working class'.
18 For the importance of succession in communist regimes, see Bunce (1999) and Keeler (1993). More on the struggle to 
'replace Tito' after his death in 1980 can be found in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis.
19 In this conclusion the second edition (1957) differs from the first (1939). While in 1939 Kardelj fully shared Stalin's 
definition of the nation as the result of the bourgeois epoch, which is present in socialism only as a remnant of this old 
epoch, in 1957 he defines nation as a 'product of the socio-economic relations of the epoch of capitalism' which is a
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nation, nor for any national integration about which in their time some advocates of hegemony 
and denationalizing terror used to dream' (Kardelj, 1979:237).20 For Kardelj, Tan-Slavist and 
Yugoslav illusions' were the main potential danger for the future of Yugoslavia. They were the 
product of the epoch of bourgeois expansion and nationalism and, therefore, had to be defeated 
by the socialist revolution. But also -  and even more dangerously -  they were potentially 
attractive to 'dogmatic forces' and the new socialist bureaucracy, which was pursuing a policy of 
'Great-State Centralism'.21 Kardelj said clearly that there was a danger from 'Great-State 
ideology' when the old revolutionaries passed away. In 'The Development of the Slovene 
national question', Kardelj wrote that the Communists were the only force that could offer a 
viable solution of the national question in Yugoslavia. But, also, in the new circumstances, it was 
from the ranks of the Communist bureaucracy that the main potential danger came. It is, 
therefore, the struggle with bureaucracy that should be given high priority in party and state 
policy.
As early as the beginning of the 60s, Kardelj concluded that even the idea of socialist Yugoslavism 
was no longer feasible, since the Yugoslav nations had became fully constituted nations.22 
Yugoslavia had helped them to reach the level at which they wanted to have their own nation­
states, staying in Yugoslavia as long and only as long as it suited their common interests. These 
interests, Kardelj concluded in 1970, could arise mostly in three areas: first - in the common 
defence policy; second - in the common goals of the revolutionary transformation of the country; 
and third - in developing a common market area. In all other areas, Kardelj said, the countries of 
Yugoslavia had became mature enough to take care of their own interests.
Consequently, Kardelj argued that Yugoslavia ought to make a decisive step forward from a 
supra-state to a federation of sovereign nation-states. It was only then that both the inter-war 
concept of Yugoslavism and the Soviet model of the centralised state could be defeated in reality. 
The interests and identities of the constitutive nations should be the basis for a genuinely new 
Yugoslavia. A multi-ethnic state which would not protect the independence and state structures
product of 'the social division of labour'. Since under socialism the division of labour still exists, so does the nation. 
Kardelj himself admits that the second edition dropped elements of Stalin's influence. For the importance of this change, 
see Filipovic (1979:157).
20 He repeated an almost identical sentence in his speech to the Federal Assembly on 20 September 1962 (1962:138).
21 The phrase Great-State Centralism (veliko-drzavni centralizam1) was a post-war replacement for 'Great-Serbian 
centralism'.
22 Kardelj used term completed or fu lly  constituted nations (’zavrsene nacije1), emphasising that the republics in Yugoslavia 
became states after the socialist revolution in 1945. Observing from his Slovenian experience of living in two multi-ethnic 
states which treated their ethnic groups as cultural, but not political entities (Austro-Hungary and the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia), Kardelj was a fierce opponent of any similar attempts in post-war Yugoslavia. For relations between Kardelj 
and the Austro-Marxist tradition see Necak (1991).
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of small nations would not be in their interest. Although Kardelj was an advocate of the 
existence of a Yugoslav state, Yugoslav unity in his concept now became conditional on the 
agreement of its constitutive parts. Already in 1957, Kardelj used words such as 'today' and 'a t 
this moment' when concluding that Yugoslavia was in the interest of all Yugoslav nations 
(1957:47,62). And it existed because nations were 'complete national organisms wishing to live in 
a community with all other peoples, and especially with the Yugoslav peoples' (1969:226). But 
Yugoslav unity was neither a matter of ethnic similarities, nor of ideals, but of interests and 
historical necessities.
'The unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia is not based so much on their ethnic relatedness 
as on joint interests deriving from a common destiny and above all on their joint struggle 
for socialist relations among men and nations' (1975:141).
In fact, the existence of Yugoslavia was desirable 'provided [that the state] was founded on the 
free will and equality of all peoples'. Kardelj believed that the socialist character of Yugoslavia, 
and not ethnic similarity, was the main unifying force of the country. He was in favour of a 
socialist Yugoslavia also because he believed that small nations could not remain independent in 
the world of 'imperialism'.
'Unity was to their advantage not only because of their momentous bonds from the past 
or from the standpoint of the brotherhood of nations in the future, but also in terms of 
shared economic interests and the interests of socialism. Above all, unity was to their 
advantage in safeguarding their very existence and independence. In the m odem  world, 
the power of the reactionary force of imperialism and political hegemony is still 
extremely great. The Yugoslav nations would need each other's support to be able to 
guarantee their economic and political independence' (Kardelj, 1967: 54).
The Slovenian separatists, whom he often criticised, were 'cutting the branch on which they 
themselves were sitting' (1969:237) and were 'killing the ox for a pound of meat' (1969:238). In 
the world of the two blocs, it would have been virtually impossible for Slovenia (or for any other 
Yugoslav nation) to be independent to the degree that it was in Yugoslavia. In 1967 he referred 
to American policy towards Vietnam as a good example of what would happen to small 
independent states after the potential disintegration of Yugoslavia. They would become 'a 
provincial appendage of the imperialist world, which is today again showing its true face in 
Vietnam1 (1967a: 203). At the same time, however, he warned the Yugoslav 'unitarists' not to 
provoke ethnic separatism but to allow any nation to create its own state within Yugoslavia. 
Only when the Yugoslav nations secured their own states within Yugoslavia, when they really 
governed themselves would ethnic separatism be finally defeated.
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'For a free decision of a nation on the form of its cooperation with other nations, it is first 
necessary that this nation has control over itself, and only then can it make a free 
decision' (1957: 47).
Kardelj's writings and speeches in the 1957 -  1966 period met, if not with open criticism, then 
certainly with serious resistance among the advocates of Yugoslavism and South Slavism within 
the party and state leadership. The most prominent among these critics was the state Vice- 
President Aleksandar Rankovic who controlled home affairs. Although a Serb himself, he was 
recognized as more of a Yugoslav Centralist than a Serb representative in the federal leadership. 
For the democratic and liberal opposition Rankovic was the embodiment of central state power. 
As a party practitioner (the organisational secretary of the LCY and the main controller of the 
state security services) and not an ideologist (as Djilas and Kardelj were), he was a symbol of the 
bureaucracy and state apparatus. In Kardelj's criticism of 'Great-Statist tendencies' and 
'bureaucracy' he, therefore, recognised himself. Although he was very loyal to Tito and had 
never voiced any public dissent about state policy, Rankovic was widely perceived responsible 
for the belief that Yugoslavia meant more than just the sum of the six republics and that it was 
necessary to keep the federal institutions (especially the Party, Army and the security forces) 
independent of the influence of republican leaders.23 The conflict between the two options for 
Yugoslavia's future went on from 1962 to 1966. Since Kardelj and Rankovic (together with Tito 
and the once jailed Djilas) were considered as the core of the war and first post-war leadership, 
their conflict was perceived as the conflict between the only possible successors of Tito. In this 
conflict, Rankovic seemed to have a few important advantages over Kardelj: he was a party 
practitioner (not an ideologist) with a finger on the pulse of the party and state cadre policy. He 
was also very popular in the Army, Party and state security institutions and was considered to 
be more acceptable than Kardelj to the Soviet Union, despite his radical action against the 
'Cominformists' (Soviet supporters) in the 1948-1953 period. Rankovic's rare public addresses 
were uttered in simple words, which was in sharp contrast to Kardelj's theoretical discourses. 
Finally, Rankovic was a Serb, a logical choice for leadership after the Croat-Slovene Tito in a 
country in which the balance of power was traditionally based on the relationship between the 
Serbs and Croats. But, at the same time, all these 'advantages' -  and especially the last two -  
were somehow also 'disadvantages'. In a highly ideological society, the second most powerful 
position was always reserved to the main ideologist of the regime. Additionally, while in the 
Soviet Union ('state socialism') being a member of the largest nation and in charge of the state
23 By the very fact of being the main 'Serbian' politician, Rankovic was, just like his successors in this 'post' somehow 
'automatically' suspected of hegemonism and Great-State (even Great-Serbian) tendencies. The trend of 'accusing' all 
Serbian leaders of 'hegemonism' was what Slobodan Milosevic opposed two decades after the dismisal of Rankovic. For 
more on perceptions of Rankovic in the 1980s see Chapter Six.
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apparatus of coercion and repression could indeed be the main advantage in the power-struggle, 
within the Yugoslav system of 'anti-statism' this was not the case.
From 1962 to 1966 Tito was puzzled by the discussion between Kardelj and Rankovic. He 
seemed to switch his support from one side to the other a few times. Deep in his heart, says 
Djilas, Tito believed that one day all the differences between the Yugoslavs would disappear, 
both in the social and in the national sense. Milovan Djilas, once his enfant terrible and then his 
best-known prisoner, recalls a discussion on Yugoslavism with Tito in 1953:
'Tito believed that the nationalities of Yugoslavia would ultimately merge into one true 
nation. When I remarked that King Aleksandar Karadjordjevic thought so too, he 
retorted: 'Ah, but there was no socialism then' (Djilas, 1981:134).24
Tito was also a pragmatist, who understood well the importance of real instruments of power. 
On the other hand, what were the prospects for socialism if the nations of Yugoslavia were not 
satisfied regarding their national demands? And what was the future of Yugoslav independence 
if Yugoslavia were not able to create an effective and radical alternative to Soviet 'state 
socialism'?
The series of internal party discussions between 1962 and 1966 showed a deep divide between 
the two options for the future of Yugoslavia. This debate, in which Kardelj won over Rankovic 
(ousted from power in July 1966) determined the course of events that constituted the prelude to 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the last two decades of its existence. Kardelj's main argument 
in this debate -  the one that finally swayed Tito to his side -  was that Yugoslavia would not be 
different from the two antipodes unless it further decentralised. The main goal of socialism was 
that everyone decided upon the results of their labour. This principle applied to nations as well.25 
The de-centralisation of Yugoslavia was a pre-condition for self-management to work. Since self­
management was the only real democracy, de-centralisation was a precondition for 
democratisation too. On the other hand, the continuation of a centralised Yugoslav state would 
endanger both the national and socialist dimensions of the Yugoslav revolution. Finally, Kardelj
24 In his memoirs, the former Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Mirko Tepavac concludes that 'Tito was a Yugoslav in the good 
meaning of this word, and even a unitarist. To him, even Yugoslavia as it was was somehow too small1 (1998:154).
25 This explains why Yugoslavia refused to accept Soviet supreme authority and to join the Warsaw Pact. Since Yugoslav 
nations were 'completed', Yugoslavia itself came close to becoming a 'pact' between the newly created national states on 
its territory. It is not only that various republics therefore spoke of Belgrade (the federal centre) as a supra-national force 
with no right to 'intervene' in their 'domestic affairs', but Kardelj himself contemplated Yugoslavia more as an 
international conglomerate than a state in any 'classic sense'. Once it arrived in 1991/1992, full state independence was 
perceived by the non-Serbian republics of Yugoslavia (primarily Slovenia and Croatia), in rather similar terms to the non- 
Soviet countries of the bloc, as 'liberation' from a supra-national centre. For the Serbs, of course, this was not a valid 
interpretation, since they certainly did not see themselves as 'the Soviets' of the Yugoslav 'bloc'. On the contrary, as I 
have shown here and will further elaborate in Chapter Six, they felt disadvantaged in Yugoslavia.
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underlined that the state was withering away in the transitional period and that the model of 
governance should be transformed towards direct democracy.
Tito, who believed that the key to socialist transformation lay in the Party, not in the state, 
accepted that the state should be decentralised, but requested that the Party should remain 
united. He agreed to strengthen the Party and to weaken the state. If the Party were sufficiently 
strong to organise socialism, then the national question would be solved. Furthermore, Tito 
shared Kardelj's argument that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not a realistic option because it 
would change the whole international balance of power. If this was so, then the nationalism and 
separatism had no chance for as long as the communist remained in power. And this would be 
so, for as long as the communists demonstrated they could offer more independence to nations 
than either 'imperialist forces' or 'the forces of (Soviet) statist socialism'. Since, in principle, there 
could be no 'return to the past', the real danger originated in a different, statist type of socialism.
'For, as I have already stated, the alternative here is not whether Yugoslavia will survive 
or not but whether it will continue to develop as a socialist, self-managing and 
democratic community of equal peoples, or whether it will fall into the hands of 
hegemonic forces in any political or ideological guise' (Kardelj, 1981:228).
By 'hegemonic forces', Kardelj meant Soviet-type communists or any other type of great-statist 
ideology, which would 'naturally' rely on the strongest nation, the Serbs. Kardelj insisted that 
these forces m ust be denied any possibility of succeeding to the Presidency and that Tito's role in 
achieving this was crucial. No other 'social critics' (as Kardelj called them in his 1965 book) 
represented such a real danger for the Yugoslav project of socialism as those who advocated 
different 'directions of the development of socialism'.26 Since the old society 'had  absolutely no 
chance of success, it may be claimed that today the... choice [is] between socialist self­
management... and the system of bureaucratic-technocratic statism' (1973:286). The future of 
Yugoslav socialism depended -  in both its national and its class aspects -  on who would define 
and lead socialist policy. Neither the liberals nor the nationalists could succeed, both because of 
'objective laws' of social development and because of international and domestic reality. The
26 In his 'Notes on Social Criticism in Yugoslavia' (1965), Kardelj analysed four types of opposition: 1) bureaucratic (or: 
Stalinist); 2) nationalist-separatist; 3) 'the radical left' (Praxis philosophers) and 4) liberals. It is in his Marxist belief in 
General Laws of History that one needs to find the explanation for Kardelj's conclusion that nationalists and liberals had 
no recil chance of overthrowing communists. 'A man who would today try to make gold following the recipes of 
medieval alchemists would be considered a charlatan or a ridiculous ignoramus/ says Kardelj, concluding that the same 
rule of natural science should apply to the social sciences, where the creation of an 'ideal society' was attempted 'with the 
aid of an alchemical mixture of abstract eternal truths about humaneness and freedom, in disregard of the objective laws 
which govern social life and regulate the relations between man and nature' (1965:64). Kardelj's criticism of liberals and 
'right-wing' critics was a typical example of the 'scientific' rhetoric of the Yugoslav Marxists, who claimed that Marxism 
was scientific socialism.
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future of Yugoslavia, thus, ultimately depended on 'subjective forces', among which the Party 
played an exceptional role.27
In this conclusion, Kardelj had the support of the younger cadres, the newly elected leaders of 
the republics and provinces. Not only did they share his enthusiasm for further changes of the 
'bureaucratised system', but they also sought more autonomy for their republics and more 
security for their positions in the post-Tito era. Since none of the Republics (not even Serbia) had 
a majority of votes to control the federal leadership on their own, all of them preferred the 
'second best' option: to have as much autonomy as possible in their own territories and to 
prevent any drastically unfavourable outcome. Since the federal leadership was firmly in Tito's 
hands, they were all expected to be only republican representatives. They were, therefore, used 
to conducting only 'republican' politics, thinking of Yugoslavia in an increasingly similar way to 
the pre-war Croat leader Stjepan Radic - as an arena for their republic's 'foreign' policy.28
The victory of Kardelj's concept over the one symbolised by Rankovic in 1966 marked the end of 
the third constitutive concept of Yugoslavia, and introduction of the fourth, which we here call 
Kardelj's concept of Brioni Yugoslavia. The new concept, based on Kardelj's interpretations of 
Marxism and of Yugoslav political reality, was defined in the 1967-1974 Constitutional debate 
and codified in the 1974 Constitution. As both Tito and Kardelj admitted, the changes introduced 
on this occasion had a revolutionary character. Further in this chapter we analyse the main 
elements of the last constitutive concept of Yugoslavia.
2.2. The Elaboration of Kardelj's Concept
2.2.1. A Biographical Note on Kardelj
Edvard Kardelj was the most prominent ideologist among the Yugoslav Communists 
throughout the Tito period (1937-1979). When Rankovic was ousted in 1966, he remained the
27 Ironically, Kardelj's belief that the future of Yugoslavia depended on the future of Party and -  ultimately -  on the 
Yugoslavs themselves today sounds almost like prophecy. Despite the optimistic predictions of the last Yugoslav Prime 
Minister Ante Markovic and of most Western analysts, the disintegration of Yugoslavia indeed followed the collapse of 
the Party in January 1990. In the following chapters we shall take a close look at the struggle within the LCY and 
Yugoslav society in general over the different options for Yugoslavia after Tito and Kardelj.
28 On symbolical level, a good illustration of this shift is decision of Edvard Kardelj to move from Belgrade to Ljubljana in 
the early 1970s. The main Croatian leader, Vladimir Bakaric, had never moved his house to Belgrade, but always -  even 
when member of the Yugoslav Presidency (1974-1983) lived in Zagreb. In the 1970s, Belgrade was left to Tito, federal 
ministers and federal administration (largely domestic, i.e. Serbian), while real politics shifted to republican (and 
provincial) capitals.
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only member of Tito's closest wartime leadership still in power. Tito himself considered him his 
closest political aide, and 'an  illuminating figure [that] will be an inspiration to generations to 
come as an example of a consistent Communist, tireless revolutionary and a wonderful man' 
(Tito, 1979:385).29 His Slovenian origins, Yugoslav political orientation and Marxist beliefs 
provided the major context in which Kardelj's actions in the post-Rankovic years should be 
analysed. Although a Slovene, Yugoslav and Marxist, Kardelj opposed Slovenian nationalism, 
Yugoslav unitarism and Soviet 'state socialism', building up his own interpretation of Slovenian 
interests, the Yugoslav constitution and Marxist principles. Although Kardelj's views on these 
three major issues had been developed in almost 30 years of his writings prior to 1966, it was 
only now that he saw the real chance to transform his beliefs into a new constitutive concept and 
make it the pillar of the new (fourth) Yugoslavia. Unrestricted by any other member of the 
political elite except Tito himself, Kardelj proceeded to see his ideas transformed into the 
constitution, laws and political decisions, creating what would become Kardelj's Yugoslavia. 
Before I move to expound his views in detail, a brief biographical note is necessary in order to 
explain the origins of Kardelj's ideas.
An event which, as he himself later explained, 'decisively influenced' his decision to join the 
Communist Party, was the conflict between the Communists and members of the Organisation 
of Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA) which occurred in his youth in the Slovene mining town of 
Trbovlje. In 1928 (at the age of 18), while a student at the Teachers' Academy, Kardelj joined 
'anti-unitarist' and anti-monarchist forces. His first public appearances were indeed closely 
linked to discussing the national question in the light of Marxist theory. In his first article ('The 
National Question as a Scientific Question', 1932) Kardelj concluded that 'every nation has the 
right to an independent life, but such freedom will be won only by the constant struggle of the 
working people, because -  as we have seen -  the national problem is in its essence not a cultural, 
but a social problem' (Filipic, 1979:154). This idea was further developed in Kardelj's 1939 book 
on 'The Development of the Slovene National Question', which marked a turning point in the
29 Several sources confirm that Tito considered Kardelj as his potential successor. West (1994) and Dedijer (1981) say that 
in a situation of despair after the first unsuccessful actions of the Yugoslav Partisans in Serbia in December 1941, Tito 
offered his resignation from the post of Party General Secretary and proposed Kardelj as his successor. Ridley (1994:332) 
mentions that Kardelj was 'acting president' during Tito's visit to India in 1953. However, the Tito-Kardelj relationship 
had its bad days as well. In the early 1960s Tito supported the 'hardliner1 Rankovic and not the 'liberal' Kardelj. In Dec 
1962 Kardelj went on a private visit to London without telling Tito that he was going. Tito thought that Kardelj had 
deserted him (Ridley, 1994:371). It is not clear why Kardelj spent almost two months in London, but Kardelj's wife told 
me in 1987 that this was for health reasons. In Summer 1962 Kardelj had been shot and injured in a him ting expedition 
and needed to recover. The Croatian historian Bilandzic told me in an interview conducted in December 1995 that the 
tense relationship between the two lasted between 1961 and 1964, when Tito finally changed his mind. Ridley explains 
why and how. From then on, Kardelj was undoubtedly Tito's closest political ally. However, in an interview I conducted 
in October 1997, Stipe Suvar, once President of the LCY Presidency, said that Tito and Kardelj disagreed about the future 
of Yugoslavia even in their last years. According to Vidoje Zarkovic, the Montenegrin representative in the Party and 
state leadership, they addressed each other formally ('Vi', not 'ti') by the end of their lives. The texts discussed in this 
chapter were written mainly in between 1965 and 1979.
69
Communist understanding of the national question in Yugoslavia. After several years of illegal 
political activity in Slovenia and several prison sentences (some of which -  the most extensive 
ones30 -  were served in Belgrade prisons), in 1934 he went to Moscow to attend courses and 
teach the history of the Comintern at the Communist University of the National Minorities in the 
West (KUNMZ), and at the International Leninist School. After two and a half years spent in 
Moscow, he returned to Yugoslavia in February 1937, when he joined Josip Broz31 who was this 
year appointed General Secretary of the CPY by the Comintern. Kardelj remembered Broz from 
his spectacular 1928 trial in Zagreb, when Broz was jailed for five years for attempting to 
organise an uprising in Zagreb.32 They soon became close, fighting against the 'factionalism' and 
'sectarianism' of the CPY. The new political leadership, Kardelj said from a distance of 30 years 
in 1967, 'dropped sectarian slogans' and offered 'the unity of democratic forces in the struggle 
against the anti-democratic regime and against the growing fascist menace' (1967:12-3). There 
were, Kardelj acknowledged, four major focuses of the party's new policy: a) the fascist threat - 
especially after the Austrian Anschluss in 1938; b) the economic situation and increasing poverty 
of the working class and masses; c) the anti-democratic political system; and d) the national 
question. But, as much as the Communists later emphasised Tito's autonomous role in 
consolidating the Party, it was nevertheless a fact that these four issues were entirely in 
accordance with the new approach favoured by the Comintern itself. This was the time of 'the 
popular front' policy, which urged the Communist parties to approach and co-operate with 
other 'progressive1 social and especially national movements in their respective countries. Anti­
fascist fronts, of which the Communists were a part, had been formed in France and Spain at the 
same time. Within the Comintern, as well as within almost each of its national sections, the 
supporters of the old policy of the struggle of 'class against class' were replaced by the 
supporters of the new policy of the 'popular front against fascism'.33 The internal party conflict 
between the two approaches to Fascism was strong in the Yugoslav party as well and was not 
resolved until the Fifth Party Conference in Zagreb 1940. At this conference Tito was confirmed 
as the Party Secretary, while Kardelj was elected to the Politburo. Tito and Kardelj, therefore, 
came to the top of the Party as both Comintern loyalists and as exponents of less sectarian and 
more open politics for the renewed Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
30 A detailed description of Kardelj's imprisonments is given in Dedijer (1953:70-81).
31 Kardelj first met Broz (later: Tito) in Ljubljana in 1934. On this meeting see Kardelj's interview with Veljko Bulajic on 26 
February 1977 recorded for a documentary on Tito, and published as 'My First Meeting with Tito' (1980:209-55). Tito's 
memories on his first meeting with Kardelj are recorded by his official biographer Dedijer: 'Comrade Kardelj was a calm, 
quiet man, and it was just his equanimity that impressed me most. He was an honest revolutionary at a time when many 
were corrupted by factionalism' (Dedijer, 1953:96).
32 About the Bom baskfproces see Sobolevski (1977). At this trial, Broz publicly declared his communist beliefs and refused 
to recognise the legality and legitimacy of the Yugoslav Royal Courts. In fact, he said: 'I do not recognise this court. The 
only court I recognise as relevant is the Court of my Party'.
33 On the 'class against class policy' see Vlajcic (1989).
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During the war, Kardelj was among the main organisers of the Slovene anti-fascist resistance. 
Practising the policy of a wide anti-fascist coalition of the main political forces in the country, the 
Slovene 'Liberation Front' (Osvobodilna Fronta) became a unique political formation. It was not 
led by a Communist, but in fact by a man who started a public polemic with Kardelj's book in 
1939.34 But, Kardelj himself was its vice-president. The formation of the 'Liberation Front', 
containing representatives of the three main currents of the political spectrum (Christian 
Socialists, Liberals and Communists), was a sign of wide co-operation with the Communists 
from the beginning of the occupation. Partly, it was also an expression of the Slovene political 
tradition, which is often characterised as 'corporatism'.35 But it was also Kardelj's 1939 book that 
made many believe that the Communist movement did care about Slovene national interests and 
that the anti-fascist struggle would result in a Slovene state based on social justice and national 
freedom.
Between 1941 and 1945 Kardelj was the most prominent Slovene representative in Tito's 
headquarters. He was one of the two main creators of the 1943 AVNOJ Declaration (the other 
being Mose Pijade), which declared the wish of the Yugoslav Partisans to establish a federation 
after the war. In 1943 Kardelj became Vice-President of the newly established National 
Committee of the Liberation of Yugoslavia (NKOJ). He drafted the Agreement between NKOJ 
and the Yugoslav Royal Government in 1944 (The Tito-Subasic Agreement). In 1945 he became 
Vice-President of the Yugoslav Government and Minister for the Constitutive Assembly. He was 
Yugoslav Foreign Secretary, and Head of the Yugoslav Delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference.36 He was also the main Yugoslav participant in many talks with Stalin in Moscow 
between 1945 and 1948.37
In the whole post-war period, Kardelj was in charge of the structuring of the political system and 
ideology. Milovan Djilas, his colleague in the Yugoslav party leadership, remembers that Kardelj 
was - together with him - the main creator of the 'self-management7 doctrine. Writing about the 
first days after the conflict with Stalin in 1948 Djilas says that Kardelj and he had to convince Tito 
'that without an ideological squaring of accounts with the Soviet system, w ithout ideological
34 Josip Vidmar. Vidmar was not a Communist, and in his criticism of Kardelj in 1939 he opposed his Marxist views on 
nation.
35 For this see Luksic (1994).
36 On this period of his political activity see Kardelj's 'Reminiscences' (1982).
37 Like Djilas, Kardelj published several accounts of his talks with Stalin. Some of them are in his 'Reminiscences' (1982) 
and in Dedijer's 'Tito' (1953).
backing for our positions, we would lose our bearings, our confidence and our stability' (Djilas, 
1981:33). In Djilas' words, Tito accepted self-management only after initial hesitation, and 'w as 
never exactly passionate about it' (1981:76). On the contrary, Kardelj was - on Djilas1 account - a 
genuine democrat within the Party. He belonged to a 'liberal group' within the party leadership 
(1981:157), not only immediately after 1948, but also later - from the early 1960s.
But, although Djilas remembered Kardelj as 'resourceful, clever, tolerant, civilized and cunning' 
(1981:159), he also saw him as a political realist to an even greater extent than Tito himself was. 
In 1954, a year after Stalin's death, Tito was showing signs of wavering about 'self-management'. 
Milovan Djilas was the first victim of the new circumstances. In January 1954 it was Kardelj who 
claimed that Djilas was a 'revisionist' under the 'anarcho-liberal' influence of the ideas of 
Bernstein. More like Tito, Kardelj believed, Djilas says, that 'w ithout organization and without 
power, ideas are little more than a pipe dream' (Djilas, 1981:159).38 Although he 'cherished a 
secret desire for what is democratic', Kardelj, Djilas believed, was 'w ithout the guts to fight for it, 
to sacrifice for it' (1981:149).39
Djilas' characterisation of Kardelj explains his wording of the Programme of the CPY, which was 
accepted at the Seventh Congress of the LCY in 1958, never to be changed or even amended by 
the Party until its disintegration in January 1990. Because of its severe criticism of the Soviet one- 
party system, the Programme became the source of constant dispute between the Yugoslav and 
Soviet Communist Parties. Consequently, Kardelj was considered to be the main 'anti-Soviet' in 
the Yugoslav leadership until his death.40
Within the state leadership Kardelj held the post of chief law-maker and, especially, of 
Constitution-writer. His most important job, for which he will be remembered in all the 
Yugoslav republics, was that of the chairman of the Constitutional Committee for three Yugoslav 
Constitutions (1946,1963 and 1974). Being in charge of the Constitution, Kardelj formulated the 
normative elements of Yugoslav socialism. He did it not only through his speeches and public 
addresses, but also in a dozen books.41 His last book 'Ways of Developing the Socialist System of
38 Some would see Kardelj's last book (1977) as a 'return to Djilas'. But, as Suvar said in the interview conducted for this 
thesis in October 1997, this view is certainly an exaggeration.
39 According to Djilas, Kardelj was privately very sorry about this split between the two. Before the session of the party 
leadership in 1954, he even told Djilas that nothing had been so difficult in his life as to write a political platform against 
him (Djilas, 1981).
40 For more on Soviet-Yugoslav relations, including the ideological dimension of the dispute, see Clissold (1975) and 
Micunovic (1980).
41 His published opus has about 6,000 pages, but there is almost the same amount of unpublished material, some of 
which is used in this chapter, courtesy of the late Mrs Kardelj who gave me access to some of Kardelj's manuscripts back
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Self-Management' (written a year and a half before his death, in 1977) was accepted as a 'p a rt of 
the ideological and political guidelines for the League of Communists' in preparing the 11th 
Congress of the LCY in 1978.42 Together with Tito's concluding speech at this Congress, it 
represents the unofficial 'political testament' of the two leaders of Yugoslav socialism.
For all these reasons, it is not difficult to understand Tito's words, that Kardelj was a key 
participant in the 'strategy-making of [our] movement' (1979:383), and that he was his 'closest 
aide' in foreign policy and in formulatiiig a new 'theory of the national question' (Tito, 1979:383). 
It is, therefore, justified to take Kardelj as one of the most reliable sources to reveal the Yugoslav 
Communists' story, their intentions and the policies that led to their realisation. Later in this 
chapter, I shall take a closer look at Kardelj's interpretation of who the Yugoslav Communists 
were and how they would like to be seen by others. In recovering Kardelj's views on Yugoslavia, 
I shall present the Communist concept of Yugoslav identity as projected by Kardelj in the last 
phase of its development before the country's actual disintegration.
2.2.2. Kardelj's Interpretation of Marxism
As I have already argued, there were two antipodes to the new project of socialism, as Kardelj's 
writings suggested: (1) inter-war Yugoslavia, which was considered to be unjust in ethnic and 
social terms; and (2) the Soviet type of socialism, which was treated as 'revisionism' from 
Marxism following the split between the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1948. We have already 
discussed the Kardeljist alternative to inter-war Yugoslavism. This part of the chapter focuses on 
Kardelj's interpretation of Marxism and the differences between the Yugoslav and Soviet 
models.43
The Yugoslav Communists claimed their project of socialist revolution was a 'practical 
implementation of Marxism in society7 (Tito 1952 in Dedijer, 1984:610). When asked about 
'Titoism', as a new doctrine, Tito fiercely rejected its existence:
in 1987. The private archive of the Kardelj family, containing 64 boxes of correspondence and other sources collected 
between 1928 and 1992, is now part of the Slovenian State Archive. It is, unfortunately, still inaccessible for detailed 
research.
42 The decision was taken at the 13th session of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the LCY: see Dolanc, 1978:13.
43 Although both sides in the conflict -  Yugoslavs and Soviets -  exaggerated the differences between their interpretation 
of Marxism, these differences were far from being entirely insignificant. For this see Zukin (1975) and Lapenna (1964).
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'Titoism as a separate ideological line does not exist... To put it as an ideology would be 
stupid... It is simply that we have added nothing to Marxist-Leninist44 doctrine. We have 
only applied that doctrine in consonance with our situation. Since there is nothing new, 
there is no new ideology. Should 'Titoism' become an ideological line, we would become 
revisionists; we would have renounced Marxism. We are Marxists, I am a Marxist and 
therefore I cannot be a 'Titoist'.' (Dedijer, 1953:432).
As Marxists, the Yugoslav Communists believed that socialism was a 'transitional phase' from 
capitalism to Communism. The notion of 'transition' remained a stable part of Kardelj's concept. 
'The times we live in are a typical transitional period between two historical epochs. Elements of 
both historical epochs exist and are operative within the frameworks of each individual country,' 
said Kardelj in his 1955 speech at Chatham House in London (1955:69). More than twenty years 
later, in 1977, in his last important study 'Ways of Democracy in Socialist Societies', Kardelj 
repeatedly concluded: 'We are living in a typical period of transition' (1977:18).45 Transition was 
a long-term project, which only began with the socialist revolution.46 It was also a complex 
project of social, economic and political changes.47 These changes are permanent and 
revolutionary in their character. They mean the 'gradual acquisition of positions in society by the 
working class' (Kardelj, 1977:104) and destruction of the last remnants of the bourgeois system.48 
Socialism is a time of building a 'future world', which would reduce social antagonisms to a 
minimum, fully developing 'each individual's creative will' (1955:20). The end of the process is 
known -  Communism.
Kardelj had a clear vision of the future world, and was convinced that a 'vision' of the future was 
a gift granted to exceptional politicians, such as Tito was. But, it was not only the top politicians,
44 Back in 1953, Tito still used the phrase 'Marxism-Leninism' to name the doctrine he followed. This phrase was later 
proscribed as a synonym for dogmatic Marxism, especially for the Albanian official interpretation of Marxism as 
formulated by Enver Hoxha. Following the 1981 unrest in Kosovo, many Albanians were convicted for joining 'Marxist- 
Leninist illegal organisations'. Indeed, several groups of Albanian separatists were named 'Marxist-Leninist' (Mertus, 
1999). At the same time, Hoxha called Yugoslav 'revisionism' -  'Titoism' (Hoxha, 1982).
45 The notion of transition (i.e., the transition to communist society) was the basic assumption of the Programme of the 
LCY, whose draft was made by Kardelj. To a similar extent to the Programme of the CPSU (1961), this was a programme 
for the Party in the transitional period.
46 Kardelj's argument was in this respect not much different from the one expressed in guidelines to Communist Parties 
issued at the December 1961 meeting in Moscow. In this document, the process of transition was described in ten steps 
(see Wilczynski, 1981:604).
47 The 'triple' transition to communism could be compared with the post-communist notion of 'triple transition' (Offe, 
1991). Although their conclusion on the nature of the end result are totally different, many elements of the communist 
and post-communist 'transition' rhetoric are similar: both of them talk about 'revolutions' after which the 'false' and 
'unnatural' course of History was reversed; they both saw the trend as inevitable in the long run, though allowing the 
possibility of the 'set-back' (counter-revolution) in the short term; they both rely on a 'scientific' approach to history and on 
the idea of progress in history; they both use the notion of 'transition' (transitional period) and -  finally -  they both have a 
strong vision of the future (liberal democracy, communism).
48 This is why the Yugoslav -  and all other socialist societies -  were in a state of permanent 'reform'. Yugoslavia changed 
four constitutions (including the 1953 Constitutional Law) in the 28 years between 1946 and 1974. The necessity of 
permanent changes could only be understood within the logic of 'transition'.
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but the Communist rank-and-file who were expected to be clear in their goals and 'm ust build 
[the society] in anticipation of such a future' (1977:185). The whole idea of politics in a socialist 
society was linked to this final aim. The very formulation of the concept of the future was the 
prime political activity. It involved selection of the 'new7 which should be protected and helped 
by the state to develop, and of the 'old ' which should be equally 'helped' to 'w ither away'. In the 
order which claimed to represent the future that was coming, the political prophets (visionaries, 
in Kardelj words) were creating reality. As formulated in the LCY Programme (1958:266) the 
'historic task' and 'ultimate goal' of the Yugoslav Communists was to 'transform the 
contemporary social scene, which bears all the marks of the transition period, into one in which 
classes and all traces of exploitation and the oppression of mem by man will disappear', to create 
'a  society without a state, classes, or parties' (1958:267).
What politics also involved, the Yugoslav Communists argued, was to convince as many people 
as possible about this vision of the new society. It was the scientific character of Marxism which 
could help them in doing so.49
'Following a critical Marxist analysis of social trends, the League of Communists has 
arrived at scientific data about the essence of social processes. On this basis it established 
the directions of the further development of the revolution, ensuring its continuity. At 
the same time, it armed the working class with these data, making it the conscious 
subject of socialist development' (Tito, 1978:65).
As Tito said in his report to the 11th Congress of the LCY (1978), self-management was 'the 
cornerstone of the scientific theory of the classics of Marxism' (1978:66). Marxist science and 
philosophy50 were, therefore, an essential help to socialist forces in contemporary Yugoslavia. 
These forces should base their activity 'upon scientific knowledge' (Tito, 1978:68).51 On the 
contrary, 'those social sciences, which are under the influence of bourgeois science would hardly 
be in accordance with our socialist trends' and should, therefore, be subjected to 'ideological
49 About the scientific character of Marxism see Waller (1972:29); Graham (1966/73:65), Marx's writings in his 'Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts' and Engels' 'Anti-Duehring'. The scientific character of Marxism was in line with the 
arguments of the main Enlightenment authors to which Marx referred in his writings.
50 Tito urged Marxist philosophy to 'do much more to research the character, factors and development of socialist society' 
(1978:66). This was no different from the way in which the Programme of the CPSU urged the Soviet social sciences: to 
'constitute the scientific basis for the guidance of the development of society' (CPSU Programme, 1961/1962:223). This 
was the main motive for the later (1985) invitation of the Serbian president Ivan Stambolic to the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts to join the political leadership in resolving political and economic crises in the country. While the 
'nationalist' intelligentsia was condemned, 'constructive criticism' of the regime from within the 'progressive forces' of 
the intelligentsia was tolerated and supported.
51 Accordingly, in the 1970s Marxism entered school curricula as a compulsory course. 'Political schools' at all levels were 
established to promote Marxism to the members of the LCY and general public. Political science, heavily based on 
Marxism, became a university study after four Faculties of Political Science were opened. In Skinner's words, one can 
describe this as an attempt by the ideology to control the instruments of dissemination (1988:15).
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struggle'.52 In Kardelj's words, change from one epoch to another was the result of organised 
political action, which was 'based on science and specialised knowledge, placed at the service 
of... the masses' (1972:45).
Such a change was inevitable and it meant a progression.53 Socialist societies were 'an  important 
historical advance' when compared with the 'political pluralism of bourgeois society' (1977:165). 
The main difference between the two was not primarily in the model of government, so much as 
in the types of interests they protected and promoted. In general, politics was about interests. A 
state protected and promoted the interests of the ruling class regardless of the form and political 
system it developed.
'The only difference [between 'our society' and 'bourgeois democracy'] is that... our 
defence of the system is in the interest of the overwhelming majority of working people, 
whereas in a bourgeois democracy there is often a hypocritical cover-up of the fact that it 
is the political system best suited to the capitalist mode of production' (1977:216).
Such a 'cover-up' was impossible in the long-run and would, therefore, inevitably underpin the 
internal conflicts immanent to a bourgeois society. Kardelj did not have any original thoughts 
about it, which were not already expressed in Marx's or Lenin's notion of dialectics. However, he 
explicitly underlined that to be 'in  the interest' of the majority does not necessarily mean to be 
supported by the same majority. The majority might be unaware of its own best interests - it 
m ight be 'blind' about them. This is why a vanguard was needed to show the proper way and to 
educate the masses. This was why the role of the Party as the collective intellectual was crucial in 
the transitional period. 'Communists', says the Programme of the LCY, 'm ust educate the working 
people to take a greater, more direct and more independent share in the management of society, 
and to think and act in a socialist manner, until the very last citizen has learnt to manage the 
affairs of the community' (Programme, 1958:12s).54 There is no doubt that the Communists were 
seen as not only capable of but as a 'predestined' force for this task.
52 This explains the tougher stand against philosophers and some 'radical left' and 'liberal' social scientists and 
philosophers (such as those around the Praxis journal) in the 1970s. Also, it explains the reasons behind the permanent 
conflict between the Party and the humanistic intelligentsia ('dissidents') not only in Yugoslavia but elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe. Both groups believed they were entitled to a monopoly over truth. For politics as the struggle for truth in 
'Gnostic societies' see Voegelin (1952). This thesis also argues that politics in Yugoslavia was to a very large extent a 
struggle for the 'right' interpretation of 'truth' which took the form of the struggle between the right interpretation of 
Marxism and revisionism, both internationally (with the Soviets) and domestically (with the various left groups opposed 
to the official interpretation).
53The idea of post-communist transition is also based on the notion of inevitable progress from 'authoritarianism' to 
'democracy' following the 1989 revolutions. Anthony Giddens, for example, argues that these changes were inevitable 
and are irreversible, since they are the results of deeper structural reasons (see my interview with Giddens, June 1999).
54 Almost identical formulation of the role of Party could be found in the CPSU Programme: 'The Party considers that the 
paramount task in the ideological field in the present period is to educate all working people in a spirit of ideological 
integrity and devotion to communism, and cultivate in them a communist attitude to labour and the social economy...'
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'That democracy is not synonymous with rule by erratic impulse and that it is not the 
Party's role to act as a programmed executor of the 'will of the majority' are 
fundamentals never forgotten by the Party despite its consistent commitment to 
democratic goals and the masses. If the Party meant to remain the leading force of 
society, it had to see deeper and further than the broad mass of the people and the 
'majority'. The Party had to perceive the principal historical meaning of its leading 
ideological and political role in elaborating the long-term goals of progressive social 
action and in persevering in its work of transmitting its progressive learning to the broad 
masses of the people' (Kardelj, 1967:47).55
Socialist democracy, Kardelj argued, was not only superior to 'political1 (capitalist, liberal) 
democracy, but was the only real form of democracy, because it included economic, not only 
political equality. Socialism was a definite break with any exploitation, both within countries and 
between them. Ultimately, democracy is possible only when exploitation has been abolished.56 
Democracy is not only a procedure. It is not a system either. It is not acceptable per se, but only if 
socialist. Socialist democracy is -  as the CPSU Programme (1961/1962:32) declared -  'a  new type 
of democracy -  democracy for the working people'. There could be no genuine democracy in a 
capitalist society, because democracy was primarily the possibility to fully decide upon the 
results of one's own labour. In Tito's words, 'only in socialism could an individual be regarded 
as totally equal, because equality always has an economic basis. The economic basis makes 
democracy in socialism real' (Tito in Dedijer, 1984:610). This was why both Tito and Kardelj 
believed that self-management was the highest realistically possible level of democracy 
applicable to Yugoslav experience. Self-management was the key to connect 'real individual 
liberty', which 'is made through the economic process' (Tito in 1952, Dedijer, 1984:611), with the 
freedom of social groups, such as class and nation. On both accounts -  as a strategy for social 
justice and national equality -  self-management was seen to be the perfect solution. In contrast to 
pre-war Yugoslavia in which centralisation meant both national and class exploitation, the 'new 
Yugoslavia' was -  at least in theory - based on the principle of full autonomy in deciding the 
outcome of one's own labour.
(1961/1962:202). Statutes of other organisations of the Yugoslav regime, such as the Socialist Youth Organisation, or the 
Socialist Alliance of Working People, used the word 'education' to define the goals of these organisations.
55 Only by understanding this can one explain why the Party mattered more than the state in a socialist society. It was the 
position of the General Secretary of the Party, not the state president that held reeil power. When thinking of resigning his 
post as state president in 1971, Tito wanted to remain the Party president -  not vice versa (Tripalo, 1991). Tito could 
accept the federalisation of the state, but not of the party. The federalisation of the party would mean real federalisation, 
not a symbolic one. All political conflicts in Yugoslavia took the form of intra-party divisions. Even as late as 1987, the 
Serbian State President thought it was 'unthinkable' to use his state position to act independently from the Party (more in 
Chapter Six). In its final phase, the LCY Central Committee became the real 'parliament' of Yugoslavia. Ultimately, this 
explains why the disintegration of the Party meant the end of Yugoslavia as a state.
56 The link between the 'man's emancipation from exploitation, which is what primarily constitutes social justice' and 
democracy is established also in the CPSU Programme (1961/1962:40).
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Kardelj made a significant effort to explain self-management as the result of Yugoslav political 
tradition, which was not that of the developed capitalist mode of production. The autonomy of 
the Yugoslav partisan movement from Moscow, as well as its relatively broad scope among the 
population, were now used as the main sources of new system-building. Kardelj also 
emphasised that the Yugoslav bourgeoisie did not leave any significant heritage of democratic 
institutions, characterised by strong parties, parliamentary tradition or impressive record of 
hum an and political rights. But even if it had been much different, a socialist country could not 
just simply take over the institutions of bourgeois society without re-adjusting them to new 
social goals. Of course, it had even less reason to establish them where they did not previously 
exist. The institutions of bourgeois society, Kardelj says, in fact 'blur the true class nature of the 
system' (1977:108), when claiming they represent 'abstract citizens' or 'the whole society'. In 
reality, however, a citizen had no say in bourgeois democracy dominated by political parties. In 
fact 'he often feels as though he were living in a jungle in which there is a constant struggle 
going on between interests and forces which are alien to him and incomprehensible, so that he 
retreats into the only world which is left to him, the world of the 'lonely consumer' (Kardelj, 
1977:112). However progressive it was in previous periods of social development, 'political 
democracy' was now only a farce, a false and misleading external picture, a facade of capitalist 
society,57 which promoted a real economic and political inequality among its citizens.
Parliament and political parties are the main institutions of such a system. Kardelj rejected them 
both. In his conception, parliament was an embodiment of the representation of 'abstract 
citizens'. Thus, it was no more than a place for the stabilisation of class-power, which was 
concentrated outside it, in many circles of 'extra-parliamentary power'.58 Subsequently (and from 
this conception, of course, logically), Kardelj attempted to build the Yugoslav political system on 
exactly the opposite grounds. Yugoslav Communists, he says, have no reason to buy 'second­
hand' clothes from the bourgeoisie. They had no interest in re-building political parties, which 
had never found their roots among the people and which were not 'the last word' in social 
development (1977:130). Parties and parliaments were the product of the bourgeois phase of 
social development: they did not exist before, nor they will necessarily exist after it. One day 
when socialism became the indisputable and dominant system in the world, we would look at 
political parties in the same way as we did now at the institutions of feudalism, Kardelj was 
convinced.
57 The whole bourgeois system 'gives the masses the illusion that they are in charge of society or that at least they have an 
opportunity of running society, even though in fact society is being managed by the top echelons of the political parties 
and the state executive, and above all by the leading forces of extra-parliamentary class power' (Kardelj, 1977:109).
58 'By extra-parliamentary power we mean the real power which is exercised by the ruling class by virtue of its right to 
private property7 (Kardelj, 1977:109).
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What makes Kardelj different from the Soviet critics of bourgeois democracy, however, is his 
criticism of 'one-party systems' as well.59 Kardelj refutes the Soviet-style one-party system as 
incompatible with self-management.
'Furthermore, the one-party system becomes more vulnerable to deformations the
farther way it gets from the initial stages of revolution' (1977:118).
In a powerful attack on 'one-party systems', Kardelj went so far as to conclude that in Eastern 
Europe one party had taken over the role that was performed by many parties in the West. And 
that was all. This very change, however, had not changed much. Certainly, it did not open the 
doors to direct democracy - which was Kardelj's ideal. Politics had not become more accessible to 
the people, but was controlled by the top leadership of the party. It was all contrary to w hat self- 
managing democracy was intended to be. Kardelj's criticism of the Soviet model was as strong as 
his rejection of Western democracies.60 For Yugoslavia, he was constructing a third way in what 
he considered to be a real alternative to both sides of the Cold War divide.61
The attempt to offer an alternative to both East European models and the Western democracies 
was the reason behind the revolutionary restructuring of the Yugoslav political system. The old 
parliamentary structures were destroyed. New 'delegate assemblies' were created and thousands 
of people really became members of 'delegations', 'working councils', 'self-managing interest 
communities', etc.62 Instead of professional politicians as in parliamentary democracies (who 
were declared 'subservient to extra-parliamentary class power'), the Assembly delegates were 
only spokespersons of their delegations. In most cases, they had to vote as they were instructed, 
and were replaceable at any time. A complex electoral system was introduced which abandoned
59 In Tito's words soon after the split with Stalin (1952, dialogue with Dedijer): 'The role of the party is historically limited 
to a certain period... The party withers away gradually. That does not mean that a one-party system will be superseded 
by a multi-party system. It merely means that the one-party system, having superseded a multi-party system, will in turn 
vanish... Therein lies the very difference between our view and that of the Soviets' (Dedijer, 1953:430-1).
60 Having this in mind, it was not surprising that strong criticism of 'state socialism' and 'statism' was not only permitted 
but encouraged by the elite. Criticism of Soviet models of 'state socialism' (or even 'Stalinism') was a major problem in 
relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. In the late 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic attempted to re-affirm the role of the 
state, but this was immediately recognised as 'state socialism' and 'Stalinism'. The most loyal supporters of Kardelj's 
concept (in Slovenia and Croatia, but also -  as will be demonstrated in Chapter Six -  in Serbia) recognised in his 
demands exactly what Kardelj criticises most: 'great-statist' tendencies coming from a 'Serbian nationalist'. More on 
Milosevic in Chapter Six of this thesis.
61 This is how one can explain non-alignment as the main foreign-policy orientation of Yugoslavia. Kardelj believed that 
Yugoslavia could offer a model of national independence and social justice to the Third World. This definition of national 
interest was based on these ideological premises.
62 In 1977 there were about 75,000 delegations altogether, comprising over a million citizens: thus nearly one in five of 
Yugoslav adult workers were directly involved in the process of self-management (Wilson, 1978:255). -
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equal representation of citizens, replacing it with functional representation of social groups.63 
The Party still kept the leading role, but without being named a party (since 1952: the League of 
Communists), and was supposed to run society by persuasion of the workers and citizens 
(assembled in the Socialist Alliance of Working People), not directly. The system of self­
management was to replace the state, which was de-centralised on its way to withering away. 
Even the defence system was -  in theory -  replaced by the concept of general people's defence.64 
Finally, the functions of the Yugoslav Federal state were drastically reduced, while the functions 
of the republics were increased by the new constitutive concept. The reform of the federation in 
the 1967-1974 period was a logical consequence of the introduction of Kardelj's concept, which 
was accepted by all relevant participants in Yugoslav politics. Here I argue that one cannot 
understand the motives of political actors in the 1967-1974 Constitutional debate without 
understanding the narrative they had followed. This narrative was based on Kardelj's 
interpretation of Marxism, which included the notion of the gradual decentralisation of state 
towards its 'dying out7 at the end of the transitional period towards Communism.
2.2.3. The Notion of State in Kardelj's Concept
On both accounts -  as a supra-national body and as a potential 'nest' of 'bureaucracy7 -  the 
federal state had been increasingly seen as a potential danger. Apart from this, if the Yugoslav 
Communists wanted to offer a real alternative to both the inter-war Yugoslavism and Soviet 
Communism, they had to make a significant step towards further de-centralisation of the federal 
state. It was in this belief that one has to look for the motives of the constitutional reforms.
Kardelj was not an anarchist and was a severe critic of 'theories of spontaneity7.65 He believed 
that the state had an important and progressive role in securing the results of the revolution,
63 More on the new structure of the Yugoslav political system in Potts (1997) and Cohen (1989).
64 On the GPD concept see Gow (1992). More about what happened in reality will be said in the following chapters of this 
thesis. It was not only that the system was never fully put in practice (since it would have seriously destabilised die real 
pillars of power, including Tito's and Kardelj's role) but the results of actions that were taken were often directly 
opposite from the declared intentions. A system that claimed the working people to be its cohesive force became divided 
into thousands and thousands of small units. Bureaucracy was not defeated either in its size or in its real power. On the 
contrary, the possibility of manipulation increased, both because the new 'delegates' had no political experience or 
adequate education, and because they had no courage to voice their own opinion, since they were always accountable to 
'delegations' they had to represent. The system of government became extremely expensive and complex. Millions of 
anonymous self-managers were formally 'responsible', while 'extra-parliamentary' centres held real power. Instead of 
moving towards 'direct democracy', voters in Yugoslavia had an opportunity to elect only members of 'delegations', not 
even a delegate herself. The whole structure soon became an example of real disenfranchising, which made many people 
feel manipulated and powerless.
65 Although Marx believed in the inevitability of progressing from capitalism towards the classless society, he also argued 
that this process could not be the result of its autonomous logic, but could only happen if the 'subjective forces' organised 
and led it. In his pamphlet 'What Is to Be Done', Lenin wrote: 'All worship of spontaneity of the working-class 
movement, all belittling of the role of the conscious elem ent... mean... strengthening the influence of bourgeois ideology
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especially in its immediate aftermath. But, the state was still a product of the past historical 
epoch, which was inevitably to be substituted at the end of the 'transitional phase'. It was not the 
aim of socialism to 'create a state-sponsored democracy, but rather to socialise state functions 
and to promote self-management and self-managing democracy' (Kardelj, 1977:140). Once direct 
democracy was promoted, the 'state apparatus will turn into a specialised public service of the 
self-managing society7 (1977:140).
Contrary to the Soviet optimistic predictions of the Khrushchev period that the state would 
wither away in 20 or 30 years,66 Kardelj thought that it would take several generations before 
that happened. But the process of the 'withering away of the state' was relentless. And it began 
with the revolution itself. The promotion of the Yugoslav model, therefore, demanded 
transformation of the state by transferring its functions to 'society7.67 In 1969, Kardelj declared 
that the Yugoslav state was not a 'classic' state68 but a 'self-managing community of working 
people, nations and nationalities', and that therefore terms like 'federation' or 'confederation' 
were not any longer applicable to describe the new Yugoslavia.69 Although the state was still 
named the 'Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia',70 'federation' was -  Kardelj said -  an 
'outdated category, which can solve nothing in our system' (1969:246). The same applied to the 
term 'confederation'.
upon the workers' (Lenin, Works, V:354). This was the main argument Kardelj used against Djilas' proposals to reduce 
the role of the Party back in 1953-1954.
6,6 The official CPSU gazette Komunist declared in 1959 that the 'main elements [of the transitional period] should be 
completed within the next fifteen years' (De Koster, 1964:151).
67 This process was called the 'socialisation of state' (podrustvJjavanje drzooe). Instead of 'state property' -  'social property' 
was introduced, while administrative units (such as municipalities, regions, republics and the federation) were named 
'socio-political communities'. This was all done in order to demonstrate the differences between 'social self-management' 
and 'statist socialism' as practised in the USSR. An excellent account of the debates between Soviet and Yugoslav 
Marxists on the 'withering away of the state' is given in Lapenna (1964). For 'socialisation of defence' see Gow (1992).
68 As Bettelheim argued (1971:34), the socialist state was 'no longer completely a state because it is the instrument of the 
exercise of power by the working masses themselves', and not an instrument of control and repression against them. I 
argue that the incredible weakness of Yugoslav state to resist the pressure it faced in the late 1980s had its deep roots in 
this 'anti-statist' rhetoric and action. It was precisely in Yugoslavia, in which the state 'withered away7 faster than in 
other cases in Eastern Europe that the consequences of this process were most obvious.
69 Kardelj's concept introduced many new words into the Yugoslav political vocabulary. Old words were considered to 
be unsuitable to describe the new reality. Creating new words was in fact the first step to changing the world. In this 
dissertation I prefer using the official (Yugoslav government) English translation for these terms, if it exists. I realise that, 
outside of their ideological contexts, some of these terms are easy to misunderstand.
70 Interestingly, it was reported that Slobodan Milosevic, then a student at the Law Faculty in Belgrade, was the member 
of the LCY who proposed that the country be named the Socialist Federative, rather than (as Kardelj originally had 
suggested) the Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The emphasis on socialism, rather than on the form of the 
state, somehow suited both Rankovic's and Kardelj's concepts. While within the concept of the Third Yugoslavia (pre- 
1966), the socialist character of the state was emphasised, in the fourth concept (Kardelj's) the form of the state was to be 
rated second to the 'form of social order'. Rating 'federal' (character of the state) second to 'socialist' (type of social order) 
was, therefore, in their common interest. Milosevic’s proposal was accepted by his Party organisation (Law Faculty in 
Belgrade) and later by the Party leadership itself.
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'Both the federation and the confederation ... represent categories of the multinational 
state, which was a form of bourgeois political society in the capitalist epoch' (1969:246).
These forms of state played a progressive role in their time, but -  just like as parties and 
parliaments -  were not suitable for the new epoch.
'Briefly, present-day Yugoslavia is no longer a classical federation, nor can it be a 
classical federation, but is a socialist self-managing community of peoples, which in 
many respects represents a substantively new category in relations among nationalities' 
(1969:248).
Finally it was not only that words to describe the institutions of the new Yugoslavia had to be 
invented, but the entire structure of the state was unique. The functions of the Yugoslav Federal 
state were drastically reduced mainly to common defence and foreign policy, but even in these 
areas the federation itself became 'more the initiator, executor and agent of adjustment ... than 
an autonomous decision -  maker' (Kardelj, 1974:292).71 And these areas were left to Tito himself, 
who acted almost as if foreign and defence policy were his private domain.72 According to 
Kardelj's interpretation of the national question, the federal state had no autonomy in itself, but 
was only a tool of the (by then already divided) working class and their nation-states. Federal 
bodies were not independent of the republics, but formed directly by them. The republics 
handed over to the exercise of the federation only these powers which they 'explicitly 
determined in the federal constitution', which could be amended only with the consent of all 
members of the federation. 'The power of the federation... derives from the republics, not the 
other way round', was the principle realised in the Yugoslav legislature (Kardelj, 1973:279).
Consequently, Yugoslav citizens as such were not directly represented in any of the federal 
institutions. As Zagreb professor Zarko Puhovski said (1984), they were fictive political beings:
71 Republics increased their influence over appointments of ambassadors and intensified their bilateral relations with 
foreign states. (This included the relations between Kosovo and Albania, which would cause many controversies in the 
following decades.) In defence policy, although the Army was highly centralised and under Tito's full control, the 
republics were allowed to form units of Territorial Defence and the military strategy re-emphasised the partisan (local) 
tactics as opposed to frontal army activities only. (The territorial defence units would a decade and a half later become 
the main source for the emergence of separate armies in the republics, while the concept of self-defence via Partisan war 
in fact provided suitable training of civilians, many of whom used this knowledge in the post-Yugoslav wars).
72 Tepavac remembers that while the ministers of defence and foreign and internal affairs were in constant personal 
contact with Tito, the speaker of the parliament and the prime minister could not see him even after repeated requests. 
'However, Tito's direct contact with the republic governments and LC leaders became more important as their autonomy 
increased. With these leaders he met regularly, if not frequently... republican delegations officially reported to Tito and 
increasingly turned to him for approval of many measures they believed could not be adopted through constitutional 
channels. Furthermore, Tito was inclined to agree with everybody. When a problem arose between two or more 
republics, republican leaders learned to approach Tito separately, instead of meeting together. Tito often would satisfy 
the parties individually, sometimes at each other's expense, and without resolving the underlying issues' (Tepavac, 
1997:74-5). This explains why Tito's death left Yugoslavia without effective federal government. More on this in Chapters 
Four and Five.
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'A nd since the system of representation through federal units, which means through 
ethnic identities, has been taken to be decisive for any political participation, there can be 
no place for those who have cancelled their belonging to such a system/
Another professor of politics, Jovan Miric (also from Zagreb), concluded:
'As long as a citizen remains an outsider, an unrecognised element of the community, 
the awareness of belonging to this community will not develop. A community (in 
contrast to a society) can be built and destroyed in our own minds. It cannot be 
constructed externally, from somewhere outside ourselves' (Miric, 1985:45).
But the concept of citizenship that both Puhovski and Miric had in mind, was a liberal concept, 
and, therefore, was not acceptable to Kardelj. As he explained in his 'Notes on Social Criticism' 
in 1965, the Yugoslav political system should not be based on the liberal notion of 'abstract 
citizens', because an 'abstract man' is 'non-existent7 (1965:74). He existed only in liberal models, 
which 'try  to transform man into a God' instead of accepting that man's life was dependent on 
both society and on nature. Instead of basing their criticism on man as he was, they criticised him 
from the position of man 'such as he ought to be' (1965:73). On the contrary, Kardelj believed 
that his concept should enable representation of existing interests, making sure that the interests 
of the majority (i.e., working people) were satisfied. It was because of these beliefs that he saw no 
problems in basing the entire structure of the Yugoslav political system on separate interest 
groups, rather than on the equality of abstract citizens.
The fact that the citizens of Yugoslavia were politically non-existent was, therefore, the logical 
result of Kardelj's Marxist beliefs as well as of his views on the national question. Since the idea 
of a 'Yugoslav nation' was condemned as 'great-state, nationalistic, unrealistic and profoundly 
harmful and reactionary', people who wanted to declare themselves as ethnic 'Yugoslavs' could 
in the 1971 census register only as 'undeclared/Yugoslavs', not as a separate ethnic group. 
Unlike the recognised 'constitutive nations', and even the 'nationalities' and 'national 
minorities', they were not represented in politics.73 This was a legal expression of Kardelj's belief 
that 'socialist forces would be making a big mistake if they allowed themselves to be carried
73 On this issue, Tito and Kardelj seemed to disagree. Although in 1964 Tito for the first time declared himself a Croat 
(rather than a Yugoslav), at the 8th LCY Congress elections he opposed 'witch-hunts' against Yugoslav patriotism, as seen 
in his passionate speech against Croatian nationalism in December 1971. What did it mean to be against Yugoslavism, he 
rhetorically asked his colleagues in the party leadership? 'If it means to be against the old Yugoslavism of King 
Alexander, then of course I am against this sort of Yugoslavism. But, if it means to love my country, to feel a Yugoslav in 
the first place and to be proud of it, then I must tell you that I am Yugoslav. Of course, as you know, I am from Croatia, 
but I am also a Yugoslav and I have spent all my life working for Yugoslavia.' But, Tito was already an exception, both in 
constitutional and in real political terms. No other politician would escape the label of 'unitarist' if he repeated Tito's 
words. At the same time that Tito declared himself a Yugoslav, Kardelj was writing that the illusion of Yugoslavism 
represented the greatest danger to Yugoslavia itself.
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away by futile ideas of creating some new kind of nation', since 'this would only intensify 
nationalism and chauvinism in the existing nations' (1957:127).74
One of the greatest controversies in Kardelj's writing (and in the ideology of Yugoslav 
communism) was his argument against the federal state at the time when republics were 
declared states themselves. Why was Yugoslavia on its way to withering away at the same time as 
separate nation-states of its constitutive nations were to be created and strengthened? Was it 
because he still considered Yugoslavia to be an 'artificial creation', as Comintern argued for 
almost the entire inter-war period?75 Was it because he believed that multi-ethnic states were in 
principle only a transitional creation, an incubator which helped small nations to become completed 
and then -  subsequently -  to create their own separate states? In the decades to come, Kardelj's 
critics (especially those from Serbia) pointed to this controversy as the main evidence of Kardelj's 
(Slovenian, ethnic) nationalism.
Kardelj himself offered only a few explanations of this controversy. As has been already 
mentioned in this chapter, he believed that no supra-national state (such as the Austro- 
Hungarian or the Yugoslav) could create a 'supra-nation', especially when its constitutive 
nations had been 'completed'. The failure of the concept of 'national unity7, which attempted to 
create a Yugoslav nation in inter-war Yugoslavia, was the main historical lesson to be learnt by 
the Yugoslav Communists. Nations would gradually be transformed into 'something else' as the 
world approached communism. But, in the meantime, they were a reality and should be treated 
as a reality.76 Socialist society should be a step ahead, a better alternative to a liberal-led 'melting 
pot of nations'. Multi-ethnic federations made sense to their constitutive nations only if they 
increased 'the feeling of security of the peoples' that constituted them (1975:148).
The recognition of republics as nation-states followed yet another of Kardelj's arguments about 
the future. In an expression very reminiscent of present-day globalisation theory, Kardelj argued 
that the international process of integration constituted 'the present and the future of m ankind'
74 A similar type of argument was later used by Milosevic and Kucan. They were both 'saving Yugoslavia' by 'satisfying' 
national demands, in order to 'prevent' ethnic nationalists taking power and destroying Yugoslavia. Milosevic was also 
'saving' Yugoslavia from 'anarchy', arguing that anarchy would lead to a totalitarian response.
75 In an interview conducted for this thesis in December 1995, Dusan Bilandzic, the Croatian politician and historian, 
recalls a talk with Kardelj who told him in 1971: 'We have tried every possibility so far to preserve Yugoslavia: first, it 
was a unitary state, then it became a federation, while now we are moving towards a confederation. If this proves to be 
yet another unsuccessful attempt, then it remains only to admit that the Comintern was right when arguing that 
Yugoslavia was an 'artificial creation', and that we, the Yugoslav Communists, have made a mistake.'
76 In 1970 Kardelj declared that socialism had not changed the nature of the nation and the character of its demands 
significantly (1970/1979:270). These views were somewhat different from what Tito said on several occasions -  that the 
national question had basically been solved after the socialist revolution. Many Yugoslav communists -  as Milka Planinc 
said in an interview I conducted with her in April 1999 -  believed the same as Tito and were surprised when the national 
question re-appeared in the 1960s. More in next chapter.
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(1975:175). This globalization is an inevitable result of technological revolution and a 'natural 
result1 of 'scientific and technical progress' (1969:246) which would bring about new 
communication and cultural links between nations. Kardelj was convinced that this was a 
sufficient guarantee for the future of Yugoslav togetherness.
'It is beyond any doubt that Yugoslav society, all Yugoslav people and in all situations,
will find enough strength to resist all disintegrating tendencies' (1969: 228).
This argum ent was only strengthened by the global political situation, in which the two blocs 
were clearly opposed to any disintegration of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the eventual 
disappearance of the two world military and political blocs would be very much a confirmation 
of the far-sightedness of the Yugoslav non-aligned policy.77 Whatever happened, thus, would 
only confirm Kardelj's belief that 'the alternative here is not whether Yugoslavia will survive or 
not, but whether it will continue to develop as a socialist, self-managing and democratic 
community of equal peoples, or whether it will fall into the hands of hegemonistic forces' (1969: 
228).
Now, with the existence of Yugoslavia guaranteed, Kardelj turned to satisfy the needs of its 
nations within the globalised world. The creation of nation-states within Yugoslavia was 
Kardelj's attem pt to find a new balance between increasing globalisation in the world and the 
wish of the Yugoslav nations to protect their national identities. In Kardelj's concept, to increase 
'national feelings' was not incompatible with globalisation: as long as they were well balanced, 
these were two sides of the same coin. Problems would emerge only if 'globalisation' went too 
far: this would necessarily increase nationalism and the separatism of Yugoslav nations. W ithout 
a balance between globalisation and securing national identities the whole Yugoslav house was 
endangered.78 He saw discontent with the possible violation of national rights as the main 
potential danger for the future of Yugoslavia. Although the main conflict even in socialist society 
was still a class and not a national one (1975 a: 268), the national question, Kardelj warned, could 
be used to undermine Yugoslavia in the same way as it was used by the Communists in the 
inter-war period against the bourgeois government. Ten years after the disintegration of
77 For this, see his 1970 speech at the 12th Session of the LCY Presidency (Kardelj, 1970). In fact, Kardelj was thinking of 
Yugoslavia as a multi-national corporation, as a core of the prospective wider integration in the region, rather than as a 
state. When the time came, Yugoslavia would be an ideal example of different nations in different states living under the 
same roof. Yugoslavia was once again (not only in an ideological sense, but also as a state) meant to be a transitional 
entity, as something that might well be transcended in a broader post-Cold-war political structure of Europe. More on 
the views of other Yugoslav leaders about the prospects for Balkan and other regional integration in the late 1960s will be 
said in the next chapter.
78 Anthony Giddens' recent conclusion on fundamentalist traditionalism  as a reaction to globalisation comes close to 
Kardelj's views (see interview I conducted with Giddens, published in 1999).
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Yugoslavia, one can safely conclude that this was one of very few of Kardelj's predictions that 
did indeed materialise.79
2.3. Conclusion
The Yugoslav political system underwent 'revolutionary political changes' from its third to 
fourth (Kardelj) constitutive concept, following the new interpretation of reality that was 
expressed in Kardelj's texts after 1957. The new concept was the result of Kardelj's interpretation 
of Marxism, but also of contextual circumstances, such as the attempt to construct a system that 
would be an antipode to both inter-war Yugoslavism and the Soviet model of socialism. Once it 
had been formulated as a -  more or less -  internally coherent vision of reality, Kardelj's 
interpretation became a blueprint for political action. It became a new platform, a 'Party line' to be 
followed by all Yugoslav Communists. In a society in which politics was primarily a 
representation of ideals and not of reality, the dominant interpretation of truth was to be 
protected by the state apparatus and implemented in reality, despite all resistance. Any 
opposition to such an interpretation was treated as 'contrary to the truth of history' and would 
be defeated as 'a  representative of untruth in history' (Voegelin, 1952:59).
But in the Marxist conception, the purpose of knowledge of the truth is to change reality and to 
construct the new world. Knowledge makes sense only if it becomes action.80 Revolutionary 
theory is a weapon in the revolutionary transformation of societies. This is why Kardelj's 
interpretation was so crucial to the political events that followed in the last two decades of 
Yugoslavia. To use Voegelin's description of Gnostic societies, his interpretation of reality and 
vision of the future presented 'a  dream-world which itself is a social force to motivate attitudes 
and actions' (1952:167). Within this conception the transition meant the denial of one reality and 
the construction of a new reality, which should come as close as possible to the ideal, non­
existent, 'dream-world'. The Communists were entitled to lead such societies not because they
79 In his last public addresses Kardelj uttered some pessimistic predictions about the future of the Yugoslav project. At a 
closed session of the Party leadership in 1974 he warned that the 'Chilean scenario' could happen in Yugoslavia if the 
country did not stop taking loans immediately (Unpublished papers, and also Suvar, interview for this thesis, April 
1998). In his dramatic speech at the 11th LCY Congress in 1978 he (already suffering from terminal cancer) concluded that 
social consciousness had not changed much and that it was still equivalent to that of pre-war Yugoslavia (Documents, 
1978). This meant that the main task of the Party -  to change people's consciousness -  was far from being achieved. 
Indeed, Kardelj earlier even said that 'many democracies collapsed because they could not control their internal 
contradictions and antagonisms and defend their own social system from the pressure of contrary tendencies, either 
revolutionary or reactionary' (1969:219). I heard from several of his colleagues in the Party and state leadership that I 
interviewed for this thesis (such as Jure Bilic, Josip Vrhovec, Dusan Dragosavac, Raif Dizdarevic et al.) about Kardelj's 
disappointments in the last years of his life with what had been achieved.
80 As Marx famously explained -  the point is not to describe reality, but to change it.
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were the only ones who could interpret the existent, but because they represented the future, 
which would inevitably one day become reality.81
But even if the future 'works', present reality might not. In fact, it is characteristic of Gnostic 
societies to neglect reality for the sake of the future. By neglecting reality, however, they often fail 
to recognise the need to react to it in a real and adequate way. Being convinced that the future 
m ust come in the way they predicted, communists in fact underestimated the real danger from 
the real world. Their vision of the future blurred their ability to view the present. Their almost 
religious belief in the power of words and beliefs made them react by moral condemnation, 
resolutions and propaganda, rather than measures that belonged to the world of real politics. 
They, therefore, engaged in endless criticism of 'deviations'. They 'reformed' the system 
relentlessly in order to be more efficient than both Western representative democracies and 
Eastern 'state socialist systems'. But at the same time, they allowed an almost anarchic situation 
under the name of 'self-management'. As will be demonstrated in detail in Chapters Four and 
Five, the disintegrative processes were a direct consequence of their belief that the state should 
decentralise in order to 'wither away'.82 Instead of supporting 'integration across borders', the 
system collapsed into various small units, all becoming more and more 'autarkic'. Instead of 
enabling direct democracy within 'self-management', it became more bureaucratic than ever.
Although Kardelj's concept had materialised in the laws and political actions of the Yugoslav 
communists, the results of these actions were different from what Kardelj intended. His own 
disappointment about the reality only three years after the new constitution had been 
introduced83 offers a good example of failed predictions, which were entirely based on w hat he 
believed was the scientific analysis of politics. They also from not only a useful, but a necessary 
prelude to the disintegration of Yugoslavia -  an outcome that Kardelj felt he was preventing by
81 A nice illustration of this belief is to be found in a report of a certain Lincoln Steffens after visiting Russia in 1918, as 
quoted by Sweezy and Bettelheim (1971:80). Steffens, a Communist, said: 'I have been over into the future and it works/ 
Communists often referred to Communism as the 'bright future', or the 'future of mankind'. Some of this rhetoric is 
preserved in Slobodan Milosevic's speeches in the 1984-1987 period, analysed in Chapter Six.
82 In this respect, one can only share the conclusion of Warren Zimmermann, the last American Ambassador in socialist 
Yugoslavia, who asked himself why the other socialist countries of Eastern Europe succeeded while the Yugoslav 
reforms failed? 'The key reason is that those countries had strong central governments; Yugoslavia did not' (1999:49). 
Indeed, as I argue in Chapter Four of this thesis, both economic and political reforms in the 1980s failed for this reason.
83 In 1977 Kardelj accepted criticism by the Serbian leaders, recognising that the way the Constitution was implemented 
in reality produced results opposite from those desired. His wife Pepca Kardelj told me of his disappointment with the 
general situation in the country in the final years of his life. He felt sidelined and misunderstood by his colleagues in the 
federal leadership. Also, he felt that Tito had lost the ability to change things any more. More on this in the next chapter.
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offering his new concept. The end of the Cold War ten years after Kardelj's death indeed offered 
a chance to Yugoslavia to transform itself towards a new 'association of sovereign states'. But, 
although more realistic than many of his contemporaries, Kardelj still underestimated the 
strength of anti-globalisation tendencies among the Yugoslavs, and, especially, w ithin the 
political elite itself. Instead of being a vanguard of further globalisation, the Yugoslav party elite 
became an ally of the forces of disintegration. It was because of his loyalty to the Marxist 
interpretation of the General Laws of History that Kardelj failed to see this danger. Although he 
perhaps understood reality better than any of his contemporaries in the Yugoslav leadership 
(including Tito), it was still his own vision of the future that prevented him from taking reality as 
the basis for his action.
In the next chapter we analyse why other relevant participants in the Yugoslav politics accepted 
the Kardelj concept and how they transformed it into the institutional and constitutional 
structure defined in the 1967-1974 Constitutional debate. I argue that the main reason was to be 
found in their beliefs and perceptions about political realities. These beliefs were best expressed 
by Kardelj himself. Of course, they interpreted some of Kardelj's ideas in their own ways, 
depending on the context in which they operated. But, the cohesion of the Yugoslav house was 
possible primarily because the relevant political participants shared the same concept of what 
Yugoslavia was, w hat it was not, what it should become, and what was to be prevented. In the 
Fourth and Fifth chapters we analyse the political actions of the Yugoslav communists who tried 
to change reality to fit their vision of the future. I argue that in doing so they clashed with reality 
and failed to react to the challenges they faced in reed politics. On the contrary, they reacted in 
the way described by Voegelin: by condemnations and resolutions only. In the meantime, the 
problems in reality remained unresolved. Defending their vision of the future, the Yugoslav 
Communists in the end lost touch with the present. Once they realised the vision itself was not 
adequate to explain and change reality, they lost both the present and the future.
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Chapter Three:
The Constitutional Debate 1967-1974:
Why did Serbia Accept the Kardelj concept and 
the 1974 Constitution?
'Rankovic's whole line was conservative. In Serbia, we felt him to be a heavy 
burden... Tito exercised full control over foreign policy and the Army, while 
Rankovic controlled the Party and police. We wanted to put the lid on this... 
Everything that Kardelj initiated and promoted in our political system, 
distinguished us from the East and it was a guarantee that we would not return 
to the past. In general, he was a reformist and a Yugoslav.'
Petar Stambolic, 1992.
At no time and in no place was the mistake of granting more rights and wider 
possibilities for the development of smaller nations and nationalities (than 
necessary) committed. History does not ever record that such a 'mistake' has been 
committed towards the nationalities and national minorities.'
Marko Nikezic, June 1968.
3.0. Introduction
Kardelj's concept was transformed into legislation during the long constitutional debate in 
which members of the Yugoslav political elites representing the interests of republics and 
provinces engaged between 1967 and 1974. In this chapter I examine this debate, in order to 
show why the Yugoslav republics (and especially Serbia) agreed on the proposed compromise
and accepted the 1974 Constitution. Most observers would today argue that the 1974
Constitution became one of the least logical and most unchangeable Constitutions in the world 
and that it became the crucial catalyst of the dissolution of the country.
But, how was it possible that such an 'illogical' constitution found support in the Yugoslav 
republics and provinces? In this chapter we concentrate on explaining why this happened. The 
main question of this chapter follows the main aim of the dissertation as a whole: to explain 
why certain political decisions, which in different contexts seem to be so clearly 'irrational' 
were nevertheless taken by responsible political actors in given circumstances. W ithout
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understanding why these decisions made sense to the actors we will be unable to explain why 
they were taken.
When discussing the constitutional debates of the 1968-1974 period, most authors focus their 
research on the 'Croatian Spring', the reformist attempt of the Croatian leaders that re-opened 
the 'Croatian question' and initiated nationalist tendencies within Croatian society. My focus in 
this chapter is, however, not on Croatia but on Serbia. More precisely, I focus on the reasons 
behind the decision of Serbia's leaders to accept the Kardelj concept and the constitutional 
compromise of 1974. The reason for this is provided by the further course of the events that 
preceded the disintegration of Yugoslavia. First, dissatisfaction with the implementation of the 
Constitutional compromise originated in Serbia. The 'Serbian question' (both in its internal 
dimension -  the question of the relations of Serbia with its two provinces -  Kosovo and 
Vojvodina; as well as in its external aspect -  its relations with other republics and the Yugoslav 
federal centre) dominated Brioni Yugoslavia. Finally, it was in Serbia that the 1974 Constitution 
was first rejected by the political elite (though not before 1989), which had an enormous impact 
on the final stage of the Yugoslav crisis.
Here I ask: why did the Serbian political elite in 1967-1974 agree on such a Constitution, which 
is today seen in Serbia as the main cause of 'Serbian dissatisfaction' with Yugoslavia? I argue 
that only by taking into account Kardelj's concept and the interpretation of Serbian interests 
based on this concept by the relevant political actors in the historical context in which the 
decision was taken, can one understand this political action. If one wants to avoid the prolepsis 
fallacy (as described by Skinner), one should focus on the beliefs, intentions and expectations of 
the relevant political actors (members of the Serbian political elite) at the time when the 
decision was taken, rather than on later results and recent interpretations of their decisions once 
Yugoslavia had already disintegrated. I argue that a different approach cannot accurately 
explain w hat happened in reality, since it cannot explain why the Serbian elite accepted such an 
'unfair' and 'illogical' compromise. On the contrary, by examining the interpretation of reality 
by the members of the elite, which was based on Marxist ideology and Kardelj's explanation, 
one should be able to understand the action.
Although this chapter is focused on Serbia's acceptance of the 1974 Constitution, its conclusions 
address the other Yugoslav republics as well. It is today widely accepted that the other 
Yugoslav republics accepted the 1974 Constitution because it offered them better status in terms 
of national rights and autonomy than any previous concept of Yugoslavia. But, although 
national issues played a significant role in the Constitutional debate, it was also the context of 
the Kardeljist interpretation of wider social goals (such as -  above all - social self-management 
as the main element of Yugoslav identity when compared both with the East and the West) that 
m ade the leaders come to support it. The main motive for their decision was to be found in
i
I
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their firm belief that state should gradually be weakened and decentralised, as explained in 
Chapter Two. As the debate we examine in this chapter confirms, it would be misleading to 
reduce all the reasons for the acceptance of the 1974 Constitution to the national question. 
Finally, overestimation of the 'national question' among the motives for the acceptance of the 
1974 Constitution would necessarily fail to explain why Serbia agreed to it.
*
While Chapter Two focused on the emergence of Kardelj's concept within its historical and 
ideological context, this Chapter places this concept in its practical context, that is 'the 
problematic political activity or relevant characteristics of the society the author addresses and 
to which the text is a response' (Skinner, 1988:10). It addresses the question of 'how  ideological 
change comes to be woven into ways of acting' and analyses the relations between political 
ideology and political action. It also focuses more closely on the dominant Serbian 
interpretation of Kardelj's concept, which has been permanently contested within Serbia itself, 
only to be replaced by alternative concepts which emerged in the 1980s.
3.1. Did Serbia Accept Kardelj's Concept Voluntarily?
Three frequently stated arguments should be discussed before we answer the question of this 
chapter:
First, that the republics (including, or even especially, Serbia) had to accept everything that Tito 
and Kardelj dictated, because of the nature of the autocratic system in which any opposition 
(primarily) to Tito would be marginalised and purged. Consequently, it was Tito (and Kardelj) 
who imposed the 1974 Constitution on Serbia, contrary to its interests and regardless of the real 
wishes of its leaders.1
Secondly, that the Serbian politicians of the time were not interested in Serbian national 
interests, but were either a-national (as Communists also inter-nationalist), or too opportunistic 
to risk their personal privileges.2
1 Borisav Jovic, the president of the Serbian National Assembly in March 1989 when the 1974 Constitution was 
significantly amended, talked about the 'imposed Constitution'. The SANU Memorandum (1986) uses the word 
'prescribed [by the leader]' (oktroirani) to describe the 1974 Constitution. 'Serbia must openly say that this order [of the 
1974 Constitution] was imposed on Serbia' (Krestic, 1986/1995:145).
2 Antonije Isakovic, the Chairman of the Commission for the SANU Memorandum, says that the SANU academicians 
thought Ivan Stambolic, the President of Serbia (1986-1987), a 'traitor to his own people' (interview conducted in April 
1996). Similarly, Slobodan Milosevic said in June 1989 that 'no nation would tolerate such weakness in protecting its 
national interests as was demonstrated by leading Serbian politicians in the past' (Politika, 29 June 1989).
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Finally, that the Serbian elite was illegitimate in democratic terms and that therefore they did 
not reflect the political preferences of the population which were significantly different from 
those represented by the elite itself. In this respect, it was irrelevant whether the elite itself 
agreed or disagreed with Tito and Kardelj, since their decisions lacked (democratic) legitimacy.
It is important to examine these three arguments, since they created the dominant discourse in 
the contemporary Serbian debate on the 1974 Constitution, influencing the political actions of 
the Serbian leaders in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Here I argue that although there 
are elements of truth in all of them, all three arguments disregard or greatly misrepresent the 
motives of the relevant political actors in accepting the 1974 Constitution.
3.1.1. Relationship Between Tito and Republican (Serbian) Leaders
First we should examine the statement that Tito was too authoritarian to be opposed by 
republican elites. Available primary sources (interviews with Tito's former aides, memoirs of 
the leading Yugoslav politicians in the late 1960s and early 1970s, etc.) confirm that Tito indeed 
had an extraordinary and central role in Yugoslav political decision-making processes. Such a 
position was the result of both his personal role in the formation of Yugoslav institutions (the 
Army, the re-organisation of the Party, the formation of the Yugoslav Communist Federation, 
the role of Yugoslavia in international politics, etc.) and of the offices of the President of the 
Republic (which he held since 1953) and of the Party (since 1937). But none of this had really 
prevented other politicians from being critical of his initiatives, especially in face-to-face or 
more confidential debates. This criticism was particularly strong during the 1967-1974 
Constitutional debate, when it originated mostly from the Serbian leaders (Koca Popovic, 
Mijalko Todorovic, Latinka Perovic, Marko Nikezic, Petar Stambolic, etc.).3
This criticism of Tito's position by Serbian leaders sometimes (and not only on subordinate 
issues) influenced Tito's further decisions. Tito's closest aides say that far from initiating 
conflict, he tried to avoid disputes with other leaders whenever possible.4 He spent four crucial 
years (1962-1966) before taking an active part in the conceptual disputes that emerged within 
the closest circle of his aides -  between Edvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Rankovic.5 Throughout
3 For direct criticism of Tito by other members of political elite see Tepavac's account of tire dispute between the Vice- 
President of Yugoslavia Koca Popovic and Tito (1998:127), on the argument between the Yugoslav Ambassador to the 
USSR Veljko Micunovic and Tito in 1961 (Tepavac, 1998:134), on the dispute between the Macedonian politician Lazar 
Kolisevski and Tito (Djukic, 1989:117-20), etc. Many examples are to be found in Draza Markovic's memoirs, frequently 
quoted in this chapter.
4 For this see Tepavac: (1997:74-5), quoted in footnote 72 in Chapter Two.
5 Leon Gerskovic, one of the two main constitutional lawyers who co-operated with Kardelj and Rankovic in writing the 
1963 Yugoslav Constitution said in an informal conversation with Mladen Babun that Tito's hesitation to take a stand 
on the differences between the two men resulted in a constitution that had to be replaced immediately after the 
overthrow of Rankovic three years later.
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the first phase of the Constitutional debate (1967-1971) Tito hesitated to take a direct part in it, 
avoiding direct confrontations with either side. In such moments of wavering, all the 
participants in the debate tried to influence Tito, some of them more successfully than others. 
The compromises Tito suggested were, therefore, the result of interaction between him  and 
republican leaders, as well as between him and Kardelj, and not simple proclamations of Tito's 
personal views. This is how Tito re-affirmed his central role without antagonising the republics 
and provinces. At the same time, however, by promoting direct talks between himself and 
republican leaders, Tito reduced the role of other federal institutions (the Party federal 
presidency, Federal Assembly, etc.) and prevented any collective action by two or more 
republics against others and against himself.6
Available sources indicate that Tito's relations with the Serbian leadership were especially 
strained throughout the constitutional debate. In his diary (published in 1987 and 1988) the 
leading Serbian participant in the Constitutional debate Draza Markovic describes several 
occasions in which the Serbian leaders opposed Tito.7 When one sums up Markovic's 
recollections, the following list of disagreements between Tito and Serbia appears:
1. The Serbian leaders thought that Tito favoured the Croatian leaders (especially when 
compared to the Serbian leadership).8 The Serbs felt that Tito publicly criticised w hat he 
saw as deviations in Serbia's politics while he kept his criticism of Croatian politics (then 
already developing its 'Croatian Spring' policy) hidden from the public and restricted to 
'inner circles' of the federal leadership, or even to tete-a-tete talks with the Croats. The 
Croats also believed that Tito was the main political ally of the (otherwise isolated) 
Croatian leadership, which made the Croats tough participants in the constitutional 
debate. The impression of the Serbian leaders that Tito was the main sponsor of the 
'Croatian Spring' was shared by other republics (including Slovenia's Kardelj, the main 
critic of the Croatian leadership's 'avangardism'). It is not surprising that Tito in the end 
accepted Serbian demands that he should act more resolutely to bring Croatia back to 
negotiations. The Serbian leaders felt that without Tito's support Croatia would be much
6 In an informal conversation we had in 1993, Miko Tripalo (then member of the Federal Party Presidency for Croatia) 
said that Tito and Kardelj were 'mediating between Serbs with Croats but in such a way that they really did not want 
them to act united'. He thought Tito decided to move against both Croatian and Serbian leaders in April 1971, when 
Serbo-Croatian agreement on confederalisation seemed to become more realistic than ever before. Tito and Kardelj 
feared not only for the future of Yugoslavia, but also for their position if this happened.
7 Markovic, at the time President of Serbian Assembly (the highest ’state1 position in Serbia) describes conversations of 
15 May 1971 (1987:284), 26 June 1971 (1987:288), 4 July 1971 (1987:289), 30 November 1971 (1987:317), 14 May 1972 
(1987:357), 5 November 1972 (1987:399), 14 April 1973 (1987:433-4), 10 June 1973 (1987:446), and many other talks after 
the 1974 Constitution had been enacted, which is not the subject of this chapter. Another important Serbian politician 
Latinka Perovic, the Secretary of the LC CC Serbia, describes some of her talks with Tito during 1971. Although in 1972 
Markovic and Perovic went different ways in intra-Serbian political divisions, there is no major disagreement between 
these two accounts. For talks between Tito and Croatian leaders see Tripalo (1990), Bilic (1988) and Dragosavac (1988).
8 Markovic, 1987: 6 March 1971; 15 May 1971; 26 June 1971; 30 November 1971; 10 December 1971; 15 November 1972, 
etc.
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more willing to negotiate9 with others in Yugoslavia during the Constitutional debate.10 
However, it is not clear to what extent Tito really wanted to replace the leaders of the 
Croatian Spring, and how much he was really forced to remove them by those (unnamed) 
persons who had told him 'either them or you', as Tripalo recalls Tito's words.11
2. The Serbian leaders also objected to Tito's harsh public criticism of many Serbian 
institutions (such as Belgrade University, the Student newspaper and the Belgrade media 
in general), of Serbian intellectuals (the Praxis group, etc.), Serbian politicians (Koca 
Popovic, Mijalko Todorovic, etc.) and the general political situation in Serbia. Tito's 
criticism of the 'Belgrade Carsija'12 was seen as criticism of the Serbian political leadership 
and its inability to prevent 'anti-socialist activities'.13
3. The Serbian leaders were dissatisfied with Tito's inclination to make concessions to the 
demands of the two Serbian provinces -  Kosovo and Vojvodina. Serbian politicians 
believed Tito was too soft on Kosovo and Vojvodina, and ready to accept political 
compromises with them even when this was clearly against the main principles of the new 
Constitution. In this respect, they considered Kardelj to be much more principled than 
Tito.14 To some extent, it is correct to say that Serbia's (and other republican) leaders 
preferred building up institutional politics with clear rules rather than leaving too much 
power to Tito personally. But, for many reasons, this was not a realistic option. They had
9 Perovic (1990:141) and Markovic (30 November 1971).
10 It seems that Serbian criticism initiated a change in Tito's views on the Croatian leadership of Savka Dabcevic Kucar 
and Miko Tripalo. Markovic reveals that ten days after a difficult talk he had with the leadership of the City of 
Belgrade, Tito sharply criticised Croatian politicians, giving them a 'final warning' at a closed meeting in Zagreb and 
Brezice, 4 July 1971. He asked them to act more resolutely against Croatian nationalism. On the very day of his meeting 
with the Croats, Tito spoke to Draza Markovic for more than two hours. Markovic recalls: 'He was very worried about 
the situation. He spoke about the attacks on him: he talked about himself, his past, emphasising that he had devoted his 
whole life to the cause of the working class, to revolutionary struggle; he was very critical about the situation in Croatia 
and the LC of Croatia. He told me he would leave for Zagreb that day, and that he would be absent from Belgrade for 
two months. He was interested in my assessment of the situation in Serbia and Belgrade; almost directly he asked for 
guarantees of stability and security in this period' (4 July 1971; 1987:289).
11 Tripalo, 1990:187. Tito, for example, tried to convince Tripalo not to resign, saying that he did not have to. Tripalo, 
however, resigned in protest, saying to Tito that the attacks on the Croats were in fact directed at him, and that once he 
(Tito) had left the scene, the forces that had initiated the removal of the Croatian leaders would 'publicly hang us both'.
12 6ar§ija is a word of Turkish origin, used to describe semi-public but influential circles among Serbian intellectuals, 
which used to criticise the regime at various 'private' and semi-official gatherings. Tepavac says that 'Serbia always 
worried Tito more than any other republic, because he sensed the volcanic potentiality of Serbian nationalism' 
(1998:154). Tito was kept informed of their views by Secret Police reports. This gave the impression of massive 
surveillance of leading Serbian intellectuals, and left room for speculation about how much the role of the secret police 
had really changed after the dismissal of Aleksandar Rankovic (1966). Several affairs involving police information 
emerged during the Constitutional debate, most of which were used to try to blacken its participants in Tito's eyes.
13 In return, this helped Serbian leaders and the opposition to build some bridges between them, since they both felt 
attacked by Tito. This explains why the political elite tried to soften Tito's demands for legal prosecution of the leading 
Serbian intellectuals. Markovic's diary reveals his frequent contacts with some of them -  like Antonije Isakovic and 
Dobrica Cosic. In this sense, the Serbian (and other) intellectuals were not really dissidents in the sense in which this 
word was used in other Eastern European countries. They always managed to find a segment of the political elite to act 
as their protector.
14 This is how Petar Stambolic describes Kardelj and Tito (Djukic, 1992:241).
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to adapt to Tito's extraordinary position, but they used any opportunity to influence him.
15
4. In line with the previous objection, Serbia's leaders (but also those of other republics) were 
suspicious of Tito's tendency to use his enormous influence with the Security and Military 
apparatus and to take advantage of his charismatic status with the broad Yugoslav 
population in order to stop or reverse political processes in the republics and the country 
in general.16 They feared Tito's personal links with the masses, as well as his support in the 
international arena, both of which enabled him to act as a fully independent participant in 
Yugoslav politics.
5. The Serbs (even more than others) objected to the violation of intra-party rules and 
procedures by Tito, especially when it came to the selection of Serbian candidates for 
various federal posts. Serbian leaders asked Tito to clearly state that some of the 'Serbian' 
cadres in the Federation (such as Defence Secretary Gen. Nikola Ljubicic and Foreign 
Secretary Milos Minic) were his appointees and not those of Serbia.17 Serbian leaders were 
even more dissatisfied with Tito's attempts to decide even upon cadres for various 
positions in Belgrade and Serbia, including civil servants (mostly Serbs) in the President7 s 
private office.
6. All Yugoslav republics, but again especially Serbia, were suspicious of Tito's 'acceptance' 
of his closest associates' manipulation of his name and authority, especially after 1972. In 
this year, when Tito was 80, the newly created collective leadership of the Federation 
moved to take over several of Tito's duties, and to restrict access to the ageing (and ailing) 
leader. An 'inner circle' of leading federal functionaries that kept daily contact with the 
President was reduced to not more than ten people (the Foreign, Defence and Home 
Secretaries, Chairman and Secretary to the Party's Central Committee, Vice-President of 
the Federal Presidency, Kardelj and Tito's Chief of Cabinet).18 However, Tito maintained 
contacts with his personal friends, who now influenced him more than the political
15 In an interview conducted for this thesis, Milka Planinc, who was the President of the Croatian Central Committee 
(1972-1982) and the Yugoslav Prime Minister (1982-1986) told me that 'leaders of all republics would meet Tito 
separately, in order to avoid direct discussion between them, and when they returned - they would argue that Tito had 
supported their position, not that of the other republics.' This was in accordance with Tito's tendency to appear 
impartial and not deeply involved in political arguments between republican elites in Yugoslavia.
16 The direct link between Tito and a wide range of the population is explained in £upanov's theory of 'social contract 
between the highest and the lowest positions in society' (see further in this and next chapters).
17 Tito did this in the case of General Ljubicic. In proposing him for a third term in the office of Defence Secretary in 
1978 he disregarded the rule which banned anyone from being twice re-elected to such a post, but on Serbian insistence 
he clearly stated this was his decision. Tito's other appointee, Milos Minic, was removed from politics two years after 
Tito's death (see more in Chapter Five: section on 'the case of Draza Markovic').
18 This list was composed after interviews with Josip Vrhovec, Jure Bilic, Dara Janekovic and Dusan Dragosavac, who -  
at least in some periods -  had direct access to Tito.
95
leaders. Markovic's memoirs reveal Serbian dissatisfaction with the role played by many 
of these friends (such as the Croat Ivan Krajacic Stevo, whom they considered to be a 
Croatian nationalist), and those played by Tito's wife Jovanka Broz,19 the Chiefs of Cabinet 
and other semi-officials from his entourage. Other republics were also discontented with 
this, but none of them so much as Serbia. Tito was also influenced by the secret police 
reports that he relied upon. Many political struggles in the 1970s were fought for the 
control over the state security apparatus.
In m any respects, 1971 was the most critical year in Serbian relations with Tito. Since 1968 
Serbia had tried to persuade Tito to influence Croatian politicians, who isolated themselves in 
the Constitutional debate. By April 1971, the Serbs felt that the Croatian demands in the 
Constitutional debate had become intolerable and that only Tito could and thus had to stop 
them. They were not prepared to accept, as they said in a conversation with Tito on 15 May 
1971, the permanent suspicion under which Serbia and institutions in Belgrade had been kept 
by the other republics and the federal centre. During an extremely open meeting, the Serbian 
leaders told Tito that before the fall of Rankovic they had been suspected of being the 'basis of 
conservatism', while they were now accused of 'technocratic deformations'.
'We are identified with unitarism and centralism, although our position on these issues 
is very clear and principled; we have been treated as the bearers of resistance to the 
changes [Constitutional amendments], although today all the others have greater 
reservations about them than we do,' they told Tito (Markovic, 1987:284).
Markovic describes the tense atmosphere in the President's Office:
'The tone was occasionally sharp, very unpleasant. Tito told us a few times: 'Well, you 
came here to attack me, didn 't you?' We denied it, arguing that we did not want to 
attack anyone, but to inform and to clarify certain points. This was accepted and 
respected... At the end of the talks we concluded that a full-stop should be pu t to all 
this, and that we should all together move towards serious tasks ahead and look to the 
future, rather than to the past' (Markovic, 1987:284).20
19 Dissatisfaction of the closest circle of political and military elites with the role of Jovanka Broz resulted in her 
'separation1 from Tito in 1977. Immediately after Tito's death in May 1980, Jovanka was forcibly evicted from all state 
estates and kept under surveillance (see Toma Fila's interview to Globus. 20 September 1999). Jovanka Broz blames 
General Ljubicic and Stane Dolanc for 'misinforming Tito about the real situation in the country' to which she reacted, 
but was stopped by the closest circle of political dignitaries. Dara Janekovic, the journalist very close to Tito and 
Jovanka Broz, confirmed this interpretation in an interview I conducted in April 1998. Janekovic says Dolanc and 
Ljubidic prevented Tito from giving her an interview in 1978, despite his previous intention to do so.
20 Latinka Perovic writes that Tito commented on this meeting to a Montenegrin politician Veljko Vlahovic in the 
following words: 'The Comrades from Serbia came to talk to me. They made me very angry at the beginning. No one 
has talked to me like that in the past 30 years. But, it is good that we have people like them in our Party.' (1991:263). 
Tito was surprised to see the Serbian leaders united in opposition to his recent statements and actions. He decided to 
accept some of their criticism, but -  as Latinka Perovic said -  never forgave them such an independent way of thinking 
(1991:263). In this and many other conversations Perovic finds the main reason for Tito's decision to eliminate both 
Croatian and Serbian leaders in 1971 and 1972.
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However, when talks like this became almost a regular practice, Tito concluded that some 
Serbian leaders represented a 'different concept, a different policy' (Markovic, 1987:357) and he 
initiated changes in the Serbian leadership. Clearly, the Serbian leaders' independence 
indicated that Serbia was not a passive but a very active participant in the Constitution-making 
process (1967-1974). However, Tito's decision to remove some leading Serbian leaders in 1972 
raises a question: does it not prove that Serbia had to accept Tito's proposals (including the 
Constitution) regardless of their disagreements and opposition to them?
In order to answer this question, one should emphasise the following facts:
1. Although it was true that Serbia changed leading politicians more often than any other 
republic between 1966 and 1972 (Rankovic was removed from power in 1966, Cosic and 
Marjanovic in 1968, 'the liberals' in 1972, also the 'silent removal' of the Executive 
Secretary of the LCY Presidency Mijalko Todorovic in 1974 and the withdrawal of Koca 
Popovic, the former Vice-President of Yugoslavia after Rankovic, in protest in 1972), it is 
also true that similar changes occurred in all the Yugoslav republics, except Montenegro.
2. The fact that so many Serbian politicians were forced to leave politics does not yet mean 
that Tito did not command substantial support for his position from the majority of each 
republican political elite and from the masses in each of the republics. Political conflicts in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s were not only (and not even in the first place) between Tito 
and the leadership of Serbia and Croatia respectively, but also (and at certain moments 
even more so) conflicts between groups within each of these two political elites. Tito used 
existing differences in order to support the side that seemed to be less independent and 
more loyal to him. He exploited internal party 'pluralism ' which offered some space for 
various interests to be represented in the political elite, fearing unanimity such as was 
shown by the Serbian leaders in his talks with them on 15 May 1971. It was precisely 
intra-party diversity that enabled Tito to make 'pacts' with various factions both at the 
federal level and in republican politics. He did not need to send down anyone from the 
federal leadership to introduce and implement his politics in 'disobedient' republics:21 it
21 The possibility of sending 'healthy forces' from the federation was debated immediately after the Croatian Spring in 
1972. In an interview with me conducted in October 1997 Stipe Suvar confirmed that it seemed that Tito would send 
three prominent Croatian leaders from Belgrade back to Zagreb as his 'commissars': Mika Spiljak, Marijan Cvetkovic 
and perhaps also General Ivan Gosnjak. All three politicians had at that time been treated as 'unitarists' by the Croatian 
leader Vladimir Bakaric, who did not allow them to take a direct part in Croatian politics but 'sent' them to federal 
posts in Belgrade. However, there was no need for their return since Tito could rely on Bakaric and a clear majority of 
the CC LC Croatia. It is often forgotten that, ultimately, neither the Serbian nor the Croatian leaders ousted by Tito in 
1971/1972 secured a clear majority in their leaderships. For example, in the five months following the 21st Session of 
the LCY Presidency (between 1 December 1971 and 30 April 1972) only 741 (out of 214,614) members of the LC Croatia 
were expelled from the Party (which makes about 0.2% of its total membership). 131 people were forced to resign, 
while another 280 resigned 'voluntarily1. Among them were three members of the LCY Presidency and its Conference, 
nine members of the Croatian Central Committee and its Executive Committee, five members of the LC Croatia 
Conference and 37 secretaries of the basic organisations of the LC Croatia. 85 people were removed from their state 
positions (at all levels) and 52 people were ousted from managerial offices. Among those expelled from the Party, four 
became CPY members before 1940, while 31 joined the Party during the war. 91 were Partisans, of whom 19 joined
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was sufficient to rely on existing 'cadres'.22 Relying on a majority in each particular 
republican leadership and on the mass support he enjoyed among the population, Tito 
managed to strengthen his already independent position and to use it to eliminate those 
republican leaders he disagreed with.
3. When it came to crucial issues in relations within Yugoslavia, there were no major 
differences between the various conflicting groups in either the Serbian or the Croatian 
leadership. In both cases, differences arose over how to treat non-communist political 
actors; these became public in the late 1960s as a result of the general democratisation of 
political life in Yugoslavia. The Croatian leadership remained united on the Croatian 
position in Yugoslavia and on the arrangements for Brioni Yugoslavia.23 None of the 
Croatian leaders of the time was an anti-Titoist, and not many of their opponents in the 
various cultural, semi-political, or academic institutions were so. On the contrary, their 
rhetoric was very much pro-Titoist.24 Contrary to many current interpretations, the main 
idea of the 'Croatian Spring' was not to challenge Tito's power, but to present itself as the 
only force in the country which truly understood, followed and supported Tito's concept 
of equality among the Yugoslav nations and the self-management of the Yugoslav 
workers.25 The League of Croatian Communists insisted on describing itself as a 
'progressive force', which was pushing forward in the same direction as Tito, facing the 
same obstacles he was facing. They tried to convince Tito that their critics were in fact 
targeting him when criticising them. Furthermore, it was not the Croatian leadership that 
initiated conflict in 1971, but Tito himself.26 Tito was for a relatively long period (more
Tito's troops in 1941. As a consequence of the Croatian Spring, 23 basic organisations (totalling 715 members) were 
suspended (see Official Report, 1972).
22 A good illustration of this technique is again to be found in Markovic's diary on 21 October 1972. At the meeting of 
the Serbian leadership in October 1972, Tito interrupted the Serbian leader Mirko Canadanovic when he said he wished 
to argue against Draza Markovic: 'You may argue against him, but you would then argue against me as well, since I 
agree with Draza1 (1987:392). This was how Tito supported one group against another in all the republican leaderships.
23 Tripalo (1990:117-26 and 163-9). Tripalo, the leading politician of the 'Croatian Spring', says that groups within the 
Croatian leadership differed on the importance of the excesses which had occurred at public rallies, on what measures 
should be taken against the 'anti-socialist forces' and on what endangered the system more: nationalism or unitarism. 
They differed on how to approach the 'opposition' but not on how to structure Yugoslavia. In this sense it really was a 
conflict between reformists and conservatives within the LCY, but not between 'confederalists' and 'federalists', or 
'centralists' and 'federalists', as often presented.
24 An excellent example is Savka Dabcevic Kucar's toast to Tito in Zagreb, in September 1971. She said: 'I raise this glass 
to the man whose personality most vividly expresses the glory, unity and successes of our past, the revolutionary 
socialist strength of our present, and the bright prospects of our future; to a great revolutionary, thinker and statesman, 
to a real fighter for workers, national and human rights and freedoms, to the greatest son in the history of the Croatian 
and all our other nations and nationalities, to our dear Comrade Tito and to Comrade Jovanka' (Perovic, 1991: 296-302). 
This toast was proposed less than three months before Tito decided to remove the Croatian leadership (headed by 
Savka Dabcevic Kudar) for being 'nationalist'.
25 Serbian leaders complained about Croatian 'avangardism'. Interestingly, the term avangardism  held a negative 
connotation, although the Party itself was treated as the 'vanguard' of the working class.
26 An interesting parallel could be drawn between the current interpretations that the Croatian leaders 'split' with Tito's 
autocracy, and Tito's claim that it was he who 'split' with Stalin in 1948. Both interpretations are incorrect, but both 
entered public discourse, producing important myths.
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than three years) the main protector and sponsor of such avangardism.27 Finally, when he 
decided to withdraw his further support, as one of the most prominent Yugoslav and 
Croatian leaders of that time witnesses now,28 he started re-emphasising his Croatian 
origins. To conclude: the change of leadership in 1971 in Croatia was only a partial 
replacement of various (minority) factions within the republican leadership, in which the 
majority (including the leading Croatian politician Vladimir Bakaric) not only survived 
but were promoted to higher posts. The majority of the Croatian Central Committee and 
the vast majority of the Croatian political elite in general supported Tito and not the 
ousted leaders.29 Finally, the changes in Croatia changed the Croatian position neither on 
the Constitutional changes, nor on Tito in general.30
The same applies to Serbia, as can be documented by even more sources available at the 
moment.31 Two main actors, one of whom (Latinka Perovic) was forced to resign in 1972 as the 
Secretary to the Serbian LC Central Committee, while the other (Draza Markovic) in 1972 
became the leading Serbian politician over the next 15 years, both confirm that differences had 
been significant not on issue of the status of Serbia within Yugoslavia, but on the relationship
27 A myriad of examples of this could be found in Tripalo's book. Tripalo describes Tito's personal participation in 
writing the conclusions of the Tenth CC Croatia session in 1970, which subsequently became the turning-point in the 
emergence of the Croatian Spring (1990:112). Stipe Suvar (in an interview of 11 October 1997) confirms that Tito's role 
in supporting the Croatian leadership of Savka Dabcevic Kucar and Miko Tripalo was crucial, and to some extent 
directed against Vladimir Bakaric.
28 Jure Bilic, in an interview I conducted on 9 January 1998 said: 'I would not say that Tito was biased, but I think it is 
true that he felt better in Croatia than anywhere else in Yugoslavia... I could even say that Tito became 'more' Croat 
after 1971 than he was before. For example, I remember him telling me that he proposed that Franjo Herljevic (Bosnia- 
Herzegovina) should take up the post of the Federal Minister of the Interior. He told me: 'You know, he is a Croat!' In 
these words exactly! It was perhaps true that he felt more obliged to protect 'Croatian interests' after 1971 than before.' 
Miko Tripalo in his book (1990) recalls his conversation with Tito in May 1970. Tito criticised the Croatian leaders, but 
he also said: 'I think you understand my position very well. You know that I am from Hrvatsko Zagorje, which is the 
cradle of Croatia. And, when it becomes needed, I shall give you my support' (1990:117).
29 Support for this conclusion may be found in the growth of the LC Croatia membership from 206,985 in 1972 to 
350,513 in 1982. Only when the economic and political crisis in the country emerged in the early 1980s did the Croatian 
League of Communists (just like the others) start losing its membership. In 1984, for example, the LCC left 12,050 
members, while only 6,653 were admitted. This year, 77.7%, of the LCC basic organisations did not admit a new 
member (73.2% in 1983) OP CK SKH. 5/1985 and 6/1985).
30 It is often asked to what extent die ousted Croatian leaders participated in the process of Constitution writing before 
1974, and whether the Constitution was not the result of their 'pressure'. The 1974 Constitution was certainly not 
written by the Croatian leaders ousted in 1971, but, as we have said, their successors did not differ from them when it 
came to the main issues treated in the Constitution. Also, one needs not to forget that the main directions for the new 
'constitutional concept' were drawn up in the 1967-1972 amendments to the 1963 Constitution.
31 Dusan Dragosavac disagrees with this conclusion, saying that Perovic's 'liberals' acted more on the line formulated 
by (Serbian 19th century social-democrat) Svetozar Markovic, for which reason the Croatian leadership preferred them 
to the much tougher stand taken by Draza Markovic and Petar Stambolic' (interview, April 1998). However, 
Dragosavac admits that both Markovic and Stambolic proved anti-nationalists in the late 1980s, opposing Milosevic's 
new nationalism. In an interview for this thesis, Dragosavac says: 'They proved they were not ethnic extremists, 
although they had been perceived as Serbian nationalists by other leaderships in Yugoslavia'. Dragosavac's comment 
shows how easy it was to become perceived as nationalist, even if one was a member of the highest state leadership. In 
fact, both in the 1967-1974 period and in the late 1980s, both 'liberals' and 'conservatives' opposed what they saw as 
Serbian nationalism and Yugoslav unitarism.
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towards the inner or external 'opposition' to the regime.32 Even when the Serbian leaders 
disagreed on the issue of the Serbian position in Yugoslavia, this was also a result of their 'soft7 
or 'hard ' approach towards the opponents of the regime.
In his account of points of disagreement between his group and the 'liberals' (Latinka Perovic, 
Marko Nikezic and Mirko Tepavac) Draza Markovic lists the following elements:
1) freedom of the press in Serbia ('the liberals' advocated more media freedom, while 
Markovic accused them of having a 'm edia monopoly' since they controlled the 
main Serbian daily Pohtika);
2) the replacement of one generation of leaders (Partisan Veterans, still committed to 
the concept of Pre-Brioni Yugoslavia, and somewhat displeased with the removal 
of Rankovic) with another (the young 'technocrats'33: Markovic saw this as 
unnecessary while the 'liberals' argued it was a sine qua non for modernisation);
3) control over some important institutions in Serbia (primarily the police forces);34
4) some ideological disagreements, expressed in mutual accusations of being 'liberal' 
or 'conservative'.
From this account one could conclude that the two groups in the Serbian leadership fought 
over the issues of the democratisation of Serbia and Yugoslavia and not over the Serbian position 
in Yugoslavia.35 At the end of July 1972, Markovic wrote in his diary that 'the issue of socialism 
or non-socialism' was at stake (23 July 1972; 1987:378). For a Communist, there could be no 
more important issue than this one. To conclude: the fall of the Serbian 'liberals' in October 
1972, therefore, did not mean a radical change in the Serbian position on the Constitutional 
debate, but it did mean a change in treating opposition and opposing various 'anti-socialist 
activities and groups'. Both factions of Serbian politics ('conservatives' and 'liberals') accepted
32 Although showing much more respect for the 'liberals' Perovic and Nikezic than for the Tito loyalists Markovic and 
Stambolic, Dobrica Cosic still criticises them for accepting the Constitutional amendments of 1967-1972 and for not 
protesting against the methods used in purging Rankovic in 1966 (Djukic, 1989:225).
33 In order to eliminate the conservative Veterans from important positions, the 'liberals' issued a recommendation that 
only those having higher education could occupy executive posts in factories, state organs, etc. This met with strong 
opposition from the Partisan generation, exemplified by Markovic (17 June 1972; 1987:368).
34 Markovic opposed 'the liberals" attempt to control the Serbian Interior Ministry, which was the stronghold of 
conservative forces in the leadership (15 July 1972,1987:372).
35 In his diary Markovic explicitly confirms this, saying that 'the liberals' had not been at all interested in the 
Constitutional debate. When they could not entirely avoid debating these issues, their contribution was counter­
productive for Serbian interests, since they made 'too many concessions to the provinces, especially to Kosovo'. They 
were also 'indifferent towards the Yugoslav centre'. But more importantly, they ruled out ('were not prepared for') any 
use of 'administrative measures' against 'the groups of enemies' in any situation.
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the Constitutional changes when the reform of the federation was debated, and thus the 
objection that the reform was imposed on them by Tito or by other federal units proves to be 
incorrect.
3.1.2. Serbian Leaders and 'Serbian National Interests' in  the 1967-1974 Debate
The second question to be discussed here is -  were Serbian politicians at all interested in 
'Serbian national interests'36 or were they only concerned with remaining in power, w ithout 
showing any concern for public issues, such as Serbia's position in Yugoslavia. This question re­
appears throughout any political analysis. In Chapter One I argued that Communist politics 
was very much an attempt to implement visions in reality. The analysis of the differences 
between Serbia's leaders and Tito in this chapter shows that Serbian leaders were surprisingly 
negative towards Tito's pragmatic politics, arguing in favour of principles as they understood 
them, rather than too many political compromises. But in their views the principles they 
followed did not clash with the real interests of Serbia and Yugoslavia. It was by following 
these principles (based on a Marxist interpretation) that the interests of each Yugoslav nation 
could be best served. To separate interests and principles, was impossible for them, and thus 
should prove unproductive as an approach for us. Principles drove their action, but this action 
was also held to be in the interest of those they believed they represented.
The Serbian (and other leaders) could perhaps have found much more convenient means of 
securing personal power than by opposing Tito on so many occasions that Tito finally decided 
to remove some of them from office. Yet, their beliefs drove them to such a situation.37 They 
were not 'soft' negotiators, nor were they ready to accept everything Tito and the other 
republics asked them to accept. They had been very firm in not accepting Kosovo as the seventh 
Yugoslav republic, for example. They had also been interested in securing sufficient autonomy 
for Serbia within Yugoslavia, with which Serbia had been identified in the perceptions of other 
republics for much too long: during the whole inter-war and to some extent even in the post­
war period until 1966. Finally in March 1971 they came very close to realising that other 
arrangements for Serbia might also be in the Serbian best interest.38 Only Tito's move against
36 The concept of 'Serbian national interests' is not, of course, an objective, fixed and once-and-for all agreed concept, 
but -  as we can see from this chapter -  not much more than a perception of these interests by the relevant political elite. 
However, nationalist criticism of Serbian leaders for their acceptance of the 1974 Constitution insists on their 'betrayal' 
of Serbian national interests, as if they were fixed categories.
37 The same argument goes for Tito and, indeed, for Milosevic two decades later. As Tepavac, the Yugoslav Foreign 
Secretary in the late 1960s and early 1970s argues, in some of his controversial foreign policy decisions, Tito 'was not a 
slave of Russian pressure, so much as he was slave of his own ideological beliefs' (1998:60). As examples, Tepavac lists 
the diplomatic recognition of Eastern Germany and the breaking up of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967. As I 
argue in Chapter Six, it would be too simplistic to treat Milosevic as a 'pragmatist', as if he had no ideological beliefs. On 
the contrary: I argue that it is lack of pragmatism and firm ideological beliefs that have often driven him to conflicts ' 
with many others.
38 According to Tripalo (1990), in April 1971 the Serbian and Croatian leaders were close to agreeing on a more con- 
federalist structure for Yugoslavia. This possibility moved Tito and Kardelj to act against both republics.
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the Croatian 'mass-movement' (which was, to a large extent initiated by 'Serbia standing up for 
herself, as Tito said in April 1971) convinced them to re-think the consequences of such a 
move.
For this reason, neither the position of the Serbian nor of the other Yugoslav leaders in the 
Constitutional debate can be understood without explaining the main principles of Communist 
nationality policy, shared by all Communists. This is especially important since it was over this 
principle that the advocates of the Pre-Brioni and the Brioni Yugoslavia argued during the 
constitutional debate. The central question was: was it possible to be at the same time an 
advocate of Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, etc., national interests and a Communist? While the 
advocates of the Pre-Brioni Yugoslavia found it extremely difficult to reconcile the two, thus 
yielding always precedence to Communist over national affiliations, the new concept (Kardelj's 
Brioni Yugoslavia) argued that the two not only did not clash but always went together. As will 
be shown in the following sections of this chapter, the majority of the Serbian leaders in the 
Constitutional debate accepted the Brioni rhetoric, believing that the national and the 
Communist did not exclude each other. 39
The second important principle in the Communist movement was that the Communists were 
expected to oppose nationalism primarily in their own nation and only later (or, in practice, 
almost never) in other nations. This necessarily drove the Serbian Communists to act against 
Serbian nationalism, leaving aside Albanian, Croatian and all other nationalisms. In such a 
situation, however, to the Serbian public it seemed that the Serbian Communists overstated the 
presence of Serbian nationalism, while underestimating the danger of other nationalisms, 
especially the growing Croatian and Albanian nationalism of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same was felt by other Yugoslav nations -  that the Communists 
overestimated the danger of 'domestic' nationalism. Paradoxically, by fighting nationalism in 
the ranks of their own nations, the Communists now found themselves under the accusation of 
being the 'gendarmes' of their own nation. In return, this only added to the arguments by 
nationalist forces, which now found it easier to promote their conclusions about the 
'treacherous' role of national Communists.
Of course, the Serbian Communists (just like the others) expected Communists in other nations 
to fight their nationalism. But, in the late 1960s, it seemed that more autonomy for the republics
39 A good illustration of this belief was offered at the 14th session of the Serbian Central Committee by Milojko 
Drulovic, who used an example from the Paris student demonstrations which took place at this time: 'The rioting 
masses, and Communists among them, raised both red flags and French national three-colour flags; the masses were 
singing both the Marseillaise and the Internationale. I ask you: why would it be a problem for French Communists, when 
they demonstrate, to feel at the same time both French and Communist?' (1968:195). In this context, it was argued that it 
was these Serbian Communists who argued in favour of Kardelj's concept that showed more concern for the 'national 
question' than those who stood for the Pre-Brioni concept of 'brotherhood and unity' and 'socialist Yugoslavism'.
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might lead to a situation in which not everyone in Yugoslavia would have the same criteria as 
to w hat nationalism was and how to fight it. It was the rather mild stand of the Croatian 
Communists towards the 'Croatian Spring' that displeased the Serbian leaders. At the same 
time, they felt they were losing the institutional and political tools to do anything to change the 
situation.
Also, the Serbian politicians were aware that the position of Serbia remained somewhat 
specific, since Serbs were the largest nation in Yugoslavia, the one with the historical burden of 
inter-war Serbian domination strongly felt on its shoulders. This specificity did not allow Serbia 
to revise its position towards Serbian nationalism. The Serbian Communists felt that their 
opposition to Serbian nationalism must be unconditional and forceful, since, as Petar Stambolic, 
the President of the Serbian Central Committee said in May 1968, the Serbian nation was the 
only one that could 'realistically become hegemonic' (1968:142).40 Belonging to the largest 
Yugoslav nation, many members of the Serbian elite felt disadvantaged in opposing ever new 
demands by the smaller Yugoslav nations.41 The Serbian Communists thus found themselves 
more than any others caught between the principles in which they believed and the reality they 
faced. Disappointed by what they saw as the reluctant reaction in the past of other Yugoslav 
Communists to nationalism in their own nations, and unwilling to offer additional arguments 
to those who argued that the only realistic danger for the Yugoslav decentralised system came 
from 'Great-Serbian hegemonism'42 (either in the form of a renewed inter-war 'bourgeois' 
Yugoslavia, or as a Soviet-style centralisation) Serbian Communists found themselves in a 
frustrating situation, between two fires. This frustration would remain a permanent source of 
political crisis in Serbia and Yugoslavia throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
3.1.3. The Serbian Leaders and the 'Lack of Democratic Legitimacy'
Finally, the third objection to the view that Serbia voluntarily accepted the 1974 Constitution 
relates to the issue of the legitimacy of the Serbian political elite. This objection could equally be
40 This attitude remained unchanged until 1987, when Milosevic introduced a new rhetoric in the LC Serbia. Already in 
1984 he said: 'For a long time, and for no reason, a complex of unitarism and a sense of guilt over the behaviour of the 
Serbian bourgeoisie in the past have been imposed on Serbian Communists... Serbian Communists have always been in 
a situation to remove this shame which does not belong to them, and acquit themselves when it came to issues of unity 
and the Yugoslav state, just to avoid being accused of unitarism. We have no reason whatsoever to bow our heads to 
anyone' (1984/1989:34).
41 To some extent this could be compared with the position of the Czechs in Czechoslovakia and even the Russians in 
the USSR. However, there is an important difference: while the Czechs and Russians were the majority in their 
respective states, the Serbs (although the largest ethnic group) made up less than 40% of the total population. In 
addition, the Yugoslav system was much more decentralised than the Soviet and Czechoslovak systems at the time. 
This all decreased the chances of Serbian domination. However, it did not eliminate the wariness of other Yugoslav 
nations towards the Serbs.
42 As explained in Chapter Two, Kardelj avoided the term 'Greater-Serbian', using 'Great-state hegemonism' instead, 
except when explicitly referring to pre-war Yugoslavia. However, it was a common understanding that the two terms 
were synonyms.
103
raised about the political elites in Yugoslavia in general, including the elites in those republics 
where the issue of legitimacy regarding the acceptance of the 1974 Constitution has never been 
raised. The Serbian leadership was not less legitimate than, for example, the Croatian or 
Slovenian. In no Yugoslav region (with the possible exception of Kosovo, which from today's 
perspective seems surprising) had any significant protest against Kardelj's concept been 
expressed.43 Between the elite (especially Tito himself) and a wide range of the population there 
was tacit agreement on basic political issues.44 Whenever Tito wanted to remove the political 
elite in one or another republic, he would rely on the direct link between himself and the 
population.45 He was always capable of securing wide support from the population, in which 
sense he really was a populist. The only occasion described by Serbian politicians in which Tito 
faced criticism from the population originated from positions of 'radical egalitarianism' and not 
from a demand for greater democratisation or more national rights 46
Tito's popularity amongst the masses had its origin in several factors, extensively examined in 
the relevant literature on Yugoslavia. The Washington Post correspondent in Belgrade (1973- 
1976) Dusko Doder writes on his talks with the Yugoslavs:
'O ut in the country Tito has a real hold on the people. It was my impression that if by 
some miracle free elections were suddenly held in Yugoslavia, Tito would get a 
majority of the votes, even if his Communist party would noT (1978:118).
Doder quotes from various Yugoslavs he spoke to about the reasons for such support. When 
one sums up what they said, one main reason appears central -  the fear of Soviet domination. 
Tito was seen as the guarantor of Yugoslav independence and the chief defender from the 
Soviet Union. Doder quotes a textile worker from Pirot, a small town on the border between
43 By 'significant' I mean -  public protests that would force the leadership to rethink its position. There were several 
protests against the main principles of the Constitution among the intellectual elite, especially in Serbia, and Cosic's and 
Marjanovic's criticism of the majority of the Serbian CC in May 1968. However, these protests were not forceful enough 
to have a significant impact on the policy-making process. One could say that no public protest would have been 
allowed in Yugoslavia at that time. However, several protests against the elite in other East European countries 
(Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, Poland 1980, etc.) prove that no regime could prevent protests if the population 
were really dissatisfied. No similar attempts to convey discontent with the leadership occurred in Yugoslavia, with the 
exception of the 1968 demonstrations of Belgrade students, which ended up in support of egalitarianism and of Tito 
personally, not against him.
44 The reasons for this agreement are explained in Chapter Four of this thesis ('personal network of survival') and in 
Zupanov's notion of the pact between elite and masses.
45 A month and a half before ousting the Croatian leaders, Tito took a trip throughout Croatia, and a month before 
replacing the Serbian leaders he did the same in Serbia. Tito's personal popularity was especially strengthened after the 
1968 student demonstrations in Belgrade, when he briefly sided with demonstrators against 'bureaucracy'. The idea of 
'anti-bureaucratic' revolution, promoted by Slobodan Milosevic in 1988, had its origins in Milosevic's attempt to re­
establish the direct link between himself and the population against the 'bureaucracy' as Tito used to do.
46 Draza Markovic describes the exceptionally favourable perception by the Serbian population of Tito in his diary on 
30 October 1969,14 May 1972 (1987:148 and 358). He also writes about the expression of discontent which the workers 
of the 'Ivo Lola Ribar' factory conveyed to Tito when he visited them in 1972. The workers demanded radical measures 
against 'bureaucracy' and inequalities in society. In order to restore support from the masses of the population, Tito 
issued two Letters to party organisations and the general public in 1972 and 1973, insisting on more equality and social 
justice. Although they were reminiscent of Mao Zedong's rhetoric of the time, the letters were very well received by the 
population.
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Serbia and Bulgaria. When Doder asked him why would the Russians come to Yugoslavia, the 
worker 'motioned eastward toward Bulgaria' and said: 'Ask them, over there' (1978:118). He 
received a similar answer in Slovenia from a Roman Catholic clerk: 'God bless his [Tito's] soul. 
Had it not been for him, we would have been another Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia today' 
(1978:118). Or in Zagreb: 'I do not like him. But I guess we all respect him  for having stood up 
for the Russians and kept us out of their clutches' (1978:118). All other reasons were derived 
from the comparison with the Eastern neighbours of Yugoslavia.47 Tito was praised for being a 
'm ild ruler', for not m urdering his political foes, for allowing private initiative in the country, 
for importing goods and encouraging consumerism, for keeping the country peaceful, united 
and respected and for promoting the 'third way' between the two blocs. Based on Tito's 
resistance to Fascism and Stalinism, a myth of the special place that Tito held for Yugoslavia in 
world politics was promoted by the media. The facts of life seemed to support this myth: 
Yugoslavia's leader was the most prominent figure within the non-aligned movement, while 
maintaining good relationships with both East and West. Yugoslav economic successes and 
political stability were widely admired, while Tito was seen as the main guarantor of Yugoslav 
stability. Were there any reasons for the Yugoslavs not to share this belief?
While the political and intellectual elite expressed some criticism of Tito's role and of the 
system he had shaped, a wide range of the population proved to be far less critical and much 
more supportive of Tito. There is no better illustration of this than a diary note by Dobrica Cosic 
(the leading Serbian anti-Titoist) on the day of Tito's death in May 1980. Describing the reaction 
of the Serbs to the news of Tito's death, Cosic says:
'W ith my anti-Titoist feelings, I am here alone... I felt desperation and coldness 
walking on the opposite side of the street from the people; I felt alone, completely 
detached (from them). For the first time in my life I felt this loneliness, detachment 
from the people of my country' (1992:22-3).
When, a week after Tito's funeral, Cosic saw several kilometre long queues of people waiting to 
see Tito's mausoleum, he wrote (on 13 May 1980):
'All anti-Titoists are confused by the way people are reacting to Tito's death. Such grief, 
especially among the young people, is confusing' (1992:39).48
The popularity of all the Yugoslav leaders was largely dependent on Tito, and not the other 
way round. Several groups of Serbian leaders had been removed between 1966 and 1974, but no
47 The Eastern danger was also stronger than a Western among the members of the elite, as Petar Stambolic's explanation 
of the reasons for supporting the fall of Rankovic explains (Djukic, 1992: 212-4, quoted later in this chapter). This is also 
illustrated by Balearic's fears of the Russians during the Czechoslovak crisis (see footnote 92, this chapter).
481 should here also mention a very positive views on Tito expressed in the West See more in Pavlowitch (1992).
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serious political strike was organised, nor even did any civil disobedience to the Titoist system 
gather strength.49 The only exception to this was the 1968 Belgrade student demonstrations, 
which did not seek to stop but actually to speed up the removal of 'the bureaucrats' (all but 
Tito) from their offices. The only real outcome of these protests was the strengthening, not 
weakening of Tito's position in the country. They had a negative effect on the process of 
liberalisation, which had started a few years before 1968. The protests of 1968, like later protests 
in Kosovo (December 1968) and Croatia (1971) only helped Tito to send a clear signal to local 
leaders -  that their position and the stability of the country ultimately depended on him.50 The 
public protests helped the President to restore his position, somewhat weakened by the 
pressure from republican elites and the federal apparatus.
'Tito could once again say that only he himself expressed authentically the interests of 
the masses. [In 1968] he once again accused his fellow leaders of being unwilling to 
listen to his advice. Such overwhelming [plebiscite] support, he would say, could be 
compared only with his popularity immediately after the liberation of the country. 
There was nothing he could not do. In fact, he was rather economical with his own 
power. He was more cautious than those who were inviting him to use i t /51 said 
Latinka Perovic, a leading Serbian 'liberal' politician (1991:59).
In conclusion: the Serbian leadership represented the Serbian population when supporting 
Tito's proposals for the reform of the federation, but it also showed significant independence 
(both from Tito's views and from its own population) when defending what they saw as 
Serbian national interests. They considered the proposed reforms to be in the Serbian interest, 
although they objected to several ideas, asking Tito and others to change their original 
proposals and to offer more guarantees for the equality of Serbia in Yugoslavia. By doing this, 
they found themselves permanently squeezed between two sides: Tito and the mass of the 
population on the one hand, and the intellectual opposition (critical intelligentsia, dissidents) on 
the other. In w hat was a process of negotiation beneath the surface of unanimity, they tried to 
satisfy all sides, but ended up being denounced as 'liberals' (by radical egalitarians) and as 
'traitors to Serbian interests' (by nationalists). Still, while they differed on issues of 
democratisation, the Serbian leaders remained fairly united when the issue of the Serbian 
position in Yugoslavia and the reform of the Yugoslav federation came onto the agenda.
49 Certainly, one must not neglect the fact that public criticism of Tito was impossible, since the regime, which situated 
Tito in its centre was in absolute control of the media. It is, however, impossible to explain the tacit consent between the 
population in general and Tito only by coercion.
50 The same happened in Croatia, where no significant protests followed Tito's decision to remove the popular leaders 
Dabcevic Kucar and Tripalo. Their popularity, one might conclude, was largely due to the support they enjoyed from 
Tito.
51 A similar conclusion was drawn by Miko Tripalo (Croatia), who says that the 'already hesitant leadership' used the 
1968 demonstrations to halt any radical reforms, in the economic sphere and in terms of democratisation of the country 
(1990:89).
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For all these reasons it seems that much of today's dominant interpretation of the intentions 
and actions of Serbian leaders in accepting the 1974 Constitution fails to explain their 
motivations. Later in this chapter they will be re-constructed. It is here that we shall answer the 
main question of this chapter: why did it make sense to Serbian leaders to accept the 
arrangements of the 1974 Constitution?
3.2. The Serbian Leadership Between Rankovic and Kardelj
In order to answer this question, we should first explain why the Serbian elite accepted the 
removal of Aleksandar Rankovic, the most distinguished Serb in Tito's political and military 
leadership since the late 1930s, and why it abandoned the concept of the AVNOJ (Pre-Brioni) 
Yugoslavia, to which Rankovic was fully committed? Then, we shall also analyse their reasons 
for refusing to criticise Kardelj's concept, as they were expressed by two leading Serbian 
intellectuals, themselves members of the political elite -  the writer Dobrica Cosic and the 
historian Jovan Marjanovic - at the 14th session of the Serbian CC LC (29-30 May 1968). Both 
events signified divisions within Serbia's political elite throughout the 1960s and were the 
subject of debates among Serbs -  between those who advocated the pre-Brioni and those who 
argued in favour of Kardelj's Brioni Yugoslavia. Once again, the main political conflicts 
remained confined within the same ethnic group, not between them, while political alliances 
(like the one between the main Serbian leader and the Slovene Kardelj) extended beyond them.
The reasons for accepting the removal of Rankovic were explained by the main political actors 
of that time. Twenty-five years after this event (when it became extremely unpopular to criticise 
Rankovic and the concept he symbolised) the then (in 1966) Yugoslav Prime Minister Petar 
Stambolic said:
'Rankovic's whole line was conservative. In Serbia, we felt him to be a heavy burden. I 
remember my talk with Milentije Popovic [another leading Serbian politician] in 1963. 
Both of us concluded that it would be a great misfortune if Rankovic replaced Tito. One 
should remember that everything that happened at that time was linked to the issue of 
the Russians, because we feared very much that they would again draw  us into their 
Bloc... There was a time when I thought we would join them. It is at this time that there 
was a lot of debate about Tito's successor. It is in this framework that one should 
situate the Rankovic's case. Tito exercised full control over foreign policy and the 
Army, while Rankovic controlled the Party and police. We wanted to put the lid on 
this' (Djukic, 1992:212-4).
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The Serbian leadership saw the fall of Rankovic in July 1966 as a unique chance for the 
emergence of a modern, democratic52 Serbia, relieved from the permanent suspicion of being a 
'guardian ' to everyone else in Yugoslavia. The young generation of Serbian leading politicians 
hoped to decrease federal influence over Serbia, to the same extent as over all the other 
republics (Perovic, 1991:42). They saw their acceptance of the decentralisation of Yugoslavia as 
the ultimate evidence that Serbia was not and did not want to be a 'tu tor' in the country. Aware 
of their historical burden, the leading Serbian politicians believed that any centralisation was 
contrary to Serbian interests, since there was a temptation to identify Yugoslav centralism with 
Serbian hegemony. As the Serbs did not in fact dominate in Yugoslavia, the accusations on this 
account were, they believed, unjust and incorrect. There was only one way to eliminate them -  
by accepting the de-centralisation of Yugoslavia, which would bring more autonomy to Serbia 
as well. The constitutional changes of 1967-1974 were acceptable 'because they also 
strengthened the position of Serbia as an equal among equals, thus reducing further pressures 
on her, and (minimising) the chances for renewal of hegemonic tendencies in the political, 
economic and cultural areas in Serbia itself', says Latinka Perovic (1991:268). It is easier to 
understand the logic of such reasoning once we know about Serbia's dissatisfaction with some 
of Tito's decisions. A looser Yugoslav federation would mean, the Serbian leaders believed, a 
weaker position for federal institutions, which were in fact reduced to tools of Tito's personal 
politics. This would also secure more independence for Serbia, enabling her to develop as the 
real centre of a modern, democratic Yugoslavia, and as the strongest promoter of reforms in a 
post-Titoist Yugoslavia.53 Serbia, they felt, had to change her image. From being a rural, 
conservative country, suspected by everyone, it should become the centre of democratic 
transformation in Yugoslavia, a m odem and technologically developed republic. As Draza 
Markovic said, the Serbian post-Rankovic leaders were 'constructing Serbia with a different 
face and different qualities', which would be 'closer to the Serbia of the future, than to the 
Serbia of the past7 (1 March 1970; 1987:180-1). To a large extent, they were successful in doing 
this. N ot only in the late 1960s but even later, right up until Milosevic, Serbia was perceived as a 
democratic stronghold in Yugoslavia.54 This made Serbia think of keeping the central role in the
52 As I explained in the Introduction, the terms democracy and democratic should be understood in the context of self- 
managing, not liberal democracy. Liberalism, as the removal of the 'liberals' in Serbia illustrated, was a proscribed 
doctrine, almost to the same extent as 'nationalism' (for this also see Chapter Two).
53 It should not be forgotten that Tito was already 80 when he decided to replace the Croatian and Serbian leaderships 
(in 1971 and 1972 respectively). As in the case of Djilas (1954) and Rankovic (1966), the large-scale replacements in the 
early 1970s were another episode in the permanent struggle for the succession. Tito ended this struggle by declaring 
himself the President 'without limitation of term' in the 1974 Constitution (Article 333, finally formulated by Serbian 
leader Draza Markovic), and promoting collective leadership in state and party institutions (in 1972 and 1978).
54 For this see Doder (1978). The positive image of Serbia was in a sharp contrast with the terrorism of emigre Croatian 
separatists, who organised several hijacks of Yugoslav planes, bombing campaigns at railway stations, on airplanes and 
at cinemas, and assassinations of Yugoslav diplomats. Consequently, the Croatian nationalist opposition to the regime 
was identified with this terrorism. The old images of the Second World War Ustasha atrocities re-emerged in the 
international press. Additionally, the Croatian non-terrorist (nationalist) opposition refused to join their Serbian and 
Slovenian counterparts in united action against the regime. This made Belgrade and Ljubljana (Slovenia) the two 
centres of anti-regime activity, with Zagreb falling into silence. In this respect the situation paralleled the one in 
Czechoslovakia, where the main opponents of the regime came from Prague, not from Bratislava (see Innes, 1997). One 
should here notice that the Serbian leaders had good reasons to tolerate and even protect the opposition in Serbia in the
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future process of the democratisation of Yugoslavia. As Markovic wrote in his diary on 17 
January 1971:
'Although a democratisation of the country today seems impossible, since real 
democratisation in society is not really wanted, the trend of democratisation cannot 
really be halted for good... I think that Serbia is precisely the republic with the greatest 
chances to give the strongest boost to such a development. We should firmly remain on 
this orientation. This is where our strength lies. Both for Serbia and for Yugoslavia as a 
whole' (1987:253).55
It was not as the result of pressure or against their understanding of Serbian interests that the 
Serbian elite supported the Constitution but because of their firm belief that the Constitutional 
arrangements were in Serbian interests. For these reasons, the Serbian leaders respected 
Kardelj, the main architect of the new explanation of Yugoslav reality. If their relations with 
Tito were defined by pragmatic reasons, their relationship with Kardelj was influenced much 
more by sharing the common ground of ideology. In the Summer of 1991, Petar Stambolic, by 
then a retired and heavily criticised (but in 1967-1974 still central) figure of Serbian politics, said 
that he had been and remained Kardelj's supporter, since 'Kardelj's mistakes were also mine'. 
Stambolic repeated the most common argument of the Kardeljists:
'Everything that Kardelj initiated and promoted in our political system distinguished 
us from the East and was a guarantee that we would not return to the past. In general, 
he was a reformist and a Yugoslav.'56
To some extent, the Serbian leaders criticised Kardelj less than Tito, since they believed that 
Kardelj was a man of principles, while Tito was a pragmatist, ready to give too many 
concessions to other republics, and especially to the provinces.57 The difference between the 
two became obvious in the case of the 'Blue Book' (1977): while Kardelj supported the Serbian
face of criticism from Tito and other republics. This was what they indeed were doing. The same applies to the 
Slovenian leadership, but much less to the Croats. Consequently, the division between the regime and opposition in 
Croatia was sharper than in other parts of Yugoslavia, which would seriously radicalise the Croat opposition by the late 
1980s.
55 Not only the Serbian, but most of the other republican elites had the same ambition: to take the central role in a post- 
Tito Yugoslavia. Since the late 1960s, and especially after 1972, Yugoslav politics was full of struggles for the best 
possible position in the post-Tito period.
56 After all that has been already quoted in Chapter Two about Kardelj's views on Yugoslavia as a 'transitional 
community of people', it seems illogical that Stambolic believed he was a Yugoslav. But both Stambolic and Kardelj by 
Yugoslavia understood Brioni Yugoslavia. They both believed that it was in the interest of the Yugoslavs to live 
together, and that this interest, not ethnic origins, was the reason for being together. To Cosic, Kardelj's conclusions 
meant abandoning Yugoslavism, since in Cosic's concept (of the Pre-Brioni Yugoslavia), the Yugoslavia of Kardelj was 
not Yugoslavia any longer. Speaking from different discourses, Cosic and Stambolic understood Kardelj differently -  
one as an anti-Yugoslav, the other as a Yugoslav.
57 This relates to Tito's views on Croatia during the Croatian Spring and on Kosovo after the 'Blue Book' of the Serbian 
leadership in 1977 (for which see Chapter Five). For Croatia see Markovic's diary on 6 March 1971,15 May 1971,26 June 
1971, 15 and 19 September 1971, while for Kosovo see Petar Stambolic's interview with Slavoljub Djukic (Djukic, 
1992:212-4) and that of Ivan Stambolic with Slobodan Inic (1995).
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demands, Tito inclined towards the position of the provinces.58 While Kardelj acted from the 
principle that 'only the republics are sovereign, thus only they decide which elements of this 
sovereignty they would delegate to the federation, and which to lower socio-political 
communities, such as provinces' (I. Stambolic, 1995:70), Tito was motivated by the pragmatic 
need to avoid confrontation within the political elite in what he felt would be his last years in 
power.
Markovic's diaries reveal that his relationship with Kardelj had undergone a serious 
transformation in a positive direction during the Constitutional debate. While he was very 
critical of Kardelj in the beginning (19 October 1971, 21 January 1971, etc), considering him 
intolerant, dogmatic and 'schematic' (10 October 1970), as time went on Markovic understood 
that Kardelj was not a priori hostile to the Serbian point of view. On the contrary, he witnessed 
several situations in which only Kardelj supported Serbia, when she was either isolated or 
ignored by other republics. This was especially the case with regard to the Serbian provinces, 
which the other republics treated as a Serbian internal question, leaving Serbia to struggle alone 
with their demands, being again constantly on the verge of new accusations of 'hegemonism'. 
In such situations Kardelj was an invaluable ally of the Serbian leadership. The extent to which 
they appreciated such support is described in Markovic's words (24 January 1976):
'Sometimes one wonders -  what would happen without him? Can the whole system be 
based on the authority and intervention of one man? For now, this is so. One must, 
however, live after him, and without him. I do not see how.'59
A year before Kardelj's death, in January 1978 Markovic wrote in his diary:
'I have learnt to like him. He is the right man... clever, open-minded, a democrat. 
Tolerant in discussions, wide in his views' (6 January 1978; 1987:426).
Kardelj also liked Markovic. The leading Croatian politician of the time Jure Bilic recalls a talk 
with Vidoje Zarkovic, the Montenegrin representative to the State (1974-1984) and Party 
Presidency of Yugoslavia (1984-1988). Already on his deathbed, Kardelj told Zarkovic that 
among the Serbian leaders, Markovic was the most loyal to his concept. 'H e is as nationalistic as
58 For Kardelj's and Tito's position on the provinces see Markovic's diary on 13 November 1975,24 January 1976,12 and 
28 February 1977 and 29 May 1977. Petar Stambolic also says that Kardelj was acting out of principle when it came to 
the provinces to a greater extent than Tito (Djukic, 1992:241).
59 Indicatively, Markovic writes of Kardelj (not of Tito) as the key figure in Yugoslavia, which only confirms our 
conclusion that the Brioni Yugoslavia was based on Kardelj's concept. It also offers an argument for the importance of his 
personal views in the legislative decision-making and Constitution-writing processes. Contrary to this pessimism in 
Markovic's diary, public statements by Yugoslav politicians were extremely optimistic. They kept repeating that 
nothing would change after Tito.
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any other Serbian leader, but he is more than others committed to the concept of self- 
m anagem ent/60
To conclude: the dominant explanations of the reasons for the Yugoslav disintegration 
underline the inter-republican and inter-ethnic conflicts as the main cause of the state and 
regime failure. But the sources we have quoted in this chapter show a high level of 
understanding and co-operation between the Slovene Kardelj, the Croat Tito and Serbian 
leading politicians. In what follows it will become clear that the main conflict was within 
republics, and not primarily between various ethnic groups and territorial units. The political 
conflicts in Serbia were primarily between members of the political elite belonging to the same 
ethnic group, as will be shown by the example of the debate between the majority of the 
Serbian Central Committee and two other members (both Serbs) in May 1968. The same applied 
to the other Yugoslav republics.
Secondly, contrary to today's dominant interpretations, the leading Serbian politicians firmly 
believed that Kardelj's concept projected Serbia as a republic equal to others and offered her 
much more autonomy than she had before. In fact, they believed that Kardelj satisfied two main 
goals of Serbian politics: to preserve Yugoslavia and to secure the autonomy of Serbia within it. 
While Yugoslavia still remained united (despite permanent political differences between its 
regions) Serbia's extensive autonomy (’statehood1) was now fully recognised as a permanent 
and undeniable fact. As to the other Yugoslav republics, the principle of 'not intervening in its 
internal affairs' was also recognised by the federal Constitution as applying to Serbia.61
It was the ’ethnic nationalists', 'liberals' and 'Stalinists', three categories the Yugoslav 
Communists aimed to suppress in public life, who were left dissatisfied with the 1974
60 Bilic, in the interview conducted in January 1998. I did not have a chance to check Bilic's interpretation with Vidoje 
Zarkovic. However, Markovic indeed became the strongest opponent of the nomination of Slobodan Milosevic for the 
leading Party post in Serbia 1986. Ivan Stambolic described Markovic's reaction to the election of Milosevic: 
'Immediately after Milosevic was selected (as the only candidate), Draza told me that history would never forgive me 
this choice, and that the Serbian people would never pardon me for pushing Milosevic through, for Milosevic would 
spoil everything... Frankly speaking, I would feel less guilty today if Milosevic had managed to blind Draza as well. It 
would be easier for me now. But, he could not outplay the old fox' (I. Stambolic, 1995:148-9).
61 One can here ask -  was this solution not against the interests of Serbs outside Serbia, since the principle of 'non­
intervening' ruled out their more extensive links with Serbia. But it was always clear to Serbia that the problems of the 
Croatian Serbs should be resolved in Zagreb, not in Belgrade (Serbia), as Marko Nikezic told the Croatian Serbs on 
several occasions. Of course, this arrangement was made on the understanding that both Croatia and Serbia were 
socialist republics, and that Croatian Communists would fight Croatian nationalists, protecting the equality of Serbs 
and Croats in Croatia. Some Serbian leaders, such as Draza Markovic, however, felt that the Croatian Communists 
were not doing this, but they were also aware that raising this issue would be understood as 'intervention in Croatian 
affairs'. After talking to a Croatian Serb on 26 October 1974 Markovic wrote in his diary: 'I am more and more 
convinced that there is something defective, something bad in this. On behalf of what principles should we promote 
such relations? Why should I be indifferent about the position of the Serbs in Croatia, Albanians in Macedonia, etc., if -  
as a Communist and a citizen -  I am not indifferent about the Turks in Cyprus and the Irish in Great Britain?' 
(Markovic, 1988:58). The principle of 'non-intervention' was violated for the first time when Slovenia supported the 
Kosovo Albanians in 1989, to be continued with Serbian support for the Croatian Serbs in 1990.
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Constitution.62 The republics neither followed ethnic lines in Yugoslavia, nor did democratic 
elections take place constituting a (liberal) democratic Yugoslavia.63 The proposed concept was 
a further step away both from the East European, especially Soviet institutional setting and 
from W est European political systems, based on representative democracy. But, the Serbian 
politicians in the late 1960s and early 1970s were neither ethnic nationalists nor democratic 
Yugoslavs in the West-European meaning of the word. Still less were they pro-Soviet in the 
sense of being dissatisfied with Kardelj's ideas on these grounds.64 Like other Yugoslav 
Communists, they shared the 'self-managing' concept, adapting it to the Serbian situation. It 
was their interpretation of Kardelj's ideas that defined Serbian identity in the last twenty years 
of Yugoslavia. This interpretation is analysed further in this chapter.
3.3. Two Visions of Serbia and Yugoslavia Within Serbian Politics in May 1968
Even more explicitly than other Yugoslav republics, Serbia understood that the change of 
concept (after the fall of Rankovic) urged her to re-construct her own discourse in Yugoslavia. I 
shall examine the creation of this new Serbian discourse in the light of the polemics between 
two defenders of the Pre-Brioni concept (Dobrica Cosic and Jovan Marjanovic) and the majority 
of the Serbian Central Committee, which took place at the 14th CC LCS session on 29-30 May 
1968. This debate had important consequences for several reasons:
1) the Serbian Communists once again confirmed their commitment to Constitutional 
changes, offering new arguments in their support; by doing this they in fact 
defined Serbia's political discourse which remained valid until the late 1980s;
2) the debate indicated the existence of long-term divisions between factions of the 
Serbian party, which now entered a new phase; these divisions cannot be entirely 
described by terms such as 'conservatives' and 'reformists', or 'inter-nationalists'
62 Nevertheless, one should acknowledge that some democratic Yugoslavs in emigration proposed the re-organisation 
of Yugoslavia in a very similar form to the one accepted by the 1974 Constitution (see Ivanovic, 1996:84-93). Already in 
1963 the Democratic Alternative, a group of Yugoslav like-minded emigres mainly from the UK, in their Stansted 
Declaration projected a Union of Yugoslav peoples, each of which would be entitled to form its own state. This was the 
result of the conclusion, which the Yugoslav politicians in emigration reached 'with a heavy heart' (as the leading 
person of the group, Vane Ivanovic said), that 'the Yugoslavs are today a small minority in our country' (1970/1996:95). 
In this respect, one should take cum grano salis the criticisms of Kardelj's concept as being an invention of his personal 
'Slovenian nationalism' (as stated by Ko£a Popovic, in Nenadovic: 1988).
63 Markovic openly admitted that 'regardless of all declarations, the real democratisation of society is not wanted. The 
main obstacle to this is those people who have been sitting at the forefront of the state and society and who have 
identified with them, who have merged together... positioning themselves at the centre of all that happens. This is also 
continued by some new people who do not want a really democratic discussion' (17 January 1971; 1987:253).
64 It was, however, out of the political elite itself that these three opposition groups had been created. In Chapter Six we 
examine the transformation of some of the losers of the intra-party conflicts in the late 1960s into prominent leaders of 
the anti-Kardeljist opposition in the post-Titoist period (Dobrica Cosic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia being 
the most obvious examples).
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and 'nationalists', since they were rather complex ideological explanations and 
visions of the future;
3) the debated issues such as the position of Serbia in Yugoslavia; relations within
Serbia and with the provinces; recognition of ethnic and political diversities, etc.,
entered the main agenda of Yugoslav and Serbian politics to stay there and only to 
be re-defined again with Milosevic twenty years later;
4) one of the main participants, Dobrica Cosic, became the leading figure of the
opposition in Yugoslavia, and also the first President of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1993; in this respect the debate was equally 
formative of the views of the Serbian opposition and the Serbian elite since 1968.
The debate between the two concepts (the Pre-Brioni and Brioni)65 was the result of a different 
understanding of the internal party paper 'On the tasks of the League of Serbian Communists in 
the realisation of the policy on national equality in SR Serbia', proposed by the Serbian 
leadership to Central Committee of the LC Serbia at its 14th session (29 and 30 May 1968). The 
document clearly suggested that a 'new phase' in the policy on the national question had begun 
with the fall of Rankovic two years ago. In the earlier phase, the document admits, the 
'bureaucratic forces had in practice violated the main principles of the LCY's policy on national 
questions'. An especially grave form of this violation was 'permanent suspicion of the 
nationalities fnarodnosti'),66 and the obstruction of the politics of national equality'. This was 
especially the case in Kosovo-Metohija, with regard to the Albanian nationality. The Document 
explicitly denounced the previous policy of 'bureaucratic forces' in Kosovo as 'a drastic form of 
anti-socialist chauvinist practice' (Minutes of the XIV LC CCS Session, 196867:18).
The 'new  phase' was intended to fully realise the equality of Yugoslav nations and 
'nationalities', in line with Kardelj's abandonment of the Slavonic character of Yugoslavia. Since 
Yugoslavia was not any longer based on the ethnic similarities of its constitutive nations, but on 
their common interests, non-Slavonic Albanians should not be treated differently from others.68
65 The Pre-Brioni corresponds to the third, and the Brioni to the fourth constitutive concept of Yugoslavism, as described 
in Chapter Two.
66 The use of terms nationality ('narodnost'), nations ('narodi') and national minorities (nacionalne manjine') is explained in 
the Introduction. An interesting debate developed on the usage of these two terms fnarodnosti and nacionalne manjine') 
between Petar Stambolic and Dusan Dragosavac in July 1983 (letters in possession of the author).
67 Reference (Minutes, 1968) is further in this Chapter used for quotes from the authorised Minutes of the 14th LC CCS 
session, as published by Komunist, Belgrade 1968.
68 It soon proved, however, that the abandonment of the Slavonic basis for Yugoslavia necessarily led to the Kosovo 
Albanians' demands to be treated as equal to other Yugoslav nations, which meant as a ’constitutive nation’ with the
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Apart from this matter of principle, there were more pragmatic reasons for this change: 
Albanians had now become the fourth largest Yugoslav ethnic group (smaller than the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes, but larger than the Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians and Montenegrins), 
with a growing intelligentsia. They thus became a typical example of an 'emerging nation', 
fitting into Leninist theories of social development. Before the eyes of Yugoslav Communists an 
ethnic group now developed the characteristics of a fully developed nation, demanding what 
every nation demands for itself: its own state. The same, of course, applied to the Slavonic 
nations of Yugoslavia -  they now became 'completed nations' (as Kardelj concluded), willing 
and ready to form their own states. Yugoslavia, as explained in Chapter Two of this 
dissertation, was there to acknowledge and support this historical process. In granting more 
autonomy to Yugoslav constitutional units (both republics and provinces), Yugoslav 
Communists believed they were acting in a truly Marxist way -  recognising what was an 
inevitable result of the historical process.
The Serbian Central Committee, acknowledging the new development, invited the relevant 
institutions to pass additional measures to reduce differences in development between Kosovo 
and the rest of Serbia and to speed up the education of the Albanians, so that they themselves 
could take responsibility for the further development of Kosovo (Minutes, 1968:25). The 
political equality of nations and nationalities could not, the Serbian Communists argued, be 
achieved without economic equality, since it was the economy that formed the base of the 
political supra-structures. Equality, on the other hand, was the fundamental value of socialism. 
W ithout equality, no society could pretend to be socialist.
The 'new  phase', the Serbian Communists admitted, carried with it the danger of nationalism. 
For this reason, the Document invited the Communists of Serbia (regardless of their nationality) 
to block any action by nationalist and chauvinist elements in their own nations. In opposition to 
the interpretation that some (i.e., Serbian) nationalism was 'defensive1 and only a reaction to the 
'aggressive' nationalism of other nations (i.e., Croats and Albanians), it was stressed that 'each 
nationalism had its own origins in a particular nation or nationality' and should, therefore, be 
fought within that nation by the Communists of the same nation. There was no such thing as 
more or less dangerous nationalism and no 'defensive' nationalism should be tolerated.
3.3.1. Discourse One: Cosic and Marjanovic
Dobrica Cosic, however, did not accept the strong criticism of the 'old phase' of Yugoslav 
socialism. Cosic, a partisan himself and a writer who helped Kardelj to word the Programme of
right to form a republic, rather than as a nationality without the right to self-determination. Kardelj's refusal of these 
demands had been seen as an indication of the unwillingness of the Yugoslav leadership to secure political equality for 
Albanians in Yugoslavia. More about the sense of inequality among Kosovo Albanians in Chapter Five.
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the League of Yugoslav Communists in 1958, came under suspicion after sending a letter to Tito 
in which he opposed the removal of Rankovic in 1966. Now, two years later, he again voiced his 
disagreement with criticism of the 'Rankovic period', saying that 'since the Republic of Serbia 
was established up until the present, the leading political forums of the Republic of Serbia have, 
in general and in historical perspective, conducted a democratic and internationalist policy' 
(Minutes, 1968:105). If there was a reason to be worried, then this was so because of the most 
recent events. 'The unity of the working class and of the nations of Yugoslavia is underm ined at 
its roots by strong social and national differentiation and growing economic inequality,' This 
was all, Cosic said, the result of 'bureaucratic nationalism which keeps replacing Marxist 
internationalism and universalism', as well as of 'the ideology which equates socialist self­
management and national, i.e., state sovereignty' (Minutes, 1968:102). This trend made many 
people worried about the future of Yugoslavia, which might well result in various nationalist 
tendencies.
Cosic was supported by Jovan Marjanovic, another member of the Serbian Central Committee 
and one of the main historians of the Yugoslav Second World War period. Marjanovic criticised 
what he saw as the abandonment of 'socialist Yugoslavism' and Yugoslavism in general and 
opposed innovations in the ethnic structure of Yugoslavia (recognition of a separate Muslim 
nation and of the existence of a separate Montenegrin culture, etc.). Both Cosic and Marjanovic 
said that a debate on the state of the Serb nation had been avoided, despite the 'serious anti- 
Serb atmosphere, which has been widely manifested in certain areas, especially in Croatia and 
Slovenia', where Serbs were perceived as those who 'want only to dominate, govern, and 
control' (Minutes, 1968:103). Accusing other Communists of being tolerant towards anti-Serb 
nationalism, Cosic refused to follow the rule of 'non-intervening' in other republics' 'internal 
affairs'. He especially refused to leave Hungarian and Albanian nationalism to Communists in 
Vojvodina and Kosovo respectively, warning of 'Hungarian segregationism and the 
bureaucratic autonomism69 of the Vojvodina bureaucracy'. Marjanovic asked why the Slovene 
League of Communists defined itself as a 'national organisation' in its Statute (Minutes, 
1968:91). He argued against the recognition of the Muslim nation, since this would - as he said - 
lead to new ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. This decision, as well as the recognition of the 
cultural separateness of the Montenegrins (as opposed to their Serbian background) were two 
examples of 'bureaucratic nationalism' which was opposed to 'the free development of 
Yugoslav socialist awareness, and of a sense of belonging to the Yugoslav socialist community' 
(Minutes, 1968:98). The bureaucratic forces that made these decisions, 'used violence to halt any 
process of integration and unification of the Yugoslav nations and their segments'. Yugoslavia
69 This is how the term autonomism  ('autonomaStvo') appeared in the Serbian political vocabulary. When it was repeated 
by Spiro Galovic at the Serbian Centred Committee session on 6 May 1981, the leaders of Vojvodina accused the Serbian 
leadership of 'borrowing' labels from Cosic, by then the most prominent opponent of the regime. More in Chapters Five 
and Six of this dissertation.
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thus found itself in 'the absurd and comic situation that despite the proclamation of the right to 
self-determination, one could not declare oneself a Yugoslav, while many honest fighters for 
socialism experience humiliation as people without nationality, being treated almost as 
displaced persons,' said Marjanovic. It was not true, he emphasised, that people did not want to 
be Yugoslavs. They were discouraged from being so by the political elite which 'paid much 
more attention to elements that make us divided and different in national terms rather than to 
those that integrate and bind us together' (Minutes, 1968:97).
But, it was Kosovo that divided Marjanovic and Cosic most in the Serbian Central Committee 
from the advocates of the 'new  phase' approach. Despite the dominant rhetoric according to 
which the rights of Albanians had been violated under the 'Rankovic regime', Marjanovic and 
Cosic now claimed that the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo suffered in the 'new phase'. 
They had been pushed out of jobs and pressurised by the Kosovo Albanians. Therefore, they 
had begun to leave the province.70 The Provincial Committee of the LC of Kosovo 'did not 
attach appropriate importance to the struggle against Albanian chauvinism and irredentism, 
coming out with mere political phrases' (Minutes, 1968:107). A policy which replaced class with 
national criteria and which understood the self-managing rights of nationalities as their right to 
statehood and sovereignty could be fatal. In opposition to Kardelj's rather loose understanding 
of 'sovereignty' and of 'statehood', Cosic argued that in Kosovo, there could be either Albanian 
or Yugoslav sovereignty. 'A combination of both is impossible without negative results, at least 
in today's circumstances,' said Cosic (Minutes, 1968:108). One of these outcomes could be the 
revival of the 'old historical aims and national ideals of the Serbian nation - to unite itself into 
its own state' (Minutes, 1968:111). This could have unimagined consequences.71
Cosic saw the solution in the strengthening and not the abandoning of socialist 
internationalism, which would eventually lead to a Balkan Federation of socialist countries. 
National conflicts could only be prevented by a truly internationalist politics, which would 
result in the 'formation of an internationalist community of nations... bound together on the 
grounds of common class, economic, social aims and interests, regardless of national 
allegiances and borders'. In such an association 'class, societal and individual interests should
7 0  Many of Cosic's conclusions were indeed based on facts. The situation in Kosovo after 1966 is analysed in detail in 
Chapter Five of this thesis.
71 Cosic's warnings on the danger of the emergence of Serbian nationalism, as well as the whole tone of his speech, 
show that at this time (1968) he was more a defender of the Pre-Brioni Yugoslavia than a promoter of 'Greater Serbia' or 
even the pre-war concept of 'national unity'. His criticism was for this reason even more dangerous for the political 
elite, which could not easily label him a nationalist. A Croat 'Praxis' Professor Predrag Vranicki came to the same 
conclusion in his review of Cosic's 1982 book. However, what he saw as the lack of commitment of other Yugoslav 
nations to Yugoslavia, and his conviction that Kardelj's Yugoslavia abandoned the main principles of the Partisan 
Struggle, made Q>sic so disillusioned that he moved towards Serbian ethnic nationalism, whose 'patriarch' he gradually 
became in the late 1970s. Cosic then became one of the very few Serbs to argue that Yugoslavia was not in Serbian 
interests. The evolution of Dobrica Cosic from a Rankovic supporter in the 1960s to the main patron of Serbian 
nationalist ideas in the 1980s is paradigmatic for a large number of Serbian intellectuals and indeed for a large section of 
the Serbian population. For this reason we discuss it again in Chapter Six. See also Pavkovic (1998).
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always have priority over national and state allegiances'. A federation of Balkan nations, 'as an 
organic part and form of the processes of global integration', would 'not be a pure alliance of 
nations or states, but would tend to become an alliance of free people and working 
associations... not of 'supra-nations" (Minutes, 1968:115).
Cosic was convinced that such an association was possible and feasible.
'If this is impossible and only a fiction, then socialism itself is a fiction and an unfeasible 
ideal. If our intentions to realise this goal should be postponed for better and more 
suitable times, then the revolution itself should have also been initiated in more 
appropriate and better times. But I think neither that this ... is impossible to achieve, 
nor that it (or the orientation towards this aim) should be postponed. Quite the 
contrary' (Minutes, 1968:115).72
In his speech, Cosic stressed that the Albanian and Macedonian questions were the most 
complex parts of the Balkan problem, since these two nations were divided between several 
Balkan states. It was true, he said, that in certain circumstances, those who argued for the 
unification of all Albanians within a single state could become perceived as 'a  historical 
vanguard and could also have a certain socialist programme and revolutionary slogans' 
(Minutes, 1968:13).73
'In  principle, we have no right to ignore or to hide from ourselves the sentiments of the 
Albanian nation for its own unification.' Rather, this reality should be 'seen in 
correlation with the past and the future of relations between Serbs and Siptari [Kosovo 
Albanians], and in the spirit of socialist internationalism'.
Cosic, in fact, invited members of the Serbian Central Committee to openly debate the question 
of Kosovo:
'The Serbian nation is aware and has enough power and willingness to understand the 
democratic national feelings of the Shiptars of Kosovo-Metohija, and to support all 
their aspirations if they are democratic in form and content, if they do not endanger 
peace in the Balkans and the independence of the Yugoslav community, that is -  if they 
do not realise their national sovereignty by nationalist methods, endangering the
72 If one wonders how it was possible to dream of Balkan associations in the tircumstances as they were in 1968, one 
should be reminded that Kardelj himself was talking (though cautiously) of a 'future co-operation in this region' (see 
Chapter Two). Tito, who saw himself as the central figure of Balkan politics in the whole post-war period, could have 
been only supportive of this possibility. The idea of a Balkan Federation, however, was older them Tito (see the ideas of 
Svetozar Markovic and Dimitrije Tucovic, the leading Serbian socialists of the 19th century) and it continued after him 
(see, for example, Branko Horvat's proposals for a Balkan Federation as die only possible solution for the Balkan 
national questions, in April 1998 (Feral Tribune, 6  April 1998), or similar proposals by the Kosovo Albanian leader 
Adem Demaqi).
73 The already difficult problem with Kosovo and the Albanians was only intensified because Albania was another 
socialist country, with a separate interpretation of Marxism and a domestically rooted and legitimated leadership. All 
these elements made it additionally dangerous in ideological terms, since - as Kardelj argued - the real danger for 
Yugoslav socialism lay only in an 'alternative form of socialism', not in liberal democracy. Albania, being different from 
Soviet 'state socialism', represented an example of such a danger.
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existence, freedom and integrity of the Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija' (Minutes, 1968:113- 
4).74
But, at the same time, one should not forget that 300,000 Serbs and Montenegrins 'certainly 
cannot and will not accept becoming a part of a less developed socio-political community and 
one less civilised than that to which they belong by all criteria' (Minutes, 1968:114). For this 
reason, Cosic said, any abandonment of 'a  really internationalist policy', which would lead to a 
socialist federation of the Balkan people as 'an organic element of the processes of the world's 
integration', would be a fatal mistake.
Both speeches were an open attack on the main ideas of the 'new  phase' of Yugoslav socialism. 
But their criticism was composed of heterogeneous elements, which could hardly make up a 
consistent political alternative. Their approach, in fact, used some elements of the rhetoric of the 
national unity merging them with the Pre-Brioni discourse of socialist Yugoslavism.
Yet, Cosic and Marjanovic openly pointed to facts which the political elite in Serbia and 
Yugoslavia wanted to ignore or to hide from the public debate. With the democratisation of 
public life after 1966, nationalist tendencies were indeed more represented in the public debate. 
This was especially the case in Croatia and Kosovo, regions to which, for historical reasons, 
Serbian nationalism often referred as anti-Serb. A year before Cosic's speech, the leading 
Croatian cultural institutions and the most distinguished intellectuals had demanded the 
recognition of a separate Croatian language in the 'Declaration on the Name and Position of the 
Croatian Literary Language' (1967). Their Serbian counterparts replied with the 'Proposition for 
Consideration'. As Cosic himself experienced after his polemics with Slovenian author Dusan 
Pirjevec (in 1961), by the mid 1960s there was hardly any common sense of 'Yugoslavism' left 
between intellectuals from various parts of the country.75
Cosic's warning about the possibly dangerous consequences of the new policy in Kosovo could 
have also been supported by facts. The fall of Rankovic in 1966 was followed by public criticism 
of his 'anti-Albanian' politics in the province. Massive purges in the security structures, 
especially in Kosovo, affected many Serb and Montenegrin civil servants in the province. The 
'new  phase' now promised even further 'positive discrimination' in favour of the new Kosovo 
(Albanian) intelligentsia, which was idealistic and to a large extent nationalist. In 1967, for
7 4 In the 1990s Cosic moved towards proposing a division of Kosovo into Serb and Albanian parts, with the possibility 
for the Albanian part to join Albania. Cosic has also championed the unification of (ethnic) Serbs in the Union of 
Serbian Lands -  Serbia, Montenegro, Republic of Srpska (Bosnian Serbs) and -  until August 1995 -  the Republic of 
Serbian Krajina (Croatian Serbs). For Cosic's views on both the Albanian and Serbian questions in 1990 see Borisav 
Jovic's diary for 11 September 1990 (1995:191-4).
7 5  A good example of the controversies between Serbian, Croatian and Slovene intellectuals may be found in a 
conversation between Antonije Isakovic and Miroslav Krleza in the early 1970s. According to Isakovic (interviewed by 
me), Krleza claimed that 'Yugoslavia did not exist any longer' and that co-operation between writers could not change 
this fact, since 'it was all too late already'. For debate between Pirjevec and (tosic see Milojkovic-Djuric (1996).
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example, a historian Ali Hadri published an article on 'Kosovo in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia' 
in which he offered an 'Albanian point of view', which certainly provoked Serbian sentiments 
linked to Kosovo (Hadri, 1967; and Dogo, 1997).76 In Kosovo, where the relation between the 
two ethnic groups had often been seen as one of master-servant rather than that of two equals, 
the Serbs now increasingly felt they were becoming 'servants' of new masters -  the Albanians.77 
This launched a large wave of emigrations from Kosovo, already by far the least developed 
region of Yugoslavia. Between 1961 and 1981 about 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins left 
Kosovo. Together with the much larger birth rate of the Kosovo Albanians, this in reality 
destabilised the ethnic structure of the Province, in which the share of the Serbs had fallen in 
these 20 years from 23.5% to 13.2%. Interviews conducted with the migrants, as well as research 
into their economic backgrounds, show that the sense of inequality and political pressure after 
1966 was by and large the most important reason for migration (Petrovic, 1992; Blagojevic, 1997 
and 1998).78 Cosic was indeed the first Serbian politician to warn about these trends, at a time 
when nationality issues were still somewhere between a taboo and an open issue.79
It is no surprise, therefore, that the debate that followed their speeches at the 14th CC LCS 
Session had a strategic importance not only for the Serbian position in the Constitutional 
debate, but for the course of events in the late 1980s. It was a clear choice between various 
concepts of Serbia and Yugoslavia. The majority of the Central Committee declared in favour of 
Kardelj's concept. Next in this chapter we follow the arguments that the majority used in 
polemics with Cosic and Marjanovic.
3.3.2. Discourse Two: The M ajority of the Serbian Central Committee
The Vojvodina Party leader Mirko Tepavac argued that if Cosic's approach were accepted, the 
Albanians would have no alternative but to feel 'like sub-tenants in a Serbian national state, to 
acknowledge that they are second-rate citizens, to accept that only if they accept Serbian 
domination they could remain where they are' (Minutes, 1968:141). For Draza Markovic 'the 
idea that everything, including national feelings, should be subordinated to the notion of unity, 
is not a new argument' but an old Stalinist idea. 'However, even fifty years after the October 
Revolution the national question could not be put off the agenda by any talk of 'unity ',' as the
76  Muhamedin Kullashi (himself an advocate of the 'Albanian point of view 7 in Kosovo historiography) now admits that 
textbooks used to teach history in Kosovo were 'to some extent nationalistic'. But, he said quite accurately, this was a 
'phenomenon common to all historiographies in Yugoslavia' (Kullashi, 1997:58).
7 7  An interesting analysis of the ’master-servant1 relationship in Kosovo is presented by Kofos (1998).
78 Serbian migration from Kosovo became the central issue of Serbian politics in the mid 1980s and significantly 
influenced the rise of Milosevic and the return of Cosic to Serbian politics. We shall return to this question in chapter Six 
of this thesis. The Albanian discourse will be explained in Chapter Five.
7 9  This is how one might explain his enormous influence on the Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s. Cosic was the key figure in 
linking them with the Serbian elite (see Hudelist, 1989).
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Czechoslovak case explicitly proved.80 This case was used by Milojko Drulovic, who asked 
w hat was the reason that the Czechs and Slovaks 'had only now come to the conclusion that the 
relationship between the them should be organised in an entirely different way' (Minutes, 
1968:195). The main reason was in their previous commitment to the Stalinist tradition of 
'resolving' problems between nationalities, which neglected the complexity of this issue in a 
socialist and multi-ethnic state. The President of the Serbian Assembly Milos Minic, speaking 
for more than two hours, went a step further than the main group of Serbian politicians,81 when 
he proposed that even the most 'radical' proposals of the Kosovo leaders in the Constitutional 
debate should be accepted. Minic accepted the new name of Kosovo (without mentioning 
Metohija),82 the change of the name to 'Socialist' (instead of previously only 'Autonomous' 
Province)83 and the wide use of a new flag of Albanian nationality.84 On the other hand, Minic 
criticised Marjanovic for his mentioning of the Ustasha crimes against the Serbs in the context 
of this debate.85 The Serbs had no reason to be afraid of granting wide autonomy to its 
'nationalities' and regions. On the contrary, it was precisely because of the large differences 
between regions in Serbia (and especially between Vojvodina and Kosovo) that 'autonom y 
should be created even if it has not previously existed -  and very wide autonomy, because 
otherwise we will not be able to solve such different problem, without making bureaucratic 
centralism stronger/ concluded Minic.
8 0  This refers to the 'Prague Spring' of 1968, which reached its peak in the days of the 14th CC LCS session. Markovic 
here talks about the federalisahon of Czechoslovakia, for which Dubdek (1993) is a good source.
81 Minic did not make many friends among Serbian politicians with this speech. Draza Markovic (2 June 1968; 1987:68) 
considered Minic to be ready to make too many concessions to Provinces. After Minic's speech at the 14th Session, the 
gap between him (on the one side) and Markovic and Petar Stambolic (on the other) became ever wider. The conflict 
between them culminated in June 1982 (see chapter Five for 'the case of Draza Markovic'). Marginalised after 1982, 
Minic became the first of Tito's confidants to sense the change in policy of the Serbian leadership after Tito's death. The 
conflict between Minic and Markovic is only one of the many intra-elite conflicts in Serbia, which confirms that ethnic 
elements did not play a primary role in the politics of Brioni Yugoslavia.
8 2  On the importance of this change see Simic (1998:201).
83 Serbian politicians at that time opposed this change (for reasons, see Markovic, 20 October 1968; 1987:92). A 
compromise solution was reached on 4 November 1968 (see Markovic, 6  October 1968; 1987:98). However, already in 
May 1968 Minic concluded that the word 'socialist' should be accepted in order to distinguish socialist provinces from 
'the classical political autonomies of bourgeois-parliamentarian and some other political systems, where autonomies 
exist... without being democratic in the socialist sense' (1968:272).
84 The issue of national symbols in Kosovo was very controversial. Minic believed that the free use of the flags of the 
'nationalities' (Albanians, Turks, etc.) in Kosovo was a civil right, and that the flags would not in themselves create 
problems (1968:272). The debate continued long after 1974, reaching its peak in the 1980s. (See correspondence between 
Dragosavac and Stambolic, July 1984).
85 Emphasising that he was the former Military Prosecutor in the Trial of Draza Mihailovic, Minic said: 'All slaughters 
were terrible, because they were (the result) of a bestial madness, but the most terrible one to me was when five 
thousand Bosnian Muslims were slaughtered on a bridge in Foca... Entire Muslim villages were exterminated by 
Serbian Chetniks. (Thus) I would prefer very much if Joca (Marjanovic) had taken any of the many cases of the Serbian 
Chetniks' slaughter, leaving the Comrades in Croatia to talk about the slaughter committed by the Ustashas' (1968:275). 
This attitude of Minic's represents the main line of Communist policy on the national question -  that it was the duty of 
Communists in all Yugoslav nations to attack nationalism in their own nation. The Yugoslav Communists did not 
accept the 'Brezhnev doctrine' of 'fraternal help' in internal Yugoslav relations.
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However, the speeches of the three most influential members of the Central Committee -  its 
former, present and incumbent presidents Dobrivoje Radosavljevic,86 Petar Stambolic87 and 
Marko Nikezic88 -  defined the Serbian mainstream interpretation of Kardelj's concept on the 
national question. Formulated in opposition to Cosic and Marjanovic, this platform remained 
almost unchanged in the next two decades -  until the 8th CC LCS Session in September 1987, 
when Slobodan Milosevic defined a new programme.
The main ideas of the Serbian mainstream discourse in the 1968-1987 period were:
First, the existence of nations is a reality that should be acknowledged. Regardless of 
the fact that they were products of ’the bourgeois epoch1, nations had not withered away and 
would remain in existence for much longer than Stalinists believed. In itself, this is not 
necessarily an obstacle to the successful development of socialism. The Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia, Dobrivoje Radosavljevic said, had long ago (and especially during WWII) 
abandoned dogmatic views on nations.
'Yugoslavia is a multi-ethnic community... and no political forces of the Old (Pre-War) 
Yugoslavia could have resolved the national question. No revolutionary movement, no 
socialism which did not at the same time deal with the national question, no 
Communists that disregarded the existence of the national question would be able to 
do anything' (1968:237).
On the contrary, it was the fact that they addressed the national question that made 
Communists popular and accepted by the Yugoslav nations. The Party became strong only 
when it proved itself as a force from within the nation, as a part of a nation, not something that 
was imposed on the nation from the outside. The aim of the Party, especially in a complex 
multi-ethnic community such as Yugoslavia, was to secure the free development of nations 
according to socialist principles, and not to deny or neglect the national question. In this 
context, Cosic's and Marjanovic's argument that the Party over-emphasised differences and 
neglected similarities between Yugoslav nations was rejected.
Secondly; one could not resolve the national question, even if one wanted to, by 
unitarist formulas, or by pressure on existing nations. Past failures in building up a 'Yugoslav
8 6  Radosavljevic was the CC LCS President between July 1966 and March 1968. Latihka Perovic describes him in these 
words: 'I profoundly agreed with him on two issues -  on his understanding of the development of socialist democracy, 
and on his genuinely internationalist policy on the national question... He was the only person I sincerely missed once 
circumstances detached me from the people I had worked with' (1991:51).
8 7  Petar Stambolic, the wartime Party leader of Serbia, was a 'caretaker' in the post of the President of the CC LCS 
between March and November 1968.
88 At the time of the 14th Session of the CC LCS Nikezic was the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary. Very popular as Tito's 
'mouthpiece' in the period of the Czechoslovak crisis, Nikezic was elected President of the CC LCS in November 1968. 
This move was also an attempt to normalise relations with the Soviets after their intervention in the CSSR. He remained 
in this post until October 1972, when he was removed after Tito's attack on 'liberalism' in Serbia.
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nation' (in the First Yugoslavia) and the Stalinist experience in the East European countries 
(especially in Czechoslovakia) were instructive enough. The national question re-appeared in 
its full force, regardless of the Yugoslav Communists' naive wishful thinking that it would 
disappear after the revolution89 (Stambolic, Minutes, 1968:303, Radosavljevic, Minutes, 
1968:242, etc.). The politics of Diktat and pressure on nations from above in a state, as Marko 
Nikezic said, were no longer acceptable to anyone, including, of course, Serbia. 'New relations 
have become needed by everybody,' he said, and this was the reason why all republics in 
Yugoslavia had accepted them. 'To dictate, at a time when it is no longer historically inevitable, 
which means - when it can no longer be justified - this is hardly acceptable,' especially to the 
more developed regions of Yugoslavia (Minutes, 1968:212). When it came to nations, the 
Serbian politicians concluded, it was much better to give more rather than fewer rights. It was 
'better to be too generous, in terms of concessions and flexibility towards national minorities, 
than to fall below real needs' (Minutes, 1968:242).90
Thirdly; even if Serbia advocated the centralisation of Yugoslavia and a unitarist 
approach to the national question, she could find no political support for this policy in 
Yugoslavia.91 The only potential allies of unitarists were outside the country -  in the USSR and 
East European countries. Bearing in mind the context of the Czechoslovak crisis, to Serbian 
(and other) leaders it was clear that a defence of the unitarist concept of Yugoslavism would 
lead to the endangering of Yugoslav independence.92 Petar Stambolic argued that the notion of
8 9  Milka Planinc offers a good illustration of this belief. In an interview conducted by me in April 1998, she said: 'We 
were all, including myself, Yugoslavs, and we did not have, even in our most private thoughts, the idea that Yugoslavia 
could disintegrate. I remember how shocked I was when it was reported that Vladimir Bakaric, a very experienced 
politician, said somewhere in Belgium in the mid-1960s that what we were doing was re-structuring Yugoslavia, but 
that only the future would show how long it would last as a common state. To me, this statement came as a big 
surprise. I asked myself: 'How could he say this? Does he really think that there could be something else but 
Yugoslavia?' We all believed that, in principle, the national question had been resolved, and that the misunderstandings 
we occasionally had would decrease as economic development progressed.' Other members of the leadership, 
regardless of their ethnic or republican origins, shared the same belief. For example, Dusan Dragosavac (the leading 
Serb politician in the Croatian Communist leadership) believed the same, as he told me in April 1998.
9 0  Serbian and Yugoslav politicians often quoted from Lenin: 'There is nothing that halts the development and growth 
of proletarian class solidarity more than injustice on the national front, and there is nothing that members of a small 
nation feel more sensitive and hurt about, than a sense of inequality and the violation of equality, even if in negligence, 
even in the form of a joke, when it comes from their comrade proletarians. This is why, in this particular case, it is better 
be too generous, rather them not flexible at all. This is why in this case, the basic interest of proletarian solidarity, and 
thus the interest of the proletarian class struggle, demands that we abandon a formal (bureaucratic) approach to the 
national question . 1 This paragraph is from the 14th Session, quoted by Dobrivoje Radosavljevic (Minutes, 1968:242). It 
was also used by Dusan Dragosavac at the Presidency of the CC LCY Session in July 1984, when he argued in favour of 
the wide use of the flags of nationalities in Kosovo.
91 Nikezic said that Cosic and Marjanovic did not count on political alliances, as their speeches did not intend to open a 
dialogue with others, but to re-introduce a system of monologues. 'This speech is a monologue, sometimes even an 
insulting monologue. But the time of monologues is expiring everywhere, while in our country it has already ended. 
The monologue is always an expression of a political monopoly, which we have left behind us by now 1 (Minutes, 
1968:220).
9 2 The time of tire 14th Session was characterised by extensive Yugoslav worries (of both leaders and population) that the 
USSR might intervene in Czechoslovakia, and - subsequently - in Yugoslavia, for Yugoslavia not only supported 
Dubcek's reforms, but it promoted a much more liberalised version of socialism them was the Czech programme. The 
fear of Soviet intervention had permanently preoccupied Yugoslav public opinion, but it reached its peak in 1968
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'socialist internationalism', when combined with demands for 'unity' could 'serve as a cover-up 
for a claim that we are all Communists, that we therefore have internationalist obligations and 
consequently, that we have to subordinate our actions, for example, to some conclusions 
reached at some global meeting of world Communists' (Minutes, 1968:303). The Yugoslav 
Communists defied such attempts when they split with Stalin in 1948, arguing that they were 
responsible to their own country, their own working class and the people they led in the 
revolution.
Marko Nikezic (then the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary) argued that the crisis of the Western 
Democracies was so intense, that in practice only socialist (Communist) ideas were left in the 
political arena. Demonstrations in Paris, the Vietnam War and anti-war action in the United 
States of America provided the confirmation of what all Marxists believed - that Capitalism was 
the epoch of the past, which was to be replaced by socialism, as a transitional phase to 
Communism.93 'Thus, it seems to me that the question is not: socialism or not, but - what type 
of socialism.'94 Consequently, Cosic's and Marjanovic's ideas, being socialist (but in a different 
sense from Kardelj's socialism) presented a greater danger than any Capitalist alternative.
'It seems to me that there is a realistic danger that the socialist future becomes in reality 
discredited by elements of the old models. For, we have already seen societies that 
expropriated the rich classes and that even organised industrial development, but 
which nevertheless failed to improve the liberation of man. I m ust say that we have 
already attempted to do this, we have already been there ... but, fortunately, we were 
moved from there,95 and now we do not want anyone to push us back to these ideas' 
(Nikezic, Minutes, 1968:214-5).
(Tripalo, 1990). This may be illustrated by the discussion at the emergency session of the Yugoslav political and military 
leadership on 2 September 1968, seven days after the intervention of the Warsaw Pact units in Czechoslovakia. 
According to Miko Tripalo (a Croat participant) the Army leadership admitted that Yugoslavia would be able to resist a 
USSR attack for not more than three days. An additional problem was that the core of the Yugoslav army was stationed 
on its Western, not its Eastern borders. Koca Popovic (the Vice-President of Yugoslavia, Serbia) then attacked the 
Defence Secretary Ivan Gosnjak (Croat), and indeed (as Tepavac witnesses in 1998:127) - Tito himself, for the ideological 
dogmatism that created the grounds for such a decision. The situation was so tense that the Croat leader Bakaric said he 
would not sleep at home since the Army commanders in charge of Zagreb were pro-Soviet. He accused the Army (led 
by another Croat -  General Gosnjak) of being responsible for the situation in which Soviet troops would reach Rijeka 
(the Adriatic port) in two days. Tepavac argues that at this moment, only 1,000 soldiers protected the territories 
between the Yugoslav border with Hungary and the Vojvodina capital Novi Sad (1998:127). On 5 September 1968, the 
Daily Telegraph reported on the preparations of the Yugoslavs for Partisan war against the Soviets. The concept of 
'people's self-defence1 was developed as the consequence of this debate. The situation was only worsened when the 
Romanian leader Ceausescu three days after the invasion (24 August 1968) sought formed permission for his Army to 
retreat to Yugoslavia if attacked. Tito agreed, on condition that they left all weapons on the borders (Tripalo, 1990:104).
93 This belief would be only strengthened in the next six years, before the final acceptance of the Constitution. In the 
early 1970s economic crisis hit the West, in 1974 the Watergate affair underlined the 'moral corruption' of Western 
democracies, etc. Consequently, to many (left-wing) intellectuals in the West (and in the East) Yugoslavia looked like an 
'oasis of stability and progress in Europe'.
94 This conclusion is in agreement with Kardelj's views. As explained in Chapter Two, Kardelj was convinced that die 
only real and long-term danger came from an alternative type of socialism, i.e., from 'Stalinism' ('state socialism') and to 
some extent from the type of socialism advocated by the 'Praxis' philosophers. The basis for such thinking is a linear 
understanding of history, as explained in Chapter One of this thesis.
95 This is a very carefully worded allusion to the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948. Interestingly, 
Nikezic had chosen the passive form ('we were moved from there') rather than repeating Tito's interpretation that 
Yugoslavia broke with Stalin.
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In Nikezic's words, if Cosic's and Marjanovic's ideas were supported, Yugoslavia would move 
to 'statist concepts', while in its nationality policy it would return to positions which many 
other socialist countries (for example, Czechoslovakia) wanted to leave by any means. 
Furthermore, it made no sense for Yugoslavia to move towards centralism at precisely the same 
moment that everyone else realised that this system provided no grounds for the development 
of socialism.
Fourthly, the majority of the Serbian Central Committee argued that Cosic and 
Marjanovic misinterpreted the notion of Yugoslavism. Yugoslavism emerged as an expression 
of the demands of the South Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire for their national 
individuality.
'When they had no strength to achieve their national freedom individually, they relied 
on each other, and all South Slavs, creating a certain strength in order to achieve 
independence,' said Petar Stambolic (Minutes, 1968:303).
Accordingly, no one wanted to be a Yugoslav in order to deny or even less to suppress their 
own national existence, but, on the contrary, they invented Yugoslavism to make their own 
national existence possible. The same motive mobilised the Yugoslav nations during the war for 
national liberation, which they did not fight for the slogan of unity, but for their own freedom, 
impossible without them being united (Nikezic, Minutes, 1968:214). A unity which would 
endanger the freedom of the Yugoslav nations, therefore, was unacceptable.
'For the reason of our relationship with other Yugoslav nations, we in Serbia m ust be 
very clear about this, we have to deal very carefully with all these expressions of 
Yugoslavism, and this is what creates a political problem here,' said Stambolic.
Fifthly, the main enemy of Serbian national interests was Serbian nationalism, which 
the Serbian Communists must oppose with all their strength. 'No force in society is more 
reactionary than nationalism and chauvinism,' concluded Milos Minic. If we wanted to test a 
Serbian Communist on nationalism, we needed to ask him what he thought of Kosovo- 
Metohija, Minic said.
But what was Serbian nationalism'? Serbian Communists (as well as other Communists) 
became extremely sensitive on nationalism and 'nationalism', leaving the threshold for labelling 
one as 'nationalist' rather low, especially in ethnically mixed areas and where Serb-Croat 
relations were at stake. On the other hand, once a person became labelled as 'nationalist', this 
immediately led (at least) to his complete exclusion from official political life. To Petar 
Stambolic, Cosic's warning that the Serbs were leaving Kosovo as a result of political pressures 
seemed 'strange', since it basically originated in the doctrine of Serbian nationalism. 'It is
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strange when Communists of Serbia, debating nationality issues in 1968, look at who inhabited 
an area before others', he said. Replying to Marjanovic's criticism of the recognition of Muslim 
national and Montenegrin cultural specificities, Stambolic invoked the CPY practice of treating 
Muslims as a separate entity in all wartime declarations, recalling tha t the Muslims had 45 
national heroes.96 The statehood of Montenegro was older than that of Yugoslavia, while the 
separate (as distinct from the Serbian) culture of the Montenegrins had been developed over the 
last several decades in Yugoslavia. In general, the Serbian Communists believed that 'one does 
not need to do more to harm Serbia today, at this moment of our real differentiation on 
nationality issues, than to preach Serbian nationalism' (Tepavac, Minutes, 1968:141).97
Sixth; for historical reasons, Serbia needed to be careful w hen opening up national 
issues. Serbia did not want to be permanently suspected and blamed for dominating others in 
Yugoslavia. She was satisfied with the widespread perception among the others (especially 
Kardelj) that she had acted responsibly when accepting the removal of Rankovic in 1966. 
Emphasising this positive perception of Serbia in Yugoslavia, Petar Stambolic also argued that 
any fears that Serbia might be endangered in Yugoslavia were senseless:
'First of all, could anyone today say that it would be in the interest of the Serbs if the 
nationalities did not enjoy the same rights as we do or if other naitions did not have the 
same rights as us?... No one wants and no one can say this. Secondly, are we really 
endangered by the nationalities?98 I do not know of any case w hen one could be 
endangered by a nationality.99 It is only the majority that can put pressure (majorise) on
96 The argument based on participation of ethnic groups in socialist revolution was often used in relation to their status. 
One of the main arguments against the status of a republic of Kosovo in 1945 was the poor participation of Kosovo 
Albanians in the Partisans (Horvat, 1998; Vickers, 1998). On the other side, Stambolic used what he claimed to be a 
relatively high participation of Muslims (Bosniaks, as they prefer to be called now) in the Partisans as an argument in 
favour of changing their status in the new structure of Yugoslavia. However strange this argument seems today, it was 
logical for those who believed that the Communist revolution was the beginning of the 'real History' of the Yugoslav 
nations. It was also based on the notion that its socialist character bound Yugoslavia rmuch more than the ethnic 
similarity of its 'constitutive nations' (see Chapter Two).
9 7 The Serbian Communists took this line even during Milosevic's first years in office, but now  they violated the rule of 
'non-intervention' that Minic insisted on when objecting to Marjanovic's 'Ustasha examplle'. Milosevic and his aides 
denied neither the existence of Serbian nationalism nor the necessity to oppose it, but thiey now claimed that only 
Serbian Communists were fighting their nationalism, while all other Communists (and especially Kosovo Albanians, 
Croats and Slovenes) made a tacit or even open coalition with the most prominent nationalists in their nations. They also 
argued that Serbian nationalism was only a reaction to other, at this particular moment more dangerous nationalisms 
(see my interview with Rados Smiljkovic in 1989). Milosevic's statement at the end of the Eighth CC LCS Session 
(September 1987) illustrates this: 'We have often failed to react in an appropriate manner to> other forms of ideological 
and political pressure on socialist self-management, pressure created by bourgeois and statist ideas, which were put 
forward by their protagonists. But we have always considered our nationalists as first-class enemies. And it was not 
without reason. Serbian nationalism today is not only intolerance and hatred of another nattion or other nations: it is a 
real snake in the bosom of Serbian nation' (Milosevic, 1987/1989:171-2).
9 8  It is obvious that Stambolic here deliberately avoided the word minority, although thiis word seems to be more 
appropriate for what he wanted to say. However, at the time of this speech, it was already politically correct to use 
'nationality' instead of 'national minority'. Later Stambolic revised his position. In his letter to Dragosavac of 20 June 
1983 he used the word minority, explaining that this word fitted into 'how the world talks about it'. (See Stambolic to 
Dragosavac, 20 June 1983, and Dragosavac to Stambolic, 27 June 1983, copies in my possession).
9 9  Marko Nikezic concluded similarly to Stambolic: 'At no time and in no place was the mistaike of granting more rights 
and wider possibilities for the development of smaller nations and nationalities (than necessary) committed. History 
does not ever record that such a 'mistake' has been committed towards the nationalities and national minorities' 
(1968:143). Dragoslav Markovic was, however, of a different opinion when he spoke (13 years later) at the CC LC Serbia 
Session immediately after the Kosovo demonstrations ( 6  May 1981). Markovid then said that the policy that the
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minorities, and therefore - the problem of the minority is not a problem for the 
minority, but for the majority. And this is why we take these decisions regarding 
Kosovo-Metohija - it is in our own interest, in the interest of political stability and the 
strength of Serbia.1
Finally, seventh, Serbia believed that the new Constitutional structure not only would 
not lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, but that it was the only way to prevent it. The 
unitary Yugoslavia of the pre-war period, the Serbian (and other) Communists argued, 
disintegrated not only because of the military attack by the Germans, Italians, Bulgarians and 
Hungarians in April 1941, but also because internal tensions had previously weakened its 
defensive strength. The AVNOJ Yugoslavia of 'brotherhood and unity', although a federation, 
also failed to eliminate an d /o r resolve the national question. Although successful in preventing 
further ethnic conflicts in the aftermath of the War and in granting more rights to smaller 
national groups in Yugoslavia than they ever had, this model 'could no longer secure progress 
and the consequence of this conclusion was that, after serious consideration, we have taken 
conscious action to move further on,' said Nikezic. It remained to be seen if integration could be 
secured on other grounds100 - by the enlarged autonomy of nations and their republics-states. 
'This is not a disintegration, this is an integration, because integration can be successful only if it 
is voluntary,' concluded Petar Stambolic (Minutes, 1968:309).
3.4. Conclusion
The Serbian political leadership accepted the 1974 Constitution because they saw Kardelj's 
concept as a step towards the realisation of the main Serbian national interests: to preserve a 
self-managing and socialist Yugoslavia, in which Serbia would have substantial autonomy 
without being suspected of suppressing the free development of other nations and 
'nationalities'. Decentralisation of Yugoslavia, under these conditions, meant greater autonomy 
for Serbia, and thus was not against, but in favour of Serbian interests. The Serbian leadership 
wanted to use this autonomy to modernise Serbia, and - to some extent - to 'liberalise1 its 
political system. By doing this, the Serbian leaders believed that they would increase the 
influence of Serbia on political decision-making in the country, especially after Tito's departure. 
They also hoped to advance a self-managing (de-centralised) socialism, which they saw as the 
only realistic alternative to both 'parliamentary democracy' and 'state socialism'. Serbian 
Communists did not seek and did not want to accept an alliance with 'Serbian nationalists' and
Provinces should be given more rights than the Constitution instructed resulted in reducing the rights of Serbia. 
Therefore, he advised, 'everything is anti-constitutional which is not in accordance with the Constitution, whether more 
or less than (the rights secured) by the Constitution1 (1981:103).
1 0 0  This scepticism Nikezic obviously shared with Kardelj, as witnessed by Bilandzic and quoted in footnote 75 in 
Chapter Two. As Tepavac witnessed, Tito's views on the future of Yugoslavia were also pessimistic. In November 1971 
he told his political aides in an informal conversation on the train between Bucharest and Belgrade: 'If you only knew 
how I see the future of Yugoslavia, you would be shocked!' (1998:153).
126
'Yugoslav unitarists', since they believed that they represented the main threat to Serbian long­
term interests. Yet, they did not like to see other republics7 and the federal leadership's constant 
attacks on Serbian 'nationalists' and on other 'negative tendencies' within Serbia, considering 
this to be an 'intervention in their internal affairs'. They expected Communists in the other 
Yugoslav republics (and two provinces) to reject any coalition with nationalists in the ranks of 
their nations. In this context, it was entirely understandable that the issue of Albanian 
nationalism was left to the Albanian Communists (predominantly in Kosovo), while the Serb 
Communists were expected to condemn, prevent and reduce the strength of Serbian 
nationalism. In addition to the already explained communist beliefs that the state should de­
centralise in the 'transitional period' in order to enable direct democracy ('self-management') to 
replace its main functions, the decision of the Serbian Communists to accept Kardelj's 
Constitutional proposals seemed perfectly logical.
In analysing the intra-Serbian dispute over what were Serbian interests and how they should be 
defended, I re-emphasise that the greatest political conflicts in Yugoslavia were for a long time 
neither inter-ethnic nor inter-republican, but about the vision of society and, therefore, 
ideological. To the majority on the Serbian Central Committee the Slovene Kardelj was much 
closer than the Serb Cosic. Even more so, they preferred Kardelj, the architect of a loose 
structure of Yugoslavia, to Cosic, the defender of the strong socialist and united Yugoslavia 
which developed before the dismissal of another Serb and Yugoslav - Aleksandar Rankovic. 
Finally, they abruptly rejected Cosic's argument that the Serbs had become unprotected and 
that the 'anti-Serbian' nationalism of the Croats, Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims and especially 
the Albanians was entering a dangerous phase. Instead, the Serbian leaders argued in favour of 
greater autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina, fully supporting further de-centralisation not 
only of Yugoslavia, but equally of Serbia itself.
Reading this today, one can only ask: how was this possible? But as we argue throughout this 
thesis, ex-post attempts to explain past actions tend to go wrong if they fail to understand the 
reasoning of the relevant actors within the relevant context. Within the discourse of Serbian 
nationalism, it is impossible to say anything else about this 'impossible' coalition of Serbian 
leaders and the Slovene Kardelj but that it was a 'betrayal' of national interests.101 But in the 
discourse of the Communists of Serbia in the 1970s, the nationality of the political actors played 
a secondary role compared with ideological agreement. As Kardelj argued, it was 'the common 
vision of society', not ethnic similarities, that bound Yugoslavia together.
101 Cosic says that the Serbian leaders were nothing but 'Tito's obedient servants' (1982/1992:58). In an interview 
conducted by me in April 1996, Antonije Isakovic (a long-standing political and personal friend of Cosic's) described 
the Serbian leaderships before Milosevic as 'opportunists of the worst kind' and 'traitors to their own country'. These 
statements are still representative of the dominant discourse among Serbian nationalist intellectuals.
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Unable to situate events in their context, the Serbian nationalist discourse today offers no other 
explanation of the 'pact' between the Serbian population and the Croat-Slovene Tito, its 
'greatest enemy [of Serbia] in this century',102 (as Dobrica Cosic called him on the day of his 
death) but the one advanced by Cosic himself in 1989. Speaking in Budva (Montenegro) 
immediately after Milosevic's successful overthrow of the last Titoist leadership of the smallest 
Yugoslav republic, Cosic concluded:
'The reasons for this [i.e., for Serbs supporting Tito] were not primarily political or 
objective, but anthropological; they may be found in the anthropological nucleus of our 
national being... In our ethos, there is an existential incapability of being rational when it 
comes to ourselves and the world in general, there is an inclination to self-destruction, a 
perm anent tragedism in our historical existence.'
It was because of this 'tragedism' that the Serbs simply 'had no power to recognise the enemy', 
or to recognise them only too late (Cosic, 1989/1992:246).103
Of course, Cosic's explanation of Serbia's support for the 1974 Constitution in terms of 
'anthropological' or ethno-genetic reasons falls short of any understanding of what really 
happened. But it is not only Cosic who proves incapable of understanding how it was possible 
that Serbia accepted the 1974 Constitution. Those who try to explain the failure of Yugoslavia 
by the 'permanent ethnic hatred' argument exhibit the same failure. It is because of them that 
we should once again emphasise the main argument of this chapter: despite the internal 
divisions within the Serbian political elite and the conflicts which crossed ethnic and even 
republican lines in Yugoslavia, the Serbian elite in 1968 understood the Constitutional 
compromise as a reasonable framework for the realisation of Serbian national interests.
Further in this dissertation (and especially in Chapters Five and Six) we analyse why this 
changed.
1 02 This is how Cosic describes Tito on the day of his death, 4 May 1980. Excerpts from 6 osic's diary (published in 1992) 
witness Cosic's obsession with Tito and his alleged 'anti-Serbianism'. Although he admits re-editing his scripts in order 
to eliminate the most radical expressions, he still authorised this one. Cosic's anti-Titoism is the key to understanding 
why he (and many other Serbian nationalists) supported Milosevic. They saw him as 'the most successful destroyer of 
Tito's order, the fittest person to achieve Serbia's abandonment of a half-century long subordination to the anti-Serb 
coalition, a Communist who re-established the Serbian state which was annulled by the Serbian Communists, a 
politician who aroused the historical consciousness of millions of Serbs and who re-established Serbia as a political 
factor' (Cosic, 1991/1992: 168). Ironically, Milosevic tended to promote himself as the new Tito who would unite 
Yugoslavia (more in Chapter Six).
103 A similar explanation is offered by Croatian nationalist Franjo Tudjman, the president of Croatia, when he says that 
the Croats lived in the dark-ages of Communism, without being aware of their national interests, all the way through to 
the establishment of his party -  the Croatian Democratic Community in 1989. Cosic and Tudjman, as well as Kardelj, 
are all 'visionaries' - all three of them had a mission of bringing light to the dark age that preceded their existence. To all 
of them, the real history of their nation began with them; everything else should be 'burnt' and forgotten. 'The future 
revolution in this country, over which Communists, Stalinists and Titoists ruled, ought to begin with the burning of 
their papers! The burning of all books, all texts and newspapers written by Communists under their governance... Our 
literacy must go back to the evangelism of Miroslav,' says Dobrica Cosic (1982/1992:70). More on Cosic's position in the 
1980s in Chapter Six.
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Chapter Four:
The Economic Crisis
The (Lack of) Response of the Yugoslav 
Political Elite to Economic Crisis in the Early 
1980s
The Party Presidency was a big problem to me, but at the same time, I knew I would 
not be able to operate without their support... In order to secure their support, I had 
to convince them that the market was not against self-management. I argued that the 
market was a limitation of state, the same as self-management. And that, therefore, 
they could go together, since they are both opposed to statism. The debate on this 
was going on and on for all four years of my term in office.
Milka Planinc, Yugoslav Prime Minister (1982-1986) 
Interviewed for this thesis, April 1998.
4.0. Introduction
The acceptance of Kardelj's concept by the Serbian leaders in the 1967-1974 Constitutional 
debate, I argued in the previous chapter, was the result of their commitment to Marxist 
ideology and of their perception of Serbian interests. In this Chapter, I follow the response of 
the Yugoslav political elite to economic crisis in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, arguing that the 
same two reasons -  commitment to ideology and the perception of the interests of the various 
segments of society -  motivated their actions. Communist societies, as I argued in Chapters One 
and Two, favoured a vision of the future rather than the imperatives of reality. Yet, their vision 
of the future was based on their perception of the interests of those they 'represented'. As 
Kardelj argued, it was not for reasons of ethnic similarity, but because of common interests in 
developing a self-managing community of nations that the Yugoslav nations decided to remain 
in Yugoslavia. The interests of the Yugoslav nations were not opposed to Marxist ideology: on 
the contrary, they could be best served only by following it.
The economic crisis, which began in the late 1970s, represented a serious challenge to the link 
between ideology and interests. Two groups emerged within the leadership: one (primarily in 
the Federal Government) argued in favour of a more pragmatic and less ideological approach, 
while the other (mostly linked to the Party leadership) remained committed to the ideology, 
even when the economic and political situation was causing concern among experts and foreign
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observers. In this conflict, the 'ideologues' in the Party prevailed over the 'pragm atists' in the 
Government. Although they made a significant effort to accommodate the ideology to the 
circumstances in which they operated, in any serious clash between ideology and reality, the 
Communist leaders, as I argued in Chapter One and Two, ultimately favoured the vision of the 
future rather than the imperatives of reality. The Party as the representative of the future was, 
therefore, predestined to win over the Government, an institution of the state that would wither 
away.
For an observer who fails to recognise the importance of the ideological context in which 
political action was taking place, such an order of priorities makes little or no sense. The 
economic theory of stability argues that a rational actor would be more likely to prefer interests 
over ideology, and thus would introduce changes to the political system (i.e., the party in power) 
if the economy were failing. Those who followed Kardelj's concept would argue that only by 
following self-management would the economic interests of the workers be realised. Their main 
criticism of political action was directed at the inefficient implementation of the concept, not at the 
concept itself. Although the elites were genuinely concerned with the economic crisis in 
Yugoslavia, their confidence in the ideological vision of the world which they were attempting 
to construct blinded them to the economic and political reality and to the consequences of their 
actions in reality.
4.1. Boalisation: Associated or Disintegrated Labour?
The Yugoslav economic system was reconstructed following the main ideas of Kardelj's 
concept. Among the aims of the reform, normatively prescribed in the 1976 Associated Labour 
Act (ALA), were: (1) to enable workers even in large enterprises to take direct part in decision­
making; (2) to enable workers to control not only the factories but also the whole 'social 
reproduction' and (3) to further decentralise the state by reducing its control over the economy 
and transferring many of its functions to 'workers' councils' and other alternative institutions. 
The ALA (consisting of 671 articles) was to replace the 'state constitution' once circumstances 
allowed it. It was, therefore, to even greater extent than the Constitution itself an ideological 
document. Its main ideas were in line with the idea of transforming society into an 'association 
of free producers'. Associated labour was imagined to be an integrative factor in the complex 
Yugoslav multi-ethnic society. It was also an alternative to Soviet state socialism, characterised 
by a larger role of the state in the economic sphere.1
1 Speaking of this system in 1995, Ivan Stambolic said that its main idea ('however ideological') was an expression of an 
'orientation that was not wrong: that before any party, state and before politics in general there was a 'world of labour'. 
'To us [political leaders] it meant above all -  basing ourselves in the 'world of labour', rather than basing our power on 
force and the authority of one political party' (Stambolic, 1995:45).
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To enable workers to control the factories, the complex system of Yugoslav economy was 
divided into small functional units, the Basic Organisations of Associated Labour (BOALs, or in 
Serbo-Croat, OOUR). Although the BOALs could remain autonomous units (self-organised 
enterprises) in most cases they were too small to remain independent. Therefore, at least in 
theory, several BOALS 'associated' in one Work Organisation. A  typical Work Organisation (RO) 
had three to four BOALs and one Work Community (RZ, administrative unit). The final forms of 
associating were the Complex Organisations of Associated Labour (COAL, SOUR), which 
sometimes had even more than hundred BOALs.
However, in practice, the organisational reform meant that the existing large enterprises were 
divided into smaller units. Four years after the declaration of the ALA, 94,415 BOALs were 
created in Yugoslavia.2 In large enterprises, like, for example, the [Yugoslav] Post and 
Telecommunications (PTT), there was no less than 291 BOALs, 2 Work Organisations without 
BOALs, 26 Work Organisations with BOALs, 4 Work Communities or BOALs and 22 other 
Work Communities.3 Even Air Traffic was organised in not less than 52 different units, 21 of 
which were BOALs.
Outside observers did not take long to realise, however, that instead of the development of 
associated labour, the Yugoslav economy was disintegrating and fragmenting. True, many more 
workers now became members of governing bodies in their own BOALs and COALs. But, 
instead of ruling the factories and the whole process of 'social reproduction', they participated 
in decision making only in their small units, not at any higher level. And the BOALs themselves 
were powerless to change the 'conditions of production'. Even if the workers formed a majority 
in these bodies, they often felt powerless and not competent to face the large amount of legal 
and economic decisions they were asked to take. They therefore leaned heavily on the 'techno­
managers' and administration. Instead of the 'de-bureaucratisation of society', a sea of new 
regulations were issued in order to support and explained new structure.4
The new system was based on the ideological notion that the working class was pluralist within 
itself, but that its historical role remained an integrative factor for the various separate interests 
that could emerge within it. 'Social agreements' (drustveno dogovaranje) between BOALs were
2 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 16,207; Montenegro 1,813; Croatia 20,038; Macedonia 6,002; Slovenia 10,836; Serbia 35,519 out 
of which 12,846 in Vojvodina and 3,356 in Kosovo. StatistickiBilten  1286, SZS, Belgrade, 1980.
3 Statistidki Bilten 1986:22.
4 Between 1,25 and 1,5 million directives, orders, contracts and other obligatory acts were enacted throughout the 
system in the first few post-Constitutional years (Bilandzic, 1986:39). The Croatian sociologist Letica calculated the costs 
of the new legislation to be equal to creating 150,000 new jobs. The Belgrade political scientist Goati says that by 1988, 
the Yugoslav political and economic life was directed by 8  million directives, laws and legal acts. Number of employees 
in administration increased 44.3% between 1972 and 1978 (1989:43).
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promoted as the main instrument of potential conflict resolution. But instead of uniting to 
promote 'working class interests', the BOALs started to fight with each other to protect the 
small interests of their workers against those working in another BOAL of the same firm. In 
some factories the situation became so paradoxical that physical barriers were raised to separate 
workers in two BOALs.5 A complex system of 'consensus' (unanimity decision-making 
requirement) made possible a situation where half of the workers in one BOAL practically 
vetoed thousands of other workers in their BOALs if they voted against the majority decision.6 
Since BOALs were the 'basic units' of decision-making in industry, the invention of Kardelj and 
Tito and also a symbol of working class power in socialist Yugoslavia, it was extremely difficult 
to over-rule their decisions. This was especially difficult at the state level, since in the 
ideological concept promoted by Kardelj, the state must follow, not obstruct the interests of the 
working class. In the end, the state would wither away at the end of the process. Workers1 self­
management was, therefore, institutionally protected to a level that the state was not. Statism 
was seen as the main obstacle to its further development (Kraigher, 1985:76)7
The whole idea, however, showed itself to be inefficient, expensive and disintegrative very soon 
after the first steps to implement it were taken. The Yugoslav system resulted in the creation of 
an autarkic and divided working class. It was not so much that the Yugoslav working class was 
now divided into working classes of republics8 (this was already explained by Kardelj's notion of 
completed nations and Bakaric's of national working classes) but that not even within the Republics 
could the process of disintegration be terminated.
Still, the Republics were in a position to do much more about the re-integration of their 
economic systems than the Federation. In the end, they controlled their own Plans and 
therefore had the final say on issues of investment: all of them except Serbia. They had an 
additional motive to do so: fearing the social pact between Tito and the working class they were 
interested in satisfying the needs of 'their' workers in order to legitimise their own power.
Paradoxically, in order to prevent a total disintegration of the system and to preserve political 
power that was formally increasing but practically decreasing in the last years of Tito's life, the
5 Stambolic, 1995:46 and Ckrebic in Politika, 31 December 1985.
6  Stambolic offers an example: 'Seven thousand workers voted for a decision on referendum, but the BOAL of the 
Catering Services voted 31 against and 29 f<?r: because of these two votes, seven thousand workers could not realise 
their self-managing will' (Stambolic, 1995:44).
7  This was, however, one among many controversies in the Kardeljist project. The states were to be replaced with self­
management, but the statehood of republics was recognised in 1974. The way out of this paradox was found in the self- 
managing concept of the states, and in the 'new role of the party' which was theoretically directed at managing self­
management. Even the politicians themselves, however, admitted this was an illusion.
8 For example: the Assemblies of Republics and Provinces had their Chamber o f Associated Labour, but the Yugoslav 
Assembly did not have such a chamber. Several proposals, mainly by the Serbian leaders, to form one were rejected 
always on the basis that there was no such thing as a Yugoslav (supra-national) working class.
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republics aimed at centralisation within themselves while decentralising Yugoslavia as a federal 
state. This trend again found its support in the new understanding of the nationality question in 
Yugoslavia, which was expressed in the 1974 Constitution by which the republics became 
sovereign states of their completed nations.
The Yugoslav republics, being recognised as sovereign states, significantly reduced their 
mutual trade. While in 1970 - 59.6% of goods and services were traded within the republics in 
which they were produced, in 1980 this percentage rose to 69%. Only 21.7% of goods and 
services were exchanged between Yugoslav republics, while 9.3% went to foreign export. Not 
infrequently one republic imported goods which the other republic exported, paying, therefore, 
more for goods which already existed on the domestic market (Korosic, 1988:72). This, for 
example, happened with electricity: four regions with electric power production resources 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Serbia proper and Kosovo) exported it, while another four 
(Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia and Vojvodina) imported it from neighbouring countries. 
Consequently, the price of electricity varied in 1983 from 89% of the Yugoslav average in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, to 121.4% in Kosovo.9 The same happened with other prices, which varied 
by 20% to 30% across the regions. Living standards, already several times lower in the under­
developed regions of Yugoslavia, now additionally differed from region to region. Average 
salaries in Slovenia were in 1986 about 40% higher than the Yugoslav average, while in 
Macedonia they were 30.6% lower. The ratio was 1:2.02. The rent of state owned flats, for 
example, was in 1985 in Bosnia-Herzegovina 39.5% lower, and in Slovenia 76.8% higher than in 
Croatia.10 Little was left of the Communist promise to reduce the differences between the 'poor' 
and 'rich' regions of socialist Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the differences were growing, which 
is evident from the following chart.
Table 1: GDP in Republics and Provinces 1952-1989 (Index 100 = Yugoslavia's average)
1952 1962 1972 1982 1989 1989:1952
Slovenia 182 189 194 193 196 + 14
Croatia 121 121 126 125 126 + 5
Serbia (total) 93 92 90 91 92 -1
Vojvodina 90 107 112 119 119 + 29
Montenegro 88 70 74 76 74 -14
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
86 71 67 68 68 -18
Macedonia 71 61 69 67 65 -6
Kosovo 47 34 32 28 26 -19
YUGOSLAVIA 100 100 100 100 100
(Source: Vojnic, 1994:263)
9  Ekonomska politika, 1691,27 August 1984.
10 Danas, 30 July 1985.
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As demonstrated in this table, both the biggest winners and the biggest 'losers' of Yugoslav 
economic development were situated in Serbia, in its provinces. While Vojvodina was the only 
region of Yugoslavia that successfully transformed itself from an 'underdeveloped' (below the 
Yugoslav average) to a 'developed' area, the other Serbian province -  Kosovo -  even further 
decreased its economic level when compared with the other republics and Vojvodina. While in 
1952 the ratio in GDP level between Kosovo and Slovenia was 1: 3.9,30 years later, despite large 
investments in Kosovo, the ratio had doubled to 1:7.9. While Croatia and Slovenia (and 
especially Vojvodina) raised their level of development, all the others (and especially 
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) saw no relative improvement for themselves in 
Yugoslavia.
The growing gap between the developed and under-developed regions in Yugoslavia created a 
problem for an ideology that claimed there was no real equality between nations without 
economic equality. Not only did this process re-open the issue of economic exploitation but in 
fact presented the case described in Kardelj's warnings about the potential problems for 
national equality in Yugoslavia. Events were, however, following a different path from what 
Kardelj defined as necessary in the transitional period. The inability of the Yugoslav communists 
to reverse these trends produced a growing sense of inequality and economic exploitation in 
Yugoslavia. It further promoted a policy of 'protectionism' within the more developed 
republics, particularly Slovenia. Although there were no laws banning employees from other 
regions of Yugoslavia from moving and finding a job in Slovenia or Croatia they somehow 
increasingly felt unwanted in the more developed regions. 'Bosnians' ('Bosanci', a term used in 
the Slovenian colloquial vocabulary for 'Southerners', Serbo-Croat speaking manual workers in 
Slovenia) felt this in Slovenia, while the Kosovo Albanians had the same experience anywhere 
in Yugoslavia.11 In a situation of economic crisis, and with increasing tendencies to 'autarky7, 
the 'Southerners' became 'foreigners'. Gradually, the general public begun to recognise them as 
culturally, religiously, politically and ethnically different. The economic differences thus 
increasingly became social and political. The sense of exploitation and of undesirability was 
growing. Sticking with one's own republic, and in some cases (when, as in Kosovo and the 
underdeveloped regions of Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia, they were inhabited by a minority 
ethnic group) with one's own people, was a viable alternative. It was now more and more true 
that the anti-nationalist rhetoric of the regime was in sharp contrast with the results of the 
system built upon the same ideology. As in other areas of life, ideological rhetoric and reality 
were growing apart from one another.
11 For 'Bosnians' see Meznaric (1986), for the social distance between Slovenes and Albanians see Kuzmanic (1989).
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In the last years of Tito's life, the already low social mobility across the borders of republics 
decreased still more. In 1976 only 2.1 percent of Work Organisations had one or more BOALs in 
some other republic. But even such a small number fell to 1.5 percent in 1981 (Korosic, 1988:76). 
However, each republic had its own aluminium factory, dozens of tobacco factories, an electro­
industry and car-factories, even when they had no basic conditions to make them productive. 
Many of these were actually 'political factories' - a pure expression of the political fears of being 
'dependent' on others in Yugoslavia. Yugoslav industry, paradoxically, found it sometimes 
easier to co-operate with non-Yugoslavs than with partners in other republics. It seemed that 
fears of being dependent on others in Yugoslavia led Yugoslav republics to increase their 
dependency on international banks. This trend was also supported by the government's 
encouragement of exporters: they were now additionally looking for partners abroad, rather 
than within the country. But, the protectionist measures in Western Europe, as well as the low 
quality and high prices of the Yugoslav products, made this attempt fail. Many young 
unemployed people also found it easier and more promising to move to West European 
countries than to try to find jobs elsewhere in Yugoslavia.12 This was also due to the fact that a 
student, for example, in Zagreb had more chances to learn English or German than Slovenian, 
Albanian or Macedonian, and to obtain a British scholarship than to be supported by the 
Yugoslav Federal Government for studying in Skopje (perhaps also because there was no 
federal ministry of education: education was a matter for the republics and provinces).13 Not 
even federal officials (Army officers, custom officers, federal politicians and bureaucrats) spoke 
more than their own native language, unless this was not Serbo-Croat.14 Both these under­
developed, and these most developed now asked: what was then left of the equality of nations 
in practical terms? Was it all just a fiction, an unfulfilled promise? The economic crisis now 
provided a context in which the wider issues of the political system re-emerged in the 1980s.
4.2. Debating the Causes of the Crisis
The main question, however, is -  what prevented the Yugoslav leaders from reacting to the 
growing problems of the economy in time? The main reason, I argue, is to be found in their 
commitment to Kardelj's concept. Not only that the ideological commitment provided a pre­
1 2  In October 1979, as many as 1,185.000 Yugoslavs lived in West European countries. Of these 695,000 were employed 
and 490,000 were dependants (including 250,000 school age children). In non-European countries, mostly in the USA, 
Australia and Canada, as well as in some Latin American countries there were about 300,000 people with Yugoslav 
passports. 62% of the Yugoslavs living in Europe were between 18 and 35 years of age. The largest part of them (about 
240,000) were from Croatia. The large majority (70%) had no professional training. Among European countries, 
Germany had the largest number of Yugoslavs - in 1977 405,000 (RFE/RL, 18 October 1979). During the 1980s the 
Yugoslav workers held about 21 billion US dollars in Western banks, while only 1.2 billion went to Yugoslav banks.
13 S ta tistidkigodisn jak Jugoslavije za 9 0 /9 1 ,1991:599. It was not surprising, therefore, that in all the Yugoslav republics the 
number of students studying in their own republic was about 90%: in Bosnia-Herzegovina 88.4%, in Montenegro 91%, 
in Serbia 91.4%, in Croatia 91.5% in Macedonia 96.3% and in Slovenia 96.8%.
14 This fact was used by ethnic nationalists (especially in Slovenia) to illustrate ethnic inequality in the late 1980s.
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text from which reality was read in a specific way, but the elite also believed that economic 
problems were only the result of 'incomplete' or 'inadequate' implementation of Kardelj's 
concept in reality, not of the concept itself. They criticised autarky and disintegration, but it never 
occurred to them that both the autarky and disintegration were outcomes of the self-managing and 
anti-statist ideas and practices of the Kardelj constitutive concept itself.
Analysing reality from an ideological platform, it was difficult even to recognise that the 
Yugoslav economy was facing 'great difficulties'. The first to identify the problem were 
economists, not politicians. In the mid-1970s, they warned the Yugoslav politicians that three 
problems had appeared in full strength: 1) the low efficiency of Yugoslav industry; 2) a high 
rate of inflation and 3) high foreign debts (Korosic, 1988:55). When analysing how to respond to 
these three problems, Yugoslav economists found that this was rather difficult in the 
circumstances of economic fragmentation which had emerged since 1974.
Yugoslav economic experts offered two explanations for the causes of the crisis: one insisted on 
'objective' causes, while the other criticised 'subjective' reasons for its occurrence.
Among the 'objective' causes of the crisis, the global economic problems of the 1970s were the 
most frequently mentioned. Between 1973 (with the global oil crises)15 and 1981 Yugoslavia 
borrowed in foreign banks and institutions about 16,5 billion dollars. Its foreign debt thus 
increased from 4,663 to 21,096 billion US dollars. When its loans to other countries were 
deducted from this sum, there were still 19,511 billion US dollars of netto debt in 1981. Another 
unfortunate circumstance was that many short-term loans (amounting to more than 11 billion 
dollars) were taken up in the 1977-1980 period, when interest rates (for the loans taken out in 
the United States) rose from 5.5% to 16.8%. These short-term (five-years) loans were due to be 
repaid in the 1982-1985 period. The international oil crises and the increasing interest rates in 
the United States, as well as the prices of technology coming from the West European countries 
proved to have disastrous effects for a country which was rich neither in oil nor in technology. 
These 'objective' causes of the crises left Yugoslavia almost w ithout any choice but to take ever 
more new loans in order to 'preserve some level of production and of income in order to satisfy 
basic needs and to return loans', as the Yugoslav Prime Minister Veselin Djuranovic concluded 
in his 1985 analysis of the causes of economic crises (1985:207).
Among the 'subjective causes' of the problem, however, the de-centralisation of power and 
disintegration of the Yugoslav market were listed as two of the most important. Yugoslav
1 5 The damaging effect of the oil crisis for the Yugoslav economy may be illustrated by the fact that in three years 
between 1979 and 1981 Yugoslavia spent on oil impdrts annually 2,335 million US dollars (or more than 7 billion 
dollars in total) while in the three years before (between 1976 and 1978) the annual bill was on average 934 million 
dollars, thus 1,422 million dollars a year less (Djuranovic, 1985:208).
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economists argued that these processes were the result of the 'subjective' decision of the 
Yugoslav political elite, which was based on ideological and not economic reasons. Until 1961 
only the federal government had been authorised to decide on foreign loans. After 1961, 
however, the 'right to receive loans' was given first to specialised banks and after 1967 to work 
organisations as well. By 1975 the federal institutions had lost control over the amount and 
structure of foreign loans taken out by various economic subjects. After 1971, republics had full 
control over their economic plans, and they planned unrealistically. The notion of 'national 
economies', promoted firmly by the Croatian leader Vladimir Bakaric, was frequently quoted as 
an ideological justification for this. In practical terms, the decentralisation of the country, 
following the 1974 Constitution, was the real cause of the Yugoslav economic disintegration. 
The Yugoslav economists pointed out that the federal government warned the republics in 1975 
to be cautious about foreign debts, but in vain (Kraigher, 1985:201). Kardelj even mentioned 'the 
Chilean scenario' as a possible dangerous outcome of the situation in which 'no other solution 
would be possible as result of the high inflation, low living standards and anarchic situation in 
the country' but the reintroduction of 'firm hand' governance.16 But, the interests of the 
republics and provinces in continuing their 'autarkic' roads were so strong, that in the Social 
Plan for 1976-1980 they only sanctioned each others' megalomaniac investments. Tito was still 
there, but he was rather hesitant to stop what looked like a great prospect for a new boom of 
the Yugoslav economy. While evidently worried about the political situation in the country and 
especially in the Party by the end of his life, the ageing leader proudly announced great 
economic successes of the Yugoslav economy in his last address to the LCY Congress in 1978.17 
The biggest problem, however, was again in the irreconcilable controversy between the 
ideological background and demands for re-centralisation. How could the fragmentation of the 
Yugoslav economic system be stopped without re-centralisation? Kardelj and his successors 
found it simply impossible to answer this question. Nobody wanted re-centralisation, which 
would reverse the achieved level of autonomy both of constitutive nations in their republics, and 
of the self-managers in their BOALs. Yet, without such a re-centralisation, how could one stop 
the negative trends of autarky and anarchy?
In all these years, the economic situation in the country was becoming worse. In 1965, 73.8% of 
Yugoslav imports were covered by exports, while in 1979 this share decreased to only 55.9% 
(Djuranovic, 1985:214). The country's dependency on the import of electrical power increased 
from 30% in 1970 to 42% in 1979 (Djuranovic, 1985:215). At the same time, people spent eight
1 5 Several years later, Slobodan Milosevic used the same argument in his fight against 'anarchy'. He proclaimed he was
in fact fighting against the 'strong hand' (re-centralisation with elements of Soviet socialism) which would be the logical 
result of 'anarchism' and fragmentation of the Yugoslav economic and political system. More on this in Chapter Six.
1 7 As described by Tepavac (1997) and Perovic (1991) and explained in Chapter Three, Tito tried to avoid conflicts with 
other politicians. Since 1972, he tried to please local leaders by accepting almost all proposals which did not endanger 
his personal position. The economy, for which he did not have much interest, was the area in which he could accept 
many compromises without many problems.
137
percent more in money terms than they produced. Public investments were growing fast. 
Between 1974 and 1978 the annual investment rate grew by 12.7% each year. The share of 
investments in the total social product rose from 29% in 1974 to 40% in 1978. The wave of 
investments spread all over the country. Since decisions were taken by the political leadership, 
or 'in  close links between the inner circles of the political elite and commercial banks' 
(Djuranovic, 1985:220), even insolvent enterprises started investing. The 'investomania' 
characterised the Yugoslav economy throughout the last years of Tito's life. The reason for this 
could also be found in ideology. Yugoslav society, after finally finding the golden key of social 
development, had to prove its successes in economic terms as well. Additionally, the new 
leaders of the republics now wanted to demonstrate that the 'federal centralism' they were 
finally being freed from, really was the main obstacle to the rapid development of their own 
republics and provinces, and that the ousted pre-1972 leaders were not only politically but also 
in economic terms inferior to them.18 For various reasons (such as the wish to modernise the 
economy, to show the advantages of de-centralisation, and to reach the level of the more 
developed regions; to demonstrate that Yugoslav socialism was economically successful, etc.) a 
new wave of investments was launched in the late 1970s. The 'autarkic tendencies', boosted by 
the 1974 constitutional arrangements, now significantly contributed to an intensive and (from 
an economic point of view) irrational increase of foreign debts in the second half of the 1970s as 
well as to high inflation in Yugoslavia during the 1980s (Kraigher, 1983/1985:201-3). In 1978 
there were 40,000 new projects in which investments were made.19 Decisions on them were in 
many cases informal, taken by the political leadership at various levels and not by the self- 
managing organs in BOALs or COALs. But everyone was happy to see libraries, factories, 
television centres, hotels and roads built, not asking where the money came from. The Party 
Congress in 1978, therefore, concluded in a very optimistic tone, rejecting any notion of crisis. 
This was Tito's last Congress, and even if they were aware of the problems,20 the leaders would 
have hesitated to make them public in such a situation.
4.3. Government and Economists vs. Party Leadership and Republican Leaders
The first segment of the political elite that recognised the problem was the one that was directly 
involved in economic policy -  the Yugoslav Government (Federal Executive Council, FEC). In a
18 This was particularly important in Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia where the replaced leaders had placed great stress on 
economic issues. Especially in Croatia, where the ousted leader of the CC LC Croatia -  Savka Dabcevic Kuiar -  was a 
professor of economics.
1 9  XI Congress o f the LCY: Documents. It was not before 1984 that the Federal Assembly managed to suspend the 
investments projected by the 1981-1986 Social Plan.
2 0  That they were aware of them was shown, for example, at the joint session of the Party and State Presidency with the 
presidents of republics and provinces in November 1979. The top leadership debated the 'threats of further 
deterioration' (KFE/RL, 30 November 1979).
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communist society, the Government was no more than an economic council and thus had a 
secondary role to the ideological headquarters -  the Party leadership. Being in everyday contact 
with the economic data and facts of economic life, the Yugoslav Prime Minister (FEC President) 
Veselin Djuranovic (1977-1982, Montenegro) warned in the late 1970s that the 'objective' causes 
of the world oil crises left Yugoslavia almost without any choice but to take loans in order to 
'preserve some level of production and of income in order to satisfy basic needs and to return 
loans' (Djuranovic, 1985:207). In a later account of the causes of the economic crisis, Djuranovic 
admitted that many 'subjective' causes, originating from domestic policy, had contributed to it. 
The Yugoslav economy was 'autarkic, inefficient and inflexible, with a long-standing 
orientation towards the domestic market and not exports, with an ever growing level of 
dependency on imports and with a permanent and significant trade deficit'. For all these 
reasons, Djuranovic argued, the Yugoslav economy was simply incapable of resolving the 
problems which had occurred as a result of the international oil crisis (1985:207).
In an attempt to reverse these negative trends, the FEC (advised by its economic experts) 
proposed a much more realistic approach to investment in the 1980-1985 plan. But, although 
speaking with Tito's full support (in 1979), the Federal Prime Minister Djuranovic was not able 
to persuade the members of the Yugoslav Assembly to accept his government's measures for 
strict austerity.21 The Federal Government had no choice but to w ithdraw in front of the 
'sovereign' republican elite and their unrealistic ideas.
The Prime Minister then proposed the devaluation of the dinar in order to support exports. But 
Tito, who was particularly sensitive on the issue of the national currency for symbolical 
reasons, rejected this demand.22 Djuranovic then simply had no alternative but to raise inflation 
by printing money which was lacking both for investments and for returning the foreign loans 
which were already due to be repaid. In the four years between 1977 and 1981 capital was 
'artificially' created by printing 350 million dinars, said Ivo Perisin, the Chairman of the Federal 
Advisory Board for Economic Development, in June 1981.23
The economic crisis, however, could not be hidden from the general public. In the late 1970s the 
Government introduced reductions in the electrical supply to households. The import of 
tropical fruits, coffee, washing powder and chocolate was reduced, which caused the first 
queues on the streets of Yugoslavia. In May 1979 Djuranovic introduced restrictions on car use
21 RFE/RL 28 December 1979.
22 Interview with Dusan Bilandzic in December 1995.
23 RFE/RL, 30 June 1981. Perisin was against the 'revival of any unitarism' and centralism while favouring a 'unified 
Yugoslav market'.
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and increased petrol prices in the country.24 The 'ordinary man in the street' in Yugoslavia now 
for the first time after the short post-war period experienced restrictions on his consumerism. 
This was a serious political challenge to the regime, which was very much based on the 
consumerist culture. The Yugoslavs, who tended to believe that their living standards, much 
higher than those of other people living in Communist countries, were the product of their 
better work and of their unique self-managing system, which managed people's needs better 
than Soviet 'administrative socialism', wondered what had happened. As a reaction, shopping 
abroad, in the neighbouring countries of Austria and Italy, increased. In 1979 every second 
Yugoslav citizen travelled abroad at least once, while in all they crossed the border 24 million 
times. About 2 billion dollars were spent in these 'shopping tours' in that year.25 This became an 
additional problem for the reputation of the country. While more than one million of its 
workers already worked in the West, an additional 12 million people buying soap-powder and 
coffee in Austria and Italy did not promote a good image of Yugoslav socialism.26 Nevertheless, 
both measures helped the regime to dissipate potential revolt in the country.
When Tito died in May 1980, Djuranovic took a new initiative to alert the leaders. On 6 June 
1980, only 32 days after Tito's death, he devalued the Yugoslav dinar by 30 percent.27 On 2 July 
1980 he presented a report to the National Assembly meeting admitting a number of serious 
'economic difficulties' threatening to weaken the stability of Yugoslavia. With an openness 
which -  as the Western reporters noticed - went 'beyond anything taking place in the other 
communist countries',28 Djuranovic detected the basic causes of these difficulties in 'insufficient 
economic motivation and a highly buoyant domestic market, which has discouraged exports 
while stimulating imports; [in] unrealistic development ambitions, which could not be satisfied 
by raising indebtedness abroad; and [in] inconsistent and inadequate application of some 
systematic solutions in this sphere'. He announced 'radical measures' to accompany the 
devaluation of the dinar.
» RFE/RL, 30 April 1979.
2 5 The regime significantly liberalised regulations for travelling abroad: out of 2.4 million applicants for passports in 
1979, 'only' 26 thousand applications were rejected, while 1,644 people were compelled to return their passports 
(RFE/RL. 26 September 1980).
26 This was stopped by the 'Deposit Law' introduced in October 1982, after which Yugoslavs travelling abroad had to 
have a deposit of 5,000 dinars in their bank account. Total travel abroad decreased in the month after introducing this 
measure by 69%. Travel to Italy decreased by 93%, to Greece by 94%, and to Austria by 42% (RFE/RL. 11 March 1983).
27 This was the forth devaluation of the Yugoslav dinar: in 1961 it lost 20 percent of its value, in 1965 15%, in 1971 - 
26.5% and in 1980 -  30%. Its positive effects could be seen in a 32% increase in exports and only 7% in imports in 1980. 
As a result, the trade balance deficit decreased by 15% compared with 1979. But the devaluation of the currency alone 
could not bring any further effects without being supported by other measures, on which no agreement could be 
reached. (RFE/RL, 29 January 1981).
28 RFE/RL, 7 July 1980.
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Djuranovic did not, of course, touch upon Tito's personal responsibility for the 'economic 
difficulties'. But in his next public speech in November 1980 he made it clear that 'there were 
dilemmas and hesitations earlier, and this was precisely one of the basic causes of the problems 
which have finally led us into such an unfavourable economic situation.'29 Djuranovic's 
statements and actions were indeed the first sign of a 'new  policy', which thus appeared 
surprisingly soon after Tito's death.
The 'silent rehabilitation' of Kiro Gligorov,30 the creator of the 1965 economic reforms, who 
disappeared from the public scene when his term in office as Federal Assembly President 
ended in 1978, was another indication of the 'new  economic policy'. In June 1980, Gligorov 
reappeared as the foremost critic of the 'subjective causes' of the Yugoslav 'economic 
difficulties'. The existing problems, Gligorov argued, were only partially influenced by the 
international economic crisis. On the contrary, the crisis originated 'from our domestic 
difficulties and contradictions'. In his interview with Nin in June 1980, Gligorov said that 'in  the 
past, some people claimed we would solve our difficulties in a relatively easy manner, that no 
great sacrifices were needed, sacrifices which would inflict only harm and demoralize our 
workers.' He argued in favour of 'radical measures', which would carry out 'a  revision of all 
currents of our economic life and do so at all significant points'.31
Gligorov's criticism was even sharper in November 1980. The present 'difficulties' stem, he 
said, directly 'from suppressing market laws and operating in a subjectivist way in which social 
and economic goals and plans were formulated not on the basis of our realistic possibilities, but 
rather from w hat our socialist society would like to achieve'. The economic problems were, in 
other words, a consequence of 'forgetting realities in Yugoslavia'.32 The main Yugoslav 
economic experts, such as the Croatian Professor Marijan Korosic supported Gligorov and 
Djuranovic. Already in June 1980, Korosic demanded the introduction of 'energetic measures 
and even shock therapy'. These measures should aim to 'change economic policy radically'.33
However, the warnings of Djuranovic, Gligorov and Korosic did not disturb regional leaders. In 
November 1980 they simply carried on with the 1981-1985 Social Plan, as if almost nothing had 
happened. In July 1981 they basically ignored a letter of the State Presidency to the Federal 
Assembly, in which the state leadership insisted that foreign credits could be taken out only to
29 RFE/RL, 2 December 1980.
30 Gligorov was the main creator of the 1965 economic reforms, one of the main economic advisers to Sergej Kraigher 
and later to Ante Markovic. Between 1990 and 1999 the president of Macedonia.
31 RFE/RL, 7 July 1980.
32 RFE/RL. 20 November 1980.
33 RFE/RL, 7 July 1980.
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boost exports and improve the country's balance of payments'.34 In September 1981 they turned 
a blind eye to the warning of Dobroslav Culafic (Montenegro), a member of the Yugoslav Party 
Presidency, that 'the greatest part of the leadership, of the organisations, and the members of 
the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia up to the present day were not able to understand 
or to accept the fact that our country is undergoing great economic difficulties.'35 They acted as 
they publicly 'swore' when Tito died: as if nothing at all would change after his death.
It is in fact striking and not entirely clear how it was possible that the federal leaders used such 
strong rhetoric of 'radical changes' while the republics they represented in the federal 
leadership acted in a different manner. Even more striking was the fact that the republican 
leaders (with some exceptions) did not publicly disagree with this rhetoric. W hat was then the 
'invisible' obstacle to the implementation of the changes? The federal leaders kept talking about 
'unnam ed' obstacles, addressing 'everybody7 and nobody. They argued against the 
'bureaucracy', as if they were not in charge of it. They were critical of 'autarkic tendencies' as if 
they had no control over the republics they represented in the federation. They complained of 
'investomania' without doing much to stop it. Who were they in fact directing their complaints 
against?
In an interview I conducted with Milka Planinc, who in June 1982 succeeded Veselin 
Djuranovic as the Yugoslav Prime Minister, she said:
'The Party was the main obstacle. They indulged themselves in laments about the 
ideological and political situation, about the enemies of socialism, etc. They always 
tried to find reasons against fundamental economic reforms because they were 
sceptical about the market. On the other hand, I was responsible for the economic 
situation and I tried to find quick and efficient ways to improve it. The Party 
Presidency was a big problem to me, but at the same time, I knew I would not be able 
to operate without their support. They controlled the votes in the Federal Assembly, 
and in all the republics and provinces. In order to secure their support, I had to 
convince them that the market was not against self-management. I argued that the 
market was a limitation on the state, the same as self-management. And that, therefore, 
the market and self-management could go together, since they were both opposed to 
statism. The debate on this was going on and on for all the four years of my term in 
office.'
Planinc's assessment of the main conflicts within the leadership confirms that the main lines of 
division were not ethnic, and not even strictly between republics, although -  as Planinc admits 
-  the divisions were often between the developed and the under-developed. The main conflict was 
between the ideological and pragmatic approach within the Yugoslav political elite. It was 
because they lost the battle for a more pragmatic approach to politics, that the four successive
RFE/RL. 6  Tulv 1981.
35 RFE/RL. 15 October 1981.
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Yugoslav Prime Ministers in the analysed period (Djuranovic 1977-1982, Planinc 1982-1986, 
Mikulic 1986-1988 and Markovic 1988-1991) left politics disappointed and disillusioned about 
the prospects of Yugoslavia.
'The Party was supposed to be a cohesive force, but by then (1982) it had become, on 
the contrary, the main source of conflicts and conservatism in Yugoslav society. In 
Tito's time, changes were still possible, if Tito was convinced they were necessary. But, 
after him, it was much more difficult. There was no money any more to satisfy 
everyone's needs. And the Federal Government had no instruments on its own to run 
affairs. It had to rely upon the republics, upon the Federal Presidency, and the Party 
Presidency. When members of the Party leaderships became the main defenders of 
their own republics, Yugoslav cohesion became impossible1, says Planinc.
Paradoxically, it was the main promoter of 'national economies', the Croatian leader Vladimir 
Bakaric, who proposed Milka Planinc for the post of Prime Minister in 1982, in order to stop 
Djuranovic's attempts to 'centralise' the Yugoslav economy. Milka Planinc, who between 1972 
and 1982 held the post of the Croatian Party President, was a Party appointee. But, once in the 
office of Federal Prime Minister, it did not take long before she changed into a promoter of the 
market economy and Yugoslav economic unity.
’When a person holds this office, she/he changes a lot. This happened to me, bu t also to 
my successor Branko Mikulic [Bosnia-Herzegovina]. All the way through, as a member 
of the Federal Presidency, he was my hardest critic. During the 1984-1986 period, there 
was no session of the Federal Presidency at which he would not criticise my policy, 
demanding administrative regulation, state intervention and the suspension of the 
market. But, when he became the Prime Minister in 1986, he needed only one year to 
change his position and to become even more radical than I was. Only when one faces 
the pressure from the republics, from abroad, from your colleagues in the Party, only 
then can one appreciate the real difficulty of the situation'.36
However, while all four Yugoslav Prime Ministers in the post-Tito period (Djuranovic, Planinc, 
Mikulic, Markovic) changed their ideological position for a more pragmatic one, the Party 
leadership remained committed to Kardelj's concept. Although they tried to 'reform ' the system 
from within, the Federal Government had no courage to face the real problems: political 
provisions, ideological barriers and the habits produced by them. Although dependent on the 
republics and provinces, as well as on the Party leadership, the Government showed substantial 
independence from them. But it did not make the last step: to challenge the political system 
which made 'radical changes' impossible. A programme of economic stabilisation conceived 
under the slogan 'economic reforms yes, political reforms no', said Josip Zupanov, 'sim ply 
could not yield any serious results, because it was attempting to deal with the consequences
1 6 In an interview for this thesis, Jure Bilic, the Croatian representative in the LCY Presidency (1982-1986) said Milka 
Planinc was promoted by Bakaric, but soon she started playing her own game, mostly because Bakaric died in February 
1983. 'She ended up on the opposite side from what Bakaric expected/ Bakaric's widow, Marija, whom I interviewed in 
Summer 1983, praised Milka Planinc for her role in Croatian and Yugoslav politics.
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rather them the causes of the crisis/ 37 And the cause of the problem was in the political system. 
The confederalised system of 'consensus policy' was described by Korosic (1988:68):
'Only those changes which satisfied [all] political interests were generated. The result 
was that there were no fundamental changes. Every group of interests was capable of 
blocking a reform. This was because the economic results were not, in fact, w hat 
mattered: they were taken into account only incidentally, as an excuse for changes if 
and when [politicians] had already accepted them. In other words, the political system 
dominated over economic rationale; its aims were decisive, while the economy 
remained subordinated and unimportant. Since the resistance to political changes was 
even growing, the economic system was waiting in line. At the same time, the rest of 
the world was marching at a fast pace out of the 20th century' (Korosic, 1988:68).
Not only did ideological obstacles prevent any 'radical change', but institutions were set up  to 
stop it. Djuranovic's position was so weak by July 1981 that the international commentators 
wrote: 'H ad it been possible for the members of the two chambers of the Yugoslav National 
Assembly... to have held a vote of confidence, Djuranovic would have been defeated 
immediately.'38 He ended his mandate in June 1982 marginalised and unpopular. However, 
soon it was proved that his successors in the office of Federal Prime Minister had every reason 
to envy him: they were publicly criticised (Milka Planinc in 1985), forced to resign (Branko 
Mikulic in 1988) and rendered non-existent in a political (and almost a physical) way (Ante 
Markovic in 1991). They all faced the same opponents.
4.4. The International Factors
In her book Balkan Tragedy, Susan W oodward argues that the foreign influence on what 
happened in Yugoslavia was enormous and started with the IMF intervention in 1982-1983. In 
her analysis, W oodward identifies the Western financial pressure on Yugoslavia as damaging 
for the stability of the country. Indeed, the IMF intervention in the Yugoslav economy was of 
great significance. But, taking into account the context of internal conflicts within the elite, one 
can conclude that the IMF intervention may have had ambivalent, rather than exclusively 
negative consequences.
Had there been no obligation to repay foreign loans, the status quo would have certainly 
prevailed over any attempt to reform the economic system. The resolution of the 12th LCY
3 7 In his 1985 interview, Zupanov said that 'every prolongation of the crisis would lead to the disintegration of the 
country's economic and political systems' and that 'no one in the world is prepared to give up a monopoly of power if 
he is not forced to' (RFE/RL, 22 April 1985).
38 Slobodan Stankovic: 'Yugoslav Government Under Domestic Fire', RFE/RL, 16 July 1981. Djuranovic simply did not 
want to discuss issues with the members of Parliament, claiming that his report on economic failures had been directed 
at 'some other people' who 'were well known -  they were the people who really made decisions, who could be found at 
all levels, and who of late have made the federal government the chief target of their attacks'. Djuranovic meant 
republican leaders and ideologues within the Federal Party leadership.
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Congress in 1982 still talked about 'acute problems and contradictions'39 although even 
members of the State Presidency agreed that the situation was 'dram atic' and needed an urgent 
and systematic response. But, in 1982 the loans came up for repayment, and the republics 
suddenly realised that they were simply not capable of doing this.
Croatia, whose level of investments was (largely due to political reasons) the highest in the 
country, was now the first republic to face the wall of bankruptcy. 'If Croatia is not helped by 
the other republics, it will not get out of its present economic crisis', declared Croatian top 
politician Jure Bilic at the CC LCY session in October 1982.40 He said that without such help, 
'Croatia would be compelled to take new foreign credits, or would be threatened by a the 
complete halt of its whole economy.'41
At the same time, the International Monetary Fund demanded federal guarantees for the 
repayment of the loans. The Planinc government reacted to this not only by introducing new 
measures of austerity, but also by proposing a tight control over foreign currency. Planinc saw 
this as her chance to win the support of the republics and provinces, at a time when it had 
become unavoidable to introduce some economic reforms. A year earlier, in May 1982 a new 
law was proposed with the effect of centralising foreign currency earnings in the country. The 
law was meant to reduce the almost unlimited rights of BOALs and Work Organisations to 
dispose of foreign currency earnings as they pleased. But, the Slovenian leadership reacted 
most sharply to this idea. Andrej Marine, the newly elected President of the Slovenian Party 
Central Committee, said that this proposal 'contradicted some of the very foundations of the 
system of socialist self-management, and was against the position of workers in associated 
labour and against the constitutional system'.42 Vojvodina also objected to this 'ideologically 
and politically unacceptable centralisation'. These regions in the end forced the federal 
government into a compromise: the law was withdrawn, and only a partial centralisation was 
imposed by Government decree for a period of one year only.
39 ' l c y  Tasks in the Realization of the Economic Stabilization Policy', Resolution of the Twelfth Congress of the LCY 
(1983:165).
40 Croatian post-1971 leaders (including Milka Planinc, the President of the Croatian League of Communists) were the 
most outspoken advocates of the policy of high investment, by which they wanted to demonstrate their care for 
Croatian real (economic and political) interests. In 1983, Croatia faced debt to foreign creditors of 3 billion US$. As a 
consequence of the restrictions introduced by the new federal government, the GDP in Croatia decreased 3,7% in 1983 
when compared with 1981, while imports fell by 30.4% and export by 5.6%. The investment rate fell by 27%. As a 
consequence, the foreign currency income decreased by 28.1%, while unemployment increased by 24.9% (from 96,000 in 
1981 to 124,000 in 1985 -  or from 4.5% to 5.8%). At the same time, in these two years prices increased 82.9% (IP CKSKH, 
1/1986:13-15).
41 RFE/RL, 12 October 1982.
42 RFE/RL, 26 May 1982.
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But the situation was different after IMF pressure. In July 1983 the federal government finally 
succeeded in breaking through the barrier of separate republican interests. It looked as if the 
marathon session of the Federal Assembly on 2 and 3 July 1983 should have in this respect been 
considered as 'a  turning point in the country's modern history' and 'a  beginning of the real 
post-Tito era' (as the RFE/RL commentator said immediately after it).43 Milka Planinc 
demanded from the Federal Parliament the approval of several laws written in co-operation 
with the IMF, which aimed at making the Yugoslav state, its federal bank and its government 
guarantee all the credits received by the various Yugoslav institutions. To the shocked delegates 
of the Federal Assembly, the Federal Prime Minister openly declared that Yugoslavia 'w ould 
not be able, even with the greatest effort, to repay the debts falling due in 1983', and that 'unless 
we find other possible means, we are without any doubt in a situation in which we will have to 
proclaim a moratorium and embark on a general rescheduling of our debts to foreign 
countries'. The 'other possible means' were presented through legislation proposed by the 
Federal Government and backed by the IMF. 'We had to accept these conditions,' Planinc said, 
precisely because 'owing to our earlier conduct and even our conduct this year, owing to a lack 
of discipline in repaying our foreign debts ... our negotiating position was very weak. For this 
reason, we had to accept the provision that the National Bank of Yugoslavia should be not 
merely a guarantor but also a direct debtor and that the SFRY should guarantee all the credits it 
received.'44
Pushed into a corner by the threat of the resignation of the federal government and faced with a 
'm oratorium ' which would include immediate confiscation of all Yugoslav property abroad, the 
delegates accepted the laws. But the opposition to 'radical reform' was stronger than ever. Not 
only some republican leaders, but also many Veterans' organisations throughout the country 
opposed it for different reasons. The Veterans, as well as a large part of the Yugoslav Army, 
saw in the IMF a representative of Western Capitalism that had seriously underm ined Yugoslav 
independence. Sergej Kraigher, a member of the Yugoslav Presidency (representing Slovenia), 
who was in charge of economic reforms, had to justify the IMF-backed legislation to members 
of the Army General Staff on 29 July 1983. His message was simple: there was no alternative.
'Analysis has shown that if the International Monetary Fund denied us [financial] 
resources, and without loans from foreign banks, production would fall by 15 to 20 
percent. This means that we would no longer be capable of sustaining the level of 
employment as it is, and especially - we could not create new jobs' (Kraigher, 
1983/1985:192).
And all this happened less than three years after Tito's death, at a time of high ethnic tension in 
Kosovo, following the 1981 unrest. Watching the TV news from Poland, the Yugoslavs could
43 RFE/RL. 21 July 1983.
44 RFE/RL, 13 July 1983.
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not avoid comparison with another deeply indebted country, in which political unrest had led 
to martial law in December 1981.45 The Yugoslav leaders were urged to act quickly and 
resolutely in order to reach a solution. But they were 'willing hostages' of their own 
constitutional provisions and ideological beliefs, indecisiveness and megalomaniac ambitions, 
especially at the regional and local levels. They also feared losing control over their own 
republic/province's 'inner affairs' and thus opposed any significant re-centralisation of 
Yugoslavia.
After decades in which GDP growth was among the highest in Europe, Yugoslavia entered a 
period of stagnation which resulted in 0.6 percent GDP growth between 1981 and 1989, 
compared with 5.6 percent in 1976-1980 and 5.9 percent in 1971-1975.46 But, even in this 
situation a large number of political leaders were not willing to change their positions. They did 
not publicly oppose, but actively obstructed any implementation of measures aimed at the re­
integration of the Yugoslav economy. Ideological commitment to Kardelj's doctrine, as well as 
more pragmatic reasons linked to their own republics and provinces -  their own 'electoral 
units' -  were much more important than economic results.
Despite the declarative support they offered to Djuranovic's and Planinc's 'radical measures', 
when the 1984 budget came to be discussed in the same Assembly four months later, the 
republics and provinces opposed every single measure aimed at further reform of the economic 
system. A 'radical reform' was simply impossible. The Yugoslav Finance Minister Joze 
Florijancic (Slovenia) resigned in protest against this stalemate. Florijancic's resignation was 
motivated by the still chaotic situation in the foreign currency market, because of which 700 
million dollars were lost in 1983 alone 47 Although a Slovene himself, Florijancic did not want to 
compromise on these issues. For this he felt under strong pressure from his own republic, as a 
result of which he left politics and withdrew to business.
For the same reasons Milka Planinc offered her resignation to the Federal Party Presidency.
'They all looked at me suspiciously, many convinced I was an IMF spy in their ranks. I 
publicly said that the IMF initiative was welcome, because many people at home were 
against reforms. I had in mind the LCY leadership, although -  of course -  I did not say
4 5  The Party Central Committee discussed the Polish events at its session in July 1983. The main lesson drawn by the 
President of the LCY Presidency Dusan Dragosavac was 'that our political system of direct socialist democracy should 
be consistently developed', since the Polish crisis was a result of 'the bureaucratic-technocratic system, which had 
squeezed the Polish working class onto the periphery'. However, 'we can only support a socialist Poland' and not a 
'bourgeois-clerical and Catholic-nationalist' one, claimed Yugoslav Communists. On Dragosavac's position on the 
Polish crisis see the interview with him, quoted in Chapter Five.
4 6  The highest GDP growth was realised in 1957-1960:11.3%.
4 7  The RFE/RL report described the chaos in the following words: 'Many enterprises, in order to acquire foreign 
currency, sold their products abroad at reduced prices while later other enterprises imported these same products at 
much higher prices' (29 December 1983).
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this explicitly. But they knew whom I was criticising. Another incident occurred when I 
told the IMF representatives that I appreciated their efforts because this was exactly the 
same direction as the one proposed by my government. The Party Presidency was so 
angry that they almost formed a separate commission to discuss my words. When I 
offered my resignation in 1983, the President of the Party Presidency Ah Shukrija said 
there was no need to discuss it, since I was only a member of the Central Committee, 
and only the CC should discuss it, not the Presidency. Only because of the scandal this 
would produce did they decide not to accept it. But when I resigned again in 1985, they 
agreed, asking me to remain a care-taker until the end of the normal term in office, the 
following year.'
The inadequate reaction of the Yugoslav Party leadership to Planinc's initiatives urged Marijan
Korosic to conclude:
'The bureaucrats have taken the programme of stabilisation into their own hands, 
interpreting it in their own way... I was optimistic in July, when the government 
announced radical changes, but am not any longer. Everything seems to be reduced to 
only 'cosmetic corrections'... Because of ideological disunity in preparing changes in 
the economic system ... everything has resulted in no changes at a ll.'48
Contrary to W oodward's conclusion, therefore, the IMF initiative was in fact welcomed by the 
reformers within the Yugoslav political elite. Furthermore, at some point it looked as if they 
could use it in the internal struggle against the conservatives. However, it is perhaps fair to say 
that Milka Planinc did not realise how far reaching political changes would be, had they been 
really launched at that time. In her 1998 interview for this thesis, she complained about the 
deadlines imposed by the IMF on her government:
'Our main problem with the IMF was the tight deadlines they wanted us to follow. 
W hat they asked us to do in three years, we could have done in ten years without a 
problem. But they insisted on short deadlines.'
The IMF intervention, therefore, can only partially be blamed as a factor in Yugoslav 
disintegration. Although the pressure on the Yugoslav economy narrowed its ability to satisfy 
all groups competing for political power and therefore provoked further conflicts, it did not in 
fact much move the Yugoslav political elite, which was still committed to Kardelj's concept.
4.5. The Response of the Elite: Kraigher's Programme of Stabilisation
The unwillingness of the elite to accept significant changes was obvious in the 1,500 pages long 
Programme of Economic Stabilisation (not reforms!), which was, after two years of debate, 
formulated by the federal leadership.49 Kraigher's proposal, as the Programme was named after
48 Nin, 27 November 1983.
4 9  In 1981 the Federal Social Council established a Commission for Questions of Economic Stabilisation, which was 
chaired by Kraigher. Over the next two years, the Kraigher Commission involved or consulted about 350 leading
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its main author, the Slovenian representative in the Federal State Presidency, was just another 
'feasible7 compromise subject to various possibilities of interpretation. Here are the main points 
of Kraigher's views, as expressed in his speeches between 1980 and 1985, and in two interviews 
I had with him in January 1986 and February 1988 respectively.50 Since Kraigher's programme 
was accepted as an official document of the 12th LCY Congress in 1982 and on several later 
occasions by the LCY Central Committee, the Yugoslav Presidency and Assembly, one can 
safely assume that his views represented the dominant discourse of the Yugoslav political elite 
in response to the economic crisis in the early 1980s.
Firstly, Yugoslavia remained committed to self-management, to which there was 'no real 
alternative' either in 'liberalism' or in 'state socialism' (Kraigher: 1982/1985:104 and 1983/1985: 
209).51 Kraigher opposed 'Keynesianism and monetarism' (1983/1985:180,211), the two 
economic doctrines that had proved 'incapable of solving the economic problems of m odem  
Capitalism' (1981/1985:66,1983/1985:260-1). In a surprisingly ideological rhetoric for the 1980s, 
Kraigher argued that 'the general crisis of Capitalism was deeper than ever, and with no viable 
prospect of being resolved' (1981/1985:66). Although it was widely perceived that, historically, 
the self-management project was a reaction to Stalinism after 1948, its renaissance after 1971 
Kraigher saw as a response to growing 'liberal tendencies' in Yugoslav society. The re- 
emergence of self-management in its present form Kraigher saw as the alternative to the 
'techno-managerial' and 'liberal' tendencies of the purged republican leaders (in the 1971-72 
period), especially in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia (1983/1985:194). But, these forces (liberals and 
techno-managers) had not yet been fully defeated (1983/1985:204, 245) and this was where 
Kraigher saw the main focus for further action. The main problem was neither in the Yugoslav 
new Constitution nor in the Associated Labour Act, but in their insufficient or incomplete 
implementation. If BOALS were organised in accordance with the Constitution (not only in the 
letter but also in spirit), they would not be elements of economic and political atomisation in the 
country (1983/1985:180). But, the 'techno-managers' and 'liberals', who still kept the key posts 
in the economy and politics (1982/1985:87-9), were the main promoters of autarkic tendencies. 
Even 30 years after self-management had been introduced, decision-making was still limited to 
'narrow circles' (1983/1985:196) in which economic and political powers were linked 
(1982/1985:111, 1983/1985:160).52 Although his analysis criticised the political elite for
politicians, economists and other experts in the field. They produced a long document (more than 1,500 pages) with 
policy recommendations in 15 fields (such as an Anti-Inflation Programme, followed by separate sections on 
unemployment, housing policy, foreign economic relations, agriculture, etc...)
5 0  The interviews were published in Polet, 31 January and 14 February 1986 and in Mladost, February 1988. Here I quote 
from the minutes of my conversation with Kraigher.
51 'To us there are no other forms, possibilities or ways to resolve current developmental problems', Kraigher concluded 
in October 1982 (1985:105). Any possibility of returning 'back to some form of old bourgeois parliamentarism' was 
ruled out (1983/1985:209).
52 Like Kardelj, Kraigher believed that 'state socialism' was more likely to be accepted by the general population and 
political leaders as an alternative to self-management than liberalism (1983/1985:260). Kraigher opposed all types of
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promoting 'autarkic principles', Kraigher opposed 'witch-hunting', calling for unity in 
implementing his Stabilisation Programme rather than for ’differentiation' among the political 
leaders (1983/1985: 240-1).
Secondly, Kraigher acknowledged that the Yugoslav market was seriously fragmented, but he 
warned that 'one should not exaggerate' this (1983/1985:211; 1984/1985:326 and 363). The 
centralised federation, as it had been before the constitutional changes, had produced even 
worse conflicts over the redistribution of economic goods via federal institutions 
(1983/1985:211). It was true that 'autarkic' tendencies must be prevented, but not by any re­
centralisation of Yugoslavia. By repeating Kardelj's notion of self-management as both a 
solution for the national question and a socialist vision, Kraigher argued that re-centralisation 
would in fact destroy both equality of nations and self-management (1981/1985:37). It was true, 
Kraigher argued, that the process of inter-republican negotiations in Yugoslavia was difficult 
and slow, but this was also a result of the unavoidable 'pluralism of self-managerial interests', 
as promoted by Kardelj (1977). Responding to increasingly critical public opinion which was 
calling for the government to meet its responsibilities, Kraigher opposed the idea that the state 
leadership (such as the Federal government) should take the whole responsibility for the 
economy, since this would again reinforce statist structures (1983/1985:166). On the contrary, 
power should be devolved from any 'statist' power-centre, whether federal, republican or 
municipal, to self-managing employees (1983/1985:177).
Thirdly, the workers, Kraigher argued, were not 'naturally' prone to a self-management 
orientation (1983/1985:253). In a rhetoric which again repeated Kardelj's attack on theories of 
spontaneity (1983/1985:167; 1984/1985:324), Kraigher warned that the key to the workers' 
action still lay in 'subjective forces' (i.e., in the Party). He shared and extended Kardelj's view on 
the new role of the Party. The Party (which he criticised at several places for being too closely 
linked to the state and too distant from the workers) should act as the main promoter of self­
management in the BOALs (1983/1985:230). This was where he saw the new place of the LCY 
in political system.
Fourthly, Kraigher concluded that some 'minor modifications' were necessary in the political 
system. These 'modifications' should be 'corrections of our practice, and probably of some 
elements in the system itself in terms of its further clarification, but not of the system as such' 
(1983/1985:209). Kraigher emphasised that no fundamental change of the political system could 
be expected. But, for example, political objections to 'small private enterprises' (coming from the 
conservative Partisan Veterans) were in his opinion undesirable. 'Small-scale industry' (crafts,
statism, regardless of whether they originated at the federal, republican or even municipal level. To statism, in his view, 
there was only one real alternative: further development of self-management (1981/1985:62; 1983/1985:176).
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and small private businesses) could not endanger socialism (1983/1985: 224, 270) and should, 
therefore, be allowed and further developed. Kraigher's criticism of the regime did not go much 
further than to acknowledge that socialism was much more endangered by privileged members 
of the economic and political elite than by potential investors in small enterprises. His criticism 
was directed at various 'hesitations', and at the lack of will to implement good ideas suggested 
in previous attempts to reform the Yugoslav economy. In the interview I conducted with 
Kraigher in January 1986, he said:
'We hesitated [in the 1965 reform] to develop a suitable economic system and to 
implement a suitable economic policy. It all went too slowly. Now, we still lack 
consistent and synchronised measures which would lead to implementation of the 
programme. The main problem has always been that we were too slow and too late. All 
other things are just the result of this indecisiveness. We spent huge amounts of energy 
and many hours in reaching a compromise, instead of spending this time creatively, in 
the implementation of our programme.'
Kraigher warned political leaders that the key to the solution of the economic crisis still resided 
with them, but he was not even in favour of changing the political elites that were 'slow7 and 
'inconsistent' in implementing the good political programme. W ithout changing the system, 
and with the old elites still in power, how could one expect to change anything? Welcomed by 
the elite, Kraigher's programme of stabilisation was still far from being successful in its 
proclaimed aim: to bring economic recovery to Yugoslavia.53
It was not surprising, therefore, to see that already in 1984 the Kraigher Programme was 
collapsing. Instead of the planned 10%, inflation increased to 75% per annum in 1985. The 
living standards of the population fell by 34% between 1979 and 1984. About 40-45% of 
households earned less than the 'poverty line'. The 850,000 new employees (employed between 
1979 and 1984) did not manage to increase total production by any more than 0.8% for the 
whole period of five years. This meant that labour productivity was in fact decreasing as 
personal income was rapidly falling. While in 1979 the price of a kilogram of bread was equal to 
payment for 14 minutes of work for an average worker, in 1984 more than twice that time (29 
minutes) was needed (Bilandzic, 1986:116-9). The foreign trade deficit was indeed reduced and 
even eliminated in 1984, but mostly because imports were reduced and not because exports 
were increased. Exports, however, did increase significantly, but to COMECON and not to the 
West European market.54 As a consequence, Yugoslavia was cutting itself off from the world 
market, instead of increasing its participation in it. Ideological barriers made even the minor
5 3  In an interview I conducted with her in April 1998, Milka Planinc said the Kraigher programme was 'the best 
possible' for the time in which it appeared. That means -  it was not openly hostile to the market, but it was so full of 
compromises, that anyone could interpret it in his/her own way.
5 4 An increase of trade with COMECON, followed by the rhetoric of 'radical egalitarianism', was noticed as a 'bad sign' 
by those who still remembered Kardelj's warning that 'state socialism' represented the greatest danger for post-Titoist 
Yugoslavia in the long term.
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recommendations of the Kraigher Programme neglected or even rejected in practice: to many 
low-ranked conservative apparatchiks small enterprises, as well as foreign investments 
(including those of the Yugoslav Gastarbeiter) were just potentially dangerous promoters of 
capitalism. Even an attempt to loose restrictions on land ownership by farmers met with 
resistance by 'ideologically correct' opponents. Additionally, no serious investors would take 
the risk of running enterprises according to the Associated Labour Act and the tons of 
regulations that followed it.
4.6. The Source of Regime Stability: the 'Syndrome of Radical Egalitarianism'
From the traditional economic approach to analysing the stability of regimes, it is certainly a 
paradox that the economic crises met with no revolt among those whose position was 
obviously worsened: workers. Why was this the case? I argue that the answer is again to be 
found in ideology. As explained in Chapter Three (and argued by Kardelj) the rare workers' 
protests against the regime in Yugoslavia were motivated by egalitarian demands. The 
syndrome of radical egalitarianism (as explained by the Croatian Sociologist Josip Zupanov) seems 
to be the most plausible explanation of mass political behaviour.55
'For our workers, it is not disastrous that they live badly; it is a tragedy if someone else 
lives better. This is quite a different system of values [than in the West]: in our society it 
is a catastrophe if someone is rich and not if somebody is poor. With such views you 
cannot expect workers to go on strike... Since conflicts do exist, however, they are 
expressed in another way, for instance, in the form of vast amount of sick leave, which, 
economically speaking, is worse than strikes.'56
'Justice' was a word used for equality in restrictions. In an interview I conducted with Zupanov 
in December 1995, he told me:
'W hen the 'even and odd' system of bans on car driving was introduced, people saw 
that the measures applied equally to everyone, regardless of how wealthy one was. Let 
me use my personal experience: I could stand sitting in complete darkness in my flat 
every Tuesday and Thursday, as long as I saw my neighbours across the street in the 
dark on Mondays and Wednesdays. But if I saw some of my neighbours' bulbs 
switched on when I was in darkness, I was ready to rebel against the state.'
Only the corruption of elites could have resulted in riots. But, the elite in fact 'corrupted' the 
masses, by what Zupanov calls 'a  pact between manual workers and political elite'. The pact 
was based on self-management rhetoric, which favoured the 'working class' in its 'fight against 
state bureaucracy and techno-managerial forces'. In a pragmatic compromise between the elites
55 For factions of egalitarianism in Yugoslav society see also Bernik (1989).
5 6  Josip Zupanov, Danas, 2 August 1983.
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and workers the latter agreed not to protest against the regime, which tolerated various 
alternative means of survival.57 Although the level of efficiency at work was lower than ever, no 
person lost a job for not working. 'They could not pay me as little as I can work', was the 
favourite proverb of Yugoslav workers in the 1980s. It was Kardelj's concept of self­
management that guaranteed that workers had a 'right' to work and to participate in decision­
making. They were not 'employed' by a boss or a manager: they 'associated their labour with 
other workers'. Workers could 'fire' a manager if they were not satisfied with h im /her, not the 
other way round. It was this concept that created the crisis. But, at the same time, it prevented 
any social protests from emerging.
At the same time, the state turned a blind eye to the massive violation of regulations, while the 
citizens tolerated elites incapable of managing the country's deep crisis. If Yugoslavia ever was 
a firmly run state in which citizens feared state repression, it was now on its way to slipping 
into anarchy.58 In people's minds, no obligations to the state needed to be met since the state 
would simply not react to any infringement.59 Weakened by the anti-statist rhetoric, the state 
was now in reality 'withering away' under pressure of both the ideology and the practice of 
'self-management\ By tolerating 'personal networks of survival', the state was, however, blind 
to the breaking of laws, which became the rule rather than exception. But, the elite also 
benefited from the whole situation. It hoped that the people would avoid any collective action 
which would endanger their 'private projects for survivals'. Losing any confidence in the 
institutional way of changing things, people became indifferent. Even those dissatisfied 
directed their efforts at building up their personal networks rather than opposing the whole 
system. However, Zupanov was right in saying that the social deal between the elite which was 
'closing its eyes' and ordinary citizens 'who tried to find their own ways of surviving the crisis' 
could not last ad infinitum. 'The conflict will emerge in an entirely different area/ he concluded 
wisely in January 1985.60
This 'other area' was in politics, more precisely -  on ethnic issues. The sense of injustice, 
triggered by the different levels of economic development of various Yugoslav regions, resulted 
in violent collective action in Kosovo, the Serbian southern province, in March 1981. The causes
5 7  The 'grey economy' was tolerated, while absenteeism took on massive proportions. According to Yugoslav statistics, 
about 700,000 people were absent from work every day because of illness; 600,000 a day were on vacation, while 
400,000 a day were attending various conferences which kept them away from work. 'As a consequence, instead of 
eight hours work a day, after deducting all absences during the year a Yugoslav worker effectively worked only three 
hours and six minutes a day.' The system itself tolerated this absenteeism which dissipated the energy of the potential 
conflict between the workers and the elite (RFE/RL. 16 August 1983).
5 8 In return, discontent was growing against this anarchism. Only a couple of years later, Slobodan Milosevic seemed 
large support against 'anarchism', which he did not fail to criticise in his public addresses in the 1984-1989 period. More 
on this in Chapter Six.
5 9 Plenty of examples to support this conclusion may be found in Dusko Doder's book 'The Yugoslavs' (Doder, 1978).
6 0 Intervju. 4 January 1985.
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of Kosovo's problems were many and will be explained in detail in the next Chapter. But the 
sense of inequality in economic, political and ethnic terms was the most important one. 
Zupanov's conclusion that it was not so much the sense of being poor, but of others being 
wealthy that triggered the discontent with the system, will be then used again.61
4.7. Conclusion
The debate on the economic crisis in the early 1980s had following five characteristics:
First, the conflict crossed republican lines both among politicians (Djuranovic was 
Montenegrin, Kraigher Slovene and Planinc Croat) and among economists (Korosic, a Croat, 
was the most stubborn supporter of economic unity). In general, it did not follow the divide 
between the more and less developed republics, since both Slovenia and Kosovo, the most 
developed and least developed regions in Yugoslavia, were opposing re-centralisation of the 
system, even when it became obvious that it had entered a deep crisis.
Secondly, the conflict was more vertical than horizontal: between 'central government' and the 
regions, rather than between republics on the horizontal level. The economic conflicts in the 
early 1080s were not ethnic conflicts. Although some republics (Slovenia and sometimes 
Croatia, and the province of Vojvodina) more often than others obstructed federal policy, the 
others also used or threatened to use their veto rights to make sure their interests were properly 
taken care of (Bilandzic, 1986).
Thirdly, there was a relatively high level of unity within the Federal Government, whose 
members managed to pu t themselves above their respective republics, or at least to be more 
than just their mouthpieces. This was also the case with the Federal Presidency, whose 
members were re-elected in 1979, still under Tito's supervision. To some extent, the same could 
be said of other federal institutions (the Party and State Presidencies) which saw their prime 
task in replacing Tito, not in representing the republics and provinces.62
Fourthly, for the same reasons, it did not come as a surprise that the Yugoslav leaders showed a 
remarkable loyalty to Tito's legacy even when facing serious economic and political crisis. They
61 Radical egalitarianism  in Kosovo was the main reason for support for Enver Hoxha's criticism of Yugoslav revisionism  
and Capitalism. The national movement in Kosovo was led by Hoxhists, whose rhetoric was that of radical egalitarianism  
(see Maliqi, 1998).
62 As Planinc argues, this changed in 1984, when the new Yugoslav Presidency was elected. Its members were now for 
the first time not Tito's appointees but representatives of their republics/provinces. Although most of them had been 
federal politicians under Tito, they now acted more as representatives of their republics than of Yugoslavia.
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remained committed to the basic values of Tito's policy, three of which were emphasised: self­
management, federalism and non-alignment.
Fifthly, the changes they introduced were made out of necessity, not by way of the introduction 
of a new ideological or political concept. They were not met with enthusiasm, and were even 
opposed as much as was possible.
Finally, among the pressures they faced, those coming from the international environment were 
feared more than those originating from within the country.63 Loss of independence, the 
advances of liberal democracy or state socialism, worried Yugoslav politicians more than 
economic crisis in itself.
It was because of the ideological concept they shared that the Yugoslav politicians created the 
institutional framework that made any radical changes impossible. The basic discrepancy 
between dramatic conclusions about reality which 'd id  not change in accordance with 
proclamations' and inadequate actions taken to change it, continued throughout the 1980s, 
despite several attempts to introduce 'radical measures'. All three Yugoslav Prime Ministers in 
this period (Planinc, Mikulic, Markovic) attempted the same, only to face the same 
insurmountable opposition from autarkic republicanism and ideological dogmatism. In 1985 the 
new Federal Presidency practically dismissed Planinc's policy. In December 1988 Branko 
Mikulic was forced to resign as Prime Minister under the same pressure. Finally, the last years 
of Yugoslavia were characterised by the same conflict between the attempts of the last Yugoslav 
Prime Minister Ante Markovic (backed even more strongly by international financial 
institutions than Planinc in 1983) to reform the system and the various ideological and separate 
national interests which opposed any re-centralisation. The great difference, however, was that 
the lines of the conflict in the late 1980s matched first the borders of republics, and then more 
and more 'borders' between ethnic groups in the country.
63 The only exception to this was the possibility of the Polish scenario in Yugoslavia, which was energetically denied by 
the leading Yugoslav politicians.
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Chapter Five:
The Political System Re-examined
The "Serbian Question' and the Rise of the 
'Defenders' and 'Reformers' of the Constitution
(1974-1984)
'The disintegration of Serbia would be only the first step towards the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia... The unresolved issue of the Constitutional structuring of Serbia is today the 
only real... root of Serbian nationalism which has not yet been cut'.
Dragoslav Markovic, May 1981
'I have always felt that whenever there was talk of unitarism, people always looked at me 
in this circle. Because, to judge by old habits, Serbia means unitarism and centralism.'
Petar Stambolic, 1992
'Serbian nationalism penetrated the highest ranks of Serbian politics with Rankovic, and 
remained there under Draza Markovic's and Ivan Stambolic's protection. The 1974 
Constitution to us who came from other republics, and especially from Serbia's provinces, 
was the most powerful tool to defeat it. And we did not want to lose it.'
Josip Vrhovec, interviewed 1998
5.0. Introduction
This chapter examines three attempts to reform the Yugoslav political system between 1974 and 
1986 and the reasons for their failure. All three initiatives came from Serbia, the only Yugoslav 
republic with autonomous provinces on its territory. The disintegrative processes in Serbia 
followed the de-centralisation in Yugoslavia after the 1974 Constitution. But, while Yugoslavia 
was a federation with elements of confederalism, Serbia was formally a unitary state whose 
relations with its provinces were based on political compromises following the 1967-1974 
Constitutional debate. Although Kosovo and Vojvodina did not become republics on their own, 
in reality their status was in all important elements equal to those of the republics. The 
Constitutional compromise left a space for both sides to interpret the 'real meaning' of the 
Constitution in their own, mutually opposed, ways. The interpretation of what the writers of
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the Constitution really meant when regulating the 'relations in Serbia1 dominated Yugoslav 
politics ever after 1974. Already in 1976 the first demand to condemn the 'unconstitutional' 
practice of 'autonomism' was presented to Tito and Kardelj by the Serbian leaders. Between 
1976 and 1984 the Serbian leaders unsuccessfully tried twice more (following the 1981 Kosovo 
protests, and by initiating debate on the political system in 1983) to resolve the problem, 
without rejecting the main ideas of the 1974 Constitution. The Serbian demands met with 
indifference or with open opposition among the most Kardeljist forces in the party, which had a 
firm control over the federal institutions and over all other republics and both provinces. They 
argued that any significant change of the constitutional provisions would mean deviation from 
'Tito's path', which was to be prevented in the first post-Tito years.
This chapter argues that the commitment to the Kardeljist concept among the Yugoslav leaders 
in the 1970s and 1980s was so strong that it prevented any change in the political system even 
when it became obvious that the system itself was not functioning. Instead of re-examining the 
main elements of the concept, the Kardeljists argued that the system had not been implemented 
in line with Kardelj's recommendations, and that another, 'non-constitutional' practice had been 
introduced in Yugoslavia. They refused to accept any change of the system, and even in the 
system, accepting only the possibility of 'building the system up' on the same principles that 
had been written in the 1974 Constitution. On all three occasions analysed in this chapter, the 
Kardeljists successfully blocked demands for reforms, also because a consensus between the 
republics and provinces was needed for any significant change.
Paradoxically, the much greater commitment of the Yugoslav elite to the story they had 
invented than was the case with the political elites in other Communist countries of Eastern 
Europe contributed to the much more tragic end of Yugoslavia, compared with the events in 
the countries whose leaders and people found it easier to abandon the ideology on which the 
system had been founded.
This chapter, together with the previous one (on the economic crisis) brings us closer to 
understanding the circumstances which engendered the different concepts of post-Kardeljist 
Yugoslavia and the founding concepts of the nation-states that emerged after Yugoslavia.
5.1. The 'Blue Book' of 1977
The 'Serbian question' was the core of the political conflicts in Yugoslavia following the 1974 
Constitution. The main reason for its revival was the disintegrative process in Yugoslavia which 
affected Serbia more than the other republics. While Bosnia-Herzegovina was a 'small 
Yugoslavia' in an ethnic sense, it was Serbia which, in its political structure (having two
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provinces on its territory1 but without being a federation itself) deserved much more to be 
called a 'small Yugoslavia'. Since ethnic issues, as I argue throughout this thesis, did not 
dominate Yugoslav politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was the Serbian (political), 
rather than the Bosnian (ethnic) question, that emerged at the focus of Yugoslav politics.2
As demonstrated in Chapter Three, Serbia accepted the confederalised model of Yugoslavia and 
supported the decentralisation of power which occurred in 1967-1972. As with the others, 
Serbia wanted more autonomy from the federal leadership in deciding on in its own 'internal 
affairs'. She also supported the idea that republics should be treated as states. But, while '1974 
signified the end of any possibility of Yugoslavia being run by one nation, by its leadership or 
any too ambitious individual from the Yugoslav elite' (Stambolic, 1995), it was clearly unjust 
that all other republics were really moving towards autonomy in their 'internal affairs', while 
Serbia alone was moving in a different direction. Because the provinces understood their role as 
being equal to the republics, they prevented Serbia from having full control over their 
territories. Serbia, her leaders felt, remained the only Yugoslav republic which did not gain its 
statehood by the Constitutional changes of 1974. On the contrary, it lost even the small effective 
control over the provinces which it had before 1966.
W hatever has been said about the disintegrative processes in Yugoslavia applies to Serbia as 
well. The 'autarkism' of republics in Yugoslavia was paralleled by the 'closure' of the Serbian 
provinces both towards Serbia and others in Yugoslavia. The megalomaniac wave of 
investment without any control by the federation was duplicated in the Serbian case. The 
conflict over competencies between the federation and the republics was the same as the intra- 
Serbian misunderstanding over what the provisions of the Constitution really intended. This 
was only emphasised by compromising formulations in the Yugoslav and Serbian 
Constitutions, by which the provinces were clearly parts of Serbia, but were also 'constitutive 
elements of the federation'.3
Serbia did not object to the Constitution itself (at least not until 1984) but to its selective 
implementation and 'incorrect' interpretation by the provinces. The first official complaint 
about the disintegration of Serbia was sent to Tito and Kardelj in the form of the 'Blue Book', as 
the official document 'On the constitutional position of Serbia and its relations to its two
1 Vojvodina in the north of the Republic, where Serbs formed 50% of the local population with 22 ethnic minorities and 
the Hungarian 'nationality' of 500,000; and Kosovo in its south, where the Albanians in 1981 made up 77.5% (1,226,736) 
of the local population (of 1,584,441), together with 209,498 (13.2%) of Serbs, 58,562 (3.7%) Muslims and 27,028 (1.7%) 
Montenegrins. Serbia was the only 'complex' Yugoslav republic, with provinces within its borders.
2  Only when the discourse shifted from political to ethnic issues, did Bosnia come to the forefront of the Yugoslav crisis.
3 This change was introduced by 1968 amendment 7, which replaced Article 2 of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution (see 
Petranovic and Strbac, 1977: III: 95).
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autonomous provinces' is now known. The document was issued after several incidents of 
symbolic and practical-political character between Serbia and the provinces.4 The Blue Book 
concluded that the provinces considered themselves as equal to the republics, which 
consequently led them to disrespect any authority of Serbia even in those fields in which only 
the republic (as the sovereign state) had rights. Serbia listed dozens of examples of such 
'autarkism': in foreign relations, defence, economic and education policy.5
'It was natural, and even compulsory, that the provinces participated when the aims 
and programmes of the Serbian Prime Minister's visits to a foreign country were 
formulated, and they had always been informed about the results afterwards. But, to 
them it seemed perfectly natural that the Serbian Prime Minister learnt from the press 
about the Prime Minister of a province's visit to a foreign country -  in which he asked 
for a million dollar loan,' recalls Ivan Stambolic from his personal experience while in 
the office of Serbian Prime Minister (1995:78).
When Serbia approached the provinces on this issue, Vojvodina rejected the proposal to co­
ordinate international visits (Stambolic, 1981/1988:57). The provinces also argued that there 
could be no Social Plan for the whole republic but that three plans should be introduced 
instead. While Kosovo and Vojvodina had their own Social Plans, the 'Serbian' plan was 
implemented only on the territory outside the provinces. 'In the volumes and volumes of Social 
Plans of the provinces, the words Republic and Serbia were not mentioned even once. Kosovo 
also denied Serbia any competence to regulate citizenship policy autonomously,' said Stambolic 
(1995:78). The common defence law could not be enacted, since the provinces rejected any 
cooperation. The ministries of education argued over whether the Serbian writers from 
Vojvodina should be classified as 'Serb' or as 'Vojvodinian' literature (Galovic, 1981/1989:133). 
In the Party, 'democratic centralism' was acknowledged on the federal level, but Vojvodina 
denied any right of the Serbian Party organisation to implement the same principle from the 
level of the republic downwards (Galovic, 1981/1989:133). A few years later, Vojvodina even 
opposed Serbia collecting statistical data on the population in the province (Stambolic, 
1981/1988:25). The term 'narrow Serbia', and 'Serbia without Provinces' entered the political 
vocabulary and statistical books, which Serbia found insulting. For all these reasons, the 'Blue 
Book' concluded that the relationship between Serbia and its two provinces 'had reached a
4 The incidents began already in 1975 during Tito's visit to Kosovo, when the Kosovo leaders used this opportunity to 
emphasize Kosovo's direct links with the Federation. 'Their obsession with statehood is absolute. By emphasising 
'Yugoslavism' even too much, by linking themselves with Yugoslavia, Tito and the LCY, they aim to blur the fact that 
the autonomous provinces are within Serbia,' wrote the Serbian leader Draza Markovic in his diary on 13 April 1975 
(1988:104).
5 For example, the Vojvodina leaders did not invite any member of the Serbian leadership to attend Tito's visit to Novi 
Sad in 1975. Furthermore, in his toast to Tito, Radovan Vlajkovic, then the president of Vojvodina, failed even to 
mention Serbia or its League of Communists. The Commander of Vojvodina Territorial Defence on another occasion 
addressed his colleague - a general from Serbia proper - as a guest from the 'neighbouring republic', making no 
difference between him and a Croatian general. Even in foreign policy, the provinces took initiatives without even 
informing Serbia.
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virtual cul-de-sac'. Making states out of provinces was, they argued, against the spirit and the 
letter of the Constitution.
In January 1977, Kardelj agreed with most of the Serbian demands, repeating his firm stand that 
the provinces - as opposed to the republics - should not be treated as states. Kardelj's position 
was 'creative' and 'supportive', as the three top Serbian politicians of that time confirmed.6 
Kardelj also rejected any notion of the federalisation of Serbia, for it would 'result in a 
(negative) reaction of the Serb nation1. As Ivan Stambolic recalls, Kardelj was 'clearly against the 
disintegration of Serbia... He thought that Serbia ought to be a unitary state with a certain 
autonomy for its provinces' (Stambolic, 1995:72)7
However, Kardelj was realistic enough to warn Markovic not to expect too much from others in 
Yugoslavia and from Tito himself. While the others would not be interested in anything but 
their own 'internal affairs', Tito 'would be reserved in the beginning' (Markovic, 28 February 
1976; 1987:333). He therefore suggested the Serbians resolve these problems within Serbia, 
avoiding the Yugoslav level. He also recommended them to be patient, since 'this would all be 
settled through the economic integration of the country anyhow'. Kardelj believed that 
'associated labour' was the formula to integrate the Yugoslavs without denying any rights to 
their 'fully completed' nations.8 But, as explained in Chapter Four, 'associated labour' already 
in 1975 looked like a distant and by no means certain future. On the contrary, the signs of 
disintegration - which brought the country to the verge of dissolution already in 1971 - now re- 
emerged with full strength in both the economic and the political areas.
The Serbs accepted the first of Kardelj's recommendations, but failed to hear the second. At the 
end of June 1977 a long session of all the relevant leaders in Serbia (including those of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina) was held, but no compromise between the two positions was possible. The 
Kosovo leaders even declared that the 'Blue Book' was a 'Bible of Serbian nationalism', accusing 
Markovic and two Stambolics of attempting to undermine the autonomy of the provinces, 
which was - in their views - unconstitutional. The Kosovans only repeated their arguments that 
Kosovo was not only part of Serbia, but a constitutive element of Yugoslav federalism itself. 
Therefore, any change in its status was a change to the Yugoslav Constitution, and could not be 
made by Serbia alone. In fact, it could not be even made by a majority, or even by all the
6  Petar Stambolic in Djukic, 1992:241; Draza Markovic on 12 February 1976 in Markovic, 1988:328; and Ivan Stambolic, 
1995:72. As Markovic said, the Serbian leaders were 'extremely satisfied' with Kardelj's conclusion that 'since the 
republics were sovereign states, therefore it was up to them to decide which part of this sovereignty would be 
transposed to the Federation, and which to lower socio-political communities, such as provinces' (1988:328).
7  Kardelj's reaction to the 'Blue Book' in 1977 secured him a positive place even in the most recent recollections of events 
leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia by his Serbian colleagues.
8 For Kardelj's views, see Chapter Two.
160
Yugoslav republics acting together, unless the Assembly of Kosovo consented.9 Siding with 
Kosovo, the Vojvodina leaders proposed a 'gentleman's agreement’ which would put the whole 
affair ad acta, with the continuation of the status quo. What surprised and discouraged Markovic 
and the Stambolics most was the opposition to the 'Blue Book' which came from their main rival 
in Serbia Proper, the Federal Foreign Secretary (1972-1978), Milos Minic.10 Since Minic was 
Tito's protege in Serbia, Markovic understood that he could not count on Tito's support in any 
serious clash with the provinces.11 'Terrible', wrote Markovic in his diary on 30 June 1977, 
concluding that the Serbs again (like the Yugoslavs in general) remained ineffective because 
they were disunited. But there was only one possible alternative to an open conflict with Tito, 
which neither of the two wanted: to accept the ad acta compromise. Tito, who was much more 
interested in preventing a new crisis in Serbia and Yugoslavia than in resolving serious 
economic and political problems in his late eighties, moved in to force the leaders of the 
provinces to drop their charges against Markovic. The debate on the relationship within Serbia 
was thus pushed under the carpet, but by no means was it resolved. On the contrary, it only 
increased the distrust between Serbia and its provinces, between Serbia and the other republics, 
and between the various factions in the Serbian leadership. It also left the Serbs with the bad 
feeling that Tito himself had prevented them from being a republic equal to all the others in 
Yugoslavia. Although the whole affair was conducted almost entirely behind closed doors (the 
news about the 'Blue Book' was broken to the general public only in the mid-1980s), it m ade the 
Serbian leadership feel somehow discriminated against in Yugoslavia, chained by the 
'unchangeable' provisions of the Constitution and their ad voluntatem interpretations by the 
provinces. As a result, Serbian politicians became much more critical of the position of Serbia in 
their public speeches, which were now more direct than before. They argued, as Ivan Stambolic 
formulated it in July 1979, that 'Serbia is lagging behind the others economically and politically' 
(Stambolic, 1979/1988:9).
At the same time, the provinces were once again grateful to Tito for his support, but now more 
than ever before worried that things would change after him. In the consensus principle, the 
Constitutional principle that gave them the right to veto any change in the constitution by not 
'ratifying' it in their assembly, the provinces discovered the best institutional protection against 
any Serbian attempt at re-centralisation. When Kardelj died in February 1979 and Tito in May
9  Amendment 18 (December 1968) - to replace Articles 111 and 112 of die 1963 Constitution.
10 Minic was the Military Prosecutor in the trial of Gen Mihailovic, the leader of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland 
(Chetniks) in 1946. This fact made it even more difficult for Markovic to attack him, while being already suspected of 
Serbian nationalism. The conflict between Markovic and Minic was a long-standing one: it originated in the 1968 
student demonstrations, on which more in Chapter Three on "Constitutional debate 1967-1974' (Markovic, 5 June 1968, 
and 15 June 1968).
11 This also confirms Ivan Stambolic, when he says that Tito took no sides in the conflict, but when they met, 'it was 
clear (from an almost invisible reaction) that he was slightly more supportive of the provinces than Serbia' (Stambolic, 
1995:67).
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1980, the Yugoslav leaders mirrored the grief of the population for the deceased leaders. But 
this sorrow was mingled with fears and expectations of changes in the post-Titoist period. 
Below the surface, there was a tense atmosphere of expectation and uncertainty. The rhetoric of 
'no changes after Tito', which dominated the public discourse, substantially helped the cause of 
the provinces. But, as Ivan Stambolic described, while they all agreed that there would be 'Tito - 
after Tito', there was still an open question: 'Whose 'Tito' would this be?'
5.2. The Kosovo Crisis
5.2.1. The Background of the Kosovo crisis (1981)
The death of Tito and Kardelj shifted the focus of the Serbian initiative from 'interpretation of 
the Constitution' to 'small changes in the Constitution'. 'Interpretation' had some sense when 
the 'supreme arbiters of meaning', Tito and Kardelj were alive. But the Serbian leaders assumed 
that the appropriate interpretation of the Constitution had become a much less realistic task for 
Tito's collective successors.
Six months after Tito's death, the president of the Serbian Constitutional Court Najdan Pasic 
sent a public letter to the Yugoslav Party leadership in which he demanded a debate on the 
political system. Pasic's action was the first post-Titoist attempt of Serbian leaders to initiate 
'small changes' in the Constitution, but it was simply ignored by the others.
Things had, however, changed significantly when the Albanian students in Kosovo demanded 
changes to the Constitution in April 1981. From today's perspective, the discontent of the 
Kosovo Albanians with the 1974 Constitution looks a paradox, since this Constitution granted 
them extensive autonomy in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Even more paradoxical is the fact that the 
Albanian students in Kosovo were motivated by the same feeling as the Serbian leaders in 
Belgrade: they both felt unequal to the relevant others. Just as Serbian leaders felt that Serbia 
was unequal to other Yugoslav republics and that it was lagging behind them in economic and 
political terms, many Albanians in Kosovo felt the same about their status and the status of 
Kosovo.12 While Serbia felt that it could not realise its status of republic without the strict 
implementation of the 1974 Constitution, many Albanians felt that only if Kosovo became a 
Republic, could the inequality they faced vanish. The sense of inequality and demand for 
equality were the main motives of both the Kosovo events in 1981 and of the Serbian reaction to 
them. Zupanov's theory of radical egalitarianism, thus, could equally help us to explain the 
political as well as the economic crisis of Yugoslavia.
12 The notion of equality occupies the central place in almost all articles discussing Kosovo, whether they present the 
Serb or Albanian 'point of view'. See Zajmi, 1997:98.
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The inequality felt by the Kosovo Albanians had three dimensions: 1) economic, 2) political and
3) ethnic.
Economically, Kosovo was the least developed area of Yugoslavia. Although it was developing 
faster than other regions in Yugoslavia, for reasons of its extremely high birth rate (among the 
highest in Europe) the GDP per capita did not show such a development. In fact, the gap 
between Kosovo and the most developed Yugoslav Republic, Slovenia, was widening: while in 
1952 Slovenia had a 4.1 times larger GDP per capita, in 1981 the ratio was 5.4:1 with a tendency 
to increase still further.13 Other economic data showed an even greater difference, approaching 
even a 8:1 ratio. These differences were comparable with those between England and Northern 
Africa (Horvat, 1988:136). Kosovo was lagging behind not only Slovenia, but all other Yugoslav 
regions as well. While in 1955 its GDP per capita was 43% of the Yugoslav average, in 1984 this 
fell to 26% (SGJ, 1986:417). Tn the situation of economic crisis in the country, Kosovo's 
prospects of reaching the others were even less likely. With a ratio of 6.1:1 and projected annual 
growth rate of 2%, Kosovo would need 91 years to reach the Slovenian level of 1981,' a leading 
Yugoslav (Croatian) economist Branko Horvat concluded. The unemployment rate in Kosovo 
was the highest in the country: in 1985 it was 3.33 times higher than the Yugoslav average (SGJ, 
1986:421). For one available job, there were 43 unemployed persons waiting to get it. In such a 
situation, it became important that the ethnic structure of employees was not always the same 
as the ethnic composition of population, although the differences were not drastic. In Kosovo, 
Albanians made 74% of the active population, but among employees they were 65%. The Serbs 
were 17% of the active population, but 26% of the employed. When a job became a privilege, 
this could become a problem (Horvat, 1988:137).
In 1948 62.2% of the Kosovo population was illiterate. But in 1981 Kosovo had the third largest 
University in Yugoslavia, with almost 50,000 students. With almost 30 students per 1,000 
inhabitants, Kosovo had the highest concentration of students in Yugoslavia. Having 61% of 
population under the age of 25 (Stambolic, 1988:32), in 1978 every third inhabitant of Kosovo 
was receiving education (Report, 198114:158). Not only did this heavily burden the already 
weak Kosovo economy, but it created new social and political problems. Kosovo faced the 
prospect of having a highly educated mass of unemployed, at a time when its economy was 
collapsing. This would not have been such a problem had not the other Yugoslav republics 
been undergoing economic crisis themselves. Both for the reasons of 'autarky' and for objective 
economic reasons, they became less and less open for young educated Kosovans (mostly
13 This actually happened, and already in 1984 the GDP per capita difference between Slovenia and Kosovo was 6.1:1.
14 Here and on several further places I refer to report 'Sta se dogadjalo na Kosovu' (Wliat happened in Kosovo), published 
by Politika. Belgrade immediately after the 1981 demonstrations. I refer to this publication as Report, 1981.
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Albanian). An additional problem was that they felt that Pristina University (opened in 1975) 
was significantly below the quality level of other Yugoslav universities and were dubious about 
their degrees.
At the same time, the Albanians themselves did not want to move out of the province to other 
Yugoslav republics in order to find jobs, but preferred low paid jobs in Western Europe instead. 
They were not alone in this respect in Yugoslavia. An analysis of internal migrations in post­
war Yugoslavia shows that economic reasons played a secondary role to ethnic ones when it 
came to changing one republic for another. The 1981 census revealed that (only?) 1,760,333 out 
of about 23 million Yugoslavs changed their permanent settlements from one to another 
Republic during their lives. Although one would expect that people migrated from heavily 
under-developed Kosovo more than from any other part of the country, the Albanians, whose 
share in the Yugoslav population was 7.7%, made up only 3.4% of migrants (59,754 people). 
But, the other Yugoslav nations also did not follow economic, but rather national logic15: all 
except the Serbs and Montenegrins. While Serbs formed 36.3% of the population in 1981, they 
were 48.8% of the migrants. The Montenegrins twice exceeded their 'quota': a nation of 2.6% 
made up 5.6% of migrants. While the language barrier can explain the hesitations of 
Macedonians and Albanians to move out of Macedonia and Kosovo, this argum ent does not 
explain why Croats and Bosnian Muslims remained committed to their territories. The 
directions of migrations show the same trend: Croats moved predominantly to Croatia, Serbs to 
Serbia. Albanians stayed in Kosovo, despite the economic hardship and political inequality they 
felt (Bilandzic, 1986:134-6).16 All these data actually show that there was occurring a strong 
process of ethno-linguistic closure within republics/provinces which mirrored the autarkism 
induced by economic and political reform. Nations, formally declared 'completed' by Kardelj, 
were now consolidating.
In some cases, as with the Albanian students, the Albanians even moved from other areas to 
Kosovo. The University of Pristina was the only Yugoslav institution of higher education where 
one could study in Albanian. This meant that many Albanians from other republics went to 
study in Pristina. The high level of unemployment only encouraged many young (below 24 
years of age) Albanians (who made up 61 % of the Kosovo population of 1,7 million) to study at
15 As Suvar argues (1995), in ten years between 1971 and 1981, about 415,000 people moved from one republic to 
another, and almost half of them left Bosnia-Herzegovina and went to Serbia and Croatia. Suvar concludes that 
migratory directions were to a great extent determined by both ethnic and religious affiliations. After 35 years of 
'brotherhood and unity' and 63 years of existence of Yugoslavia, only every seventh marriage in 1981 was inter-ethnic: 
in Vojvodina every third, in Kosovo only every sixteenth. A third of all inter-ethnic marriages were between Serb and 
Croat partners. 95% of Macedonians lived in Macedonia, 81.5% of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 75.9% of Serbs in 
Serbia; 75% of Croats in Croatia, 70.9% of Albanians in Kosovo and 69% of Montenegrins in Montenegro (Suvar, 1995: 
148).
16 The issue of migration of the Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo will be discussed in detail in the next section of 
this chapter.
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the University nearby. The megalomania of political elites and 'personal networks of survival' 
helped many to realise this dream and the University, equipped for 15,000, now had 50,000 
students. There were only 4,000 beds in the students' dormitories and it was not uncommon for 
two students to share a bed. This all made a good background for various 'extreme-left' and 
nationalist ideologies among the students, whose expectations rose high.17
Yugoslavia was, however, aware of Kosovo's economic problems and it recognised its 
development as a priority. Kosovo (together with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and 
Macedonia) was treated as an 'under-developed region of Yugoslavia', to which money from 
other republics (including Serbia proper, with a level of development about or just slightly 
below the Yugoslav average) and Vojvodina was redistributed via federal agencies. The Kosovo 
share in the total amount of money distributed in this way had been continuously increasing 
ever since 1966. In the 1966-1970 period it amounted to 30%, in the 1971-1975 period 33.3%, in 
1976-1980 37%, while for 1981-1985 it reached 42.8% (1981:156).18 In the 1981-1986 plan it was 
projected that Kosovo would develop 60% faster than the Yugoslav average (Stambolic, 
1988:31). The economic strength of Kosovo had enlarged 12-fold since the end of the war, twice 
as much as the Yugoslav average (Stambolic, 1988:32). At the same time, this was not felt in the 
everyday life of the population. The rhetoric of the Kosovo leaders, who argued that Kosovo 
was lagging behind the others, and urged the others to spend more and more on Kosovo, 
sounded much more convincing to the population at large. When Kosovo leaders started 
arguing that Kosovo was in a disadvantaged position compared with all other Yugoslav 
regions, they spoke from the hearts of the Kosovans.
Kosovo almost entirely depended on economic help from other Yugoslav regions. It was 
planned that in the 1981-1986 period almost 136 billion Yugoslav dinars would be spent on 
various investments in Kosovo, of which only 8.7 billions would come from the Kosovo 
economy itself (Stambolic, 1988:31). The share of federal funds in the Kosovo budget was 
permanently increasing - from 53% in 1966-1970 to more than 80% in 1976-1980. Between 1952 
and 1978 total investment in Kosovo increased 19.1 times, while in Serbia without provinces it 
was 6.6 times, in Vojvodina 2.6 times and the Yugoslav average 7.7 times. But, like everywhere 
else, investments in Kosovo were rarely successful and did not bring much benefit to ordinary 
people. The Kosovo political elite, using their autonomy in deciding how to spend money from 
federal sources, directed a large share to 'political investments'. A huge University Library was 
built in the centre of Pristina, and the most modern Radio-Television building in the country
1 7  As Branko Horvat noticed in an interview conducted by me in April 1998, in this sense, the situation could be 
compared with the presence of similar ideologies at Belgrade or Zagreb Universities in the 1930s.
18 Until 1970 'federal' help was distributed as 'non-returnable loans'. After this 14-year loans, with favourable 
conditions of repayment, were introduced. Kosovo had additionally 25% better conditions: loans were for 17 years, 
interest rate 4.16 instead of 4.5%, etc (Report, 1981:159).
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was constructed there. These were all symbols of Kosovo's new status in Yugoslavia following 
the fall of Rankovic in 1966 and the 1974 Constitution. But, the 'efficiency of investment' rate 
was much lower than anywhere else in Yugoslavia: in 1978 it was 33% lower than the already 
low Yugoslav average (Stambolic, 1988:33). When the economic crisis began, criticism of 
'wasted investments' was understood as criticism of Kosovo's political elite. To many in 
Kosovo, criticism of the low efficiency rate was seen as criticism of Kosovo's population as 
such.
A separate problem was Kosovo's high birth rate, the highest in Europe. While in Yugoslavia 
the annual population growth was 0.7%, in Kosovo it was 2.5%, three times higher (Horvat, 
1988:181). In Kosovo a woman of child-bearing age on average bore 6.6 children, according to 
the 1971 census, while in 'Serbia without provinces' the number was only 2.7. In this sense, the 
Kosovo Albanians differed significantly from Kosovo's Serbs and Montenegrins. The number of 
Albanians in Kosovo doubled in the 20 years between 1961 and 1981 - from 646 to 1,227 
thousands. If all of Yugoslavia's nationalities had multiplied the way the Albanians had, 
Yugoslavia would in 1981 have had about 50 million, rather than 23 million inhabitants.19 On 
the other hand, the number of Serbs in Kosovo decreased from 227,000 to 209,000 in the same 
period. This meant that the share of the Serbs in the Kosovan population almost halved in this 
period: from 23.6 to 13.2%, while the share of the Albanians rose from 67.1 to 77.5%.20
Not only had this trend changed the ethnic structure in Kosovo, but it affected the demographic 
structure of Serbia and Yugoslavia. If the high birth rate had continued, the Kosovo population 
w ould have increased from 1.76 million in 1985 to 2.53 million in 2000 (SGJ, 1986; Horvat, 
1988:181).21 Not only would the share of Albanians in Serbia then have increased to almost 25%, 
but the Kosovo population would have become larger than that of three Yugoslav Republics 
(Macedonia, Slovenia and Montenegro) and the Province of Vojvodina. Between 1961 and 1981, 
the share of Albanians in the Yugoslav population rose from 4.9% to 7.7%. This happened when 
all the other Yugoslav nations - except the Bosnian Muslims (who increased their share from 5.3 
to 8.9%) and the Macedonians (from 5.6 to 6.0%) decreased their percentage. Ethnic nationalists 
among the Serbs, whose share of the Yugoslav population fell from 42.1% to 36.3% over the 
past 20 years, and the Croats (from 23.2% to 19.7%) felt particularly 'endangered' by this trend.
1 9  These figures were presented by Stipe Suvar in Iris article in Nin, 30 August 1981 (RFE/RL, 17 September 1981).
2" RFE/RL, 18 May 1981. Significantly, tire structure of tire population in Kosovo did not change much between 1948 
and 1961. In 1948 the Albanians made up 68.5 and Serbs 23.6% of the Kosovo population, while in 1961 Albanians were 
67.2% and Serbs still 23.6%. This is why many Serbs saw the political changes in the 1960s (especially after 1966) as the 
main cause of the exodus.
21 In 1981 Kosovo was already the most populous area of Yugoslavia, with 146 inhabitants per square kilometre of 
territory, almost twice as many as the Yugoslav average of 8 8  per square kilometre.
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This is partly due to a significant increase in the Yugoslavs,22 whose share increased from 1.7% 
to 5.4% of the population in the 1961-1981 period. Yugoslavism and the high birth rate of 
Albanians in Kosovo and amongst Bosnian Muslims (mostly in Bosnia-Herzegovina) were now 
placed high on the agenda of the Serb and Croat nationalists, to stay there during the whole 
war in Bosnia and in Kosovo in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
These facts played an immense role in further political manipulation, with both the Albanian 
sense of pessimism about their own future, and Serbian fears of being 'swallowed' by the 
Albanian birth rate, which many of them saw as politically motivated. (More on this 
manipulation in Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis). When the economic crisis began in 1981, 
Yugoslav politicians and economists suggested various measures to be introduced in Kosovo, 
such as: a) birth-control; b) reducing investments in non-profitable areas; c) strict control over 
the distribution of money donated or borrowed from other republics; d) adjusting the number 
of students to real economic needs; e) increase in efficiency, etc. All of these measures were, 
however, seen as pressure on Kosovo's autonomy and as an attempt to re-establish (Serbian) 
control over the province. Since Kosovo was becoming increasingly identified with its 
overwhelmingly Albanian population, the measures were seen as an attack on ethnic 
Albanians. As soon as this happened, an economic and political debate cleared the ground for 
an inter-ethnic conflict between 'the Slavs' and Albanians in Kosovo and throughout the 
country.
In this context, and bearing in mind the 'republicanisation' of Yugoslavia after 1974, one can 
easily understand why the Albanians believed that having their own republic in Yugoslavia 
was the key to their protection from the others. As long as they did not have a republic, they 
would feel politically unequal.23 The demand for a republic of Kosovo, in fact, originated from 
the intellectual and some parts of the political elite of Kosovo itself, and emerged for the first 
time during the Constitutional debate in 1968. The whole debate was kept behind closed doors,
22 By Yugoslavs here I mean those Yugoslav citizens who declared themselves Yugoslav in an ethnic sense in the census 
of population.
23 The demand for a republic at first did not seem to be an outrage. Kosovo had changed its status within socialist 
Yugoslavia twice: in the 'AVNOJ Resolution' of 1943 it was not even mentioned. During the war and immediately after 
it, Kosovo was seen as a potential link between Yugoslavia and Albania in a future socialist 'Balkan Federation', just as 
Macedonia was seen as the link between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Tito's Partisans announced that Albanian (as well as 
Macedonian) unification would be the logical consequence of victoiy of socialist over nationalist principles. In 1946, 
however, Kosovo became an 'autonomous region' of Serbia, a level below that of Vojvodina, whose status of province 
was not changed after 1945. But in the 1963 Constitution it was put on a par with Vojvodina, becoming an 'autonomous 
province'. In the 1963 Constitution, the Albanians were also given the status of 'nationality1, which was generally 
considered to be an improvement compared with the status of 'national minority'. With the fall of Rankovi<5 in 1966 and 
Cosic in 1968 (both criticised for their views on Kosovo) there were two more changes in a symbolic sense: instead of 
being called Siptari [the Albanian word for an Albanian is Shqiptar] which many of them found offensive, the term 
Albanac (Albanian) was introduced.
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and only in the late 1980s were the first documents about it published.24 They revealed a heated 
debate within the Kosovo political and intellectual elite on the issue of a republic. In general, 
the intellectual elite (concentrated at the University) demanded the status of a republic for 
Kosovo, with full rights to self-determination. Their demand was based on historical and ethnic 
arguments. Historically, the Yugoslav communists argued that Kosovo decided to join Serbia 
after the War 'of its own free will and on the basis of the right to self-determination'. Only 
because of Rankovic's policy of oppression against tire Kosovo Albanians did this right 
'disappear' from the constitutive acts in the first two post-war decades. The removal of 
Rankovic in 1966 and the introduction of the new - Kardeljist - policy on the national question 
put the Kosovo question again on the agenda. The Albanian intellectuals from Kosovo fully 
supported Kardelj's concept of the national question, but they argued that the Albanians were a 
nation like any other in Yugoslavia, and that their non-Slavic origins were not sufficient reason 
for treating them differently.25 The argument of the federal leadership, that a Republic of 
Kosovo would mean the creation of a 'second Albanian state' was rejected: 'There are two 
Korean states and two German states. Why is it impossible to have two Albanian states?', they 
argued.26
The Albanian Communist leaders from Kosovo (some of whom also came from the University, 
like M ahmut Bakalli, the young leader of the Pristina Party Committee) took a 'm iddle road' 
policy. They knew that the demand for a Republic could not be accepted by Serbia or Tito 
himself, but they in fact used the radical demands of the intellectual elite in order to extend the 
autonomy of the Province as far as they could. As Dragoslav Markovic put it:
'I do not think that all of them are in favour of the weakening of the Republic as whole, 
but it is clear that all are united when it comes to new concessions in the economic, 
financial and other fields' (13 January 1968,1988:48).
The Kosovo leaders demanded a status which would be practically equal to the republics and 
only nominally different from them. They demanded a Constitution (and not a Statute) for 
Kosovo, a separate state holiday, a flag the same as that of the Albanian state flag with the small 
exception of a five-pointed star; a change of name from Kosovo-Metohija to Kosovo, and equal 
representation in the federal institutions. But, most importantly, they demanded the re­
definition of Yugoslavia in such a way as to incorporate the 'nationalities' on the same terms as
24 Among them is again Markovic's diary (1987) and Milos Misovic's book 'Ko je trazio Republiku Kosovo 1945-1985' 
(MiSovic, 1987). Additional testimonies on the demands for a Kosovo Republic by the main Kosovo leaders in 1968-1981 
period were published at this time.
25 The Serbian leaders, however, had problems in accepting this idea of Kardelj's. Markovic, for example, writes: 'The 
thesis that South Slav origins have no importance for tire character of tire Yugoslav community is very suspicious, 
basically incorrect and unacceptable' (1 February 1970,1987:237).
26 This argument was heard at tire session of the enlarged political leadership (the so-called 'Political Activ') of 
Djakovica and Pec (Misovic, 1987:133).
168
'nations'. While the Albanian intellectual elite demanded the abolition of the term 'nationality' 
and the use of the word 'nation' for the Albanians, the political elite found a compromise: 
Yugoslavia was to be a state 'of equal nations and nationalities'.
These issues, however, split the Albanian and Serb leaders at each level. The Albanian 
intellectual elite was dissatisfied with the proposals of its political elite, demanding a 
referendum on them. When they failed to secure one through the institutions, they urged and 
organised student demonstrations in 1968. The demands of the students were the same as those 
of their professors: a Kosovo republic. The Communist leadership of Kosovo, however, also 
split on how to react to such demands. The majority (led by young M ahmut Bakalli and Fadil 
Hoxha, the doyen of Kosovo politicians and representative of Kosovo in the Belgrade federal 
leadership) was opposed to harsh measures against them, since this would destroy the Kosovo 
intelligentsia and recall the worst days of Aleksandar Rankovic only two years after his 
removal.
The Serbs in the Kosovo leadership also split into two groups. While one argued that the 
demand for a Kosovo Republic was nationalistic and counter-revolutionary, the most 
prominent political representative of the Kosovo Serbs (Katarina Patrnogic Isma) was of a 
different opinion. She argued that the issue of republic or province was only secondary to the 
class dimension of the problem. Although a Serb herself, Patrnogic was seen by Serbian leaders 
as a promoter of the demand for a Kosovo Republic (Markovic, 20 July 1968,1987:79).
Finally, the Serbian leaders also differed on how to approach Kosovo's demands. Milos Minic 
showed much more willingness to compromise than others. Minic argued that 'in  the system of 
self-management every socio-political community has some elements of sovereignty, and thus 
the provinces have it as well, for which reason we could think of Kosovo becoming a republic' 
(Markovic, 2 June 1968, 1988:68). Dobrivoje Radosavljevic, a leading Serbian Communist, was 
also 'soft' on the Kosovo issue. He was 'obsessed', Markovic said, by the 'Serbian historical 
opportunity' to prove that the Serbs did not want to suppress the Albanians, and was, 
therefore, willing to compromise perhaps even on the issue of a Republic of Kosovo (Markovic, 
11 May 1968, 1988:66). But the majority of Serbian leaders rejected any possibility of such a 
prospect. In this, they had Tito's support,27 and the tacit agreement of the other Yugoslav
2 7  Dragoslav Markovic summarised Tito's position on this issue expressed in their talk on 27 January 1971: 'A Republic 
is out of the question, as well as any solution which might suggest a republic, when it comes to the provinces, and 
especially to Kosovo. It is also out of the question to have a President of the Presidency from the provinces (except if he 
was elected as a Serbian representative); maybe the Vice-President' (Markovic, 1987:256). However, Tito later agreed on 
having Presidents from the provinces. Tito told the Kosovo leaders directly that they could not count on his support if 
they asked for a republic (30 January 1977; Markovic, 1988:259). But, he also 'made too many concessions to them', as 
Petar Stambolic recalls (Djukic, 1992:242).
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Republics, whose interest was only to keep the issue of provinces strictly within Serbia.28 After 
a heated debate the Serbian leaders accepted some compromises and came closer to the Kosovo 
Communist leaders, but on the clear understanding that 'statehood' for Kosovo was out of the 
question.29 Kosovo and Vojvodina were declared to be 'constitutive elements of the Federation' 
and were represented in all federal institutions directly, independently of Serbia, but the 
demand for a republic was swiftly rejected. As with other parts of Yugoslavia, the 1974 
compromise left both sides equally dissatisfied (in as much as they were equally satisfied) and 
convinced that they could have got much more but for their 'soft' Communist leaders. But for 
Kosovo intellectuals there was one more lesson they learnt: that their status in Yugoslavia was 
not given once and for ever, and that it could well be changed if there was the political will for 
this. As one of the participants in the 1968 Constitutional debate in the Kosovo town of Dragas 
said: 'There will be no Republic as long as Tito is alive' (Misovic, 1987:162). But, everyone knew 
that this would not be forever. And, just like the Serbs, whose 'Blue Book' initiative was rejected 
by Tito, the nationalist Albanians waited for this moment to come. In the meantime, both sides 
were 'mobilising public opinion' to support their views (Misovic, 1987:187).
5.2.2. The 1981 Protests in  Kosovo: the Beginning of the State-Crisis of Yugoslavia
It is today widely argued that the Yugoslav crisis began with the Albanian demonstrations in 
Kosovo 1981. In analysing the Albanian public protests, many authors saw these as the first 
public sign of discontent with the solution of the national question, which was m eant to be 
finally off the agenda following the semi-confederalisation of the 1974 Constitution. The 
Albanian demonstrations are treated as the first if not secessionist, then certainly nationalist 
demand in a long chain of those that followed it in the last decade of Yugoslavia.
However, a detailed analysis of the 1981 demonstrations of Albanian students in Kosovo shows 
that the wider social and ideological dimension of their protests is today often neglected. 
Although there should be no doubt that national question inspired many participants in them, I 
argue that the protests of the Kosovo Albanians in 1981 were not only -  and to certain extent 
even not primarily -  motivated by nationalism, but also by egalitarianism, i.e., by a different 
concept of socialism from the Yugoslav self-managing and semi-confederalist one. The 
Albanian students, I argue, saw in Enver Hoxha's Albania and in Soviet-type state-socialism a 
suitable alternative to what they recognised as injustice in the economic, political and ethnic 
sense. To Yugoslav political leaders, therefore, their protests looked exactly the type of danger 
that Kardelj predicted as possible after his and Tito's death. The egalitarian demands of the
28 The other republics opposed any generalisation of the issue of provinces, fearing that this might encourage ethnic 
groups in their republics to demand the status of provinces.
2 9 Markovic, 1 November 1968 (1987:96).
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Albanian students in Kosovo posed therefore the greatest possible danger for the Yugoslav self- 
managing project, not only because they could destabilise the fragile balance between ethnic 
groups in the country, but also because they threatened to produce state socialism as its 
ultimate result.
It is in this light, I argue, that one should understand the reasons why the Yugoslav leaders 
labelled the organisers of the public protests 'counter-revolutionaries', and not only 'ethnic 
separatists' or 'secessionists'. It is also, I argue, for this reason that the regime decided (unlike in 
the 1968 Belgrade demonstrations, and even after the 1971 'Croatian Spring' protests) not to 
compromise on the students' demands but to suppress them by all available means.
The social and ideological dimension of the problem may be traced down in the chronology of 
the actual events. It all began with discontent over bad food and low quality of services in the 
Student Refectory in Pristina on 11 March 1981 and continued in street demonstrations that 
night.30 Few others joined the protest which seemed to be purely socially motivated. However, 
when a rum our spread that police had arrested a few demonstrators, the students went on the 
streets of Pristina. Together with the people who joined them, there were from three to four 
thousand demonstrators. Their main slogans were almost exclusively ideological and directed 
against w hat the demonstrators felt to be injustice in a regime that promised justice: 'We want 
deeds, not words', 'Some sleep in arm-chairs, others are without bread', 'We want our friends 
back from prison', etc. (Report, 1981:5). With only rare exceptions, no nationalist slogans were 
shouted, and ethnic issues seemed not to be on the agenda. The demonstrations ended with 
police intervention at 2.30 a.m. next morning. About a hundred demonstrators were arrested. 
The political leadership of Pristina, which was summoned next day, concluded that the 
demonstrations had surprised them, since there 'had been no indication of them before they 
happened' (Report, 1981:7). Although they recognised that the main demands were about 
student welfare, they assessed the demonstrations as 'politically damaging' (Report, 1981:7) 
since they could be used by 'enemies'.
It seemed that this was only an episode, since in the next two weeks there were no similar 
protests. But, on 26 March, when it was obvious that some of the detained demonstrators had 
not been released as expected, the demonstrations were renewed throughout the Province. In 
Pristina, several thousand demonstrators clashed with police who prevented them from 
approaching the central city square where the 'Relay of Youth' (Stafeta Mladosti) was expected 
on its way through the country. Unlike on the occasion of the previous protests, their demands
3 0  The events are here described using newspaper reports collected in Sta se dogadjalo na Kosavu, 1981; as well as books 
by the leading Kosovo politician Sinan Hasani (1986), Horvat (1988) and Mertus (1999). The RFE/RL Reports and 
Analyses are also a helpful source (esp. see 7 April 1981 and 28 April 1981). I used my talks with several Kosovo 
Albanians to reconstruct the events and interpretation among the participants and Kosovo population.
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were now political as well as economic: 'We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs', 'Kosova31 Republic', 
'Unity', 'Unity with Albania', 'Trepai [the main Kosovo mine-industry - a symbol of the Kosovo 
working class] is working for others', 'Trepai works, Belgrade builds', 'Long live Marxism - 
Leninism, Down with Revisionism', etc. In contrast to the previous one, this demonstration 
intended to use the ethnic dimension of the problem, claiming the ethnic inequality of Kosovo 
Albanians. By adding ethnic and ideological dimensions to the already existent social and 
economic ones, the protests became a potential source of destabilisation of the whole system.
This is why the political elite reacted brutally, sparing no force to crush the Kosovo 
demonstrations. In clashes between demonstrators and police on the first day of 
demonstrations, 32 demonstrators were injured (Report, 1981:11). On 28 March 1981 Aslan 
Fazlia, president of the party organisation in Pristina (Albanian himself) said that the character 
of the demonstrations was nationalistic and counter-revolutionary. Fazlia announced tough 
police measures against the demonstrators. Full-scale arrests were launched in Kosovo. This, 
however, only fuelled students' protests. Many students saw the wave of coercion as a 'return 
of Rankovic's methods' once Tito had gone. Two days later, on 30 March 1981, students of the 
three largest faculties at Pristina University (Law, Economics and Science-Maths) declared a 
boycott of teaching. On 1 April 1981 the demonstrations swept all over Kosovo, with new and 
more radical political demands. When 17 policemen were injured in clashes with 
demonstrators, the Army moved in to secure state institutions. The police did not manage to 
break up the demonstrations that day. When the reports came that some workers had joined the 
demonstrations, the Committee for People's Self-Defence of Kosovo (the crisis headquarters of 
the Kosovo leadership, presided over by Party President M ahmut Bakalli) decided to ask the 
Army to move tanks onto the streets. At the same time, police reinforcements from Central 
Serbia were stopped by a road block near Podujevo. In order to force the police to w ithdraw 
back to 'Serbia' (i.e., territory of the republic outside provinces), the demonstrators took 
hostages from 34 houses of local Serbs and Montenegrins. Only when additional police came 
from Pristina, were the hostages released. Throughout Kosovo windows were smashed in many 
cars, shops and state institutions. Demonstrators demanded a republic, 'unification of all 
Albanian territories', and 'brotherhood among Albanians' (Horvat, 1988:140). In Belgrade, an 
urgent joint meeting of the Presidency of Yugoslavia and the Presidency of the LCY was 
convened. The Yugoslav leaders declared a 'crisis situation in Kosovo' and a 'state of emergency 
in Pristina'. They ordered the level of combat readiness to be increased in all Army units in 
Yugoslavia, and the reserve force of the Army and Police to be mobilised. All republics were 
asked to send their police troops to Kosovo. The Kosovo Minister of the Interior banned public 
meetings in the province, while the Government of Kosovo (Executive Council of the Province)
31 Kosova is the Albanian name for Kosovo. In this dissertation I use this term when the source is translated from 
Albanian.
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ordered all schools, the University and other student institutions (halls of residences, 
refectories, etc.) to be closed.
However, on 3 April 1981 the demonstrations re-emerged in Vucitrn, Urosevac, Vitina and 
Kosovska Mitrovica. New slogans were added: 'We don't want our children to be beaten up by 
the police from outside Kosovo', 'Republic, Constitution, by agreement or by force', etc. But, the 
additional police force with full authority (from federal, republican and provincial institutions) 
to react immediately and resolutely, prevented these and further demonstrations in Kosovo. 
The situation was finally under police control. But it was only tire beginning of the deep state- 
crisis in Yugoslavia, one that would lead to its dissolution.
5.2.3. The Reaction of the Elite
We are here, however, interested not in the demonstrations as such, but in the reaction of the 
political elites, and the consequences of their interpretation of events for further political events 
in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leaders, as they publicly admitted, were surprised by what 
happened.32 The federal institutions relied on the reports by the leadership of the Province, 
which simply painted the situation in the Province in bright colours.33 When the 
demonstrations occurred in 1981, both the Federal leadership and that of Serbia claimed that 
they had no independent access to the real situation in the Province. W hat surprised them most 
was the extent of the violence used by the demonstrators and the relatively large participation. 
The panic reaction of the Yugoslav leadership (which declared 'a  state emergency7 in the 
Province and sent the armed forces to crush the demonstrations, as well as launching an 
overwhelming campaign to condemn and prosecute demonstrators) was a consequence of 
this.34
Tito visited Kosovo in 1979 in his last major visit to any republic/province before his death. 
This is how Dusan Dragosavac, then the Secretary of the LCY Central Committee, describes 
Tito's impressions, in the interview I conducted with him in April 1998:
3 2  Dusan Dragosavac in the interview in April 1998.
33 In the interview I conducted for Polet in January 1986, Sergej Kraigher (Slovenia) who was Vice-President of the 
Yugoslav State Presidency at the time of the Kosovo demonstrations, said that the leaders were suprised because the 
previous reports did not indicate any problems, apart from economic ones, in Kosovo. This part of my interview is 
quoted in Misovic (1987:445).
34 In the interview I conducted in February 1998, one of the leading Belgrade dissidents at that time, Lazar Stojanovic 
recalled that the regime had tolerated many petitions they had organised, but not the one on Kosovo. The petition 
protested against the police repression in Kosovo and was signed by 113 students from Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade. 
Solidarity between students threatened to undermine the rhetoric of the regime that the demonstrations were 
nationalistic.
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'I travelled in the same car with Tito, which enabled me to observe his reaction. He was 
most fascinated by what we saw. There were thousands and thousands of flags of all 
types: Albanian, Serbian, Yugoslav, Party, even Turkish, etc. He was also impressed 
with the folk customs, the well built villages and the young girls in jeans. At one 
moment, he told me: 'You see, here - it was absolutely impossible to see young girls 
without a (Muslim) veil immediately after the war, and now - they wear jeans!' Then 
we met a young couple, just married: they brought flowers to the monument of Boro 
and Ramiz.35 All this impressed him very much... He was also pleased to hear an 
Albanian, the party secretary in Pristina address him in very good, entirely fluent 
Serbian.'36
Despite this idyllic reception in Kosovo, Tito was informed about the findings of the Party
special Commission on the nationality question, chaired by Dusan Dragosavac. The
Commission was created in 1978, and presented its report in 1979.
'The main conclusion was that there were no major inter-ethnic problems in 
Yugoslavia, except as regards two ethnic groups: the Romanies and the Albanians.... 
We had concluded that the Albanians had developed to a level at which their 
aspirations rose higher than the opportunities we could offer. This had created 
economic and potentially political problems, which we did not know how to deal 
w ith /37
Tito 'was surprised' at this finding, but used his visit to warn once again about the necessity to 
preserve a good relationship between Serbs and Albanians, and invited other Republics to help 
speed up the development of Kosovo.38
The Kosovo events were the first sign of public discontent with the Constitution of Yugoslavia 
after 1974. It was particularly unpleasant since it happened less than a year after Tito's death, 
had a relatively mass character and may have had an international dimension.39 In many 
respects, it reminded the Yugoslav leadership of the 1968 demonstrations in Belgrade and those 
of 1971 in Zagreb. Having still fresh in their minds the memory of Tito's swift reaction on both 
occasions, they did not want to fall short of the Titoist formula.
35 Boro (Vukmirovic) and Ramiz (Sadiku), Serb and Albanian partisans, were war heroes shot together by the Italians in 
1942. In post-war Yugoslavia they symbolised 'brotherhood and unity' among Serbs and Albanians.
36 One should here remember what Draza Markovic wrote about Tito's visit to Kosovo in 1975 - that the Kosovo 
leadership deliberately wanted to demonstrate the direct link between them and Tito (which was like, not only 
symbolically, that between Kosovo and Yugoslavia), and that for this reason they exaggerated the formality and 
warmth of his reception. Also, this all happened after Tito's 1977 visit to Beijing and Pnom Pen, after which the 
Yugoslavs wanted to repeat the grandeur of the Chinese and Korean receptions. Finally, Tito was 87 and everyone 
knew how much he enjoyed such events.
37 Interview with Dragosavac, April 1998.
38 Which they, actually, did. Due to increased federal assistance, Kosovo reached 38.9% of the Yugoslav average GDP in 
1981 (from 33.8% in 1963), only to fall to 28.2% in die year following the demonstrations (1982). See table 1 in Chapter 
Four.
39 A very good overview of the Kosovo events, togedier widi die necessary background information may be found in 
RFE/RL Reports and Analyses of 7 April 1981 and 28 April 1981.
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But, in as much as the demonstrations were a serious threat to the stability of the regime, they 
proved to be a perfect opportunity to launch a new campaign for structural changes in the 
Yugoslav political system. In this context one should understand why the various groups 
within the elite did not attempt to remove the event from the agenda as soon as possible, but - 
on the contrary - even blew it up out of all proportion, taking into account that it was 
successfully crushed by the police, and that neither in its real size (it was localised and with a 
limited number of victims) nor in its results did it deserve to be given such attention. In the 
debate that followed, the Kosovo crisis proved to be the perfect case to be exploited by: 1) the 
Serbian leadership - which argued that this was a necessary and unavoidable consequence of 
the overall disintegration of the country and of the rejection of the 1977 'Blue Book' initiative; 2) 
the Yugoslav leaders - who argued that Yugoslavia was endangered and that the real threat 
came - as Kardelj wrote - from 'dogmatist' and 'state socialist' forces; 3) the new leaders in 
Kosovo40 - who manipulated them in order to show that their predecessors were incompetent;
4) the 'Belgrade critical intelligentsia', who used it to revive Cosic's and Rankovic's position on 
Kosovo; 5) the Albanian nationalists themselves, who argued that they had much stronger 
support among the Albanians than was really the case. Later in this Chapter, I will map out the 
official discourses of the first three groups -  the Yugoslav, Serbian and Kosovo political elite, 
while in the next two Chapters I will analyse the reaction of various groups in opposition to the 
regime, following the protests in Kosovo. I argue that the same ideological commitment, which 
prevented the Yugoslav leaders from changing the obviously inefficient economic system, now 
caused the stalemate in their action on the Kosovo issue. It was their commitment to Kardelj's 
'constitutive concept' that motivated their actions.
5.2.3.I. Discourse One: The Federal Political Elite's Reaction to the Kosovo Protests of 1981
Among the Yugoslav leaders some differences occurred over the relative importance of the 
various causes of the crisis.41 But, the majority of them agreed on four points, which then 
became the mainstream interpretation of the Kosovo events by the Yugoslav political leaders in 
the first half of the 1980s, only to be changed with Milosevic's rise to power in 1987.
Firstly, the demonstrations were an expression of class struggle (Bakalli, 1981:45) and they 
constituted a counter-revolution (Vlaskalic, 1981:90, Krunic: 1981:130). As a counter-revolution, 
they were 'directed against all nations and nationalities in Kosovo' (Vlaskalic, 1981:90), which,
40 Immediately after the demonstrations, the Party President of Kosovo Mahmut Bakalli, and the Kosovo President 
Xhavid Nimani resigned. In the 1990s, Bakalli re-appeared in politics, as one of the chief leaders of the Titoists', the 
'moderate' faction of the Albanian movement in Kosovo.
41 The conflict was over the extent to which external factors played a role in this crisis. Also, the Slovenian and Croatian 
leaders emphasised 'the crisis of self-management' and economic crisis while the Serbian leaders saw the main problem 
in the 'unregulated relations between Serbia and its provinces'.
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therefore, should act together in order to defeat it. They did not constitute a conflict between 
the nations in Kosovo, but between the minority of discontented nationalists and the large 
majority of Albanians and Serbs who remained supportive of the Yugoslav system. As a hostile 
act, the demonstrations did not and could not succeed in involving the masses of any nation or 
nationality, including the Albanians in Kosovo. On the contrary, 'they have nothing in common 
with the real attitudes of the large majority of working people and citizens of Kosovo, with the 
interests of Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins and members of other nations in SAP Kosovo' 
(Presidency SFRY and CC LCY, 1981:20). W hat is more, the 'enemies and their demonstrations 
have failed to weaken the unity, brotherhood, togetherness and mutual respect between all 
nations and nationalities of Kosovo, for which one should thank the maturity and 
consciousness of the Albanian nationality... and its activity against Albanian nationalism within 
its own nation' (Nimani, 1981:22).42 This is only confirmed by the fact that the Albanian leaders 
from Kosovo unanimously condemned the demonstrations, arguing in favour of Yugoslav 
unity. They really did not differ in this respect from their Serbian colleagues - on the contrary, 
following the Communist logic that Communists should fight against nationalism in their own 
nation, the Albanian Communists led this campaign.
Secondly, the main cause of unrest was alleged to be 'bureaucratic statism1, which was much 
stronger in Kosovo than anywhere else in the country. Speaking about this, the President of the 
Serbian Central Committee, Tihomir Vlaskalic, said that 'socio-economic development in 
Kosovo was to a very large extent linked to the 'political factor'... which created conditions in 
which statism and bureaucratic consciousness were growing, while self-managerial practice 
was under-developed' (Vlaskalic, 1981:91, 94-5). Offering a highly ideological interpretation of 
the causes of the discontent, Vlaskalic, said that workers (and people in general) felt powerless 
to decide upon the results of their work. The development of self-management was, therefore, 
seen as the main condition for resolving the problem (Vlaskalic, 1981:94).
Thirdly, the discontent was also inspired by economic factors. This point was emphasised by 
non-Serbian members of the Yugoslav political elite. In the words of the Macedonian 
representative on the Federal Presidency, Lazar Kolisevski, the unrealistic ambitions of the 
Kosovo leaders had contributed to this problem (Kolisevski, 1981:67). This was especially the 
case regarding the University, which had been developed against the real needs of Kosovo 
industry (Shukrija, 1981:72; Kolisevski, 1981:68). Such economic unrealism became a heavy
42 This attitude was later criticised by Serbian nationalists as tine main illustration of the blindness of the Yugoslav 
political leaders and their failure to see and admit the reality in Kosovo. But, apart from its heavy ideological bias, it 
was correct: the demonstrations were not massive enough to be treated as an all-Albanian riot in Kosovo, nor did they 
have (at least originally) predominantly nationalistic demands. Also, the political leadership in Kosovo did not split on 
national lines when opposing the demands for a Republic. Hie Albanian leaders, with very few exceptions, stood firmly 
against the demonstrations. In fact, up until the very end of Yugoslavia (until Spring 1990) the main Albanian leaders 
(such as Vllasi, Kolgeci, Jashari, Shiroka, etc.) distanced themselves from the 1981 protests, treating them as 
'nationalistic1 and 'counter-revolutionary1.
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burden on the economy and the main source of discontent among the young, educated but 
unemployed people in the province.43 The President of the Slovene Central Committee, France 
Popit, concluded that 'economic nationalism' was the main cause of the Kosovo demonstrations 
(1981:126). Bosko Siljegovic (Serbia) went a step further, arguing that 'economic nationalism' 
would be much harder to beat than 'ideological' nationalism (1981:133). 'We alone have created 
the economic basis for our own nationalisms/ Siljegovic said. Lazar Kolisevski came to the 
same conclusion: the economic closure of the Yugoslav republics and provinces not only led to 
economic nationalism, but it prevented the development of a united Yugoslav working class 
(Kolisevski, 1981:66). This all went against Kardelj's idea of the integration of Yugoslavia 
through the association of free producers. Economic disintegration was, therefore, seen as the 
major cause of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo.
Fourthly, the influence from abroad (mostly from the neighbouring and Communist Albania of 
Enver Hoxha) was declared to be another important element. At first, the Yugoslav leaders 
hesitated to accuse Albania of encouraging demonstrations in Kosovo (Dolanc, 1981:35). But, on 
8 April 1981, Zeri i Popullit, the main Albanian daily from Tirana, published a commentary on 
the Kosovo events, in which Yugoslavia was criticised for using police force against the 
demonstrators. The Albanian daily saw in the police intervention a 're-appearance of the old 
spirit of the Karadjordjevics and the shadow of Rankovic', and warned Belgrade that it 'should 
not have happened that Serbian militia, armed to the teeth, surrounded Kosovo cities...' 
(1981:40-1). Zeri i Popullit called Kosovo students 'brave' and reminded Yugoslavia that 'the 
Albanian population - living as a compact unit on a compact territory - was divided between 
three republics of the Yugoslav federation', and that 'in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Kosovo and 
wherever Albanians live, a Muslim nationality has been created. It has been said that the 
Muslim nationality was a specificity of Yugoslavia/ Zeri i Popullit said, arguing that the 
'Muslim nationality' was invented only to reduce the number of Albanians living in these three 
republics. The article invited Belgrade to respect 'democratic freedoms and political rights', 
which met with a strong response in a commentary published by Politika the next day: 'A  
regime known as a bunker of ultra-Stalinist dogmatism and despotism, known for its police 
terror against its own citizens, in which the regime has not succeeded in attaining even a similar 
level of development to that of Kosovo, has tried to present itself as a 'defender of hum an 
rights', 'democracy and freedom', wrote Politika, presenting figures and facts about Kosovo's 
rapid development. Pristina's daily in the Albanian language Rilindja also criticised Tirana for 
the commentary in a Zeri i Popullit (1981:42-4). The polemics continued on 17 May 1981, when
43 The President of the Yugoslav Party Presidency, the Macedonian Lazar Mojsov, mentioned a tendency to dramatise 
about the real level of under-development in Kosovo. Kosovo, said Mojsov, really was the least developed Yugoslav 
region, but its leaders endlessly repeated this fact in order to secure more investments for the province. At the same 
time, however, positive economic results in the province were neglected (Mojsov, 1981:118). Another Macedonian 
member of the Central Committee of the LCY - Vaska Duganova - said that there could be no ‘European development 
with an Asiatic birth rate1 (1981:137), alluding to the Kosovo Albanians, whose birth rate was the highest in Europe.
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an unsigned long article was published in Zeri i Popullit, entitled 'The status of a republic for 
Kosova is a just demand7.44 'Kosova seeks the status of a Republic within the Yugoslav 
Federation. This status represents the aspiration of a great people, who rightly demand the 
'status of sovereignty' and not that of a 'national minority', which it was unjustly allocated at 
Jajce45... The Albanian official daily then reminded the Serbian leaders (especially Petar 
Stambolic, whom  they called an 'incorrigible Great-Serb') that the Albanians are 'one ethnic 
entity, one people'. Repeating the arguments of the Albanian intellectuals of 1968, Zeri i 
Popullit said:
'There are two Germanies, one in the East and one in the West, just as there are two
Koreas, one North and one South. However, nobody doubts that there is a single
German people and nation, just as there is a single Korean people and nation' (ZP:
1981:52).
Naturally, this stand by the Tirana daily encouraged the conclusion that the demonstrations in 
Kosovo were organised and supported by the most rigid Stalinist regime of the time. At the 
Session of the Central Committee of the LCY on 6 May 1981 the President of the Serbian 
Presidency Dobrivoje Vidic accused Enver Hoxha of inspiring the riot in his speech of 8 
November 1978, in which he said that 'Albanians in Yugoslavia were more numerous than two 
Yugoslav republics together, that they were one nation, which was deliberately divided 
between two republics and one province and that the Albanians in Yugoslavia had no 
Constitutional rights'(1981:125). Macedonian Lazar Mojsov mentioned the clandestine activities 
of 'Albanian spies' as the main cause of the events (1981:121). Some Yugoslav party leaders 
admitted their surprise over the fact that an ideology and system such as the Albanian 
Stalinism of Enver Hoxha could have attracted any support among Kosovo Albanians, whose 
level of freedom and of economic wealth was significantly higher than those of the Albanians in 
Albania. But, to Milos Minic (one of the leading 'Kardeljists' in the Serbian and Yugoslav 
political elite) this was just a confirmation of how right Kardelj was w hen he claimed that 
Stalinism was a much more realistic (and, therefore, more dangerous) alternative than 
liberalism in Yugoslavia (Minic, 1981:140; Kolisevski, 1981:66). The Yugoslav leaders used this 
opportunity to re-affirm another postulate of their rhetoric: that both 'ultra-left' and 'ultra-right' 
forces were hostile to self-management. The Albanian Party of Labour (and - naturally - the 
Albanian demonstrators in Kosovo) was a force which united two such concepts: Stalinism as 
ultra-left and nationalism as ultra-right (Hasani, 1981:75). An additional illustration of this left- 
right co-operation against Yugoslav self-management was found in the political composition of 
the Kosovo emigres who supported the demonstrations: 'the Balists' (Albanian wartime
44 The article was then published as a book with the same title. It is widely believed that the Albanian Prime Minister 
Mehmet Shehu was the author of this article.
45 Jajce is a town in central Bosnia where the Second Convention of AVNOJ was held on 29 November 1943 - the symbol 
of Communist Yugoslavia.
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Quislings) and the Cominformists (post-war pro-Stalinists) were acting together (Dolanc, 
1981:31). Paradoxically/ Yugoslav leaders succeeded in presenting the Kosovo events as perfect 
evidence of how far-sighted the LCY analysis was.46
5.2.3.2. Discourse Two: The Serbian Political Elite's Reaction to the Kosovo Protests of 1981
While most Yugoslav politicians agreed with these three main points, the differences became 
unbridgeable on the fifth potential cause of the Kosovo event, which Serbian leaders suggested 
as the most important - relations within Serbia. Serbian leaders argued that the '1978 
compromise' on the Blue Book was the major reason for the emergence of the 1981 Kosovo 
crisis. The Serbian position was formulated at the Session of the Central Committee of the LC 
Serbia on 6 May 1981 to be elaborated at the November 1981 and December 1984 sessions held 
on the Kosovo situation.
Serbian leaders used the 1981 demonstrations to re-launch a campaign for changes in the 
relations between the Republic and provinces, which had been abruptly stopped by Tito in 
1978. Dragoslav Markovic, the leading author of the 'Blue Book' of 1977, now appeared as the 
sharpest critic of the Yugoslav refusal to confront the policy of the political closure in both 
provinces. The events in Kosovo, Markovic argued, were the result of a policy which was not to 
be attributed only to Kosovo, but to Vojvodina and to the Yugoslav republics in general 
(1981:99). He reminded members of the CC that equality of status between Serbia and its 
provinces was 'clearly anti-constitutional'. The illusion that this could change, and that 
provinces could become equal to republics, was the main reason for dissatisfaction in Kosovo. 
Talking about Kosovo, but thinking also about Vojvodina, he said that 'Kosovo has its own 
republic, and that is Serbia.'
'The disintegration of Serbia would be only the first step towards the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia... The unresolved issue of the Constitutional structuring of Serbia is today 
the only real social, the only socio-economic and socio-political root of Serbian 
nationalism which has not yet been cut', said Markovic (1981:103).
Opening up (for the first time since Cosic's debate in 1968) the issue of the exodus of the 
Kosovo Serbs in the past 20 years, Markovic warned members of the Serbian Central 
Committee that they should not bear any sense of 'guilt', when they raised their voices against 
such a tragedy.
'It is not a natural matter that the ethnic composition of those who left Kosovo is such
46 However, one member of the Yugoslav Central Committee, Slovene Joze Smole, disagreed on this issue, saying that 
the international dimension was over-emphasised. Even if it existed, Smole said, it could not have been successful 
without domestic support (Smole, 1981:143).
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that the majority of them were Serbs and Montenegrins/ he said.
Markovic concluded his speech quoting from Tito's speech in Zagreb in May 1945. Tito then 
said:
'M any still do not understand what Federative Yugoslavia means... It does not mean 
drawing a borderline between this and that federal unit, so that behind it they can do 
whatever they want or can, and I am here going to do w hat I can do. No! These 
borders, to make a comparison, ought to be like the white bands on one marble pillar. 
The borders of the federal republics in Federal Yugoslavia are not borders of division, 
they are borders of unification' (Tito, quoted by Markovic, 1981:101).
Markovic's speech met with support from three other leading Serbian politicians: Spiro Galovic, 
Petar Stambolic and Ivan Stambolic.47 These four politicians, two of whom (P. Stambolic and 
Markovic) were of an older and two (Galovic and I. Stambolic) of a younger generation 
formulated the Serbian discourse on the Kosovo crisis in 1981 and on the relationship between 
Serbia and its provinces between 1981 and 1984.48
The main elements of the Serbian discourse on Kosovo were:
1. Economic crisis, Kosovo and its relationship to Serbia are indicators and the outcome 
of the same problem - disintegration in Yugoslavia. Therefore, they should be treated at one 
and at the same time.
2. The disintegration is a result of misinterpretation of the Constitution (Stambolic, 
1981/1988:61) and of its obstruction by bureaucratic statism. Nationalism is an anti-self- 
management action tolerated, supported and even directly organised by bureaucratic state 
structures throughout the country. In Serbia, this bureaucratic statism had its base in 
'autonom ism ' in Vojvodina and 'separatism1 in Kosovo. Although the bureaucrats based their 
legitimacy on their endless attacks on 'enemies', they left the issue of their own responsibility 
for the political and economic crisis untouched (Galovic, 1989:80).49
47 Markovic was in 1981 President of tine Yugoslav Assembly. In 1982 he was elected a member of the Yugoslav Party 
Presidency, in which he held the post of President in 1983-84. In 1986 he retired in protest against the election of 
Slobodan Milosevic as President of the Serbian LC CC. Petar Stambolic was the Serbian representative in the Yugoslav 
Presidency (1974-1984), where he was Vice-President (1981-1982) and President (1982-1983). Ivan Stambolic, his 
nephew, was President of the Executive Council of Serbia (Serbian Prime Minister) in 1978-1982, President of the 
Belgrade Party Organisation in 1982-1984, President of the Serbian LC Central Committee (1984-1986) and President of 
the Presidency of Serbia (1986-1987) before he was forced to resign following his conflict with Slobodan Milosevic and 
the majority of the Serbian CC. Finally, Spiro Galovic was a member of the Presidency of the Serbian Centred 
Committee in charge of ideology (1978-1982) and its secretary (1982-1984). All four politicians, just like almost all other 
members of their political generation, have been sharp critics of Slobodan Milosevic, at least since 1988.
48 By 1984,1. Stambolic had succeeded in decreasing the influence of his three colleagues and promoting himself to be 
the new leader of Serbia. In Slobodan Milosevic (and, to some extent, in Dragisa Pavlovic) he found his closest support
49 The rhetoric against 'statists' and 'bureaucrats' was Kardeljist.
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3. Self-management remains the main ideological postulate, one which should not be 
abandoned. It was once again treated as 'the basis of democratic solutions of the national 
question' in Yugoslavia (Galovic, 1981/1989:130), and as the pre-condition for the resolution of 
the economic crisis (Stambolic, 1981/1988:50). The society of the future should be an integrated 
self-managing community of people (Stambolic, 1983/1988:63). But, in as much as self­
management was to be developed as a substitute for statism, Stambolic clearly objected to 
'illusions' that the state itself was an enemy of self-management and to its being equated with 
'statism ' (1984/1988:90). The 'autonomists' were protecting state functions where they were not 
necessary and obstructing them when they needed to be protected or developed.
4. Just as the state should not be equated with 'statism ', so unity should not be treated 
as 'centralism '. There is only one working class in Yugoslavia, and it should be united. The 
(Vladimir Bakaric's) idea of 'national economies' had been accepted without serious thought 
about the consequences. It led to nationalism (Stambolic, 1981/1988:23).
5. Serbian Communists continued to oppose any re-centralisation (Galovic, 
1981/1989:130), but centralism, they argued, was not a realistic danger in present 
circumstances. The federal state was so weak that it could not, even if it wanted, encourage or 
support any idea of renewal of centralism in Yugoslavia (Galovic, 1981/1989:81). On the other 
hand, the 'de-centralised statism' in the republics and provinces was a real danger. This, it 
should be noted, was a departure from Kardelj's beliefs that Yugoslavia could be endangered 
by centralisation and not by disintegration.
6. 'Particularism' and 'autarkism ' were developed not only in Kosovo, but as a general 
trend in Yugoslavia. 'W ithout other particularism in Yugoslavia, there would be no Kosovo 
particularism' (Galovic, 1981/1989:36). On the issue of autonomy, the two Serbian provinces 
shared thoughts and practice (Stambolic, 1981/1988:57). Particularism led the country to the 
brink of dissolution. Unrealistic investment was the result of 'everybody's closing in on 
themselves and trying to structure their industry as if Yugoslavia would disintegrate at any 
moment' (Galovic, 1981/1989:37). Such a policy simply did not count with Yugoslavia any 
longer. By doing this, 'subjective forces' (including the Party) 'expressed their concerns with the 
interests of their own nation to such an extent and in such a manner that it became difficult to 
distinguish them from nationalist rhetoric' (Galovic, 1981/1989:38). This tendency m ust be 
stopped. If not, then 'Communists would, whether they wanted to or not, find themselves in 
conflict with one another on a nationalist basis, in a dispute in which their arguments and 
rhetoric would not differ much from those in a bourgeois society' (Galovic, 1981/1989:38). The 
slogan 'Kosovo-Republic' in fact meant 'Province = Republic' and this is w hat should not be 
tolerated (Stambolic, 1981/1988:62). Action should be therefore taken not only against the
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current Kosovo leadership, but against all other 'autonomists' and 'particularists' in the 
country.
7. With regard to Serbian nationalism, Serbian Communists concluded that they would 
not change their position. In their opposition to Serbian nationalism they could not be mistaken, 
even when acting too eagerly (Stambolic, 1981/1988:22). But, nationalism could be defeated 
only at its 'root7, and, as Markovic said, ' the only still uncut root of Serbian nationalism was in 
the undefined relations in Serbia'. If the problems in Kosovo were not resolved, Petar Stambolic 
said, Serbian Communists would face 'a  serious task in fighting Serbian nationalism' (Report, 
1981:128). Verbal opposition to nationalist books, plays and pamphlets should be only a part of 
the public action against nationalism. It was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for its 
defeat. By emphasising only its 'verbal side', Communists spent too much energy fighting 
nationalism in an inefficient way: they did not attack 'the main reasons for its appearance, 
which could be found only in bureaucratic statism' (Galovic, 1981/1989:56,68). The focus of 
anti-nationalist activities should, therefore, be shifted to real problems. Instead of being 
'socialist apostles', Communists should eliminate the real generators of nationalism. 'Criticism 
of autarky would miss the target if it did not aim at what 'legimitises' the autarky' (Galovic, 
1981/1989:59).
8. It is true that every nationalism is dangerous and should meet with sincere and 
strong opposition (Galovic, 1981/1989:132), primarily by the Communists in the nation in 
which it appears. But, not all nationalisms are equally dangerous at the same time. At this 
moment, the most dangerous is Albanian nationalism, since this is the one which is active. The 
danger of Albanian nationalism is still neglected. By talking about nationalism in abstracto, one 
could even encourage the really active nationalists.
9. No one in Yugoslavia has reason to fear a 'strong and united Serbia'. A strong and 
united Serbia is a pre-condition, and not a hindrance for a strong and united Yugoslavia. The 
idea that a 'weak Serbia' means a 'strong Yugoslavia' was damaging and should be abandoned 
(Kolisevski, 1981:67).
10. The debate on the relationship between Serbia and its provinces in 1977 -  1978 was 
based on a wrong assessment of the situation, and Communists should 'be brave enough to 
admit it7.50 Ignoring the facts and warnings expressed in this debate (mostly in the 'Blue Book') 
resulted in the 'surprise' at the 1981 events in Kosovo (Stambolic, 1981/1988:56).
50 Interestingly, Joze Smole, a Slovenian member of the Yugoslav Central Committee, also said that, unfortunately, the 
problems had not been resolved in 1977. In 1989 Smole became one of the Slovenian politicians most criticised by the 
Serbian 'anti-bureaucratic revolution'.
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11. In general, Communists should not be 'hostages' of their own regulations and laws. 
'De-Kardeljisation' would not occur as a consequence of changes, but from a refusal to change 
laws, which caused inefficiency and disintegration. When Serbian Communists did not 
propose changes in the Constitution, they started criticising the Associated Labour Act. It was 
true, Galovic said, that the ALA had not been fully implemented, but one should ask why this 
was the case (1981/1989:134). 'In a normative sense, we have been too optimistic... In regard to 
some provisions, we need to start from the beginning/ Stambolic argued in 1983 (1988:72). The 
interests of the working class were still at the focus of Communist rhetoric. But, to the Serbian 
Communists, it had become clear that anything that went against the efficiency and unity of the 
working class, went against its interests (Stambolic, 1983/1988:79).
12. Finally, the Stabilization Programme (Kraigher's Programme) was seen as a good 
first step towards economic reforms. It was welcomed for four reasons: a) it was an example of 
a modus operandi between politicians and experts; b) it proved that co-operation on the Yugoslav 
level was not only possible, but much easier among experts than among 'bureaucratic elites'; c) 
it demanded a radical reversal of the disintegration of the economy; and d) it recognised that 
Serbia was economically lagging behind the other republics (Stambolic, 1984/1989:89). But this 
Programme met with strong political resistance from 'statists' and was, therefore, facing failure. 
Economic reform was, therefore, impossible as long as political issues had not been debated 
(Galovic, 1984/1989:60). Political reform was the pre-condition for the resolution of both the 
Kosovo and the economic crisis in the country.
By arguing in favour of political reforms and for changes in political practice, Serbian 
communists now became the leading 'reformers' within the Yugoslav political elite. Their 
demand for reforms (for which they were soon named 'reformers of the Constitution' -  ustavo- 
reformatori, by their opponents, the 'defenders of the Constitution' -  ustavobranitelji)51 pushed 
them into conflict with the most loyal Kardeljists in other republics (especially in Slovenia) and 
in both Serbian provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina).
5.2.3.3. The Discourse Three: the Provinces
The main position of the provinces (formulated mostly by Vojvodina, which took over the role 
of the mouthpiece for the weakened Kosovo)52 can be summarised in the following four points:
51 The term ustavobranitelji has a historical connotation - it was used to mark progressive (pro-constitutional, liberal) 
forces in Serbian politics in the mid-19lh century. One needs to notice here that to 'defend the Constitution' now became 
a position deserving political denunciation in Serbian political glossary.
52 The leading 'autonomists' and 'defenders of tine Constitution' within tine leadership of Vojvodina were Serbs -  DuSan 
Popovic, the ideologue of the Provincial Committee, and Bosko Krunic, the President of the Provincial Committee of the 
LC Vojvodina. This fact only confirms our conclusion that political divisions were not at that time primarily motivated 
by ethnic issues, nor were they structured along ethnic lines. To a similar extent as with the economic debate, they cut 
across lines of ethnic groups, and even republican borders.
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1. The core of the problem was in undeveloped self-management and not in the 
relationship between 'socio-political communities'. Integration in Yugoslavia could be 
successful only as an association of free producers, and not as 'statist integration'. The national 
question and self-management were inseparable processes. Any attempt to deny this would be 
a 'dim inution of workers' rights to decide on their surplus value' (Popovic, 1982:88). Any 
attem pt by 'certain republican leaderships in the League of Communists' to bring the national 
relationship back to the pre-Constitutional situation... would result in a conflict with the current 
level of the development of self-management' (Popovic, 1982:89). This would be an 
'unhistorical direction'.
2. Self-management and the decentralisation of state structure are major achievements 
of the Yugoslav Communist movement, and as such they should not be abandoned (Popovic, 
1982:86). Provinces were not 'gifts' or inventions by Tito and Kardelj, but expressions of the 
perm anent efforts of the CPY/LCY to resolve the national question in Yugoslavia. Apart from 
ethnic considerations, there were also historical reasons for their existence. Vojvodina and 
Kosovo decided to join the Republic of Serbia as separate units in 1945. In the case of 
Vojvodina, its status within the party structure was until 1945 equal to that of Serbia. The 
autonomy of the provinces was guaranteed immediately after the war and is, therefore, a non- 
changeable element of Yugoslav federalism.53 What happened in the 1967-1974 period was only 
a further development of their autonomy as a consequence of the de-centralisation of 
Yugoslavia, and not an action against Serbia or anyone else.
3. The events in Kosovo were being used to promote the re-centralisation of Yugoslavia. 
Serbian nationalism was gaining strength, especially in the media and cultural institutions. 
'The outburst of Albanian nationalism in Kosovo has revived all other nationalisms in 
Yugoslavia as a whole, and especially Greater Serbian nationalism/ said Dusan Popovic.54 The 
main idea of this nationalism was that all autonomous provinces should be abolished. The 
Serbian leaders had not been sufficiently aware of this danger.
4. By opening up a constitutional debate in such a form, the Serbian Communists did 
not help the real fight against Albanian nationalism. On the contrary, it was impossible to beat 
the Albanian separatists if the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina decreased.
53 The leading Vojvodina Communist Bosko Krunic said at the CC LCY Session on 7 May 1981 that the provinces had 
decided to 'enter the Socialist Republic of Serbia' of their own free will. Autonomy was not given to them, it was the 
'result of our correct policy on the nationality issue'(1981:130-1).
54 For Popovic's discussion at the 22nJ Session of the LCY Central Committee see: RFE/RL, 17 November 1981.
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wThe provinces, therefore, insisted that no significant changes in the 1974 Constitution were 
necessary and that no 'return to statism' should be allowed. They argued that the 'class 
dimension' of the problem was not understood in Serbia (Krunic, 1981:130). The Communists 
from Vojvodina also opposed the 'soft approach' towards liberal intellectuals in Belgrade, 
arguing that they were in fact Serbian nationalists.55 They rejected the notion that Serbian 
nationalism was weaker than Albanian nationalism, even at this particular moment, 
immediately after 1981. If the Serbian leaders, they argued, showed any sign of abandonment of 
the Kardeljist concept of socialism, and especially his concept of the national question, they 
would come close to the Serbian nationalist opposition. The Communists of Vojvodina - 
especially the Serbs among them - believed that it was their duty to warn about this possibility. 
In the early 1980s, they, therefore, became the most conservative part of the League of 
Communists, one that distinguished itself by its anti-democratic conservatism and by fighting 
'nationalism' wherever any sign of anti-Communism appeared. 56
5.2.3.4. The Position of Slovenia and Croatia: the 'Defenders of the Constitution'
The other Yugoslav republics, still hesitating to change anything in the economic and especially 
in the political system, now found in the Vojvodina Communists an excellent ally. Their 
opposition to growing Serbian demands for changes now could not be dismissed as the result 
of their 'anti-Serbian prejudice', since the Vojvodina Serbs themselves (as well as the Croatian 
and Bosnian Serbs among the Communist leaders) became the most stubborn opponents of the 
Serbian leadership.57 By restricting their action to support of their colleagues in Vojvodina, the 
Slovene, Bosnian, most of the Croatian and some of the Macedonian and Montenegrin members 
of the Central Committee tried to avoid direct involvement in the sensitive issue of 
relationships within Serbia. They insisted that Kosovo was primarily a Serbian issue, for which 
reason the issue of Kosovo was not on the agenda of any federal forum between 1981 and 1985. 
But, just like Tito in 1978, the federal leaders from the republics other than Serbia showed more 
understanding for Krunic's 'self-management' ('class') argument than for Markovic's 'statist' 
('nationalist') views (Slovene Smole, Macedonian Gligorov and Bosnian Mikulic). They still
55 A good example of this rhetoric is given in Dusan Popovic's interview to Polet, 15 March 1985.
56 One can here perhaps recall Warren Zimmermann1 s much later warning about the inaccuracy of equating 
decentralization and democratization. The last US Ambassador to socialist Yugoslavia wrote: 'In one of my first cables I 
cautioned Washington not to equate decentralization with democracy or centralism with authoritarianism. Those 
equations might have described the Soviet Union, a ruthless dictatorship from the center. But they didn't describe 
Yugoslavia' (1996/1999:17).
57 The most illustrative documents on how different were the views of the Serbian leaders and Serbs in the leadership of 
other Yugoslav republics, are letters exchanged between the Serbian representative in the SFRY Presidency Petar 
Stambolic and the Croatian representative in the LCY Presidency, Dusan Dragosavac (a Serb from Croatia). Stambolic 
and Dragosavac had been in permanent disagreement on the status of the provinces and the rights of 'nationalities' (as 
Dragosavac called them) or 'national minorities' (the word Stambolic used). (See - Dragosavac to Stambolic 20 June 1983 
and Stambolic to Dragosavac 27 June 1983; copies of the documents in my possession.)
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insisted on the Kardeljist view that if anything could really endanger Yugoslavia, it was not 
separatism but centralism and Serbian nationalism.58
The Slovenes, and many others in the Yugoslav political elite, believed that the Serbs were 
using the Kosovo events to promote their demand for changes, for which reason they 
exaggerated the proportions of the Kosovo crisis. The leading Croatian Kardeljist Stipe Suvar 
warned his Serbian colleagues that a too rigid stand towards the Kosovo Albanians following 
the riots might worsen the situation in the country as a whole, since it would 'brand a great 
num ber of people (as traitors), that is, future lifelong opponents and unjustified 'national 
heroes'/ Suvar was probably speaking for the majority of Yugoslav politicians when he said 
that 'other Yugoslav nationalities also had their own 'greater state' nationalism', not only the 
Albanians.59 The solution, said Suvar, 'was not to consider Yugoslavia a sum of states but rather 
as a num ber of self-managed associations of people, working people, and citizens'. The Slovene 
Party leader Mitja Ribicic also criticised the 'draconian' approach shown in the long prison 
sentence given to the 'Kosovo teenagers' for having demanded a 'Kosovo Republic'. In his 
interview to the Zagreb daily Vjesnik (19 September 1981), Ribicic argued that Kosovo was an 
economic, political and self-management problem 'rather than a problem to be dealt with by 
courts and prosecuting attorneys'.60 For him, the main problem was 'the functioning of the self­
management system in Serbia, that is, things taking place outside this system'. He also used this 
opportunity to conclude that 'some people in Yugoslavia would like, for the time being of 
course, to revise some features in the system, as if they would like to jump into the vacant post 
of the first theorist of the system,' replacing Kardelj in this capacity. But, Ribi£i5 said, 'nobody 
can fill his place.' Yugoslav problems, Ribicic argued, could not be resolved outside Kardelj's 
formulas.
The Kardeljists also differed from the reformers in explaining the causes of the Kosovo crisis. 
They emphasised much more the economic side, which the Serbian President Dobrivoje Vidic 
claimed 'was not a cause of the riots'. To Vidic, the main reasons lay in the nationalist intentions 
of the real organisers of the protests, in 'autarkic' tendencies in the country and in foreign 
(Albanian) interference in Yugoslav (Serbian) domestic affairs.61
The arguments of Suvar (Croatia) and Ribicic (Slovenia) were a clear indication that their two 
republics had been cautious about the Serbian reaction to the Kosovo events. The argument
58 See Popovic's and Krunic's speeches at the 26lh CC LCY Session, 1982.
59 Nin, 30 August 1981. See: RFE/RL, 17 September 1981.
W) RFE/RL, 28 September 1981.
« RFE/RL, 18 May 1981.
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over the 'economic' and 'political' causes of the events, which started in May 1981, never 
stopped until the break-up of Yugoslavia. This gap between Serbia and the others only widened 
in the decade that followed the Kosovo events. At the same time, the Slovenes insisted on their 
'conservative revolutionarism' up until late 1988. In 1982 the President of the Slovenian Central 
Committee France Popit denied that Yugoslav self-management was in a crisis. The 'difficulties' 
Yugoslavia was facing were the result of 'opportunism in the LC and a lack of readiness to fight 
those who are against this policy or this system', he argued, on the lines of the Vojvodina claims 
that anti-Communism was taking over in the Serbian League of Communists. Popit now said 
that 'party  responsibility must be tightened up,' and suggested Yugoslav Party 'intervention' in 
the Serbian Party's affairs:
'Communal party committees are responsible to the republican central committees, 
while the republican central committees and their presidiums should be responsible 
both to the LCY CC and to the CC Presidium. I have the impression that, in this respect, 
we have been behaving in an opportunistic way, starting with the LCY CC Presidium, 
which does not dare summon the party leadership of a republic for conferences because 
it believes that this would be taken as interference in the internal affairs of that 
particular republic. If it were to be said that something is not right in a republic we 
could not consider this to be meddling in other people's business.'62
Another leading Slovene, young rising star Milan Kucan, favoured the 'revolutionary' approach 
in polemics with his Serbian colleagues in the Yugoslav Central Committee.63 In October 1982 
Kucan was speaking for the majority in the Party when he said that 'the abandonment of 
Marxism turns every revolutionary party into an opportunistic and pragmatic party of the 
social-democratic type.' In reply to his 'revolutionary' statement, the Serbian Party Secretary 
Spiro Galovic - a representative of the dominant view in Serbia - was much more concerned 
with the state and its malfunctioning:
'By reducing the relationship between our nations to relations between different 
countries - which has somehow been the case with us - their democratic and socialist 
dimension would be lost.'64
62 RFE/RL. 12 October 1982.
63 DuSan Dragosavac (who was a member of the LCY Presidency together with Ku£an in 1982-1986) describes Ku£an as 
one who was 'endlessly quoting Tito and Kardelj at that time, even in very informal meetings, when this was entirely 
inappropriate and unnecessary. I think that his turn-about after 1987-88 could, to a large extent, be explained by his 
earlier hard-line position. He had to prove himself as a democrat after all' (interview with Dragosavac, 15 April 1998). 
Dragosavac believes the same could explain the behaviour of many other Slovene leaders - who (like Ribicic and 
Dolanc) entered politics from the secret police or military. Stipe Suvar, Kucan's colleague from the 1986-1990 LCY 
Presidency, says that many secret police people from Slovenia (like Dolanc) distinguished themselves in the 1966 action 
against Rankovic. Kucan was appointed President of the Slovenian Parliament in 1978, while Kardelj was still the main 
figure in Slovenian politics. In 1982 he became Slovenian representative in the federal LCY Presidency, where he 
remained until 1986. He was then elected President of the Slovenian LC CC.
64 Both quotations are taken from the RFE/RL report quoted in footnote 62.
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Kucan was, however, not persuaded by this argument. In 1984, when the Serbs demanded 
significant changes in the political system, he stated:
'It appears that from time to time we almost forget - both in society and particularly in 
the LCY - that our main goal is still the creation of a communist society. In abandoning 
this idea some people, of course, have also lost the main criterion upon which their 
behaviour and decisions should be based../.65
He also warned that these unnamed individuals could fall into the trap of putting 'everyday 
problems' before 'revolutionary goals', thereby changing the revolutionary Communist party 
into a 'pragmatic party representing social democratic principles'. With such radical 
revolutionary rhetoric, the Slovene and Croatian Communists rushed into conflict with the 
intellectual elite, not only in other republics, but in their own. By supporting the 'conservative' 
elements within the LC Serbia (which were in a minority), they gradually entered into open 
conflict with the Serbian political elite, which became for the first time visible in the aftermath 
of the 12th LCY Congress, on 29 June 1982. In the 1982-1986 period, this conflict only widened, 
including economic, inter-nationality and ideological elements.66 The old divide between 
'liberal' and 'conservative' groups within the Party was now becoming institutionalised and 
accommodated within the new division of power in Yugoslavia, becoming more and more a 
conflict between various republican leaderships. It is within this general trend that one can 
understand why the republican leaders moved to secure maximal unity amongst themselves by 
eliminating those who represented potential 'allies' of other republics and provinces in their 
own ranks. The conflict between the 'defenders of the constitution' (conservatives, mostly 
situated outside Serbia) and 'reformers of the constitution' (re-centralisers, mostly from Serbia) 
became visible already at the 12th LCY Congress, only to be deepened in the next four years, 
until Slobodan Milosevic became the President of the Serbian Party Presidency. These four years 
(1982-1986) were a period of consolidation of the dominant trends in the republican Party 
organisations by both the promotion of loyal supporters and the removal of those who opposed 
the dom inant trends. At the end of this process, 'the coincidence of political cleavages based on 
the internal divisions of the federal state and the party, and social cleavages based on 
nationality and levels of economic development' (Burg, 1983:27) would occur once again, after 
it had been suppressed by Tito and Kardelj in 1971-1972.
5.3. The First Direct Conflict: The Case of Draza Markovic (1982)
65 RFE/RL, 31 January 1984.
66 In fact, it was reminiscent of the 1967-1972 intra-elite conflict, which is described by Burg (1983).
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Two events at the 12th LCY Congress (26-29 June 1982) demonstrated how deep was the conflict 
between the 'defenders' and 'reformers' of the Constitution. Firstly, the Serbian delegate Rade 
Koncar 67 proposed an amendment to the LCY Statute, which would - if accepted - strengthen 
the 'horizontal' links within the party, helping the 'self-managing integration' of workers and 
thus introducing a balance to the 'territorial' principle of the party structure. Koncar openly 
criticised a 'dominant idea of the 1970s1 which he described in these words: 'let us break up 
everything in order to re-integrate it in a better way.' The only result of this policy was that 'we 
have disintegrated ourselves so far very efficiently without any attem pt to re-integrate again' 
(Kon£ar, quoted by Bilandzic, 1986:99).
Koncar's proposal met with a swift rejection by Branko Mikulic (Bosnia-Herzegovina), the 
chairman of the Party Commission for the Statutes, who argued that such a change w ould lead 
to the elimination of republican party organisation, and thus went against the main trend of 
Yugoslav post-war history. Mikulic's argument was greeted with standing ovations from the 
delegates, who rejected Koncar's proposal.
But the real conflict between the two factions within the party happened only a few hours later, 
at the constitutive session of the new LCY Central Committee, when the Serbian candidate for 
membership in the LCY Presidency Draza Markovic failed to secure the 2 /3  support for his 
candidacy. According to the Party Statute, each republican organisation nominated 'closed lists' 
of two candidates for the two positions in the LCY CC Presidency, while the Federal Central 
Committee was only to confirm them by secret voting. But in order to be 'confirmed1, each 
candidate needed to win a two-thirds majority support from all CC members. It had always 
been a pure formality. Until then.
Serbia nominated two senior politicians - Dobrivoje Vidic and Draza Markovic. Serbia held the 
place of the President in the LCY Presidency a year later (1983-84), and it was known that 
Markovic was its candidate for the post. Markovic's nomination met with disapproval in 
Vojvodina, but also in some other parts of the country, mostly in Croatia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. They preferred Milos Minic, the leading Serbian 'Titoist' and one of the very few 
remaining 'defenders of the Constitution' among the Serbian leaders. Dusan Dragosavac 
explains why:
'Tito, Kardelj and other republics had a very high esteem for Milos Minic, higher than 
for any other Serbian politician. This was expressed in the fact that Minic became 
Foreign Secretary in 1972, at a time when Tito distrusted other Serbian leaders... Also, 
in October 1979 we had a long meeting with Tito, discussing candidates for the
67 Kondar was the only son of the Croatian wartime Communist leader Rade Koncar (the only Serb head of the Croatian 
Party, with the exception of Stanko Stojcevic, elected in 1988), who was killed by the Italians in May 194Z
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Chairmanship of the LCY Presidency for the next three years. This was at the end of the 
first one-year term in office of the Chairman of the Presidency. Mikulic's term was 
expiring and Stevan Doronjski (Vojvodina) was about to take the post. Tito wanted to 
know who were the candidates for the two years after Doronjski, until the next Party 
congress. Branko Mikulic informed Tito that he had spoken to Petar Stambolic, who 
proposed Milos Minic to take the post when it came to Serbia, which was due in the 
fourth year - 1981/82. Draza Markovic was at-that time the President of the Yugoslav 
Assembly and for this reason he could not be elected to the Party Presidency. 
Additionally, this was a year after the 'Blue Book' and there was great hesitation about 
having him in the top Party job. It was thought that he could not take the top position 
in the Party because of his attitudes towards Albanians and Bosnian Muslims, which 
were not entirely clear. Tito agreed with this, and it was decided that in 1980/1981 the 
president would be Lazar Mojsov (Macedonia), and in 1981/1982 Milos Minic (Serbia). 
However, Tito died in May 1980, when Doronjski (Vojvodina) was the Chairman. In 
October 1980 Mojsov took over. But, when it came to Minic (in October 1981), Serbia 
changed its mind. This was the year of the Kosovo events and Serbia wanted a strong 
advocate of Serbian interests to be elected. It was Draza Markovic whom they 
proposed. This, of course, was unacceptable to all the others. Minic withdrew, arguing 
that the situation in the country was so difficult that he could not agree to be the 
President if his own republic was against him. We were facing a stalem ate/68
However, a compromise was reached when Serbia gave up its one-year term of office in favour 
of Croatia.69 But, the whole affair was still fresh when the 12th LCY Congress took place, not 
least because Minic, enormously popular outside Serbia but equally unpopular in Serbia, 
seemed to be quietly removed from any list of top executive posts either in the Federation or in 
the Republic. However, in a series of clandestine talks with the republican and provincial 
leaderships, a Bosnian Croat Branko Mikulic, one of Tito's favourite politicians in his last 
years,70 organised the voting-out of Markovic.71 Croatian leaders (such as the Croatian Serb 
Dusan Dragosavac,72 then president of the LCY Presidency) supported him. Dragosavac 
explains his reasons:
68 Interview with Dragosavac, 10 April 1998.
69 In fact, Croatia agreed to exchange its term (which was due in two years, in 1983/84) with Serbia (1981/1982) for 
three reasons: (1) public embarrassment would be avoided; 2) the post would be taken by DuSan Dragosavac, a Serb 
who opposed the Serbian leadership even more than Minic himself; and 3) Croatia would have more influence at the 
forthcoming 12th LCY Congress. The others also accepted these reasons, and Dragosavac (unexpectedly) became the 
President of the LCY Presidency, after being Secretary for the two previous years.
70 This is Petar Stambolic's assessment in his interview with S. Djukic (1992:240).
71 In tin interview we had in January 1998, the Croatian member of the Party Presidency Jure Bilic confirmed that 
Mikulic's role was crucial in this vote. He said that the Serbian leaders had long-lasting disagreements with the 
Bosnians, for which Markovic's diary (1987 and 1988) is a good source. Mikulic was also one of the leading 
'conservatives' and 'Titoists' in the Yugoslav leadership, and thus supported the Vojvodinian leaders rather than 
Markovic.
72 Dragosavac and Markovic disliked each other for both political and personal reasons (Djukic, 1992:35) The important 
point here is, of course, that the divisions again did not follow ethnic lines. Minic, Markovic, Krunic, Dragosavac were 
all Serbs. The lines of republics/provinces were much more important, though the conflict between Minic and 
Markovic could not be explained by them either. The division was still much more political than territorial: Dragosavac 
and Mikulic, the most pro-Titoist members of the Yugoslav Party leadership in the last years of Tito's life, preferred 
'Titoist' Minic to 'nationalist' Markovic.
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'I was against Markovic because I disliked the whole manipulation with Minic. Many 
others were also against him. For example, the Party organisation in the Army, where 
Dane 6uic73 was president, and, of course, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Draza (Markovic) 
proposed a change of legislation on the use of the Albanian flag in Kosovo. I came out 
against it, saying that the Serbs had the same flag as Serbia in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, and that therefore we could not fall below this historic parallel. In general, the 
problem was how to treat Kosovo after 1981. The majority in the Party Presidency 
argued that the rights of republics and provinces guaranteed by the 1974 Constitution 
should not be reduced, still less withdrawn. Since 1977 some initiatives from Serbia 
aimed at reducing these rights, which was unacceptable to us... We argued that Kosovo 
became a province because the Albanians were a clear majority there, and that there are 
as many Hungarians in Vojvodina as the total number of Montenegrins, while the Serbs 
made up only 51% in this province... Additionally, neither Albania nor Hungary was 
attractive to our Albanians and Hungarians respectively. We ought to do all we could 
to preserve the reputation our country had in the eyes of its Albanians and Hungarians. 
Also, we knew that Enver Hoxha's regime would not be Albanian reality for good, and 
that we needed to preserve good relations with the Albanians in order to enable closer 
links, or maybe even unification with Albania, or at least a 'Scandinavisatiori of the 
region once Hoxha had gone. We wanted to prove our openness to such a solution../74
In a secret ballot at the constitutive session of the new Central Committee of the LCY Markovic 
secured only 95 votes, 12 short of the two-thirds majority of the 159-member Central Committee 
(Djukic, 1992:34). Such a clear margin surprised even the organisers of this action. The Serbian 
leaders felt there might be a problem with Markovic's election,75 but now they saw that not only 
Vojvodina and Kosovo were against them, but many others in Yugoslavia. The two provinces 
together had 30 members of the CC LCY. Even if they all voted against, there were still 34 votes 
'missing'. When the vote was declared, chairman Dragosavac simply asked Serbia to nominate 
another candidate. But, the Serbian leaders were outraged. In a passionate and sharp speech, 
Petar Stambolic attacked 'the great plot against Serbia'. He could hardly control his reactions. 
Stambolic situated the whole affair in the wider context of anti-Serbian actions after the 'Blue 
Book' (1977), since when others had 'constantly interfered in Serbian internal affairs'. Stambolic 
now directly accused Milos Minic, saying that he was practically appointed to the LCY 
Presidency as Tito's personal choice in 1978, against the wish of Serbia. 'This time we will not 
accept such interference,' said Stambolic. He announced that he would 'consider further action', 
which many understood as the announcement of his own resignation from the Central 
Committee. Stambolic, who was then the President of the Yugoslav Presidency, directly 
accused Dusan Dragosavac, the head of the Party, of being responsible for w hat happened.
The resignation of the 'head of state' from the Party Central Committee would certainly have 
seriously underm ined Party credibility, especially if accompanied with a public explanation of
73 General 6uic was also a Serb. The Army supported Minic for his Titoist and anti-nationalist pedigree.
74 Interview with DuSan Dragosavac, 10 April 1998.
75 Dragosavac recalls that the other LCY Presidency member, Dusan Ckrebic said in the lobbies before the CC LCY 
session that 'it is good that unity was manifested at the Congress, but now we should confirm our unity in the elections 
of the LCY Presidency' (interview with Dragosavac, 10 April 1998).
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the reasons for resignation. Furthermore, Stambolic and Markovic were the leading figures in 
Serbian politics: their example could be followed by some, or even all the members from 
'Serbian without Provinces', not only on the Central Committee but, possibly, in other federal 
institutions. Finally, Markovic explained that all of this was not a personal matter, but a clash 
'over the Yugoslav views on Serbia1. In protest, Markovic resigned from the Central Committee, 
saying that he 'did not want to be a member of the Yugoslav Party Central Committee as long 
as such views existed'. For the first time, the Yugoslav League of Communists faced 
disintegration. 'Interference in Serbian internal affairs', as Stambolic put it, was declared the 
main reason for this. Party leaders certainly did not want this to happen. The newly elected 
President of the LCY Presidency, Slovene Mitja Ribicic, said that 'this dispute... only half an 
hour after the conclusion of the Congress, was a real shame for our country. If this continued, 
not only would it lead the country into political crisis, but into complete chaos' (Djukic, 
1992:38). Nobody was really ready for this. When they realised that they had taken a step too 
far, the organisers of the 'plot' sought a way out.
In the break of the session, Croatian politicians Milka Planinc (the Yugoslav Prime Minister) 
and Jure Bilic (the President of Croatian Central Committee) proposed a new vote, offering 
'guarantees' that Markovic would be elected this time if he withdrew his resignation from the 
Central Committee and stopped short of making a public scandal. Markovic gradually accepted 
this offer, but only when the Croats agreed to Minic's political elimination. Minic's sin, 
Markovic said to other members of the Central Committee, was that he did not understand the 
Kosovo crisis.76 It was now for the first time after the elimination of Dobrica Cosic in 1968 that a 
leading politician was removed because of his 'm isunderstanding' of the Kosovo problem. The 
necessity to strengthen the 'unity of Serbia' was now introduced in order to purify the Serbian 
political elite from all 'defenders of the constitution'. The process was only finished five years 
later, when Slobodan Milosevic organised the last round of 'diferentiation' between those who 
'd id ' and those who 'did not' understand the Kosovo question; between those who wanted 'a  
change of the system' and those who wanted 'changes within the system'; those Serbian leaders 
who were acceptable and those unacceptable to other political leaderships in Yugoslavia.
In a second vote, Markovic was elected to the Presidency. But, in a series of party meetings in 
the next few months, the Serbian leadership discussed the meaning of this incident and what 
changes in the Serbian approach towards others in the country it should initiate. Petar 
Stambolic apologised to his colleagues for how he had reacted to the event, but not for w hat he
76 Accusing (again for the first time in a speech from a Serbian leader) the others of obstructing the action in Kosovo, 
Markovic identified his destiny with that of Kosovo. 'Unregulated relations in Serbia represent a source of 
manipulation and objectively provide a good opportunity for making various alliances. One should pose the question 
of the responsibility for Kosovo. One should pose many other questions as well. We shall then see what were the main 
attitudes on our policy towards Albania and who voted against tire documents on the Albanian policy towards our 
country. Who obstructed tire building of unity in the League of Serbian Communists and thereby in the League of 
Yugoslav Communists?', Markovic asked rhetorically. The answer was self-evident: the former Foreign Secretary, MiloS
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had said.
'I underline: I apologise for the way I spoke, but not for what I said. The basic problem 
is relationships in Serbia and towards Serbia. It has been constantly suggested that the 
Serbian leadership, as it is now with Draza Markovic and Petar Stambolic, is more 
national [than it should be] and that we are not sufficiently Yugoslav. Secondly, there is 
a belief in the provinces that if these two people were not in the main leadership of 
Serbia, and if Milos Minic were there, everything would be all right. This policy of 
trying to find allies among certain people in Serbia proper, which has continued up 
until now, is very damaging. I have always felt that whenever there was talk of 
unitarism, people always looked at me in this circle. Because, to judge by old habits, 
Serbia means unitarism and centralism. And I am here, so they look at me. This is what 
I meant when I said that what happened was a direct interference in Serbian internal 
affairs. I can prove it: those who have intervened are counting on some other political 
leadership in Serbia, which would be 'better' than this one' (Djukic, 1992:40).
Although Minic had spent the previous ten years (1972-1982) as a federal politician, his political 
destiny was now left to Serbia to decide upon. In an attempt to escape a public scandal, the 
Serbian leaders allowed Minic to remain a member of the Yugoslav Central Committee, but he 
was entirely marginalised. In his letter to members of the Serbian Central Committee 
immediately after the ' Markovic affair', Minic warned that his disagreement with Markovic 
and Stambolic was about political and not primarily personal issues.
'I have been convinced and I remain so that the major reforms of the federation in 1971 
and 1974 developed the basis for a solution of the national question in Yugoslavia... 
[and] that they created long-term guarantees that our federation would further improve 
as a firm, stable and sound socialist and self-managing social and state community. In 
1971 I rejected as deeply mistaken the conclusion... that Yugoslavia was becoming a 
confederation, or that the new constitutional reform promoted many elements of 
confederalism. Today, eight years after the 1974 Constitution, and 11 years after the 
constitutional amendments, I believe the same' (Djukic, 1992:53).
Minic's departure from the front benches of Serbian politics signalled that the position of 
'genuine Titoists', Tito's closest aides in the late 1970s, had weakened in Serbia and Yugoslavia 
only two years after his death. Furthermore, it showed that Serbia would not accept a 
replacement of Tito's personal arbitration in political conflicts in Serbia with the arbitration of 
the post-Tito federal leadership. Serbia wanted 'to be equal to other republics' which meant to 
decide fully and alone about its internal affairs. No 'interference' in its own affairs could be 
tolerated.
The Markovic case in 1982 also indicated how complex Yugoslav politics was now becoming. 
The Yugoslav republics (including Serbia) were much more interested in protecting their 
'sovereignty' than in developing a Yugoslav political centre as an arbiter in political conflicts in
Minic.
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the country. Despite its rhetoric in favour of unity and against 'autarkism ', Serbia was no 
different from others.77 The attempts of the other republics to eliminate Markovic by a simple 
federal vote did not succeed - this was a further boost to 'autarkism ' and the logic of 'm inding 
one's own business'. The events following it clearly showed that the system had no means to 
resolve a stalemate. The Serbs, who argued for unity and a majority vote, simply 'borrow ed' a 
confederalist rhetoric whenever they were defeated (however minimally) in 'majority' voting. 
The others now learnt how to play the game, if not for other purposes, then to resist Serbia by 
rejecting its candidates. 78
Already in 1982 it was, therefore, clear that the system of consensus was leading to a stalemate 
with no solution. But it was also clear that majority votes could have even more damaging 
consequences: the disintegration of the Yugoslav institutions. Yugoslav players were prepared 
to play the game as long as they were winners. In as much as they advocated changes, they 
simply blackmailed others by withdrawal every time the change did not suit them.
5.4. 'Constructive Criticism' and 'Critical Analysis of the Political System'
By 1983 the debate on the economic and political crises dominated the Yugoslav media and 
political forums. To most of the academic audience it became clear that no solution to the 
economic crisis and no long-term solution for Kosovo^ could be found without changes in the 
political system.79 The political system, they felt, was the core of the problem. But, it was almost 
impossible to change it without serious political conflicts, for which the divided leadership was 
not prepared. As in the case of economic crisis, the first initiative to change the political system 
came from academics who allied with the 'reformers of the constitution' in the Serbian political 
leadership.
In March 1980 Jovan Djordjevic, a top Yugoslav constitutional lawyer and Kardelj's right-hand 
man during the preparation of all four Yugoslav constitutions, criticised the 'bureaucratic
77 In Chapter Three of this dissertation (on the 1967-1972 Constitutional debate) we concluded that Serbia agreed upon 
the Constitutional arrangement on the understanding that Serbia would become equally independent from the federal 
centre as the other republics, which - Serbian leaders felt - was not the case before 1966. The Provinces and the federal 
leadership were now seen as tire main source of obstruction of this aim.
78 This message was still in their ears in 1989, when the same 'scenario' was implemented against another Serbian 
member of the LCY Presidency, Dusan Ckrebic. Preventing the outcome of a majority vote in the LCY Central 
Committee, Slobodan Milosevic repeated Petar Stambolic's argument in the Markovic case. Since the Central Committee 
again could not risk a Serbian withdrawal, they simply re-interpreted the vote as 'non-obligatory' and only 'morally 
binding'. Ckrebic withdrew his resignation without even repeating the vote. The same situation (but now with a Croat 
in the main position) occurred with the election of the Yugoslav state Presidency President Stipe Mesic in 1991.
79 'A programme of economic stabilization conceived under the slogan 'economic reforms yes, political reforms no' 
cannot yield any serious results, because it attempts to deal with tire consequences rather than causes of the crisis,' said 
Josip Zupanov (RFE/RL, 22 April 1985). Zupanov developed the same argument in his 1983 book Marginalije o 
drustvenoj krizi. The most Kardeljist members of the political elite (such as Stipe Suvar) called Zupanov a crisologist.
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concepts' that followed the 1974 Constitution.80 But it was another Serbian Constitutional 
lawyer - Najdan Pasic, the president of the Serbian Constitutional Court, who invited political 
leaders to launch a debate on the system, first in November 1980,81 then again in September 
1982, now as a newly elected member of the Central Committee of the LCY. In his open letter to 
the Party Presidency he suggested the establishment of a special Commission to study the 
problems of the functioning of the political system, similar to the one established the year 
before for the reform of the economic system (Kraigher's Commission) 82 He stressed four 
possible issues of the debate: 1) the still strong political control over the economic system; 2) 
changes in the electoral system in order to increase leaders' accountability; 3) the uncontrolled 
growth of the administrative apparatus (bureaucracy); and 4) the democratic issue, i.e. 'the 
exaggerated use of the state's legal power in all areas'. Pasic argued that these four points were 
the main reasons why the spontaneous action of citizens had disappeared, and why self­
management did not show the expected results in practice.83
Pasic's proposal was followed by a wave of similar initiatives from Belgrade academics, both 
those in open opposition to the regime and those who allied with official politics. In May 1983 
the Praxis Professor Svetozar Stojanovic proposed democratisation of the system in four steps. 
The genuine reform of the system should begin with the internal democratisation of the LCY, 
including free, democratic and secret elections with more than one candidate for each position. 
The LCY should legalise 'factions' and 'groups' competing within the party. Secondly, the 
Socialist Alliance of the Working People should be genuinely reformed in order to include non- 
Communist political groups, as had been projected by its own statute. The LCY could still be 
guaranteed 'the leading role' within the SAWP, providing that the party itself had been 
democratised. Thirdly, the trade unions should be fully democratised and made independent of 
any state or party influence, in order to become - together with the Socialist Alliance - the basis 
for grass-roots democracy in Yugoslavia. The democratisation of these two organisations would 
not, Stojanovic argued, endanger self-management, social ownership, federalism or non-aligned 
foreign policy, the four corner-stones of the Yugoslav political system. On the contrary, it 
would be a realisation of Kardelj's ideas on the 'pluralism of self-managing interests'. Finally, 
the federal structure of Yugoslavia should be preserved, but reformed. While the 
administration should be further decentralised (including some federal ministries being 
allocated outside of Belgrade), the Yugoslav economy should be further integrated.84
“  Nin, 30 March 1980, RFE/RL, 3 April 1980.
81 Politika, 6 November 1980.
82 Politika, 29 November 1982.
83 RFE/RL, 22 April 1983.
«  RFE/RL. 1 June 1983.
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Stojanovic's proposal was formally introduced to 'official' political space by Mijalko Todorovic, 
the former Secretary of the Yugoslav LCY Executive Bureau and President of the Yugoslav 
Assembly, who was silently ousted from the office in 1974 after his disagreement with Tito's 
action against the Croatian 'nationalists' and Serbian 'liberals' in the early 1970s. In November 
1983, in what was seen as an action backed by if not openly directed by the Serbian leadership, 
Todorovic promoted Stojanovic's programme at the session of the Federal Advisory Council, 
but without any conclusive results.85
Pasic's initiative would probably again have fallen on deaf ears with the political elite, had it 
not been supported by several important Yugoslav leaders and the Serbian party leadership. 
Faced with the public pressure from both intellectual and political circles, as well as with 
demands from the international monetary and political institutions to secure a stable economic 
system, the Yugoslav leaders were simply forced to accept some form of debate on the political 
system as well. Because there was still great resistance to any change, however, only a 'working 
team' within the Federal Council for Social Order was set up, instead of a special commission at 
the highest party level. The 'team ', chaired by Josip Vrhovec (since May 1984 Croatian member 
of the Yugoslav Presidency) invited in late 1983 the general public and political leadership to an 
open and democratic debate about the problems which the political system was facing. The 
widest ever public debate in Yugoslav history lasted for almost a year and a half - until the 
Spring of 1985, when the Vrhovec Commission offered its 'Critical Analysis of the Functioning 
of the Political System'. Only a limited presentation of the main arguments, analyses and 
proposals expressed in the course of this debate is possible here.
Among the academic contributions to the debate, the most influential was Jovan Miric's book 
'System and Crisis', extensive extracts from which had been published as a series in Borba (12- 
25 October 1984). The book, subtitled 'a  contribution to the critical analysis of the constitutional 
and political system of Yugoslavia', was a direct response to Vrhovec's invitation. Miric86 
argued that the 1974 Constitution itself, and not its interpretation or implementation, was the 
cause of the economic and political crisis. The Constitution, he said, was a departure from the 
principles accepted in 1943 by the Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia 
(AVNOJ). While the AVNOJ Resolution established a federation of five Yugoslav peoples, the 
1974 Constitution declared that Yugoslavia was 'neither a federation nor a confederation'. 
While in the AVNOJ Resolution provinces were not even mentioned, now they had become not 
only 'constitutive parts' of the federal structure, but 'sovereign entities' as well. For all these 
reasons the 1974 Constitution in fact derogated achievements of the partisan movement, 
especially w hen it came to the position of Serbia. By introducing the 'consensus principle' for all
85 RFE/RL, 7 November 1983.
86 Jovan Miric (Croatian Serb of Yugoslav political orientation) was professor of political science at Zagreb University.
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im portant federal decisions, the 1974 Constitution also denied the main idea of politics: that 
there should always be (and always is) a majority and a minority, and that - in democratic 
regimes - no one should have the right to permanently 'blackmail' a majority by vetoing its 
proposals. Post-1974 Yugoslavia was based neither on democratic nor on class but on national 
principles. Neither citizens nor workers were represented in federal institutions directly, but 
only as members of their republics/provinces.87 Miric argued that, theoretically constructed on 
distant dreams of 'associated labour' and a 'self-managing1 society, which had replaced the 
principles of parliamentary democracy, Yugoslavia in reality fell below the level of bourgeois 
society - in a feudalised system which preferred partiality over citizens' equality.
Miric openly rejected Kardelj's argument that federation was an outdated category of bourgeois 
legal theory. If federation was an outdated form, the confederation was even more so. Kardelj 
was wrong, Miric argued, in confusing forms of state structure (unitary vs. federal, and 
federation vs. confederation) with types of regime (bourgeois democracy and 'administrative 
socialism' vs. self-management). As far as Tito was concerned, Miric said that it was the first 
time that he 'failed to recognise' where the changes were leading. He also criticised the leading 
post-war Croatian politician Vladimir Bakaric for advocating 'national economies', which Miric 
saw as the m ain source of nationalism. The invention of 'national economies' was a typical 
example of unwillingness to accept any possibility that Yugoslavia might become a community 
sui generis. In the growing share of population who declared themselves 'Yugoslavs' in the 1981 
census,88 Miric saw such a possibility. The 'Yugoslavs' were not 'misled' or 'confused' products 
of ethnically mixed marriages, but the best educated part of the Yugoslav population, only a 
quarter of whom  originated from 'mixed marriages'. Nevertheless, the elite panicked at the 
emergence of 'Yugoslavs', which they saw as a re-emergence of 'unitarism '. For all these 
reasons, Miric said, Yugoslavia was on the verge of dissolution.
Miric's sharp analysis confused and split party officials and academics into supporters and 
opponents. Among the academics, Miric's colleague from Zagreb University Zdravko Tomac
W
was the sharpest critic. Tomac argued that the problem lay not in the Constitution, but in its 
slow and selective implementation. It was not the constitutional system, but 'extra- 
constitutional' and 'non-constitutional' behaviour that produced the crisis in Yugoslavia, 
Tomac concluded.
87 Goati (1989) offers a good explanation of this argument.
88 The number of citizens who declared themselves as ethnically 'Yugoslavs/  undeclared' rose from 320,853 in 1971 to 
1,209,045 in 1981. Some demographic estimations in early 1981 projected a further growth of this population to 5 million 
people (about 20%) in 1991. This estimate played some role in fostering fears among the nationalists (Bilandiic, 1986). It 
also enabled Slovenia and Croatia to counter Serbian arguments that the 1974 Constitution destroyed a sense of 
Yugoslav belonging. The Serbs, however, argued that the growing number of Yugoslavs was a reaction to growing 
trends of disintegration in the country.
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'Members of this parallel, informal system of business, executive, administrative and 
political structures abused their rights in order to make implementation of the 
Constitutional system impossible... Instead of criticising the Constitution for our 
present difficulties, one ought to analyse the reasons why this parallel system 
appeared, and why we could not implement the agreements .. and oppose the old 
system resolutely.' 89
Tomac was in fact warning about the 'dogmatist' and 'statist' tendencies which had dominated 
Yugoslav politics before 1966.
'The power balance was objectively such that the forms have changed but not the real 
situation. Negative tendencies... which we knew from before we enacted the ALA 
[1976], have continued. This simply had to result in the destruction of a united market, 
thus strengthening autarkic tendencies, irrational investment... and stagnation.'
Tomac agreed that 'techno-bureaucratism as the political expression of statism has become the 
main source of nationalism', but his conclusion was entirely opposite to Miric's: the 'problems 
cannot be resolved by changing the Constitutional solutions but only by resolute action to 
implement the Constitution'.90 Similar views to Tomac's were presented by Ciril Ribicic, a 
Slovenian Professor of Constitutional Law, who (five years later) succeeded Milan Kudan as 
president of the Slovenian reformed Communists.91
In as much as Miric's views were welcomed by the Serbian academics and political elite in that 
Republic, Tomac (and Ribicic) were the mouthpieces of what was to be formulated as the 
(Croatian and) Slovenian position. The leading Croatian, Slovenian and Vojvodinian politicians, 
such as Jure Bilic, France Popit and Dusan Popovic shared this view. On the other side, the 
Serbian media, Macedonian Aleksandar Grlickov and Bosnian Muslim Hamdija Pozderac 
welcomed Miric's appeal for changes. Miric's book was also welcomed by the Partisan Veterans 
regardless of their ethnic background,92 and by several 'free rider' politicians in Slovenia (Mitja
89 Kardelj argued, as explained in footnotes 58 and 59 in Chapter Two, that extra-parliamentary powers control the 
capitalist societies of the West. Now, Tomac argued the same for Yugoslavia.
90 Zdravko Tomac, Danas, 13 December 1983. For Tomac's views see: Tomac (1984). Before becoming a professor, Tomac 
was the chief of staff to Croatian President Jakov Blazevic (1974-1982). In 1990 he became the main ideologue of the 
reformed Communists in Croatia. As the SDP representative, he was the Deputy Prime Minister in the Croatian war­
time coalition government (1991-1992). In 1997 presidential elections he came second to Franjo Tudjman with 21% of the 
vote. As an undergraduate at Zagreb Faculty of Political Science, I witnessed the differences between two of my 
professors - Miric and Tomac.
o
91 On the basis of similar views they held on Miric's analysis, in 1988 Ribicic and Tomac published a book 'Federalism 
measured by the future', to which Milan Kucan wrote a preface. Miric, on the other hand, was a referee for Ivan 
Stambolic's book 'Debates on Serbia' (1988). This split within the intellectual elite illustrates the position of the Croatian 
political elite at that time: even if they had shown much more political ability than they did, the Croatian leaders would 
have faced enormous difficulties in finding a 'Third Way' between the Slovenian and Serbian options. The failure of the 
Croatian political elite to promote its own alternative proved fatal for Croatia itself, because it encouraged radical 
Croatian nationalism, which only helped to close the circle of disintegration of Yugoslavia.
92 Although the Croat Jure Bilic, for example, strongly opposed Miric's analysis, Pero Car, a member of Croatian 
Presidency, in his interview with Danas, said: 'The fear o f unitarism, in my firm belief, is a creation and a tool of those 
people whose intention is to destroy Yugoslav togetherness. The time when unitarism  was successfully used as a 
scarecrow has gone. There is no danger that togetherness could become 'unitarism'. But there are many things that
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Ribicic93) and Croatia.94 It is fair to say that significant support for Miric's ideas came from all 
parts of Yugoslavia, while in the most conservative circles of the party leadership it was treated 
as the 'worst attack on the Yugoslav socialist system since Milovan Djilas' articles in 1953'.95 
Despite the now increasingly visible match between the dominant attitudes to Miric's book and 
republican borders, there were significant and not infrequent exceptions to this 'rule'.
But although it was a major event among social scientists and with the general public, Miric's 
book 'd id  not inspire' Vrhovec.96 'We argued,' recalls Vrhovec today, with regard to his position 
and that of his political allies, 'that the republics should continue to have, even to a greater 
extent, full responsibility for themselves:
'The confederative principles should be fully developed. On this issue I differed not 
only with Miric, but with the official Croatian position. Because, both in Slovenia and in 
Croatia, many were ready to make concessions to the Serbs regarding Kosovo. Finally, 
these two republics accepted the new Serbian constitution in 1989 and whatever Serbia 
did in Kosovo at that time. They believed they could satisfy Serbian frustration by 
offering major concessions on this issue.'
However, if Vrhovec did not pay much attention to Miric's book, he could not disregard the 
official position of Serbia, which was formulated at the 18th Session of the Serbian Central 
Committee on 23 and 24 November 1984. The main message of this session was best 
summarised in the title of Politika's report: 'The changes are the condition for the way out of 
the crisis/ This time, the main speaker (Bogdan Trifunovic) was more determined than ever to 
say that 'the main problem... of how to implement the constitutional principle that the 
provinces are part of Serbia ... has still not been dealt with. This was still a matter of 'different 
interpretations' between the republic and provinces, but now these differences occurred with 
respect to 'alm ost every single issue on the agenda'.1 Trifunovic left no doubts that 'although 
the principles of the 1974 Constitution should be better implemented, developed and defended,
people who live together need to share. If one calls unitarism what happens when people who live together share their 
responsibility for decisions taken in their country, then this is a positive unitarism. Then one should be for such 
unitarism1 (Danas, 10 January 1984). Although Car was not representative of the majority in the Croatian or other 
political leadership, it was nevertheless true that these were not only his views. The same division between those 
supporting and those opposing Miric's ideas occurred in Slovenia (Mitja Ribidic vs. France Popit) and Serbia 
(republican leadership vs. Vojvodinian ideologue Dusan Popovic).
93 Interestingly, Ciril Ribicic was Mitja Ribicic's son. To explain Mitja Ribicic's behaviour in these years, I quote from the 
interview I conducted with Jure Bilic, April 1998: 'He conducted a cold-hot policy; at one moment he would make a 
most democratic, almost outrageous proposal about something, only to deny or withdraw it a few days later. It seems 
to me that his past as an UDBA [secret police] officer immediately after the War did not give him peace, so he wanted to 
go much further in the process of democratisation than any of us in the Presidency.'
94 RFE/RL Situation Report Yugoslavia, 30 November 1984.
95 This was how Milan Rakas, a Croatian Serb in charge of the media in the Federal Conference of the Socialist Alliance 
of Working People described Miric's book. Needless to say, Rakas was the most appropriate person to react, since he 
was - like Miric - a Croatian Serb.
96 In interview I conducted with him in January 1998, Vrhovec confirmed that he was aware of Miric's criticism, but that 
Miric's position was very different from his.
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we ought not to think that any of its articles were the final and definite word in the formation of 
our relationships if our practical experience shows that we need to find better and more 
suitable solutions for existing circumstances.' This was, Trifunovic argued, 'especially the case 
with the Associated Labour act'.97
The Serbian demands were formulated in 38 theses for reform of the political system, which 
were accepted by the Central Committee of the LC Serbia. In general, four key demands were 
put forward by this document: 1) enlargement of economic units by associating several BOALs 
with larger enterprises; 2) strengthening the executive branch of government (including the 
federal executive council and other federal institutions); 3) the democratisation of the electoral 
system (by introducing more than one candidate for each post); and 4) uniting Serbia by 
increasing the prerogatives of the republic in its relations with Kosovo and Vojvodina. 
Particular attention was given to the fourth point: relations in Serbia. Serbia proposed that the 
economic and financial aid Kosovo received from Serbia should not go, as had been the case, 
through federal institutions. In this way, Serbia would assume greater control over the 
economic development of Kosovo. Finally, the Serbian proposal explicitly obliged the leaders of 
Kosovo to prevent any further exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo and to ensure 
full equality of the Serbs and Albanians in the province.98 Such a proposal was accompanied by 
strong verbal opposition to 'autonomism', the term re-introduced to the Serbian political 
vocabulary by Spiro Galovic in November 1981 as a synonym for the 'autarkism ' of the 
provinces.99
The 18th Session of the Serbian Central Committee for the first time concluded that the rules 
which were always interpreted in different and opposing ways in Serbia and in its two 
provinces, should indeed be subjected to careful examination. This session also introduced a 
new type of rhetoric, which now included the possibility of an open clash between members of 
the Central Committee, for the first time in front of the general public. Probably the most 
famous of such polemics at the 18lh LC CCS Session was the one between the Belgrade party 
leader Slobodan Milosevic and a member of the CC from Vojvodina, Marija Miskolci Zvekic. 
When Miskolci Zvekic opposed the '38 theses proposal', saying that it reminded her of Miric's
97 Politika, 24 November 1984.
98 RFE/RL, 30 November 1984.
99 It did not need more than three days for the Serbian proposals to meet with criticism from Stane Dolanc (Slovene), the 
leading Kardeljist in the Yugoslav leadership. Speaking at a public rally in Jesenice, a Slovenian town on the border 
with Austria on 1 December 1984 (the day when the First Yugoslavia was created in 1918) Dolanc was critical 'of those 
in Yugoslavia who want to change the constitutional provisions concerning the workers' right to control the fruits of 
their own labour as well as the provisions guaranteeing national equality and the right of the republics and 
autonomous provinces to decide independently about their own development and about the development of the 
federation as a whole.' Repeating the Slovenian Communists' rhetoric, Dolanc warned that the politics of opposing the 
Constitution might well favour various 'bourgeois-reactionary attempts to restore a system hostile to socialist self­
management' (RFE/RL, 20 December 1984).
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concept of reform of Yugoslavia and that it would, if accepted, further divide groups in the 
Yugoslav League of Communists, Milosevic replied:
'We have been threatened with a political crisis if we continue to [do nothing more 
than] discuss these problems. All right, let us enter that political crisis! This crisis is 
going to produce a great uproar about the question of unity or separatism. In such a 
crisis separatism will not prevail, because the people have accepted unity. Those 
leaders incapable of seeing this will and should lose the public's confidence. If 
separatism is not opposed, our country will have no prospects for the future. It can only 
disintegrate.'
In w hat happened to be his first prominent public appearance, the young rising star of the 
Serbian leadership said that 'the Serbian Communists have never been in favour of unitarist 
ideas/ and that the others should once and for ever cease to accuse them of a policy pursued by 
the inter-war Serbian bourgeoisie. The Serbs were tired of charges of having been oppressors, as 
a result of which they were constantly having to clear their name and to confirm their 
acceptance of a united Yugoslavia. 'We [Serbs] have no reason whatsoever to bow our heads to 
anyone/ concluded Milosevic. Differing in style but not in policy from the majority of the 
Serbian leaders, Milosevic warned the Vojvodinian leaders that their policy of 'autarkism ' led to 
economic and political isolation from Europe and the developed world. The League of 
Communists, he said, had the opportunity to remove obstacles to the further development of 
Yugoslavia and its nations. The time was up for those who hesitated to change their behaviour 
quickly (Milosevic, 1984/1989: 30-8).
In these circumstances, however, Vrhovec's analysis of the 'functioning of the political system' 
fell short of any adequate proposal on how to resolve the crisis. The problem of this commission 
was, as Vrhovec admitted in 1985, that 'it was just another inter-republican body in which the 
opinions and proposals could not be accepted without a full consensus of all republics and 
provinces'.100 Because the majority in the leadership still opposed serious changes in the 
political system, but also because those who favoured changes had entirely different visions of 
w hat changes they wanted, the whole debate organised by the Vrhovec Commission fell short 
of any conclusion. The majority in the leadership, including Vrhovec himself, were still inspired 
by Kardelj, rejecting any notion of 'changes' and talking only of 'building up ' the system he 
projected.101 In this context, it is easy to understand why the Critical Analysis offered in fact 
further devolution of power rather than a re-centralisation of Yugoslavia.
100 Nin, 24 February 1985.
101 Ivan Stambolic recalls the great pressure he came under when the report was published because he proposed 
'changes of the system' rather than 'changes in the system'. He even now admits only that it was a typing error of his 
secretary, but the federal party leadership was so suspicious of this explanation that he became very unpopular. This 
would be reflected in their indifference to his removal by Milosevic in 1987 (Stambolic, 1995). For this see also Goati, 
1989.
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'The Critical analysis promoted the idea that the new model should be based on the 
confederative principle, and not on any return to unitarism, which was hidden behind 
the one person - one vote slogan... I saw this slogan as fatal for Croatia. It would have 
destroyed the equality of the federal units. This principle would have been acceptable 
only when and if the national question had been already resolved, when equality had 
been guaranteed. In our circumstances, this would have blown up Yugoslavia/102
'W e wanted to preserve Kardelj's concept of the nationality question and his ideas about the 
relations between federal units/ Vrhovec said in the interview.
'The main conclusion was that the basic ideas of the Constitution should not be put 
under question. Above all, the right to self-determination, which is a non-transferable 
historical right. Any denial of the right to self-determination we considered as attack on 
the concept of Yugoslavia... Then, it was crucial to re-confirm that the sovereignty 
remains in the republics, and that the Federation has only those competencies on which 
the republics agreed as common... The republics should be made to an even greater 
extent responsible for themselves.'
Like Suvar and Ribicic before, Vrhovec considered that Serbia was using Kosovo as an alibi for 
a new re-centralisation of Yugoslavia. For this reason, the federal leadership, still controlled by 
Kardeljists, simply ignored the existence of the problem of Kosovo between 1981 and 1985, 
trying to play down the Serbian attempt to change 'relations within Serbia' by using Kosovo. 
Vrhovec, as well as his main colleagues in the federal leadership, today believes that the Serbian 
leadership was already 'infected by nationalism' and that Milosevic was a consequence, rather 
than a cause of Serbian nationalism.
'Serbian nationalism penetrated the highest ranks of Serbian politics with Rankovic, 
and remained there under Draza Markovic's and Ivan Stambolic's protection. The 1974 
Constitution to the Yugoslav leaders from other republics, and especially from 
provinces, was the most powerful tool to defeat it. And we did not want to lose it/
G
Of course this caused endless disputes within the Commission on almost-every relevant issue. 
The debate spilled over into the media, which increasingly started promoting the views 
dominant in their own republic/province. The media, still under the control of the political elite 
in the republics and provinces, now looked increasingly liberalised and freed from political 
influence. But this was a false image, since they were given the 'green light' by the leaders 
themselves to criticise the views of the leaders in other republics, and (in the Serbian case) in 
both provinces.103 Information about political events behind the scenes was 'leaked' to the 
media directly from the political 'patrons' themselves. The media would never dare to attack
102 In an interview, January 1998. Note here that Vrhovec speaks about defending Croatian interests, although he was 
the chairman of the Federal Commission, and also a member of the Yugoslav state Presidency.. A few years later, the 
Serbian leadership and tire Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts complained that the Slovenes and Croats promoted 
their views through Kraigher's and Vrhovec's Commissions, while Serbian views were under-represented or even 
disregarded.
103 The same applies to political conflicts within republics: it was, for example, obvious that Stipe Suvar controlled 
Polet while Mika Spiljak patronised Danas in Croatia.
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'their own leaders'. This situation, indeed, opened up some space of freedom for the media in 
Yugoslavia. But it was far from making them independent.104
The same was true of the intellectual elite, which was now encouraged to support the views of 
one or another side. The elite and newspapers gladly accepted this role, with honourable 
exceptions in each republic. When the media and academics joined politicians in a dispute over 
the political system, it looked as if Vrhovec's Commission had produced more conflicts than it 
was capable of resolving. At the same time, its recommendations were no more than just 
another 'compromise', condemned in advance to be unsuccessful.105
Another mega-debate without results not only exposed how divided, inefficient and incapable 
the elite was, but eliminated those few credentials it still had in the eyes of the public.
5. 5. Conclusion
By 1984, the two political blocs had already been created and fairly consolidated. The one (led 
by the Serbian leadership) insisted on 'reforms of the Constitution', while the other (most 
strongly represented by Slovenia, but also dominant in other Yugoslav republics, and in the 
Army) firmly defended all provisions of the 1974 Constitutional arrangement and Kardelj's 
constitutive concept. Although the Kardeljists (the 'defenders of the Constitution') were 
stronger in all direct conflicts, successfully preventing any significant change of the political 
system, the confederalist principles of 'non-intervening in other republics' shielded the 
'reformers of the Constitution' from being removed from politics. Yugoslav politics in the early 
1980s was, therefore, in a permanent stalemate.
While in the case of economic reforms, some agreement between the republics and provinces 
was m ade possible after enormous pressure from international factors, the reform of the 
political system was entirely left to the Yugoslav elite, unwilling and incapable of serious 
change. The only effective pressure for changes, therefore, could have come from a coalition 
between the 'reformers' and dissatisfied segments of the population. This formula was not 
implemented in the first half of the 1980s, since the elite was still committed to changes from 
w ithin the system. But the public pressure, channelled and controlled by segments of the elite
1M For this reason, it seems understandable that some leaders believed that the media were pushing the country 
towards dissolution and civil war (see Dragosavac's letter to Raif Dizdarevic, 1987). They did not see (or, better, did not 
want to see) that the politicians themselves were behind the media, pulling the trigger at each other. At the same time 
as helping openness and democratisation, the media became tools of new conflicts, which they would remain during 
the weir in the 1990s.
105 Interview with Milka Planinc, 19 April 1998. In this interview she said that Vrhovec's analysis was 'a compromise to 
an even greater extent than Kraigher's Programme of Economic Stabilisation'.
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through the now increasingly open media, played its role and was now -  for the first time -  
used as an asset in intra-elite conflicts. As the conflict between the groups in republics and 
between republics increased, the media and masses were mobilised in support of 'their' leaders. 
This all set up the stage for a later phase in which practically a two-party system appeared out 
of the divided LCY leadership. In this phase, which began in 1986 with the election of Milan 
Kudan and Slobodan Milosevic as presidents of the Slovenian and Serbian Central Committees 
respectively, the political elites now moved closer to the local intellectual elites, widening the 
gap between themselves and the other republics. Surveys conducted in the mid-1980s showed 
that the difference between Communists in the various republics was greater than between 
Communists and non-Communists in the same republic.106 In these circumstances, any 
common Yugoslav policy became very unlikely.
While the debate on economic issues was not structured primarily along the lines of ethnic 
groups or republics, the political discussion in the early 1980s more closely followed the lines of 
republics but not of ethnic groups. By 1985, only the oldest generation of Yugoslav veterans 
remained untouched by the divisions into republican camps. But, their influence significantly 
decreased after the election of the first post-Titoist LCY Central Committee (1982), in which the 
most loyal Titoists (such as, for example, Milos Minic) were marginalised, and especially after 
1984, when the first representatives of republics/provinces elected after Tito's death replaced 
Tito's appointees in the Federal Presidency. However, it was not before the late 1980s that 
ethnicity became a dividing factor within the Yugoslav political elites. In the mid-1980s the 
Communist elites within republics/provinces remained united (or disunited) regardless of their 
ethnic origins, even in the case of the 1981 Kosovo conflict.
As in the previous chapter, the analysis presented here confirms that the tools used in the last 
years of the 1980s were 'invented' and even 'tried out' during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The 'case of Draza Markovic' analysed in this chapter shows that the Yugoslav League of 
Communists faced a serious danger of splitting up as early as 1982. It was in the early 1980s 
that the policy of non-intervention in 'internal affairs' of republics was established as a general 
rule. Although arguments between the republics and provinces permanently characterised
11)6 Goati (1989:98). At the same time the survey of die employed population of Yugoslavia (N=4,460) conducted in 
November 1985, showed, for example, a drastic decrease in the attractiveness of the LCY among the younger 
generation. While in 1974 only 9% of young Yugoslavs said they did not want to become LCY members, in 1985 this 
number increased to 50%. Although the sharp increase was observable in all the Yugoslav republics and both 
provinces, it progressed faster in the more developed (but most Kardeljist) Yugoslav regions of Slovenia, Croatia and 
Vojvodina. While in 1974 32% of young Slovenes did not want to become LCY members, now it was as many as 88%. In 
Croatia the number rose from 13% to 70%, in Vojvodina from 4% to 54%, in Serbia Proper from 6% to 40%, in 
Macedonia from 7% to 40%, in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 5% to 36%, in Kosovo from 4% to 35%, and in Montenegro 
from 8% to 18%. The data also showed a steep fall in esteem for the Party, again more in the most developed Yugoslav 
Republics and Serbia Proper. In fact, the esteem for the LCY was highest among the Kosovo Albanians (43% of whom  
said that the LCY enjoy 'high esteem') and the lowest among the Slovenes (10.2%). The results of the survey mirrored 
data on the admittance of new members into the LCY: the highest rate of recruiting new members was in Kosovo, the 
lowest in Slovenia and Croatia. In the first half of 1983, for example, the Slovenian party organisation experienced no 
growth at all.
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Yugoslav post-war politics (for which the analysis of the Constitutional debate of 1967-1974 
offers sufficient evidence) it was only after Tito's departure that the danger of disintegration of 
the Party became real. The dissolution of the LCY and the Yugoslav state in 1990 and 1991 was, 
therefore, not a simple result of a 'turning point' that happened after the 'anti-bureaucratic' 
(1987) or the 'velvet' revolutions (1989), but rather an outcome of long-existing controversies, 
which became difficult to reconcile once the 'supreme arbiters' had gone. These controversies 
were not, however, the expression either of 'ethnic hatred', or of the struggle between 
'democracy' and 'Communism', as is frequently argued. They could not be fully explained by 
the controversies over economic issues, since the economic debate did not follow ethnic or 
republican lines, as we have seen in the previous chapter of this dissertation. I argue that the 
main line of division between the two newly created 'blocs' in Yugoslav politics was about their 
willingness to remain committed to the ideological picture of the world, most closely expressed 
by Kardelj, even when it became obvious that the results of its implementation were radically 
different from w hat had been intended and expected. It is in the elite unwillingness to abandon 
the ideology and to face reality in order to respond to the growing challenges of post-1974 
Yugoslavia that I find the main reason for the collapse of the regime.
In the last two chapters of this thesis, I follow the development of the two separate 'constitutive 
concepts' which emerged out of two different interpretations of Kardelj's concept: in Serbia 
(Chapter Six) and Slovenia (Chapter Seven). These two new concepts, which emerged at the 
same time and in reaction to one another, ultimately drove Yugoslavia apart in the second half 
of the 1980s.
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Chapter Six:
The Emergence of Alternative Concepts 
and the Reaction of the Political Elite in 
Serbia (1986-1988)
'We made it clear that we were in favour of Yugoslavia, but only if the Serbs were equal to 
the other Yugoslav nations. We knew the Slovenes and Croats would not accept such a 
Yugoslavia. But we wanted them to say so and to take responsibility for it. And indeed, it 
did not take long before the Slovenes and Croats clearly revealed their views on Yugoslavia: 
they supported it as long as it was a tool for keeping Serbia under permanent surveillance.1
Antonije Isakovic
Vice-President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 
In an interview for this thesis, April 1996.
'Accompanied by intolerance and hatred against the Albanian nation, which is the case in 
some media, this struggle is becoming more and more distanced from socialist principles 
and closer and closer to nationalism. The editorial boards and journalists in the media who 
do not want to understand that today's struggle against Albanian nationalism means 
permanent struggle against Serbian nationalism, in effect promote the kindling of 
nationalist passions as their main policy'.
Dragisa Pavlovic
President of the Belgrade LC Committee, ousted at the Eighth CC LC Serbia Session,
In his address to editors and journalists, September 1987.
'It is true that we are under pressure from ideological opponents, but the League of 
Communists must not make the big mistake of reducing its activities only to disputes with 
them. Because we are also under pressure from a crisis that must be solved. And to be 
excessively preoccupied with our opponents would put the LC in a defensive position. This 
is a real, historically confirmed, way to lose the leading position in society...'
Slobodan Milosevic 
President of the LC CC Serbia Presidency,
Speaking in Kragujevac, December 1986
6.0. Introduction
The political monopoly of the LCY was in reality undermined in the first half of the 1980s, as the 
result of economic and political crisis, and greater openness of the media. Consequently, two new 
participants entered Yugoslav politics: 1) various groups of intellectuals, critical of the elite; and 2) 
spontaneously emergent groups within the population. Both of them centered on Serbia: the
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former in Belgrade, the latter in Kosovo. By 1986, the elite found itself under heavy pressure from 
both the 'critical intelligentsia' and popular protests. It became difficult, if not impossible, to ignore 
their existence.
Gradually, the political elite recognised the need to respond to their demands. This chapter 
analyses the reaction of the political elite to these two new participants in Serbian politics in the 
second half of the 1980s. The chapter first briefly analyses the emergence of alternative concepts 
within the 'critical intelligentsia', as well as the responses of the elite to these challenges. It also 
examines popular pressure on the leadership, which ignited in Kosovo, and the reaction of the 
leadership to the actions of 'the people'. It is within this 'triangle' (elite, 'opposition', popular 
protests) that one needs to frame the events that unfolded in the last four years before the actual 
disintegration of Yugoslavia.
It is argued that the new situation was initially produced neither by members of the elite, nor by 
the masses, but by individuals and groups within the 'critical intelligentsia'. However, once the 
new political agenda was set up through the media and by direct popular pressure, the leadership 
(especially in Slovenia and Serbia) took the initiative, trying to canalise and control popular 
protests. But, as was the case in the 1967-1974 period (described in Chapter Three), the elite itself 
was divided on how to react to the new challenges.
A new wave of political conflict in Serbia ended with victory for the 'revolutionists' led by 
Slobodan Milosevic , over the 'institutionalists', represented by Ivan Stambolic. The 1987 conflict 
within the LC Serbia was the last intra-party and intra-republican conflict on a large scale. As a 
consequence of the 'unity ' achieved within Serbia (and -  as will be explained in the next chapter -  
within Slovenia) by 1988 two clearly different concepts had emerged in Yugoslavia: one insisted 
on further confederalisation of the state and of the Party and was most strongly represented by 
Slovenia; while the other (Serbian) used a revolutionary methods to change the Constitution and 
establish a 'socialist' and 'united' Yugoslavia. They both moved away from the Kardelj concept, 
but in opposite directions. This is how the constitutive concept of the Fourth Yugoslavia ceased to 
be the main glue of its identity. Unlike in previous cases (analysed earlier in this thesis) Kardelj's 
ideology no longer had an integrative function. Instead, two new narratives were now invented 
(by the joint action of the elite and its 'opposition') in a major shift, which ultimately led to the 
disintegration of the Party and of the state, both of which were functions of the ideology that 
created them. Left without its ideological glue, both Party and state became unsustainable.
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6.1. Intellectual Dissent in Yugoslavia
Regrettably, lack of space makes it impossible for us to analyse in detail the origins, main points 
and development of Serbian nationalism throughout the 1980s.1 Instead, we can only briefly map 
out the main elements of the new narrative, as it emerged in this period, challenging (and thus 
influencing) the actions of the political elites. Our main focus will, however, remain on the political 
elites and their reaction to these challenges.
As Dragovic Soso points out (1999), the relationship between the Yugoslav regime and its 
'dissidents' differed from that between most East European states and their opponents. Although 
Yugoslav intellectuals frequently criticised the regime (as documented in the previous two 
chapters), it was only in exceptional circumstances that the state reacted to such criticism by brutal 
coercion.2 Unlike their counter-parts in the Soviet bloc, the Yugoslav dissidents published at home3 
and in general (with the exception of Milovan Djilas and Mihajlo Mihajlov) attracted less attention 
in the West.4 There were three main reasons for this.
First, Kardelj's concept promoted the notion of 'constructive criticism' of the regime from 
within itself. The ideological basis for this was found in the vanguard role of the Party and the 
scientific character of Marxism (as explained in Chapter Two). The Party and science (especially the 
social sciences) were allies (not 'partners') in building socialism. Even those whose views were not 
strictly Marxist (and thus could not be represented within the LCY) were, at least verbally, 
encouraged to participate in public debate within the Socialist Alliance of Working People. The 
boundaries of what was socially acceptable were much more flexible than in any other East
1 Several PhD theses, the best of which were by Veljko Vujacic and Jasna Dragovic Soso, as well as several articles and 
books, have recently analysed this dimension. I refer readers to these analyses.
2 According to Stipe Suvar's report at the Seventh CC LCY ssssion in April 1987, in the five years between 1981 and 1985, 
there were 36 bans on publications: ten newspapers, 16 books, 3 journals, two calendars, two tourist prospectuses, one 
geographical map, one bulletin and one poster. One here needs to take into account that censorship in Yugoslavia did not 
officially exist, and in practical terms it was easier for a book to be published than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Also, this 
was a period of 'counter-revolution' in Kosovo and of the rise of the 'critical intelligentsia' in Belgrade. Between 1982 and 
1987, 2,443 people were charged for 'political delicts' (1,748 for 'verbal delicts'). The largest number of them were from 
Kosovo (1,020), followed by Croatia (473), Serbia without provinces (306) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (291). In Slovenia 90, in 
Montenegro 71, in Macedonia 51 and in Vojvodina 37 people were charged with 'political crimes' (Suvar, 1988:131).
3 This does not mean, however, that it was the same situation in all the Yugoslav republics. In the early 1980s, the most 
tolerant was Serbia, followed by Slovenia. The situation was more difficult for dissidents in the other republics.
4 In this sense, Havel's definition of 'dissidence' (1978/1991:168) could hardly apply to the Yugoslav 'critical intelligentsia'. 
In strict sense, the term 'opposition' is as inadequate as 'dissidents'. In the real terms opposition exists only in parliamentary 
systems, in which there is freedom of expression. In the socialist societies of Eastern Europe, the term 'opposition' was used 
by the elite as 'the blackest of indictments, as synonymous with the word enemy, (Havel, 1978/1991:166). The Serbian 
dissidents themselves rejected both terms and preferred to call themselves the 'critical intelligentsia'. For a debate on 
dissidence in Yugoslavia see Republika, No. 179-182 (1998).
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European country. Thus state action against those who overstepped them was not like that in the 
Soviet bloc states.
Secondly, for this reason many more intellectuals in Yugoslavia than in other East 
European countries believed that the system could be gradually reformed and need not necessarily 
be overturned by a revolution. Many of them (being -  such as for example, the Praxis professors -  
Marxists themselves), restricted their criticism to deviations from what was officially proclaimed. 
With growing 'constructive criticism', including that which originated from various branches of the 
elite itself, the gap between criticism from outside the regime and from inside the regime was 
narrowing.
Finally, some of the most prominent figures among the Yugoslav 'dissidents' had long­
standing personal links with political leaders, established during the Partisan struggle or while 
they themselves still belonged to the communist establishment. Many of these friendships survived 
political break-ups, providing a certain amount of protection.
In the course of the events followed in this thesis, a fourth reason emerged: the political elites -  
being divided into two blocs (as described in Chapter Five) -  often tolerated, if not openly 
encouraged, the 'critical intelligentsia' to say what they themselves did not want to state publicly.5 
The 'dissidents', therefore, often played the role of 'probe balloons' for the elite, which used their 
existence to push forward their own options in the conflict within Yugoslav politics.
It would be, however, incorrect to assume that 'opposition' to the regime did not exist or that the 
regime did not take any action to restrict its activities. This was especially the case with those 
groups of intellectuals whose criticism Kardelj described as potentially the most damaging - the 
'radical left' groups around the Marxist philosophical journal 'Praxis', as well as those linked to the 
1968 Belgrade student protests (such as 'the black wave' in Serbian cinematography, etc.). As 
presented in Chapter Two, Tito and Kardelj had warned that the 'leftist', 'statist' and 'unitarist' 
alternatives to the 'self-managing concepts' would naturally tend to emerge within the largest 
Yugoslav nation, and, in fact, with the high levels of criticism within the Serbian political elite 
regarding the 1974 Constitution, intellectual dissent was indeed strongest in Belgrade. Tito's 
personal animosities towards Belgrade intellectual circles (whom he often criticised for their 
'carsija' mentality) had forced Serbian leaders to take several unpopular measures against them in
5 An example of such a link between intellectuals and elite is the polemic between the Serbian writer Dobrica Cosic and the 
Slovenian DuSan Pirjevec in 1961. This polemic was encouraged by two groups in the Yugoslav leadership (Pirjevec for the 
Kardeljists, Ctosic for Rankovic's supporters), as explained in Djukic/ Cosic, 1989.
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the mid-1970s. Consequently, Tito's departure was awaited among the Belgrade dissidents with 
more hopes for the future than in any other part of the country.
A nd indeed, only five months after Tito's death, in October 1980, 36 of the leading Belgrade 
dissidents addressed an open letter to the Yugoslav Presidency requesting an amnesty for those 
who had committed the offence of expressing prohibited political views (Review, 5/1983:412). In 
December 1980,102 petitioners proposed an amendment to the Criminal Law, requesting that the 
phrase in its Article 133 which sanctioned 'false description of social and political circumstances in 
the country with ill intentions' be deleted. The political elite, however, chose to ignore both 
demands.
But, when 120 intellectuals (including now some from Zagreb, Ljubljana, Sarajevo and Novi Sad) 
attem pted to launch a journal Tavnost (Public) in November 1980 the elite decided to react, perhaps 
also because the initiators were Dobrica Cosic (whose removal in 1968 we followed in Chapter 
Three) and Ljubomir Tadic (a Praxis philosopher). In their proposal, the two stressed their 
commitment to 'democratic socialism', which was -  as explained in Chapter Two - in itself 
dangerous for the elite. The 'democratic socialism' would be based on 'freedom of speech and 
effective communication, [characterised by] the synthesis of knowledge, experience and 
imagination'. But the formal application for registration of Tavnost was refused, whilst its initiators 
faced public criticism from the Federal Interior Minister Stane Dolanc for 'attempting to put 
themselves on a footing with subjective forces and to present themselves as an elite of society'. In 
his speech of 13 December 1980, Dolanc (the leading Kardeljist among the Yugoslav politicians) 
attacked those 'small groups' who 'raised their heads' in order to impose their 'monopolistic 
tendencies' over the process of understanding the problems of society (Review 5/1983:444).
Instead of gradually opening up to new initiatives, the post-Tito elite intensified its ideological 
action. In 1980 the Law on Higher Education was amended, introducing the criterion of 
'ideological, moral and political aptitude' for all teachers, instead of the much less ideological 
demand for 'appropriate social and overall behaviour'. Following this change, in January 1981 
eight Praxis professors were fired from Belgrade University on the grounds of 'seriously damaging 
social interests'. However, it was only with the Kosovo protests that the regime began to notice and 
react to initiatives by its dissident 'critical intelligentsia'.
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6.1.1. The Rise of the 'Critical Intelligentsia' as a Political Counter-Elite (1981-1984)
6 .I.I.I. Political Engagement
The brutal reaction of the elite to the protests of the Kosovo Albanians in March and April 1981 
revealed that the Yugoslav leadership was frightened of the possibility of mass protests, not unlike 
those that seriously threatened to destabilise Poland.6 For the first time, the dissidents realised that 
the regime did not have such unanimous support as it seemed to have immediately after Tito's 
death.7 The Kosovo events, therefore, sent various signals to all sides: the elite decided to toughen 
its actions against any type of opposition, while the dissidents saw new possibilities of 
compromising the regime.
Ensuing events bore this conclusion out. When, a month after the publication of his book 'The 
Woollen Times' in April 1981, the (Bosnian Serb) poet Gojko Djogo was arrested and charged with 
'insulting the highest values and symbols of the revolution' (Review 5/1983:467-91), Serbian 
intellectuals organised petitions and other forms of protest against Article 133 of the Penal Code, 
which sanctioned 'delict of thought' ('verbal delict'). When, after a long trial full of controversies, 
Djogo went to prison in March 1983, more than 100 Belgrade intellectuals petitioned Ivan 
Stambolic (then the Serbian Prime Minister) and other Serbian senior politicians to release Djogo. 
When they received no reply, the Writers' Association of Serbia launched 'Evenings of Solidarity 
with Djogo' every Wednesday in Belgrade. The sessions were sometimes attended by a couple of 
hundred' Serbian intellectuals and supported by several semi-official organisations (such as the 
Serbian Philosophical Society and the Serbian Literary Youth Organisation), becoming the main 
stage for the criticism of the regime. They now demanded that the gap between the letter of the 
Constitution and political practice be eliminated. This joint action resulted in the formation of the 
Committee for the Protection of Art Freedom in May 1982 within the Serbian Writers' Association.
6 The Party leadership debated the situation in Poland on several occasions in 1980 and 1981. According to Dusan 
Dragosavac, the then President of the LCY Presidency, there were two groups in the Yugoslav leadership regarding the 
situation. As Dragosavac explained to me in April 1998: 'One group was for unconditional condemnation of Jaruzelski's 
Martial Law. The others, including myself, argued that the Russians were already there with 400,000 soldiers, and that they 
had an additional 600,000 on their borders with Poland. They were already intervening in Polish internal affairs, and there 
was very little we could do to stop them. Secondly, the USA were strongly involved as well, especially via the Catholic 
Church and the Vatican. Hence, we concluded that the most we could do was condemn any intervention in the internal 
affairs of Poland and support Polish independence. Also, we had to say that we were against bloodshed and that we would 
oppose any military intervention or violence. The majority in the leadership accepted this position, and the differences 
vanished soon afterwards. However, some Communist Parties, such as for example Carrillo's Spanish Communists, 
criticised our politics. Carrillo thought this was too mild towards the Russians. He was somehow anti-Soviet all the way 
through.'
7 As Dobrica Cbsic admitted in his diaries on 13 May 1980, 'all anti-Titoists [were] confused by the way people [were] 
reacting to Tito's death. Such grief, especially among the young people, [was] confusing' (1992:39).
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This institution (chaired first by Zoran Gluscevic, then by Vuk Draskovic8) soon became a symbol 
of democratic resistance to the regime.
Such a strong reaction surprised the political elite and showed up the internal divisions within it. 
The non-Serbian leaders urged the Serbian communists to condemn the actions of the Belgrade 
intellectuals, who were undermining the stability of the country. It was still expected that the 
Serbian communists would act against the Serbian 'opposition' without any interference from 
outside. But, the Serbian leaders felt that the other republics in Yugoslavia (and even more, the 
provinces) wanted to redirect attention from the causes (the position of Serbia in Yugoslavia) to the 
consequences (the growing opposition to the regime in Serbia). Having personal links with some of 
the main dissidents, and being themselves critical towards the implementation of the 1974 
Constitution, the Serbian leaders hesitated to take firm action. This was only confirmed w hen in 
June 1983, after only three months, Gojko Djogo was released from prison on grounds of 'poor 
health'.9 The last 'protest evening' by the Serbian Writers' Association was held soon after - in June
1983.
In August 1983 Aleksandar Rankovic died and about 100.000 people in Belgrade attended his 
funeral, applauding all the way to the cemetery. Rankovic's funeral was a demonstration of the 
discontent of many Serbs with his ousting from office in 1966, but also a sign of solidarity with 
those who (like Dobrica Cosic) criticised the Brioni Yugoslavia. At the same time, it was a 
demonstration of the growing anti-Albanian atmosphere, which gained much strength in the two 
years after the 'counter-revolution in Kosovo'. The Federal Party Presidency convened to criticise 
Ivan Stambolic (between 1982 and 1984 the president of Belgrade Party Organisation) for 'losing 
control in Belgrade'. Stambolic, already suspected for his role in writing the 'Blue Book' (1977) and 
in 'the case of Draza Markovic' (1982), narrowly survived this criticism, but he never regained the 
full trust of the other Yugoslav leaders. As explained in Chapter Five of this thesis, Serbia was 
slowly but persistently slipping towards further isolation within Yugoslavia.
Seeing Stambolic not reacting to the growing opposition in Belgrade, the federal police (led by the 
Interior Minister Stane Dolanc) took further steps. In April 1984 the police raided a session of the 
'flying university' and arrested 28 its participants, including Milovan Djilas. All of them  but six 
were released the next morning, while the trial of these six 'New Left' intellectuals was organised
8 Ever since then Vuk Draskovic has been one of the leading figures of the Serbian opposition. While in the 1990 elections he 
was the leading candidate of the Serbian nationalists, he later evolved towards a more moderate political position.
9 The Serbian opposition celebrated the decision as a significant political victory. But, the Serbian political leaders now came 
under a new wave of pressure from their colleagues in the federal leadership for being 'soft' on or even sympathetic to 
Serbian 'nationalism'.
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later that year. At the same time the trial of the young University lecturer Vojislav Seselj started in 
Sarajevo. In an unpublished manuscript commissioned by the Belgrade 'Komunist' newspaper (the 
official newspaper of the LC Serbia), which police found while searching his flat, Seselj proposed to 
abolish four of the eight Yugoslav federal units, by abolishing the two provinces (Vojvodina and 
Kosovo) and incorporating Montenegro, Macedonia and the largest part of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
within Serbia.10
The wave of repression by the post-Titoist leadership against the Kosovo demonstrators and 
'opposition' throughout the country initiated a new wave of protests by Serbian intellectuals, 
which alerted the foreign press and governments to the political trials. It was on this occasion that 
19 prominent Belgrade intellectuals (twelve of whom were members of the Serbian Academy of 
Science and Arts) formed the Committee for the Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression, 
chaired by Dobrica Cosic. In the next five years (1984-1989) the Committee sent more than 100 
letters to political institutions in protest against violation of fundamental rights. Although the 
Committee originally invited Croatian and Slovenian writers to join, they politely refused, already 
doubtful about the treatment of the national question in the new initiatives of the Serbian 'critical 
intelligentsia'. The Committee, nevertheless, took an interest in the violation of fundamental rights 
in other parts of Yugoslavia, protesting against the arrest of Alija Izetbegovic and other Muslim 
intellectuals in Sarajevo (1983), as well as against that of Vlado Gotovac and other Croatian 
intellectuals associated with the 1971 Croatian Spring. It also organised several petitions in defence 
of Albanians prosecuted for 'hostile propaganda' and 'counter-revolution' following the 1981 
unrest in Kosovo. In 1986, the Committee established a 'Solidarity Fund' which secured financial 
support for those 'whose existence (was) threatened because of their critical views and social 
activism'. By 1986 the Belgrade intellectual dissidents had already created institutions through 
which they co-ordinated their actions against the regime. Democratisation and regionalisation of 
the media and the overall atmosphere of criticism (both within the elite and from 'constructive 
critics' of the regime) helped publicise their views. More dependent on international financial 
support than ever before, Yugoslav political leaders found it much more difficult to ignore protests 
by foreign institutions about hum an rights and even -  as in the case of the Belgrade Six Trial -  by 
their fellow communists in western countries.11 As a result, both the Djogo case and the Belgrade 
Six trial proved to be a complete disaster for the regime. In the Belgrade case, one of the six
10 The Seselj trial followed earlier charges against a group of Muslim intellectuals (including Alija Izetbegovic) accused of 
spreading 'Islamic Fundamentalism' in Bosnia. Izetbegovic was charged on the basis of his book published 12 years earlier 
('Islam Between East and West') and received a long prison sentence.
11 This was especially obvious when Enrico Berlinguer, the head of the Italian Communist party, supported the Six and even 
announced his wish to attend the trial.
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defendants was acquitted, two saw their trials indefinitely postponed, while only three received 
sentences, ranging from one to two years. The Serbian Supreme Court then even acquitted one of 
these three, while reducing the sentences of the remaining two to eighteen and eight months 
respectively. At the same time, Vojislav Seselj in Sarajevo (one of the strongholds of the 'Kardeljist' 
section of the political elite) was sentenced to eight years. This demonstrated the differences within 
the elite on the issue of reacting to the 'opposition' and the obvious lack of any federal platform 
regarding the use of coercion.
6.I.I.2. 'The Literature of Apocalypse'
Apart from the openly political activities of the 'critical intelligentsia' in the early 1980s many of the 
leading participants in these protests had published literary works in which they underm ined the 
main constitutive myths of Yugoslav socialism.12 Four of the main points presented in the literature 
of the early 1980s were shared by authors of different ethnic backgrounds, while some of them 
were exclusively argued by Serbian authors. Among those argued by those in all parts of 
Yugoslavia were:
First, the main argument of Kardelj's concept, that Yugoslavia offered a viable alternative 
to Soviet experience, was undermined in a series of articles and books on 'anti-Stalinist Stalinism'. 
A wave of books on the coercion used against the 'Stalinists' in 1948 (on the Adriatic Naked Island - 
Goli Otok) emphasised these points. The 'prison literature' described the inhumane character of 
Yugoslav socialism, which was based on the destruction of individual freedoms for the sake of 
ideological doctrines. Their authors argued that Tito was not substantially different from Stalin and 
thus the regime he created was just one of the variants of the Soviet model (Gruenwald, 1987). It 
was clearly argued that Tito became the CPY leader as Stalin's choice and remained a 'Soviet agent' 
throughout the wartime period (Cencic, 1981).
Secondly, the Partisans' role in the Liberation War was now re-interpreted. Contrary to the 
official interpretation that the Partisans were the only anti-fascist force in the country, several 
authors now argued that they were just one of many sides fighting the civil war. The bulk of the 
literature in Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia argued that the Partisans were perhaps even less sincere 
about their true political intentions than the others. They came to power by hiding their true
12 Ramet (1985:104-7) argues that five topics were kept out of public debate throughout the whole period of Titoism: 1) 
criticism of non-aligned foreign policy; 2) Tito's personal role and the official version of the Partisan struggle (including the 
main enemies of the Partisans, such as the Chetniks and Ustashas); 3) promotion of religious views and of any 'political1 
activity of churches; 4) criticism of the state's nationality policy; and 5) any discussions of military issues and - especially - 
any criticism of the Yugoslav People's Army. By 1984, all these areas had come under either openly political or literary 
criticism from the 'dissidents'.
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intentions both from their own people and from their international allies (the British and the 
Soviets). Not only did they take power by deliberately misleading the public about the communist 
character of their struggle, but they continued to con foreign governments for the whole period of 
Titoism. The West was misled about the real face of Tito's regime, they argued.
Thirdly, as a consequence of such an interpretation, some authors in Croatia (for example, 
Franjo Tudjman, later President of Croatia), Slovenia (Spomenka Hribar) and Serbia (Dobrica 
Cosic, later the first President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) demanded 'national 
reconciliation' within their respective nations. It was time to end the war, they argued. Instead of 
further divisions based on the Partisan -  Chetniks (in Serbia), Partisan -  Ustashas (in Croatia) and 
Partisan -  White Guard (Slovenia) WWII splits, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes should 'end ' the last 
war, primarily because its legacy was still being used to divide the nations into those 'included' 
and those 'excluded'.
Finally, in several accounts published in the early 1980s, Tito's personality and politics 
were examined in a critical light. The controversies about his pre-war life were emphasised even by 
Tito's personal biographer Vladimir Dedijer's 'New Contributions to the Biography of Josip Broz 
Tito' in 1981.13 That Tito remained 'the Comintern's agent' was evident, the nationalist stream of the 
Serbian opposition now claimed, from his political actions which followed the hostile line that the 
Comintern had taken towards the existence of Yugoslavia. This unprecedented criticism of Tito 
culminated in Antonije Isakovic's public demand for a 're-evaluation of Tito's role' in his speech in 
the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (SANU) on 27 September 1984.
There was, however, additional criticism of Tito and the Communist myths promoted by Serbian 
authors exclusively.
First, for the first time ever, the Chetniks ('the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland'), the most 
exclusively Serb fighters in WWII, were presented to the Yugoslav public as anti-fascists as well 
(most notably in Veselin Djuretic's 1986 book 'The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama'). For the 
reasons explained in Chapter Two of this thesis (fear of Serbian supremacy and of a 'return to the 
past') the official ideology treated the Chetniks as the main internal enemies of the Yugoslav 
Partisans during the War. Serbian writers, such as Vuk Draskovic (in his novel 'Noz'), now argued
13 Dedijer's controversial biography of Tito was published in Rijeka (Croatia) in 1981 and it was sold out in a month. After 
Vrhovec's criticism, the publishing house refused to publish a second edition. Dedijer, a Montenegrin who supported Djilas 
in 1954 but then moved back to Tito, lived in Slovenia. He complained that the Federal Police (led by Stane Dolanc) bugged 
his home, stole some of his documents and even murdered his son. Vrhovec thinks Dedijer was paranoid (Interview with 
Vrhovec, April 1998).
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that they were a spontaneous defensive movement created by those patriotic soldiers and officers 
of the legitimate Yugoslav Army who did not wish to obey their supreme command and to 
surrender to the occupiers after the 17-days war in April 1941. On the other hand, the Partisans 
were an organised ideological sect, concerned only with their own ideological goals rather than 
with the fate of their people and their country. The Partisans, it was argued, did not start their 
resistance before 22 June 1941, but only after and as a consequence of Germany's attack on the 
Soviet Union. They did not care about Yugoslavia (which was, as the Comintern had argued 
earlier, only an 'artificial creation' of World Imperialism); only the Soviet Union and the 
international socialist revolution were of concern to them.
Secondly, the Serbian authors now addressed the mass exterminations of the Serbs by 
Croats and Muslims in the wartime Independent State of Croatia (NDH).14 One after the other, the 
authors (such as Draskovic, Lubarda, Radulovic, etc.), often deeply influenced by tragedies that 
happened to their own families during the war, accused the Communist Party of trying to cover up 
these massacres and the post-war tensions between Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Croatia. 
Instead of facing the horror of the war and the deep scars that were still fresh in these regions, the 
elite turned a blind eye on inter-ethnic tensions, doing nothing to prevent their re-emergence. 
Consequently, it was claimed that Titoist Yugoslavia was not much better to its Serbian population 
than Ustashas' Croatia.15
Thirdly, the Communist interpretation of the Chetnik movement, which equated it with 
the genocidal Ustashas' regime, and the deliberate misinterpretation of the WWII sufferings of the 
Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, now became symbols of Serbian humiliation in 
Yugoslavia. The Serbs, being a majority in both anti-fascist movements, were the only ones who 
had fought against their occupiers for justice and who in fact liberated others from their own 
collaborators. But what did they receive in return? The 1985 best-selling novel The Book about 
Milutin by Danko Popovic summarises the answer: the Serbs gained nothing from Yugoslavia, for 
which they fought in the First World War and in which they suffered injustice ever after. As the
14 It is important to note that the Independent State of Croatia, run by the Ustashas1 Poglavnik Ante Pavelic, extended to most 
of today's Croatia (without Istria and the northern part of Dalmatia) and the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crimes 
committed by the Croatian Ustashas were now attributed to the whole of the Croatian and Muslim nations. While in the 
Partisan interpretation, the Ustashas were a minority of the Croats who sided with the occupiers (just like the Chetniks were 
treated as a small part of the Serbian nation that betrayed national interests), they now became representatives of both 
Croats and Muslims. The re-interpretation of the WW II role of these two nations had an enormous impact on further 
events, practically setting the agenda for military conflict between the Serbs on the one hand and the Croats and Muslims 
on the other in 1990-1995.
15 An open statement to this effect was expressed in the 1986 'Memorandum' of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 
which claimed (1986/1996:327) that 'Serbs in Croatia have been exposed to a subtle and effective policy of assimilation.'
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disappointed Serbian domadn Milutin, the main character of the novel, argued, the Serbs had 
fooled themselves in attempting to live with the others, instead of turning to themselves. Popovic's 
book, which was re-printed a dozen times and sold several hundred thousand copies, became the 
strongest literary expression of an alternative option for Serbia - to opt out of Yugoslavia in which 
she had lost 'in peace1 everything she had won 'in wars'. Popovic's novel, written in simple and 
accessible language, was the most explicit example of the forthcoming shift of many Serbian 
nationalist writers from 'Yugoslavism' to 'Serbianism'.16
Through both the political and the literary engagement of the Serbian 'critical intelligentsia', one 
simple message, formulated in Dobrica Cosic's 1978 Inaugural Speech to the Serbian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, entered the public discourse:
'In Europe there is no other small nation that in the last two centuries, and particularly in 
the 20th, has been so burdened by history and has made such sacrifices for the goal of 
liberation and the improvement of its existence as the Serbian nation... In the same century 
we survived Austro-Hungarian, fascist and Ustasha genocides, and in terms of our hum an 
losses we have been brought to the limits of biological extinction... What kind of a nation 
are we, what kind of people, that in wars we die so willingly for freedom and in peace we 
lose it?' (Cosic, 1982:126-31).
Words such as 'genocide' and 'ethnic cleansing' entered the public debate, making a link between 
the Serbian past (WWII) and present (Kosovo) sufferings. Nowhere was this link between the 
tragic past and present expressed more closely than in Kosovo, the Serbian Academicians argued.
'The physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo 
and Metohija is the worst defeat in the battles for liberation that Serbia waged from 1804 
until the revolution in 1941' (SANU Memorandum, 1986).
The sense of defeat was only underlined by the fact that it was to the Albanians that the Serbs had 
to 'surrender'. The sense of Serbian 'spiritual superiority' (developed again by the m yth of the 
'heavenly people', built upon various interpretations of the 1389 Kosovo Polje Battle) was now 
released again by the nationalist opposition.17 Again, this was described in Popovic's 'Book about 
Milutin':
16 Eight years later, Danko Popovic argued that Milosevic's attempt to use Serbia's citizens (such as his Milutin) to fight for 
'another grandiose political project, such as unification with the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, was in fact one in a line of 
tragic decisions by Serbia's politicians in the 20th century'. The Serbian peasants, such as he described in his 1985 book, 
willingly went to war to fight and to die, but were ultimately betrayed by the ludicrous projects of their politicians (see 
Pavkovic, 1998:517).
17 A good illustration of this feeling was the answer of an anonymous Montenegrin respondent to Slovene sociologists in an 
opinion poll conducted in 1989. There was still 'an inherited belief that they [Albanians] are something of a 'lower race1', he 
said. 'In fact, they now have an inferiority complex and believe that as soon as they say they are Albanians, I would 
immediately think of them as lower than I. They believe that we treat them worse because they are Albanians' (Gaber and 
Kuzmanic, 1989:252). One should, however, admit that ethnic prejudice against Albanians did not exist only among the
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'If God had wanted us to surrender, he would have sent an enemy to whom we could 
surrender, not Albanians... What would the Germans think of us, and would they respect 
us if we surrendered to them? Is it not so? We had stronger and more civilised enemies 
than the Albanians, yet we did not surrender. How could we now become their prisoners? 
Should we stoop that low? Not that I am a hero, but again, I would be ashamed if I had to 
surrender to them. Also, I wonder, what do they think of us when they w ant us to 
surrender to them?' (Popovic, 1986:26).
'The fate of Kosovo,' they claimed, had now become a 'm atter of life and death for the Serbian
people/
6.2. The (Croatian) Political Elite's Reaction: The White Book (1984)
When the police action (organised by Dolanc) collapsed in 1983-1984, the Croatian party 
ideologues Josip Vrhovec18 and Stipe Suvar19 took the initiative to launch a political (ideological) 
'counter-offensive* against the 'opposition'. Following its 1982 Congress, the Croatian Party 
leadership organised a series of 'advisory seminars' with its prominent members in various areas of 
the 'cultural and public sphere' in order to debate the public criticism of the regime. In preparation 
for these meetings, the Party administration produced six internal party 'books', in which quotes 
from newspapers contending with various criticisms of the regime were presented.20
The seventh party publication (which would later be named 'the White Book' in the opposition 
press) was used in the preparation for a seminar 'On some ideological and political tendencies in 
art creativity, literary, theatre and film criticism, and on public speeches by a number of creative
Serbs but also among other Yugoslav nations (as demonstrated by a Slovene Public Opinion Poll which revealed a strong 
social distance between Slovenes and Albanians in 1987 (Tos: 1987; and Pantic, 1987).
18 In 1982-1983 Vrhovec was a member and in 1983-1984 President of the Croatian LC CC Presidency. In 1984 he became the 
Croatian representative in the Federal State Presidency, where he remained until his retirement in 1989. He was also a 
member of the LCY CC.
19 Suvar was among the most colourful political figures in Croatia. As one of the most open critics of the Croatian 
nationalists in 1967-1971, he was likened to Croatia's leading politician Vladimir Bakaric. As Croatia's Education and 
Culture Secretary in 1974-1982, Suvar was associated with the re-ideologisation of schools (introduction of Marxism, 
destruction of the 'old school system' and implementation of the Kardeljist concept of self-management in education). In 
1982 he became the main ideologue for the Croatian Party, the position from which he moved to the Federal Party 
Presidency as ideologue (1986-1988) and President (1988-1989). In 1989 he replaced Josip Vrhovec as Croatia's 
representative (and Vice-President) in the Federal State Presidency, to remain there until the election of the CDC majority in 
Croatia's Parliament in 1990.
20 The topics of these 'books' in 1982 were: 'recent criticism of Miroslav Krleza' (25 February 1982), 'Goli Otok and the 
Informbiro' (14 April 1982), 'The de-mythification of the past' (10 May 1982), 'The role of the media' (16 July 1982), 'Some 
political, social and ideological tendencies' (1 February 1983) and 'On historiography' in general (May 1983). But, it was not 
before the seventh of the 'books' was written that the public knew of their existence.
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artists in which politically unacceptable messages have been expressed', held in Zagreb in April 
1984. The 'White Book' was a collection of excerpts from interviews and articles by about 120 
authors (ninety of whom were Serbian, a dozen or two Slovene, while only a few were Croatian)21 
in the four years following Tito's death. It also presented poems and aphorisms, which the 
(anonymous) bureaucrats in the Party apparatus found unacceptable. Occasionally, these quotes 
would be commented on, but in most of the cases problematic lines of poems or other texts would 
simply be underlined.
The document warned about growing opposition to the regime and sought prom pt reaction by 
Communists in cultural institutions and in the media. In introducing the 'book against book' 
method, the organisers of the Conference opposed any action of coercion against the authors and 
publications and urged 'ideological action' and 'Communist struggle' in public against their 
opponents. Suvar argued that although the main danger for the future of Yugoslav socialism still 
came from disunity within the Party, the struggle against the growing opposition to the regime 
should not be neglected. Like Kardelj before him, Suvar believed that the clarity of the ideas for 
which the Communists fought was the main pre-condition for success.
The document concluded that much of the contemporary literary production painted Yugoslav 
reality in such dark colours, that it deliberately misinterpreted it.22 Suvar argued that if the trends 
were not reversed, the country would be led into another civil war, since the ideas expressed 
destabilised not only socialism but the country's independence in general.
Not surprisingly, Suvar's initiative met with a sharp reaction from Belgrade and Ljubljana 
dissidents, who made up almost 80 percent of those quoted in the 'White Book'. Appalled by what 
they saw as a nationalist and dogmatist attack from Zagreb on free-minded intellectuals in 
Belgrade and Ljubljana, more than 100 writers signed a petition to the Yugoslav Party Presidency
21 As Lazar Stojanovic explains in an interview for this dissertation (1998), the regime showed more tolerance to books than 
to newspapers and especially to electronic media, since the books were read by a limited number of people and could not 
really influence public opinion. This is how one can explain the publishing of many non-Communist or even openly anti- 
Communist authors in Yugoslavia, including leading East European dissidents (Havel, Kundera, etc.). The regime even 
used these books to show the advantages of the Yugoslav model of socialism, as opposed to its Soviet counterpart. It was 
also relatively easy to buy and import any book in foreign languages, since the borders were fairly open. Ramet concluded 
(1985:5) that 'in Yugoslavia, one encounters the curious example of a communist regime which, in the last severed years, has 
repeatedly allowed its publishing houses to publish highly critical and controversial material, only to subject these same 
works to vilification in the press for anti-socialist views' (1985:5). This openness somewhat changed in 1983 when a deposit 
for foreign travel was introduced for economic reasons (explained in Chapter Four).
22 This was not only the Croatian Party ideologue's conclusion: some Western analysts too spoke about the 'apocalypse 
culture' that had developed in Yugoslav literature (Ramet, 1985:2-26).
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seeking protection from the emerging 'Stalinism1.23 Knjizevne novine and Knjizevna Rec protested 
against the 'Index Librorum Prohibitorum', calling it 'the Black Book of Yugoslav dogmatism' in an 
unprecedented series of anti-regime articles. Suvar's action, which intended to replace police 
repression by a public dialogue, now faced an opposition as strong as if faced with brutal police 
coercion itself.
However, w hat surprised Serbian and Slovene writers much more than Suvar's 'ideological 
offensive' was the fact that 150 leading Croatian intellectuals participated in the meeting, only a 
few of whom disagreed with the methods and content of the 'White Book'.24 Not all of the 
participants were party members, but none of them was really an opponent of the regime either. 
This was a demonstration of the unusual closeness between the Croatian Party and a large segment 
of the Croatian intelligentsia, both of whom were already concerned with what they saw as a 
Serbian nationalist offensive. But, it was also a demonstration of how detailed the purge of 
independently-minded Croatian intellectuals in the decade following the 'Croatian Spring' (1971) 
actually was. Dozens of Croatian intellectuals, labeled as nationalists, were still entirely out of the 
public sphere, while those few promoting liberal and democratic Yugoslav ideas flew to Ljubljana 
and (especially) to Belgrade to publish there, rather than at home.25 Considering the dozens of 
Croatian popular writers in 'internal exile',26 and others outside the country, as well as the main 
participants in the Croatian Spring either imprisoned27 or become 'non-existent people', the
23 Evidence for Suvar's 'Stalinism' was found when the Czechoslovak ambassador to Belgrade praised his 'White Book' in a 
public interview with Yugoslav Television for criticising publishing houses that published novels and plays of the 
Czechoslovak dissidents Kundera and Havel.
24 The meeting was open to the media -  and I remember attending it as a journalist for Polet. Short and authorised versions 
of the speeches were later published in 'Nase teme', the official journal of the Croatian LC. Only four out of more than 50 
speakers opposed some aspects of the 'White Book' material. The summary of the context of 'White Book' is here given 
from reading the document itself. In 1985, a publishing house in Belgrade attempted -  unsuccessfully -  to publish the 
'White Book'. The police prevented it, claiming that, in this case, quotes from Djogo's banned book would be reprinted too. 
The 'White Book' has never been available to the general public.
25 The visible weakness of dissidence in Croatia should be compared with the absence of Slovaks from any common action 
of the opposition in Czechoslovakia. Among the first 243 signatures collected for Charter 77, only one was that of a 
dissident living permanently in Slovakia (Wehrle, 1994:254, quoted in Innes, 1995:125). Czech dissident Frantisek Kriegel 
argued (in 1977) that this was only a reflection of the fact that 'the Slovak minority exercised power over the Czech majority, 
although the federation meant to establish parity' (Innes, 1995:125). The same argument was put forward by the Serbian 
nationalist opposition in the late 1980s, especially in the SANU Memorandum (1986). They argued that the 1974 
Constitution accomplished most of what the Croatian nationalists had been aiming at. For a detailed account of the 
relationship between the Croatian Spring and the Constitutional changes in 1967-1974 see Chapter Three.
26 Authors such as Igor Mandic, Predrag Matvejevic, etc. were welcome to publish in Belgrade magazines, while Nova 
Revija and Mladina, opposition publications in Ljubljana, published even the Croatian nationalists such as Dobroslav 
Paraga, Vlado Gotovac and Vladimir Seks. Throughout the 1980s the Belgrade media were open to all those who could not 
publish in their republics. This fact was exploited by the Serbian nationalist opposition when the Slovene and Croatian 
writers 'turned their backs' on them in die late 1980s.
27 Leading Croatian poet Vlado Gotovac, historian Franjo Tudjman, economist Marko Veselica, student leaders Drazen 
Budisa and Ivan Zvonimir Cicak were all imprisoned following 'the Croatian Spring'. The leading Communists of the 
period, such as Savka Dabcevic Kufiar and Miko Tripalo were forced to abstain from any public activity. 'We shall not jail 
you, but shall not allow any public activity either,' Vladimir Bakaric told Miko Tripalo on the day of Tripalo's dismissal
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massive attendance of 150 people at Suvar's debate gave only a partially correct impression of the 
real situation in Zagreb.
At the same time, Suvar himself was surprised when he learned that many within the Croatian 
Party leadership and the majority of the Serbian party leaders were equally outraged by his 
initiative. The Serbian leaders saw it as yet another intrusion into 'Serbian internal affairs' and as a 
sign of the lack of confidence of the Croatian Communists in their Serbian comrades. W hat Suvar 
had done was a clear violation of the main principle: that Serbian nationalism should be fought 
against by Serbian Communists, while the Croatian Communists were expected to oppose (for any 
practical purpose -  only) Croatian nationalism. Additionally, the 'White Book' initiative was seen 
as another attem pt to accuse Serbian leaders of being 'soft' on Serbian nationalism and to re-direct 
public attention from the main issues (such as the economic crisis and the constitutional position of 
Serbia) to less important issues (such as ideological struggle). Croatia was now once again accused 
of ideological 'vanguardism' and 'lecturing' (patronising) Serbia.28
Ivan Stambolic, who became President of the Serbian Party Presidency in 1984, complained about 
Suvar's initiative to the new Croatian Party President Mika Spiljak, initiating at the same time a 
debate within the Federal party leadership about the whole affair. Spiljak, whose personal 
animosity towards Suvar was a consequence of a widespread perception in the Croatian and 
Yugoslav political elite that Suvar was becoming 'the new Bakaric' (Bilandzic, 1986)29 and thus the 
most serious of Spiljak's contenders for the position of Party President of Croatia, concluded that 
Suvar's initiative led Croatia into conflict with the Slovenian and Serbian leadership. He therefore 
ordered Suvar to shelve his ideological counter-offensive. In order to downplay the whole affair, 
the ideological commissions of the Serbian and Croatian Central Committees met twice in late
1984. 'The Serbs were furious at these meetings,' said Sime Pilic, then the Executive Secretary to the 
Croatian Central Committee, in an interview for this thesis in January 1998:
following the Croatian Spring in January 1972 (Tripalo, 1990). Indeed, no alternative interpretation of the events was 
allowed till 1990, and police reacted harshly to any sign of 'Croatian nationalism' even in its most benign form.
28 For similar accusations of 'vanguardism' in the late 1960s and before December 1971 see Chapter Three.
29 In the whole period between 1945 until his death in 1983, Bakaric was the unchallenged leader of Croatia. His support for 
the controversial Suvar was a crucial element in Suvar's promotion to both Croatian minister of Culture and Education 
(1974-1982) and ideologue of the Croatian Party (1982-1986). Suvar, just like Bakaric in earlier years, portrayed himself as 
the most intellectual member of the Croatian leadership. On the other side, Spiljak had a working-class background. Bakaric 
disliked him and suspected him of 'unitarism1. For this reason, Spiljak was 'sent' to Federal positions in Belgrade where he 
was first the Yugoslav Prime Minister, then president of a Chamber of the Yugoslav Federal Assembly and President of the 
Yugoslav Unions Federation. As the Croatian politician with the longest federal career, he replaced Bakaric as member of 
the Federal Presidency and became its president in 1983-1984. Finally, in 1984 he returned to Croatia to chair the Croatian 
Party Presidency, the place of real power. The conflict between Spiljak and Suvar (i.e., between their proteges) in the whole 
period of 1984-1990 was the main reason for the weakness of the Croatian leadership and for its inability to play an 
adequate role on the Yugoslav political scene.
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'They argued that this was a violation of democratic centralism and that their position in 
Serbia had been significantly weakened by our action. They said that the Serbian public 
saw the 'White Book' as a punch in the face of the Serbian party. The opposition was now 
accusing them of not being able to protect the dignity of Serbia and the processes of 
liberalisation within it.'
The Serbian Party Secretary Spiro Galovic was open enough to say that 'to talk endlessly about the 
enemies of socialism, and at the same time to leave out one's own responsibility for the socialist 
content of social trends, was a typical bureaucratic characteristic and one of the means of 
defending the status quo.'30 The Serbian Communists put Suvar's initiative into the context of the 
constitutional debate, in which Croatia was, together with Slovenia, the most stubborn opponent of 
any changes to the 1974 Constitution. In fact, the Serbs believed that the crisis of socialism could 
not be resolved by ideological offensives, but only by cutting the roots of the crisis - which they 
saw in the 'illogical' position of Serbia following the implementation of the 1974 Constitution.
In contrast, Suvar believed that Yugoslav Communists should not stop their activities in front of 
the borders of other republics and provinces. In his article in the Party official review 'Sociializam' 
(January 1985) Suvar explained his motives for the 'White Book':
'We need to normalise relations in the whole country. As Communists, and as citizens, we 
need to know what is happening in each corner of our country, in national and social 
territories in which we do not live, as well as in those where we do. And not only m ust we 
know it, but discuss it openly and intervene in it. In this respect, there should be no 
divisions into 'ours' and 'theirs', like 'foreign' territories. We are all inter-linked by our 
destiny, and any nationalism should be of equal concern to all of us, because they are all 
against us, they all work to head us off. The only condition we need to meet before we 
criticise others is that we ourselves have done the same with regard to our own nation, 
where we live... And this is not always the case today, and therefore some of us have lost 
the moral legitimacy to talk about the others...' (Suvar, 1985:48).
Suvar 's criticism was clearly addressed to Serbian leaders but also to Spiljak's group in the 
Croatian leadership. As one of the leading opponents of 'Croatian nationalism' in and after 1971, 
Suvar now warned his colleagues against 'opportunism' and divisions into 'our' and 'their' matters.
By his open conflict with the Serbian leadership, Suvar promoted himself as a potential leader of a 
growing majority in the Yugoslav party elite, dissatisfied with the trends in Serbia. Vojvodina and 
Kosovo, but also Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina now began to treat him as the viable 
alternative to nationalism and 'opportunism', hoping that he was the right person to keep alight
30 Nin, 25 November 1984. The same argument was expressed in several speeches by Slobodan Milosevic in these years. 
Milosevic remained convinced that the Party should have a 'positive programme', rather than being focussed on criticism of 
its opponents.
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'the flame of the revolution1, while not endangering the basic construct of the 1974 Constitution. 
This belief was shared by the generation of old Partisans and by the Army, the most Titoist 
segments of the political elite, which was concerned with the growing trends of anti-Communism 
in Serbia. They were favourable to him not only because Suvar had built up a reputation as a true 
Yugoslav and as of a follower of Bakaric, but also because Croatia (unlike Slovenia and Serbia) was 
an example of an 'opposition-free' territory. These groups in the Party would bring Suvar to the 
position of Yugoslav Party President in 1988, and would subsequently shield him from Serbian 
demands for him to resign, from Croatian 'plots' against him, and from Slovenian discontent with 
his refusal to accept a more 'social-democratic' position. But, they would not be able to marginalise 
Milosevic's influence in Serbia, well secured by the same confederalist principles that Suvar 
defended while arguing in favour of the constitutional status quo.
Suvar's action in 1984 aimed at uniting Yugoslav Communists in their fight against the democratic 
opposition. But it produced rather different results: new divisions within the Party, both within 
republics and between them. The fact that these divisions became public only further encouraged 
the opposition which saw them as yet another of its successes. But most of all, the events following 
the 'White Book' seriously undermined Stambolic's position in Yugoslavia and more notably in 
Serbia. Already treated as a 'Serbian nationalist', a title he 'inherited' from his office predecessors 
(Petar Stambolic and Draza Markovic), Ivan Stambolic was now losing political support. His 
proposal to re-introduce the post of the President of Yugoslavia (in 1985) was seen as a direct threat 
to the confederalist rota system of collective leadership. His candidacy for the position of Federal 
Prime Minister was rejected by a decisive 7:1 vote in the Federal Presidency in 1986.31
6.3. Serbia Between the 'White Book' (1984) and the 'Memorandum' (1986)
Pressed from the federal leadership and other republics Stambolic moved to demonstrate that he 
was not soft on Serbian nationalism. In 1984 and 1985 he delivered several anti-nationalist public 
addresses that surprised many.32 In October 1985, he promised no dialogue with Serbian
31 Instead, the Bosnian Croat Branko Mikulic was elected. As demonstrated in Chapter Five, Mikulic belonged to the closest 
circle of Tito's confidants in his last years. As a hard-line 'defender of tine Constitution', he distinguished himself by his role 
in the 'case of Draza Markovic' (1982), as well as by organising the SeSelj Trial in Sarajevo (1983) and by effectively 
undermining the reforms proposed by the Planinc government (1982-1986). His candidacy met with public criticism in 
'Mladina1. Since Mikulic was the fourth Croat in the office of Yugoslav Prime Minister after the War (Tito, Spiljak, Planinc, 
while only one, Peter Stambolic, had been a Serb), the Serbian nationalists later used this as evidence of an 'anti-Serb 
coalition' in Yugoslavia.
32 For example the Times correspondent Desa Trevisan. Immediately after these speeches, she told Stambolic that she had 
thought he was a wise politican, but now she was afraid that he was about to 'lose his head', by fighting the nationalists. She 
referred to the opposition which at one time had had some sympathies for Stambolic's isolation from the others, but had 
now lost them after these speeches. (Stambolic, 1995:106).
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nationalists. He sent a clear message to all those who argued that 'the Serbian people have not had 
their own revolution but have been led by others; (...) [to those who argue] that the Serbs were not 
Partisans, that the Chetniks were not traitors to the Serbian people but anti-fascists, that the 
Federation was opposed to the historical interests of the Serbian people':
'When it comes to what the Partisans and all Serbian and Yugoslav patriots decided by 
their blood and their weapons, we shall not accept any dialogue with anyone. The 
Partisans defeated the Chetniks and Nazis in such a way that between us there is no room 
for reconciliation, no arguments in any form, not now and never' (Stambolic, 
1985/1988:143).
The Serbian Party President invited the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts to dissociate itself 
from its nationalist members if it did not want to be accused of supporting nationalism. 'The 
League of Communists must not allow any institutional gathering of those who advocate 
nationalist theses and actions. We shall prevent any attempt by any of our institutions, which 
survive on workers' money, to transform itself into a seed-bed of nationalism,' he said as a 
response to the growing opposition in semi-official institutions of the system. 33
But, at the same time (in July 1985), Stambolic initiated a new debate on Kosovo, this time in the 
federal party leadership. The Yugoslav Party Presidency, surprisingly, had not debated Kosovo 
since 1981, except in general terms and as a security issue. The main reason, as Stipe Suvar recalls, 
was a firm belief that this was a matter of Serbian 'internal politics' in which no one wanted to be 
directly involved.34 But by summer 1985 the Kosovo question had become an unavoidable political 
fact, both because of the activity of the Critical Intelligentsia and because of the public protests of 
Kosovan Serbs and Montenegrins that erupted in the Province, only to be spread all over Serbia.
6.3.1. The 'M artinovic Case' and the Emergence of Public Protests in  Serbia
The event that sparked the strongest wave of public protests, linking the Serbian dissidents with 
the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo, happened on 1 May 1985, when an Army employee 
Djordje Martinovic, a Serb from Kosovo, was allegedly attacked by Albanians who 'im paled' him
M The Serbian critical intelligentsia and especially the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts have never forgotten and even 
less forgiven this threat. Two years later, when Milosevic ousted him from the office of Serbian President, they celebrated 
his downfall. 'He spoke for nobody and nobody listened to him,' said Antonije Isakovic in April 1996. 'He was a traitor to 
Serbian interests. This is why we welcomed Milosevic's action to remove him from office. Especially when we saw that 
Milosevic understood the Serbian situation in a more or less similar way to what we did (Antonije Isakovic in an interview 
with the author in April 1996).
M Even when Stambolic initiated a federal debate in 1985, Croatia's representative in the Federal Presidency Josip Vrhovec 
argued that Serbia should deal with it alone, since 'we did not create this problem, and can not accept any responsibility for 
its resolution'. He openly attacked Stambolic for 'failing to resolve' Serbia's internal affairs (Interviews with Vrhovec and 
Stambolic, 1995). See also Meier (1999).
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on a bottle while he was working in his fields.35 The story, widely publicised by the Serbian media, 
was immediately interpreted as the final evidence of Serbian sufferings in Kosovo. Not only had 
the personal safety of the Serbs and Montenegrins been put at risk, but also their honour had been 
attacked by 'savage' and 'violent' Albanians. Martinovic himself became a metaphor for the 'raped 
Serbdom'. Stories of 'politically motivated' rapes of Serbian girls in the province, as well as of the 
'politically inspired' high birth rate of the Kosovo Albanians entered the Serbian media, 
constructing the image of Albanian violators and Serb victims. Recalling the myths of the Ottoman 
practice of impalement, the case was used to link the past and present sufferings of the Serbs. It 
was also used to underline the need for historical 'revenge' on the Muslims for the fate of the Serbs 
under their rule.36 In the minds of many Serbs, who felt that the high birth rate of the Kosovo 
Albanians was a deliberate political action aimed at their 'minoritisation' in the Province, every 
(male) Albanian was now potentially dangerous.37
The Martinovic case was on the top of the agenda of the Yugoslav media in the following years. 
The Police and Army investigated it, but could not agree on the final report. Martinovic himself 
later w ithdrew his allegations, admitting that there had been no attack on him. But, nobody 
believed him. On the contrary, the narrative of the event was so convincing that the Serbs in 
Kosovo considered any medical report that denied this narrative as a political attempt to cover the 
real truth, especially since the main Army hospital in Belgrade confirmed what the Kosovo civilian 
hospitals denied. The Serb and Albanian versions of truth were by now established so firmly that 
the facts mattered little.
Figures on crime in Kosovo did not support any notion of genocide, the word that now replaced 
pressure and terror to describe the criminal activities of Albanians against the Serbs. On the 
contrary: between 1981 and 1987 Kosovo made up 7.5% of the Yugoslav population, while only 
between 2.5% (in 1982) and 3.5% (in 1987) of total (recorded) crimes in Yugoslavia were committed
35 For details of this event see Mertus (1999), while for analysis of the narratives created in the Serbian 'opposition' media on 
it see Bracewell (1998).
36 Together, these two elements as permanent reminders of the 'muslim genocide' against the Serbs and the need to protect 
the Serbs from its repetition, set the context for the future war between the Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1991- 
1995) and in Kosovo.
37 Dobrica Cosic's letter to Slovenian sociologist Spomenka Hribar, written in November 1986, reveals the extent to which 
the new image of Albanian sexual crimes had entered the public discourse. Cosic quotes his friend, a frequent visitor to 
Kosovo, who told him: 'In the village of Klina, there have been over twenty girls raped this summer, and no word has been 
said or published about it. These rapes are form of a total war against the Serbian nation, which is planned and 
systematically implemented by battalions of young people poisoned with ethnic hatred, and who are protected by the law 
and the government' (Cosic, 1992:87). In his speech at the closed session of the Serbian State and Party Presidencies on 5 
September 1988, the President of the state Presidency Petar Gracanin said: 'In Kosovo, we came to the point at which no girl 
from a kindergarten, no woman, young or old if she is of Serbian or Montenegrin nationality, could walk through an 
Albanian village without being protected and accompanied' (IB CKSKS, 8/1988:61
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in the Province (Horvat, 1989:153).38 When the ethnic structure of criminals and victims was 
analysed, the extent to which the claims of Serbian intellectuals differed from the facts became 
even more striking. Between 1 January 1981 and 1 November 1986 there were 360 crimes of rape, 
attempted rape, indecent assaults and other 'acts against honour, morality and reputation' in 
Kosovo. In 277 cases both violators and victims were Albanians, while in 38 cases they were both 
Serbs. Albanians were violators and Serbs and Montenegrins victims in 58 cases (out of which 16 
were rapes), while only seven cases showed opposite situations (Horvat, 1989:154). According to 
these data, Albanians committed relatively fewer crimes of this type than Serbs (when compared 
with their share in population) but directed them more often against other national groups. Once 
the campaign against the 'inter-ethnic' crimes began in 1986, criminal activities of this type almost 
entirely disappeared. From the beginning of 1986 to June 1988, the following crimes against Serbs 
and Montenegrins in Kosovo were registered: no murder, two attempted murders and four rapes. 
There were also 784 charges for physical attacks, 67 for threats, 18 for verbal abuses, 69 for street 
fights, 56 for damages to fields, four for damages to woods and two for water poisoning (Horvat, 
1989:155).
Still, the perception of the Kosovo Albanians as being genocidal against the Serbs and Montenegrins 
was progressing with almost incredible speed. The relatively low rates of crime registered by 
official statistics, according to a now ever larger segment of Serbian public, constituted more 
evidence of the inefficiency and bias of the 'Albanian' courts and police, who simply did not want 
to take any action against Albanian violence. The judges-Albanians simply turned their eyes away 
from these crimes, while Serbs did not even dare to report them. No arguments helped to change 
this conclusion. At the Serbian Writers' Association meeting in June 1985, the situation in Kosovo 
was compared to the 'most frightening fascist experiences of World War II' and an appeal was 
made for the personal engagement of all Yugoslav citizens in order to stop the 'hesitations, games 
and manipulations undertaken in the name of false social, political and national interests, to cover 
up the real situation [in Kosovo], the slowness of government action... the impediments to the free 
flow of information'.39
38 But there was a significant difference in the type of criminal activities in Kosovo when compared with the rest of 
Yugoslavia. While in 1980, 7.9% of all 'crimes against the state order' were committed in Kosovo, in 1987 this share rose to 
52.7%. More than half of the political convictions in Yugoslavia were confined to Kosovo. Except for 'industrial criminality' 
(which also included crimes against the 'economic undermining of the state order'), all other types of crime were lower in 
Kosovo than the Yugoslav average. Crimes against property, human rights, freedom, life and body, as well as against the 
honour and reputation of citizens, declined in 1987 when compared with 1980, being three to ten times less frequent in 
Kosovo than in other parts of Yugoslavia (Horvat, 1989:154).
39 Kniizevne novine, 1 September 1985.
226
Clearly, it was the 'critical intelligentsia' that now took the lead in promoting the 'Serbian national 
question', ranking it second to none. W hat started as an action for the protection of basic hum an 
rights, by 1985 was almost entirely transformed into an action to end 'the tragic fate of Serbia and 
the Serbs' in the 20th century. Destroying one type of myth - that constructed by the communist 
regime - the 'critical intelligentsia' now rapidly promoted another myth -  that of Serbia's great past 
and dark present. Showing little concern for either Martinovic's right to privacy, or indeed for the 
facts, the Serbian 'critical intelligentsia' now used every tool in its offensive against the regime. If it 
expected support from anyone in Serbia, then it was from the Serbs and Montenegrins from 
Kosovo. The Martinovic case provided an excellent opportunity to bind these two groups of 
discontented citizens together.
The Martinovic case initiated a wave of protests by the Kosovo Serbs, 2,016 of whom signed a 
petition to the federal government in December 1985. In what the 'Defenders of the Constitution' 
immediately compared with the 1981 Albanian protests in Kosovo, the Kosovo Serbs demanded 
the return of Serbian migrants to Kosovo; the abolition of the Albanian flag in Kosovo (in principle, 
the same as the Albanian state flag); 'rehabilitation1 for politicians ousted for warning about the 
dangerous consequences of Constitutional changes (such as Dobrica Cosic); the implementation of 
Serbian language laws in the province; the removal of the 'Greater-Albania chauvinists' and the 
'Serbian opportunists' from all public offices; the deportation of 'all 260,000 Albanian immigrants in 
the province';40 and the annulment of all sale contracts between Albanian buyers and Serb sellers in 
the province. The language of the petition was remarkably similar to that used by the Serbian 
Writers' Association:
'The Serbian nation in Kosovo and Metohija is exposed to genocide(...) The authorities in
Kosovo are masked by socialist ideology but in fact do nothing to prevent (the genocide)...
This is the last effort to preserve our families' lives in Kosovo in a legal w ay...41 To
endanger the people in Kosovo means to endanger the Serbs in general.'
From the elite's point of view, the Serbs from Kosovo simply demanded the impossible. While 
Serbian leaders could not remain deaf to their demands, they could even less accept almost any of
40 The figure of 260,000 cases of illegal immigration of Albanian citizens into Kosovo was in sharp contrast with the study by 
the Federal Ministry of the Interior published in July 1986 which found that between 1948 and 1981 only 5,587 people 
emigrated from Albania to Kosovo, out of which only 1,391 actually lived in Kosovo in 1986. Only 31 Yugoslav citizenship 
applications had been made (Politika, 6 July 1986). Nevertheless, an already sky-high figure of 260,000 illegal immigrants 
rose to 350,000 or even more by 1989 (Gaber and Kuzmanic, 1989:252). The enormous difference between the official report 
of the Federal Interior Ministry and claims by the Serbian nationalist opposition may help in understanding the Albanian 
anger in these years.
41 On several occasions after 1985 the Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo threatened ’collective migration’ from the 
Province in protest at what they saw as an indifferent leadership. Their marches to Belgrade were, therefore, seen as 
unprecedented pressure on the federal and Serbian governments. They created an atmosphere of permanent emergency, 
which was later exploited by Slobodan Milosevic.
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their demands without revision of their ideological commitments to the Kardeljist concept. They 
therefore condemned the Petition in the strongest terms, labelling it as yet another act of Serbian 
nationalists. In return, they further antagonised its signatories, most of whom saw the Petition as 
the last attempt to correct injustice and to stop the inefficiency of the state administration in the 
Province. To the protesters, their claims were not at all anti-Albanian, but aimed at equality 
between the two ethnic groups in Kosovo. In as much as the Albanians felt unequal in economic, 
political and constitutional terms in 1981, the Serbs and Montenegrins now felt the same. 
Economically, they suffered as much as the Albanians, but more than the Serbs in Serbia and 
(especially) in Vojvodina. Politically and ethnically they felt unprotected and endangered by the 
growing majority of Albanians in the Province. Their response to this situation was similar to the 
Albanian one four years before -  both of them sought real protection, and both understood that 
only a Republic could grant it. But while the Albanian demonstrators demanded Kosovo as the 
seventh Yugoslav Republic, the Serbs had already their own republic -  Serbia. This republic, 
having two provinces within its borders, however, was not like other Yugoslav republics. Now 
they wanted to change this. The demand that Serbia should become a republic equal to others was 
now heard for the first time, only to be repeated by Milosevic and other Serbian leaders three years 
later - now as official Serbian policy.
The sense of the inequality of Serbia in comparison with other republics was now paralleled by the 
sense of inequality between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo and by the feeling of social injustice in 
general. The problems of inefficient and corrupt administration, economic hardship, 'personal 
networks of survival' - these all now became ethnic problems. To illustrate this, one can quote 
Cedomir Bojkovic, a Serb peasant and one of the signatories of the petition:
'It has been six years since an electric power transformer was promised to the Serbian 
village. Then, I went to see a doctor to check my knees one day. He told me: 'Come again 
tomorrow.' When I came again the next day, he told me the same. The next day - again. 
Again and again. I complained to his boss, and only then I managed to be examined by this 
doctor, but only as the last in the queue. When I signed the Petition, I wanted to support a 
public debate about these things, I wanted to say that we should all be equal: Albanians, 
Serbs, Montenegrins and all others. I fought for this. Do I need now to leave my land?'42
Bojkovic's dem and for equality in Kosovo only mirrored similar demands by the Kosovo 
Albanians, who also felt discriminated against (as explained in Chapter Five). A general sense of 
inequality now characterised all participants involved in the Kosovo crisis and - in a broader sense 
- in that taking place in Yugoslavia. They all believed that the others were 'more equal' than them. 
But they also claimed that since the others were in fact privileged, their demand for equality was
42 Politika Ekspres, 22 December 1985.
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not sincere. This is how the demand for equality became a demand for affirmative action that 
would reduce the present inequality. Kosovo demanded to be economically supported and 
politically upgraded to equal other parts of Yugoslavia. Serbia claimed to be given a status equal to 
other republics, which it did not have because of its two provinces. Finally, the Serbs asked to be 
additionally protected in Kosovo, to become fully equal in rights to the Kosovo Albanians. Equality 
understood in these terms was, however, a non-zero-sum-game: it could be reached only when the 
'past injustice' was reversed by (at least a temporary) 'positive discrimination'. In the eyes of the 
'other side', however, this demand for equality necessarily became a road to discrimination.
The 'positive discrimination' policy was the main reason why the two protests were by no means 
treated equally by the Belgrade media and official politics. At a joint session of the Serbian state 
and party presidencies in September 1988, Petar Gracanin, the President of the State Presidency 
explained this policy:
'For as long as there is a counter-revolution in Kosovo, it is unacceptable to equate those 
who demand protection of their basic rights on the one hand and Albanian nationalists 
and separatists who endanger these rights by destroying the Yugoslav constitutional order 
and by requesting an ethnically pure Kosovo, on the other' (IB CKSKS, 8/88:9).
While the Albanians were accused of 'counter-revolution', the Serb protests in Kosovo were treated 
as justified.43 Yet, it was not Albanians but Serbs who now protested.
While people like Bojkovic signed the Petition for motives which were not exactly purely ethnic, 
the Serbian intellectuals (200 of whom, including 35 members of the Serbian Academy of Science 
and Arts, supported the petition of the Kosovo Serbs44) now poured oil onto the fire of ethnic 
divisions in Kosovo. In their Letter to the Federal and Serbian Assemblies, they argued that the 
expulsion of the Serbs from Kosovo had lasted over three centuries under the Ottoman Empire, the 
Habsburg Monarchy, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, only to continue with the new violations by 
the Albanian state and Kosovo leadership.
43 Between 1981 and 1985, 96 'enemy' groups were discovered in Kosovo, 1,102 people were sentenced and 2,657 cautioned 
for 'counter-revolution'. 176 teachers were 'removed from teaching' including 11 university professors. 511 students were 
expelled from the University. As many as 1,800 members of the LCY were expelled from the League of Communists in 
Kosovo, 1,600 of whom were Albanians (Politika Ekspres, 1 Feb 1986). At the same time, an attempt to arrest the leaders of 
the Kosovo Serbs in April 1986 failed after it brought the Kosovo Party Organisation to the edge of splitting on ethnic lines. 
From then it became clear that the state would not treat the two groups of protesters equally.
44 The full text of the petition was published in Nova Revija 48-49/1986:801-7.
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'Instead of violent Islamization and Fascism [as in the past, we are now facing] - Stalinist 
chauvinism. The only new element in all this is a link between tribal conflict and genocide, 
disguised in Marxist language.'
In almost revolutionary rhetoric, the Serbian intellectuals compared Djordje Martinovic to the 
martyr Avakum in the Serbian epics on the Kosovo Polje battle of 1389. 'The case of Djordje 
Martinovic is the case of the whole Serbian nation in Kosovo,' they said. The link between 'the 
endangered Serbs of Kosovo' and their supporters in Belgrade was now firmly established.
6.3.2. Stambolic's Initiatives
This link between the Belgrade critical intelligentsia and the Kosovo Serbs became a serious 
challenge to the Serbian Party. Not only did it connect popular discontent with the intellectual elite 
which opposed the regime, but the people protesting were Serbs from Kosovo, a category for 
which the status of victims of the 'counter-revolution' was recognised by official statements after 
1981. In addition, people like Bojkovic were themselves Partisans during the Second W orld War 
and saw their dreams betrayed by the country they had fought for. Would it then come as a big 
surprise if they felt nostalgic for the 'good old times' of the Rankovic period (or even that before 
1948) or if they indeed opened their minds to an alternative story, rather than the official 
interpretation of reality? Was this not then exactly the situation that Kardelj described in his 
writings as the biggest potential danger for the future of Yugoslav socialism?
This pressure, created by the common action of the Belgrade opposition circles and the Kosovo 
Serbs, forced the Serbian leadership to increase its pressure on other republics, its provinces and 
the federation in order to secure more effective control over the situation in Kosovo.
On Stambolic's proposal, in the summer of 1985, the Federal Party Presidency formed a group 
chaired by Slovenia's representative Milan Kucan, to conduct talks with all sides involved and to 
offer conclusions on 'relations in Serbia'. Kucan's report was accepted by the Presidency on 29 July 
1985 and by the Central Committee on 31 October 1985. It described the situation in Serbia as 
'tense... full of serious discord and controversies, mutual distrust, which has significantly 
influenced political life'. Kucan's report supported Serbian demands for more unity, saying that 
'the right of the Serbian people to create its own state in the same way as all other nations in SFR 
Yugoslavia has not yet been fully implemented because constitutional principles - by which the 
Provinces were within Serbia - have not been always consistently realised in political reality' 
(Suvar, 1989:120). Kucan's position, shared by other members of the Yugoslav political leadership, 
was based on the Kardeljist principle that Serbia is a state, while the Provinces were not. It was up
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to the republics to exercise their sovereign rights and to decide freely on their internal matters. It 
also emphasised that the Party, unlike the state, was not a federalised organisation - if the principle 
of democratic centralism applied to the whole of Yugoslavia, then it should be exercised within 
Serbia as well. Finally, Stambolic still claimed that the solution could be found within the existing 
Constitution. In other words, despite his criticism of the practice that had emerged because of 
misinterpretation of the Constitution by the provinces, the Constitution itself was not yet treated 
(at least not by the political elite) as the cause of this practice. Since no major constitutional changes 
were required by the Serbian leadership, it was much easier to reach consensus on supporting the 
Serbian demands, which would not change the position of others in Yugoslavia.
This statement by the federal Party Presidency and the Central Committee was the first real 
political victory for Stambolic. In a way, it was a reaction to his anti-nationalist rhetoric, which was 
now 'rew arded' by his colleagues from other republics. It was also a sign that, perhaps, when 
facing popular protests, Yugoslav leaders could forget their differences, especially if the proposals 
did not really endanger their own positions or those of their republics. But it also proved to Serbia's 
leaders that pressure by the Kosovo Serbs did not necessarily need to be a threat to the interests of 
the Serbian political elite, but could - on the contrary - support their position in the Federation. This 
message would be later fully understood by Slobodan Milosevic.
Nevertheless, the support given by his colleagues in the Party leadership now obliged Stambolic to 
eliminate the influence of nationalists and opposition leaders in Kosovo. When the Serbs from 
Kosovo organised a protest march to Belgrade, Stambolic, the head of the Serbian Party, flew to 
Kosovo Polje to stop them. On 6 April 1986 he addressed a group of demonstrators in Kosovo Polje 
in w hat was the first direct contact between the elite and the protesters. In w hat was an obvious 
allusion to their new links with Serbian dissidents, Stambolic told the crowd that 'this was the right 
place to solve your problems, and any other place is wrong.' He urged them 'not to leave their 
homes, not to allow anyone to manipulate [them] or to form any bad and dangerous intentions 
based on [their] justified discontent' (Stambolic, 1986/1988:166). The crowd applauded Stambolic's 
claims that everyone should be equal before the law, and that no one should be allowed to sow 
hatred between Serbs and Albanians. But, while Stambolic was probably referring to several 
leaders of the Kosovo Serbs, arrested just a few days before his speech, the crowd was more likely 
to associate this demand with the Albanian nationalists. Stambolic's speech was an example of the 
rhetoric of a Serbian communist fighting Serbian nationalism:
'I am convinced that in the Kosovo League of Communists, among the Albanians, as well 
as among the Serb and Montenegrin nations, amongst the whole population of Kosovo, 
there is enough strength to beat counter-revolution. If we unite and organise, we shall win!
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Do not allow a bunch of irredentists, regardless of the fact that they are becoming more 
violent as we press them harder, to poison relationships between the Serbs and Albanians 
here, and do not allow a bunch of Serbian nationalists to do the same!' (Stambolic, 
1986/1988:167).
However, the Kosovo Serbs did not give up their intention to visit Belgrade and talk to federal 
leaders. The next day, 7 April 1986, 550 of them arrived in the Yugoslav capital, where they spoke 
to Lazar Mojsov, a member of the Federal Presidency from Macedonia. Stambolic's speech in 
Kosovo Polje, it is true, had made them less angry and their criticism of the Serbian leadership less 
direct. But still, they bitterly repeated their main claims: they were discriminated against, 
threatened by the 'counter-revolutionaries' and disappointed by the ineffectiveness shown by 
political leaders in the capital. Several speakers both in Kosovo Polje and in Belgrade threatened 
public self-immolation, and some of them even suggested talks with Gorbachev (!) if the Yugoslav 
leaders were not capable of resolving the situation (Stambolic, 1986/1988:173). In his speech to the 
demonstrators, Mojsov again insisted that the main line of division in Kosovo was between 
'revolutionaries' and 'counter-revolutionaries' and not between Serbs and Albanians. The meeting 
in Belgrade was the first of a series of protests by Kosovo Serbs outside Kosovo, in which they tried 
to initiate 'solidarity' and focus their claims. The 'rallies of solidarity with Serbs and Montenegrins 
in Kosovo' became a regular practice in the last years of Yugoslavia.
The federal leadership was very worried about the protests of the Kosovo Serbs. When they 
convened on the day of the demonstrations, Josip Vrhovec, the Croatian representative, asked 
Stambolic to stop the demonstrators from coming to Belgrade, and even accused him of organising 
the protests in order to obtain support for his programme of Constitutional change. Even Stambolic 
himself described his visit to Kosovo Polje in dramatic words: 'The real situation in Kosovo, in 
Serbia and here (in the Federation), is much worse than we think and know.' The Kosovo Serbs and 
Montenegrins had no confidence in the Kosovo leadership, and are losing confidence in the 
leadership of the rest of the country. If this continued, the Yugoslav leadership would face a mass 
movement, which would link the Kosovo Serbs with students, workers and the opposition in 
Belgrade. 'Our main task is to prevent this from happening.' Stambolic hinted that the movement 
of Kosovo Serbs was led by the opposition in Belgrade and he warned his colleagues that 'the 
elements on which they rely are multiplying and that the chances of them becoming leaders of the 
masses are high.' Stambolic proposed the following action: 1) much greater involvement with the 
masses in order to prevent their being influenced by the nationalists; 2) a continuation of 
'differentiation' in the Kosovo leadership, forcing especially its Serb and Montenegrin members 
who were not supported by the Serb and Montenegrin population to resign; 3) giving a free hand
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to the Serbian leadership when it came to Kosovo; 4) the use of 'all legal means', including police 
action, to prevent the Serbian nationalists from Belgrade from spreading their influence in Kosovo. 
However, the police action should not take place before the Communists had firmly 'rooted 
themselves' among the people in Kosovo. In the meantime, Stambolic opposed those members of 
the federal leadership who suggested that the Kosovo Polje demonstrators should be treated as 
nationalists.
'It is not about concessions to enemies, but about the wishes of the people...The people 
believe they have no rights, no freedom, and they react with all enthusiasm to words such 
as equality and equal rights. They are in favour of Tito, brotherhood and unity, Yugoslavia, 
etc... It is true that some unacceptable and counter-revolutionary demands have been 
heard. But, these people are in such a mood that they would sign anything to secure a 
change in the situation. Should we now treat them as Serbian nationalists? W hat if it were 
true that 81,000 signatories live there?45 Are all of them nationalists? They simply talk 
about the terrible things to which they have been exposed. Should we call these illiterate 
women nationalists? I would suggest realism in differentiating between them  and real 
nationalists,' Stambolic told the federal Party Presidency (Stambolic, 1986/1988:142-5).
With this speech, Stambolic challenged certain elements of the ideological discourse constructed 
immediately after the 1981 Albanian demonstrations in Kosovo. His warning about the widespread 
use of labels, such as 'nationalism', as well as of the need to regain the trust of the people before the 
opposition leaders were 'isolated' indicated a more realistic approach 46
After his visit to Kosovo Polje in April 1986, Stambolic was facing a decision: either to pu t himself 
at the head of the popular discontent and become leader of the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins, or 
to remain committed to the institutions of the system and its ideology. Subsequently, all other 
Yugoslav leaders faced the same dilemma: Milosevic and KuCan chose the former, while Suvar in 
Croatia (as well as leaders of the Montenegrin, Macedonian and Bosnian LCs) preferred the latter 
option. Stambolic, however, hoped he could avoid the answer by moving to the 'reserve' post of 
the President of the collective Presidency of Serbia, from which he could do more for the changes 
to the Constitution, a task he still saw as the main objective. From such a safe position, he escaped 
the direct implementation of 'democratic centralism', and increased his autonomy as a political 
actor. But, he was now directly accountable for any use of force in Serbia, including both against 
the opposition and the Kosovo demonstrators. Stambolic soon found that by escaping one danger,
45 Since signatures for the 2,016 petition were collected all the way through, the opposition claimed that 81,000 people 
signed the Petition in the six months between December 1985 and June 1986.
46 What he failed to do, however, was to extend the same demand to the protests of the Albanians in Kosovo. Unfortunately 
for him, Stambolic was still confined to intra-party debates. Most of his rhetoric would be repeated in public the following 
year by his successor Slobodan Milosevic, who visited Kosovo Polje in April 1987 with the same objective as Stambolic had 
before him. It was the publicity that made the difference.
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he had moved closer to another - that of being held directly responsible for the repression of these 
two Serb groups. When faced with another attempt by the Kosovo Polje demonstrators to organise 
a rally in Belgrade on 21 June 1986, he ordered the police to block all ways to the capital. To them, 
this was the final sign that he declined to be their leader. This decision would cost him his career in 
September 1987, when the person he trusted most, Slobodan Milosevic, presented himself as the 
protector of the Kosovo Serbs, trying to do exactly the same as Stambolic announced at the closed 
Party meeting in June 1986: to strengthen Party influence and isolate the 'opposition', which was 
now presenting itself as an ever more viable alternative.
6.3.3. The 'SANU M emorandum 1 and the Reaction of the Political Elite (1986)
In May 1985, when Stambolic urged the Federal Party Presidency to discuss Kosovo for the first 
time after 1981, the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts (better known by its Serbian acronym -  
SANU) established a 16-member Commission to prepare an analysis of the economic and political 
situation in the country. The Academy's action was both a response to the public invitation given 
by the Vrhovec Commission on the reform of the political system, and to Stambolic's view that the 
Academy should help find a way out of the crisis.47 It was also a reaction to a meeting between 
Slovenian 'dissidents' connected to the journal Nova Revija and their Serbian colleagues in 
November 1995 that influenced the writing of the Memorandum. As Cosic described in his diary 
(1985/1992:76-9), the Serbian writers realised that the Slovenes had their national programme 
almost ready, while they themselves were 'disorientated' and confused about their national 
objectives.48
The Serbian leaders hoped that the involvement of the Academy in public debate would lower 
tensions between government and opposition, and would further support the changes to the 
Constitution proposed by the leadership. The leaders of the Academy, being critical of the regime 
but still somehow close to many Serbian politicians, wanted - as their Vice-President Antonije 
Isakovic, the chair of the Commission, explained in 1996 - to push them further towards radical 
constitutional reform.49
47 In line with Kardelj's attempt to see the Party gradually transformed into becoming almost like an Institute, rather than 
being involved in the everyday business of running the state, Ivan Stambolic concluded 'that science needs to be more 
involved in attempts to resolve social, economic, political and other problems'. When he met with the Academicians later in 
1986 to discuss plans for the centennial celebration of the SANU (due on 1 November 1986), he approved their intention to 
present their vision of possible solutions (Stambolic, 1995:119).
48 More about the Slovene 'national programme' in the mid-1980s, and about the interaction between the Slovenian and 
Serbian 'dissidents' in the next chapter.
49 Interview with Antonije Isakovic in April 1996. The Commission was first chaired by the SANU President Dusan Kanazir, 
who soon resigned his position to Isakovic, the Vice-President of the Academy.
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Between May 1985 and September 1986 the Isakovic Commission met between 15 and 20 times. 
Their report was, however, only in its draft version, when under somewhat suspicious 
circumstances,50 on 24 September 1986, the Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti published large 
excerpts of the manuscript and powerful attacks on its main conclusions.51
There was little in the draft 'Memorandum' that had not been previously published by the leading 
members of the Serbian 'critical intelligentsia'. The text itself was more a description of the 
economic and political crisis as its authors saw it, than a political programme for action, as it was 
later often described. It was a mixture of Communist (self-management; Councils of producers in 
Federal Assembly, etc.), democratic (civil rights) and romantic-nationalist ideological elements 
expressed in a declaratory style.
Retrospectively, Isakovic reveals the position the Memorandum had on Yugoslavia, the most 
controversial point of the debate, and the one that could have easily divided the various groups of 
the opposition and of the political elite itself:
'We made it clear that we were in favour of Yugoslavia, but only if the Serbs were equal to 
the other Yugoslav nations.52 We knew the Slovenes and Croats would not accept such a 
Yugoslavia. But we wanted them to say so and to take responsibility for it. And indeed, it 
did not take long before the Slovenes and Croats clearly revealed their views on 
Yugoslavia: they supported it as long as it was a tool for keeping Serbia under permanent 
surveillance. The 1974 Constitution, written by the Slovene Kardelj and the Slovene-Croat 
Tito, was the result of this belief. This is why Slovenia and Croatia opposed any change in 
the Constitution. This is also why they kept Serbia under control by using the two 
Provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Finally, this is why they divided up the Serbs between 
various semi-states, thus making them unaware of their own national identity. This was 
the main argument of the Memorandum, the one that we all agreed with.'53
50 Isakovic believes that the manuscript was given to journalist Aleksandar Djukanovic by his father-in-law Professor Jovan 
Djordjevic, one of the leading experts in Constitutional Law, who participated both in drafting the 1974 Constitution and in 
criticising it after 1977. Djukanovic was the official Party commentator for the largest Belgrade daily. He was the last 
journalist who interviewed Rankovic before his ousting in 1966 (RFE/RL, 28 June 1983).
51 For all these reasons, the 'Memorandum' was in fact an unfinished and unofficial paper. The Academy refused even to 
comment on it and especially to condemn it, treating it as a non-existing document. Nevertheless, 'the document' was 
attributed to the SANU. It was published for the first time in Zagreb in the theoretical journal of the Croatian League of 
Communists Nase Teme (1989:128-63), and translated in (Movie's book: 'Roots of Serbian Aggression' (also in Zagreb, 
1993:289-337). Finally, on the tenth anniversary of the affair, the SANU published the entire text of 'the Memorandum', 
together with Mihailovic's and Krestic's comments. In this dissertation it is quoted from the SANU edition.
52 As we demonstrated in Chapter Two, the 'only if approach to Yugoslavia was promoted first by Kardelj himself, only to 
be continued within Slovenian politics (especially with Kufian) in the late 1980s.
53 Isakovic, in interview, April 1996. For further explanation see Krestic's and Mihailovic's introductory text to the 1996 
edition of the Memorandum.
235
Developed into approximately a ten thousand word text (the main conclusions of which were 
expressed in ten points), the Memorandum constituted the core of the Serbian dominant discourse 
in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.
First, it demanded radical changes in the economic and political systems in order to reverse 
those introduced after 1964. It opposed 'national (republican) economies' (favoured by the Croatian 
leader Bakaric) as well as the ideology that 'neglected economic laws... by relying on people's 
consciousness rather than on their interests' (1995:105).
Secondly, the Memorandum criticised the political elite for being incapable of 'breaking 
with the illusions that had brought the country to the verge of collapse' (1995:107).
Thirdly, the Academicians criticised the 'unhistorical tendency' to transform the Yugoslav 
federation into a kind of a confederation. The only way out of this 'paralysis' was - 'to get rid of the 
ideology which gave priority to the concepts of nationality and territoriality' (1995:112). It was 
concluded that, unfortunately, Slovenia and Croatia, the two Yugoslav republics 'which had 
managed to realise their national programmes through this Constitution', defended a system which 
did not deserve to be defended.
Fourthly, the Memorandum argued that the worst of all the crises in Yugoslavia was the 
moral crisis of Yugoslav society. Corruption had affected the rank and file of Yugoslav society.
Fifthly, the Memorandum concluded that 'parts of the Serbian nation, who, in considerable 
numbers, live in other republics, do not have the right, unlike the national minorities ... to organise 
themselves politically and culturally' (1995:124). The expulsion of the Serbs from Kosovo illustrates 
this most drastically.54
Sixthly, the Memorandum described Serbia's 'disastrous position' in Yugoslavia as 
consisting of three elements: 1) Serbia was lagging behind economically; 2) Serbia was the only 
republic with provinces, and hence was un-formed as a state; and 3) Serbs were undergoing 
genocide in Kosovo. This situation, the Memorandum concluded, was the result of 'consistent 
discrimination' following the Second World War, which was a consequence of the CPY's belief that
54 Contrary to many later interpretations, the Memorandum did not deny the right of self-determination (including that of 
secession) to other Yugoslav nations, if Serbs (not Serbia) had the same right. By nations, they understood ethnic groups, 
which only in the Slovene case largely coincided with the 'demos' of existing republics. According to the authors of the 
'Memorandum', only nations, not republics had the right to secede. Republics were provisional and only domestically 
recognised entities, while the 'self-determination of the nation (narod)' was an internationally recognised principle, which 
could not be altered by die domestic, 'Titoist' Constitution.
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Serbia had been privileged in the whole inter-war period and thus had to be 'punished' for this 
now. The Serbian leaders had capitulated before Tito and Kardelj, and in fact had acted contrary to 
Serbian interests (1995:131).
Seventh, these anti-Serbian policies continued in the post-Tito period, in which politicians 
from other republics were 'lecturing Serbia and the Provinces on tire fact that the solution could be 
sought by the strict application of the same Constitution' (1995:133).
Eighth, the 'genocide in Kosovo', the Memorandum claimed, was a consequence of this 
unsustainable position of Serbia. The Memorandum warned that the goal of Albanian separatists 
'to ethnically cleanse Kosovo' would be fully accomplished within the next ten years, unless 
something were done quickly. Therefore 'the fate of Kosovo remains a matter of life and death for 
the Serbian nation' (1995:136). If not resolved it would turn into 'a European issue with the gravest, 
unforeseeable consequences' (1995:136). The same urgency should be applied to the position of the 
Serbs in Croatia, who were 'exposed to a subtle but efficient policy of assimilation'.
In its ninth section, the Memorandum warned about the 'disintegration of the Serbian 
cultural space'. Deliberate action had been taken to divide Serbian culture into 'Vojvodinian', 
'Montenegrin', and 'Bosnian-Herzegovian'55 literature, while Serb democratic history was ignored 
or misinterpreted.
Finally, the tenth point of the unfinished Memorandum read as an invitation to the Serbs to 
'divest themselves of their historical guilt' and to 'establish their full national and cultural integrity 
regardless of which republic or autonomous province they live in'. The Serbs, it was written, m ust 
'become a historical subject' by 'regaining awareness of their historical and spiritual being'. 
Although Serbian nationalism was condemned in words, the establishment of Serbia as a state in 
its entire territory was declared as not any longer an impossible option for the resolution of all 
problems, especially for the 'genocide in Kosovo'. Favouring a Yugoslav56 resolution of the crisis, 
the M emorandum warned that the Serbs 'cannot peacefully await their future under such 
uncertainty', nor should they allow themselves 'to be surprised by events' if others decided to
55 This conclusion indicates that Montenegrin and even Bosnian-Herzegovian cultures were in fact elements of the Serb 
culture. In the interpretation of Serbian nationalists, Bosnian Muslims had in fact been Serbs who agreed to accept Islam in 
order to obtain privileges from the Ottoman Empire. Tito's Yugoslavia in fact sanctioned this historical 'loss' of the Serbian 
nation by recognising the Bosnian Muslims as a separate ethnic category in the 1960s.
56 The SANU Memorandum explicitly defined Yugoslavia through the AVNOJ 1943 agreement, not through the 1974 
Constitution. The criticism of the latter and approval of the former confirm our conclusion that these were perceived as two 
conceptually different Yugoslavias (see Chapter Two). Importantly, the Memorandum was much more critical of Kardelj 
than of Tito: all positive examples were taken from before 1964.
237
separate from Yugoslavia. 'The Serbs must not be passive, waiting for the others to speak first, as 
Serbia has done many times up to now' (1995:147). Instead, Serbia should take the initiative. This 
was possible only if Serbia transformed itself by mobilising all its democratic potential.
Publication of the Memorandum launched yet another wave of criticism of Serbian nationalism in 
all parts of the political elite. The Croatian representative in the Federal Presidency Josip Vrhovec, 
whose "Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System" (1985) was sharply criticised by 
the Memorandum, accused the Serbian leadership of inspiring the most radical nationalism by 
their proposals for Constitutional changes. The sharpest critics of Stambolic were again from the 
Communist elite in Vojvodina.57
Stambolic had all the right reasons to react: he did not share the views of the Serbian nationalists; 
he felt obliged - as a Serbian Communist - to condemn them in public; he also wanted to dissociate 
himself from any action by the Academy and to reject accusations of his being a nationalist. On 30 
October 1986, speaking at the University of Belgrade, Stambolic labeled the M emorandum as a 
'chauvinist initiative', aimed at 'inflaming conflicts and poisoning relations' between the Yugoslav 
nations. The authors of the Memorandum, Stambolic said, did not see that it was precisely under 
his leadership that significant advances had been made in changing the position of Serbia. They 
even accused him of 'Stalinist sins', though they themselves had been members of the elite during 
the Stalinist period.58 In addition, there was a clear difference between 'them' and 'us': while the 
Serbian nationalists sought a solution for the 'Serbian question' in the ruins of Yugoslavia, Serbian 
Communists would 'never accept the destruction of Yugoslavia, not only because Yugoslavia is the 
result of revolution, but also because it is the guarantor of the independence of all its nations' 
(1986/1988:219).
At the same time, Slobodan Milosevic, the newly elected president of the Serbian LC Central 
Committee decided to act differently from his patron Stambolic. He remained surprisingly silent 
on the M emorandum in public, at the same time launching a party action against its main authors. 
Despite direct pressure by Ivan Stambolic, he avoided any public statement on its claims,59
57 The leading daily newspaper in Novi Sad (Dnevrdk) directly linked the Serbian political leaders with the authors of the 
'Memorandum'. The journalist Tomislav Marcinko, the ideologue of the Novi Sad Party Committee, wrote that no one could 
guarantee safety in Vojvodina to those who wanted to ruin the Yugoslav political system (Djukic, 1992:115). In 1990 
Marcinko, a Croat from Vojvodina, became the editor-in-chief of Croatian Television in Zagreb and one of the closest 
confidants of newly elected Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.
58 A clear allusion to Dobrica Cosic, Antonije Isakovic and -  indeed -  many pro-Rankovic critics of the 1974 Constitution, 
who now participated in the 'critical intelligentsia'.
59 An exception being his brief remark at the Belgrade Party Committee meeting in February 1987 on the inactivity of the 
Communists in the Academy who did not find it necessary to distance themselves publicly from 'the attacks on Tito and the
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'delegating' his authority to other members of the collective Party Presidency. But he chaired the 
Party Presidency session on 27 May 1987, when an 'ideological offensive' (not unlike Suvar's earlier 
initiative) was proposed against several leading cultural and media institutions, including the 
SANU. And indeed, the Party Presidency decided to cut the public funds for 'those programmes 
and projects which are not in accordance with social criteria'. 'Black-listed' institutions included the 
Institute for Social Sciences ('especially the Department of Philosophy', where the Praxis 
philosophers were employed), the Writers' Association, the Sociological Society of Serbia, the 
Philosophers' Society, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Student Cultural Centre. 
The leading opposition media: 'Knjizevna rec' and 'Knjizevne novine' were also on the list, while 
several others, such as 'Student', 'NON', 'Intervju', 'Svet', 'N IN ' and 'Duga' were criticised. The 
Party Presidency explicitly asked the Serbian Assembly to re-assess the criteria for financing die 
SANU. It also invited Communists in these institutions to 'make the necessary cadre changes' and 
to react publicly 'to articles in the press and in academic publications, to broadcasts on TV and 
radio, and to any other public attempts to deny the achievements of the revolution and the leading 
role of the working class in our society by smuggling historical and scientific lies and by non­
objective interpretation of historical events, occurrences and personalities' (IB, 6/87).
In order to implement the Party decisions in important cultural and academic institutions, Party 
Actifs were created in December 1987 in professional associations of economists, sociologists, 
political scientists, philosophers, lawyers, journalists and writers. A Party activist group was 
formed in the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts as well (IB, 1/88).60 Following the 'Operational 
Programme', leading Serbian politicians engaged in public debates, sometimes even by writing 
unsigned articles in the press,61 with the noticeable exception of the Serbian Party President.
Current interpretations often misunderstand these events, and more notably the reasons why 
Milosevic remained aloof. It is often assumed that Milosevic was by 1987 already an 'ethnic 
nationalist' and was deliberately avoiding any public statement against the Academy. However, as 
demonstrated by the Operational Programme, Milosevic was not at all soft on the opposition. There 
were, of course, pragmatic reasons for him to avoid becoming 'a  new Stambolic' in annoying both 
Serbian intellectuals and other Yugoslav leaders. But the reasons for his decision not to engage
revolution and from the destruction of Yugoslavia1. Milosevic was expected to offer a 'platform' on the Memorandum at the 
5th CC LC Serbia session in April 1987, but he appointed Milenko Markovic to give an introductory speech, and decided to 
close the session to the public (IB, 4/1987).
60 However, not much changed after these decisions were taken: the elite soon learned that the old times of 1974 and 1981 
had gone and that the ban on all these institutions and papers would be too costly for the regime itself. Ultimately, the Party 
decision remained just one more unrealised announcement, which left the opposition unaffected.
61 Like DragiSa Pavlovic, the President of Belgrade Party Committee. Pavlovic published several articles in the daily 
'Politika' under a pen-name. In 1987 he even published a book against the opposition (see: Pavlovic, 1987).
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directly in this public ideological debate would not be fully understood without noticing that he 
believed that deeds, not empty words could change the unfavourable situation, and that Party 
should be the real generator of these changes in practice, instead of simply verbally. Furthermore, 
he believed that the 'opposition' should not be treated as a partner, and even less should the Party 
aim at wasting precious time in debates with the 'dissidents'. Despite his appealing to some 
Serbian nationalists as a determined protector of Serbian interests in the constitutional debate, 
Milosevic's reasons were originally far from ethnic nationalism. It happened, however - as with so 
many people in the collapsing Communist systems -  that they gradually evolved towards an open 
flirtation with it.
Before moving onto explaining the Milosevic discourse in the 1984-1987 period, one needs to 
emphasise that by 1987 the 'critical intelligentsia' had transformed themselves into a strong 
opposition, organised in several institutions and controlling much of the Serbian media and 
cultural space.62 Through these institutions (and finally with the 1986 'Memorandum') they 
formulated a new discourse, which consisted of three main demands: 1) democratisation of 
Yugoslavia by rejecting the Communist legacy; 2) changes to the 1974 Constitution in order to 
improve the position of Serbia, making it equal to other republics in Yugoslavia ; and 3) resolute 
action against the 'genocide against the Serbs in Kosovo' and elsewhere in the country. While all 
three demands were present in their rhetoric at all times, the national question and the status of 
Serbia occupied now the central position. The opposition linked itself to the movement of the Serbs 
in Kosovo, keeping its finger on the pulse of the enormous pressure put upon the Serbian political 
elite. In turn, this resulted in a new division within the LCY and the LC Serbia. As in previous 
situations (described in Chapter Three - the 1967-1974 Constitutional debate, and Five - the political 
crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s) the elite split on how to react to anti-Communist action by 
the 'opposition'. Since the 'opposition' in Serbia now became much more concerned with the 
national question than with democratic rights, the ensuing divisions in practice split the Party on 
the national question as well.
621 quote from Stambolic (1995) the titles of plays at Belgrade theatres in Summer 1987: 'The Defeat of the Serbian Tsardom', 
'The Salonika Fighters Speak', 'The Prince is Assassinated', 'The Battle of Kolubara'; 'The Memoirs of a Priest'; 'The Secret of 
the Black Hand'-, 'Serbia, Where's Your Shadow?!'; 'Migration of the Serbs'; 'The Rhapsody of St. Andrew', etc. These were 
all 'historical plays' in a 'political theatre', almost all of them about Serbian First World War bravery.
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6.4. Slobodan Milosevic's Discourse in 1984-1987
To an outside observer, the Serbian party leadership seemed to be fairly united at its 1986 
Congress.63 The Serbian political leaders (with the exception of those in Vojvodina, and some in 
Kosovo) shared the same strong line when it came to divisions between the 'defenders' and 
'reformers' of the constitution. However, there was a lot boiling below the surface of the apparent 
unanimity. The young generation of 'technocrats' (led by Ivan Stambolic) clashed with the older 
generation of Partisan veterans who returned back to leading positions in Serbian politics 
following the removal of the 'liberals' in 1972. As was the case in other Yugoslav republics, the 
young cadres were winning in this conflict. While Petar Stambolic, the leading Serbian Communist 
of the entire post-war period (with the short exception of the 1967-1972 period) retired in 1984, 
Draza Markovic was marginalised to a level at which he decided to resign in 1986.64
Milosevic became the President in a tight vote within the party leadership, and primarily because 
he was strongly backed by Ivan Stambolic, who in 1986 moved to chair the Serbian state 
Presidency. Milosevic and Stambolic were, as Stambolic later explained, political twins. One spoke 
for them both.
But, while Stambolic had a longer career in Serbian politics, and thus many opponents both at 
Federal level and amongst the 'dissidents' whom he now openly criticised, Milosevic was a 
newcomer. Being a protege of Stambolic, whose programme he promoted, Milosevic distinguished 
himself as the most radical critic of disunity, inefficiency and 'anarchy' in Yugoslavia and Serbia. In 
his programmatic speech in December 1986, he was speaking from the hearts of the whole 
leadership, when saying:
'Serbia does not seek to be a republic more than any other republic, but -  certainly -  it 
cannot accept to be a republic less than the others. The fact that Serbia has two 
autonomous socialist provinces within itself cannot be a reason for it to be reduced to its 
narrower territory, so called 'Serbia without provinces'. Neither should the Republic of
63 Not surprisingly, the Serbian Party congress in 1986 used as its symbol a large fist -  the symbol of the unity and strength 
of the Party.
64 The main reason was the election of Slobodan Milosevic, the former President of the Belgrade Party Committee, as 
president of the Serbian Central Committee. Markovic was Milosevic's wife's uncle. Stambolic recalls in his book: 
'Immediately after the election of the new president, Draza told me that history would never forgive me this choice, that the 
Serbian nation would never forgive me for my backing of Milosevic, and that Milosevic would spoil everything... It seemed 
to me that he said this only because he was a countercandidate for the position of the CC president... I stood up and left the 
room' (Stambolic, 1995:149). Among those who opposed Milosevic's election was also Cvijetin Mijatovic, the most 
prominent politician among the Bosnian Serbs.
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Serbia be denied political and legal authority over its entire territory, or be forced to apply 
it only to a part of its territory... We shall change everything that stands in our way to end 
this crisis' (1986:121).65
There were four points he often repeated in his public speeches in the 1984-1987 period:
First, he was the most outspoken critic of disunity in Serbia and Yugoslavia. To his mind, 
unity was the key to all problems in the country.66 Yugoslavs, Milosevic claimed in 1987, thought of 
themselves as citizens of the world, yet 'everything has been done to make them members of their 
regions, provinces and narrow communities'. Disintegration is against the 'spirit of the continent 
and of this epoch', Milosevic had concluded in 1985. The Yugoslav nations, he said, invented the 
idea of togetherness (zajednistvo) a century ago, when still fragmented by foreign empires. 'Today, 
when this idea has conquered Europe and the whole world, we are going back to thoughts and 
actions that have been abandoned by everyone else, or at least everyone in the developed world. 
We ought to be worried and we have to resist this' (1985:55). The key to the reintegration of 
Yugoslavia was in the Party. Just like Tito earlier, Milosevic insisted that even in a federal state 
(perhaps precisely because of its federal character) the Party must remain united in order to 
prevent disintegrative tendencies from the republics and provinces. For him, just as for Tito and 
Kardelj, the Party was the key institution, the one that decided the future of the nation.67 In 
Milosevic's view the disunity of the Party was the main reason for the growth of the opposition. 
The political and economic crises, the 'counter-revolution' in Kosovo and the emergence of 
'nationalist' concepts throughout the country were just the results of the Party's inability to act 
resolutely. This had to be changed.
Secondly Milosevic demanded 'change in the practice' but not the aims of Party activities. 
These changes should be 'major and urgent' (1984/1989:34) but they should not endanger two
651 happened to have a telephone conversation with Pepca Kardelj, Edvard Kardelj's widow, on the day when Milosevic's 
speech was published in the Belgrade daily Politika. Pepca Kardelj was very upset with his statement, considering this to be 
the most outrageous criticism of the 1974 Constitution. When I met her a few days later she told me how worried her late 
husband was about the possibility of the re-emergence of Serbian nationalism after his and Tito's death. She was convinced 
that Milosevic's 1986 speech was nationalistic.
66 'People can hold their present and their future in their own hands only if they are resolute and remain united,' Milosevic 
said in 1984 (1984:21). On the other hand, 'lack of unity and disintegration are at this moment the greatest problems of 
Yugoslav society' (1985:54).
67 As he claimed in April 1987: 'The future of socialism and that of Yugoslavia depends upon the unity of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia' (1987:139). Milosevic remained committed to this position until the very end of Yugoslavia. In 
his later speeches (like in Gazimestan, 28 June 1989) he preferred the word concord (sloga) to unity (jedinstvo). Unlike 'unity', 
'concord' was not directly associated with the Partisans and Tito's Yugoslavia, but more with the Serbian 19th and early 20th 
century tradition. Concord is one of the key words of the Serbian national slogan: 'Only Concord Can Save the Serbs' (Samo 
Sloga Srbe Spasava).
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supreme values: socialism and Yugoslavism. Socialism was still 'the best and the most progressive 
idea of our time' (1986:102). To him, socialism was yet to come, and the revolution was still 
continuing (1986:193). But, his description of the society he envisaged did not develop much 
further than saying that market laws should be implemented, so that 'the working people who 
govern society are not poor, but rich' (1987:136).68 It is within this context, that Milosevic indeed 
became an open advocate of market socialism, which -  as he said - was not 'a  concession to the 
capitalist mode of production, and is not an abandonment of socialism and self-management -  on 
the contrary, it is a condition that social ownership of the means of production survives and 
promotes itself as the optimal form of ownership' (1987:135).69 Some of Milosevic's reformist 
initiatives, indeed, sounded threats to 'those individuals' and 'those territories' whose interests 
they would endanger. It was perfectly logical for a 'reformer of the Constitution' to say, for 
example (in December 1986):
'The stubborn, permanent and dogmatic opposition to all change, even to that which is 
unavoidable, at this moment has the same effect as the activity of the anti-socialist 
opposition. It can even be more dangerous, because delaying the change presently 
demanded provokes the justified anger and discontent of the workers, intellectuals and 
youth. By refusing economic and political change, we would end up with the absurd 
situation of the leadership of the League of Communists defending the existing concept of 
socialism against workers, intellectuals and youth -  and this would bring socialism to an 
end much faster and more efficiently than hoped for by anti-Communists' (1986:122).
Thirdly, seeing again the main problem in the Party and its disunity, Milosevic said that 
the Party should concentrate on its own 'positive programme', rather than on disputes with the 
opposition. It was true that between Communists and oppositionists there could be no 
reconciliation. But:
'whenever we, Communists, talk about the activities of anti-socialist forces, we should 
have in mind not so much them but more the arguments with which we have provided 
them for such activities... It is, therefore, not a task of Communists in such a situation just 
to argue with anti-socialist ideas and their advocates... but -  above all -  to offer solutions to 
the crisis... It is true that we are under pressure from ideological opponents, but the League 
of Communists m ust not make the big mistake of reducing its activities only to disputes 
with them. Because we are also under pressure from a crisis that m ust be solved. And to be 
excessively preoccupied with our opponents would put the LC in a defensive position. 
This is a real, historically confirmed, way to lose the leading position in society... 
(1986:117).
68 Modem Serbia, Milosevic said in 1989, would be a Serbia with $ 10,000 income per capita (1989:316).
69 In her interview for Mladina (27 September 1999) Desa Trevisan recalls that Milosevic, visibly annoyed, insisted that he 
had advocated market reforms before Milan Kucan (Slovenia). Indeed, he did.
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It is this 'hierarchy of problems' and not his sympathies with the opposition or with Serbian 
nationalism that prevented Milosevic from criticising the Academy and the M emorandum in 
public.70
'I see the main problem in the economic and political system.71 To treat poems, novels, 
exhibitions as the main ideological topics -  as happens with some leaderships -  I consider 
this to be a lack of consciousness of what the real problems are' (Milosevic, 1984:23).
To debate about the past -  Milosevic said -  was futile and counter-productive.
'A  society whose eyes are looking to past instead of the future, will have no future. Those 
who now try to force us to debate the origins of nations and poems, who offer us 
reconciliation of armies and classes, and who advocate separatism today, at a time when 
integrative processes have conquered the whole world, they know this even better than we 
do' (1986:79).
Not only did Milosevic (sharing the view of the majority in the Party) refuse to put opposition 
activities at the top of the public agenda, but he advocated much closer links with intellectuals than 
any of his predecessors, by making clear that the Party should rely on them when attempting to 
formulate its 'positive programme'. More than most of his predecessors, Milosevic emphasised the 
role of the intelligentsia, saying (in 1984) that 'our relations with the intelligentsia are our relations 
with our own future' (1984:13). Emphasising the necessity of distinguishing 'honest' intellectuals 
from the counter-revolutionaries, Milosevic argued that the Party should not forget that a large 
majority of intellectuals saw their future in socialism:
'Intolerance towards educated and determined people, who at the same time do not 
believe that everything is dark and that existing difficulties cannot be overcome 
successfully -  which is still the attitude of some people -  should not be tolerated any 
longer' (1986:122).
Milosevic was also a more frequent visitor to the University than his two predecessors -  Draza 
Markovic and Ivan Stambolic. While they contacted the University only when asking various 
Faculties to warn their professors about the Party line, Milosevic now offered a hand of co­
operation. In 1987 Milosevic declared that 'Balkan dogmatism expressed itself by its almost feudal 
views on the intelligentsia. The struggle for economic and social prosperity cannot be won if there
70 Finally, it was his predecessor Ivan Stambolic, who gave the same explanation for his 'silence' in polemics with Suvar 
about the 'White Book' two years earlier. On this occasion, MiloSevic only repeated Stambolic's old argument: that 'some 
people' (sometimes 'dogmatist' forces, which opposed political and economic change; sometimes the 'opposition') wanted 
to distract Serbian Communists from the main issues.
71 In the end, as a Marxist, Milosevic believed that 'cultured questions do not exist independently of economic and material 
conditions of living' (1984:25).
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are no educated, capable and clever people in the first ranks (of this struggle)' (1987:139). Bearing 
in mind that his wife, Mirjana Markovic, was herself a University Professor of Sociology who 
controlled the Belgrade University Party Organisation,72 it came as no surprise that m any of his 
closest aides were recruited from among the academics and students.73
Finally (fourthly), Milosevic introduced into Serbian political rhetoric the notion of 
'firmness against anarchy' and of 'optimism'. Milosevic believed that Yugoslavia was slipping into 
anarchy, 'in  which anyone can criticise anyone, without any responsibility for w hat he does and 
how he behaves' (1986:101).
'Precisely because of this anarchy, despite all these expansions of the bourgeois 
consciousness, we are not under the threat of a restoration of Capitalism, but much more of 
the restoration of those dark bureaucratic forces which we have once avoided'74 (1986:115).
This means, he concluded, that if the processes which led to anarchy continued, 'there would be a 
strong chance that the way out would be found in some version of a totalitarian state and of 
personal rule' (1986:115).75 Milosevic considered opposition to be dangerous since it promoted 
anarchy in society. The 'atmosphere of defeatism and pessimism', which had taken over many 
areas of political and cultural life was promoted on purpose to spread fear and helplessness 
(1986:78). Milosevic warned that it was entirely illogical that the most pessimistic people led the 
country, occupying positions from which they could stop or slow down any development. Young 
people, he said in 1986, should not allow optimism to be pushed aside by the spirit of inferiority, of 
criticism and mourning, which was encouraged by those who were in conflict not only with society 
but with themselves as well (1986:87). The criticism of 'pessimists' referred not only to the 
apocalyptic Academicians in the SANU, but also to those leaders who endlessly criticised one 
another for the failures they had caused. The rhetoric of optimism that he introduced in his
72 In 1993 Mira Markovic described her influence over the cadre policy in the University: 'I was pushing through a certain 
cadre solution very energetically and very successfully' (Markovic, quoted in Popov, 1996:356).
73 Milosevic's openness to intellectuals and to the University earned him sympathies among many University Professors 
and students, even from those who had belonged to the opposition to the regime ever since the 1968 student protests, and 
the constitutional debate preceding the 1974 Constitution (like Mihailo Markovic, Ljubomir Tadic, et al.). Even Milovan 
Djilas acknowledges he was 'soft' on Milosevic, since it was under his government that he was allowed to speak in public 
for the first time after his ousting from office in 1954. Although it was certainly not his intention to support dissidents, he 
seemed to be willing to tolerate them. Support from Belgrade students for Milosevic reached its peak with the massive anti- 
Slovenian and anti-Albanian rally in November 1989 ('the largest since liberation in 1945', as Milosevic said), which was 
organised by the students. The 24-hour long rally ended with demands for the arrest of the Communist leader of the 
Kosovo Albanians Azem Vllasi, which duly happened three days later.
74 A clear reference to 1948 (the break with Stalin).
75 For further understanding of the anarchic nature of Yugoslav socialism, see Doder (1978). If there is any doubt about the 
link between anarchy and Stalinism, see Tikholaz (1996:131-8). For Kardelj's warnings about the 'Chilean scenario' in 
Yugoslavia after Tito, see Chapter Two.
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speeches, was in sharp contrast to the 'culture of apocalypse' developed in the first half of the 
1980s.7*
As a consequence of all this, Milosevic declared 'w ar' on those political leaders who were not 
ready: a) to accept the necessity to change Party methods; (b) to be optimistic in public; (c) to 
follow the right hierarchy of problems, among which constitutional changes were an absolute 
priority; (d) to re-direct their attacks from ideological enemies to a 'positive programme'; (e) to 
abandon 'dogmatism '; (f) to support Party unity, in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Milosevic soon moved 
to unite the Party by eliminating all those who did not want to follow these requirements.
6.5. From Divisions to Unity: the Emergence of 'Institutionalists’ and 'Revolutionaries' 
Within the LCS (April - September 1987)
Three incidents between April and September 1987 set the stage for the conflict within the Serbian 
leadership, after which 'unity' would be achieved in opposition to 'anarchy', 'anti-socialist 
tendencies' and 'pessimism'. Firstly, in April 1987 Milosevic addressed the Serbian and 
Montenegrin protesters in Kosovo Polje, creating a new direct link between the elite and the most 
dissatisfied segments of the Serbian population. Secondly, in May 1987 he launched an 'ideological 
offensive' against 'various attacks on Tito', displaying his determination to stop any further growth 
of the Serbian opposition movement, and any further disunity within the Party. Finally, after an 
incident in a barracks in Paracin in September 1987, when an Albanian soldier killed four and 
wounded seven of his colleagues, Milosevic moved on to convince others in Yugoslavia that urgent 
action was needed. While the first event (the Kosovo Polje speech) linked the elite with the 
population, the second ('the Student case') split the Party into 'institutionalists' and 'revolutionists', 
the two groups that would finally drift apart at the Eighth CC LCS Session in September 1987. The
76 So were his rhetorical qualities when compared with his predecessors. By the mid 1980s people were tired of listening to 
the same phrases and endless descriptions of the situation. Bureaucratic language could not inspire anyone. Milosevic 
acknowledged this. He spoke a different language, using short and simple sentences, simple but emotionally extensive 
images (like 'heart', 'children', 'snake in the bosom', etc.). As Serbian poetess Desanka Maksimovic said, reviewing his book 
of speeches in 1989: 'By his speeches he aroused in many people a desire to fight, shaking out patriotism that had fallen 
asleep and duties that were neglected'. Or, as Kosta Mihailovic, one of the authors of the SANU Memorandum said: 'He 
does not use phrases and empty words from which every trace of content has evaporated. Instead, he expresses his 
arguments in clear words familiar to everyone' (Milosevic, 1989: cover page). This was not only recognised by intellectuals, 
but by ordinary people as well. 'Milosevic's greatest contribution was that he came down to the level at which even children 
could understand him, even the elderly without any education. This is what matters. He spoke from everyone's heart,' said 
an unnamed Kosovo Serb in an interview with Slovenian sociologists in 1989 (Gaber and Kuzmanic,, 1989:247). His 
rhetorical qualities, relatively young age and the look of a determined Party leader made him a perfect candidate for a 
popular myth, built with substantial help from his friends in the media. Milosevic now became the first person who 
understood the importance of media 'spinning' in post-Titoist Yugoslav politics. Nowhere was this more obvious than in 
his speech to the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo Polje on 25 April 1987.
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third event (the 'Paracin case') was used to justify his rhetoric and practice of an 'emergency 
situation'.
6.5.1. The Kosovo Polje Speech
On 25 April 1987 Milosevic faced an angry crowd of about 2,000 Serbs and Montengrins w hen he 
visited Kosovo Polje aiming to prevent yet another protest march to Belgrade. They demanded to 
talk to him directly, without 'representatives' they did not trust. When they pushed forward 
towards the building where Milosevic was holding a meeting with local politicians, police77 used 
truncheons. Milosevic, informed of the course of events, went out of the building to talk to the 
demonstrators. Obviously moved by w hat he saw (people calling the police 'M urderers', and 
claiming they had been beaten by them) Milosevic uttered a sentence that would later become a 
myth: 'No one will ever beat you again. No one should dare to beat you!.' Frightened and confused 
by w hat he saw, Milosevic moved among the people, inviting as many of them as was physically 
possible to attend his meeting with the local leadership in Kosovo Polje. During the 13-hour long 
session with the local population, people presented hundreds of cases of maltreatment, injustice 
and oppression by local politicians and police. Not only were most of these stories similar to those 
in the 'Book about Milutin' and other novels, but the political demands echoed those of the Serbian 
Writers' Association and the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Milosevic realised that the 
opposition to the regime was potentially powerful and that radical action should be taken 
immediately so as to prevent the collapse of the regime.
At the end of 'the night of bitter words' (as the media called this unusual event), Milosevic gave a 
speech of about 2,500 words. In fact, the content of his speech would now perhaps surprise those 
analysts who tend to focus their historical analyses on the text alone, neglecting the context. What 
Milosevic said did not differ much from what Ivan Stambolic told the same crowd a year before on 
a similar occasion but it was said in Milosevic's style and heard by a larger number of members of 
the media. Although Milosevic's speech in Kragujevac in December 1986 contained more elements 
of the new rhetoric of optimism and firmness, it was the Kosovo Polje speech that m arked the 
beginning of the permanent link between the leadership and the Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins.
Milosevic's speech had elements taken from three sources: (1) old Communist ideological rhetoric; 
(2) notions of (direct) democracy; and (3) patriotic/ nationalist programmes, including some of
77 In later interpretations, it has often been emphasised that the demonstrators assumed the majority of the police were 
ethnic Albanians. It is, however, very much an open question if this was true, and -  if true -  how important this element 
was.
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those developed in recently published literature and promoted by the 'critical intelligentsia'. He 
combined claims for 'brotherhood and unity' (reviving Tito's -  after 1974 somewhat forgotten - 
catch-phrase) with invitations to the Kosovo Serbs not to abandon their 'fields and yards', since 
their ancestors would be ashamed and their descendants disappointed. He reminded the Serbs that 
'it has never been a characteristic of the spirit of the Serbian and Montenegrin people to de­
mobilise when they must fight, to become demoralised when the situation is difficult' and he 
promised Serbian and Federal support to the population in Kosovo. But he also reminded the 
demonstrators that things had significantly improved over the last few years, and that Kosovo was 
not the only problem of Yugoslavia. Milosevic criticised the state for being bureaucratic, since it 
had not secured the implementation of laws in the Province. But he also warned the Serbs and 
Montenegrins that a 'state of lawlessness' could help no one: neither Albanians nor Serbs in 
Kosovo. He defended the right of demonstrators to express their opinion and rejected political 
accusations that their meetings were gatherings of nationalists.78 But, he left no doubt that the 
Serbs 'should not allow the troubles of the people to be misused by nationalists, against whom 
every honest man has to stand'. Instead of divisions on ethnic grounds, Milosevic proposed unity 
based on the common interests of Albanians and Serbs to develop the Province in both an 
economic and a cultural sense. The working class, with its 'united' interests, was the 'bearer of the 
spirit of brotherhood and unity, justice and progress'. The working class and its Party were the 
only force that could successfully halt 'counter-revolution' which demanded that the Province 
should become a republic, a step which would lead to 'the break-up of Serbian and Yugoslav 
territorial unity' (1987:143).
In terms much stronger than any of his predecessors, Milosevic warned that the migrations of Serbs 
and Montenegrins were 'probably the last tragic exoduses of the European population',79 one that 
could be compared only with those seen in the Middle Ages (1987:142). At this moment, Milosevic 
admitted, it was impossible to re-create the ethnic structure in Kosovo as it was before, but it must 
be possible to launch a campaign for the return of those who had left the Province. 'N o price 
should be considered too high to reach this goal' (1987:145).
Although the speech itself left open the possibility of being interpreted in a nationalistic way too, 
Milosevic's messages were still clearly Titoist and anti-nationalist.
78 Here he only repeated Stambolic's conclusion after his Kosovo Polje visit in April 1986.
79 According to official data, presented by the Secretary of the Serbian LC CC Zoran Sokolovic at a joint session of the 
Serbian state and party presidencies on 2 November 1988, 31,000 Serbs and Montenegrins moved out of Kosovo after 1981. 
Out of 3,000 households that moved out of Kosovo, about 2,000 sold out all their properties in the province. Out of 1,445 
territorial units in Kosovo, about 700 were already 'ethnically pure -  Albanian', while in about 300 the number of Serbs and 
Montengrins fell below 50. Between 1983 and 1987, about 6,500 (i.e., 224 households) Croats, Muslims, Romanies and Turks 
left Kosovo as well (IB CKSKS. 10/1988: 6).
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'We m ust preserve brotherhood and unity like the apple of our eye...W e neither wish to, 
neither can we divide people into Serbs and Albanians. But we must make a distinction 
between those who are honest and progressive, who fight for the brotherhood and unity 
and for national equality [on the one hand] and the counter-revolutionaries and 
nationalists on the other'.
In terms that left no doubt, Milosevic attacked Albanian nationalism, which wanted an 'ethnically 
clean' Kosovo. 'They count on time, and -  of course -  time works for them. But they should know -  
on this soil there will be no more tyranny,' he claimed, alluding to Tirana and fears of the long­
term victory of the Albanian high birth rate over the existing structure of the Kosovo population. 
At the same time, however, he clearly invited the Serbs to seek allies among the majority of the 
Albanian population in Kosovo, who were anti-nationalistic and progressive.
'The Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo will surely receive support from many Albanians, 
Communists and other Albanian people, among whom they count relatives and friends, 
and their children their pals. Because it is our common goal here to see the Province 
economically and culturally developed so that people, all the people, can live better and 
happier. It is around this goal that all working and honest people should get together: this 
should be basis of brotherhood and unity in Kosovo.'
People in the Province, Milosevic said, 'do not address one another in their everyday life according 
to their nationality, in the same way that they do not discriminate according to their gender, age, 
social background, education and profession'. Neither Serbs nor Albanians are a 'm inority' in 
Kosovo or in Serbia: the Serbs are a constitutive nation, and the Albanians a 'nationality' that 
enjoys equal rights with other nations. 'This part of the Albanian people is streaming towards 
Europe, towards a modern society, and one should not stop it on its way,' Milosevic said, 
reminding his listeners that isolation and nationalism run against the interests not only of the 
Albanian nation but of all other nations in the modern world.
'Nationalism always means isolation from others, closure inside one's own framework, 
which implies lagging behind others in development: because there is no progress without 
the co-operation and development of further relations among Yugoslavs, nor without co­
operation within the wider context. Every nation and nationality which closes itself off and 
isolates itself from others behaves in an irresponsible way in relation to its own 
development. This is why we Communists should do all we can to eliminate the 
consequences of the nationalist and separatist behaviour by the counter-revolutionary 
forces, in Kosovo and in all other parts of the country. Our aim is to finally leave hatred, 
intolerance and distrust behind us, so that all people in Kosovo may live well.'80
80 Despite this dearly anti-nationalist rhetoric, authors such as Kaplan (1993:40), today often claim that Milosevic made a 
'direct appeal to racial hatred' on this occasion. The wide difference between what actually happened and the retrospective 
interpretation of the events was the result of severed methodological mistakes, such as those of the 'prolepsis' and 
'coherence' hypotheses; that the texts themselves were not read; that their contexts were neglected, etc. In Kaplan's book, 
but also in many recent accounts of Milosevic's policy (see Bishop's article in Daily Telegraph. 20 January 1999, or Rose's
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Milosevic's firmly Yugoslav/Serbian rhetoric appealed well to his listeners, who enthusiastically 
welcomed the new leader's determination. Once again, it was not democracy and freedom of 
speech that they put at the top of their demands. Just like Milosevic himself, they demanded an end 
to 'anarchy' and 'lawlessness'. The Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins felt that 'anarchy', not lack of 
democracy, was endangering their rights. And they demanded swift and sharp action in a Titoist 
style. Milosevic recognised this demand, and offered such action - this is why he had a real chance 
of redirecting the Kosovo Serbs from Cosic's promise of a 'revolution of burning books' to his own 
radical rhetoric of 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' only three years later. And finally, this is why no 
other rhetoric, and especially not that which would promise a more 'liberal democracy' had much 
chance to do so.
The dramatic context in which the speech occurred, contributed much to myths constructed 
immediately after the event.81 To Kosovo Serbs, Milosevic now increasingly looked like a 'new Tito'. 
He himself now attempted to repeat the Titoist formula, which included four elements: 1) linking 
himself directly with the demonstrators; 2) verbally supporting their demands in order to defuse 
their discontent; 3) using this new link between the leader and population to consolidate his own 
position within the elite by eliminating his opponents; and 4) using the newly established unity of 
the purged Party to eliminate opposition to the regime.82 And, indeed, he immediately started 
acting as 'a new Tito'.
6.5.2. The 'Student' Case: 'Differentiation' W ithin the Elite
When Milosevic returned to Belgrade from Kosovo Polje, Ivan Stambolic described his arrival as 
that of 'a  new man'. Just like Stambolic a year before, he was worried about the gravity of situation 
in Kosovo, but also encouraged by public the support he received both from Serbs and 
Montenegrins in the province and in the media. And he felt obliged to deliver what he promised. 
In the five months between April and September 1987, Milosevic introduced an 'iron discipline' 
within the Party leadership. He cut out the lengthy meetings and weekly informal 'consultations' 
between the leaders of the Serbian institutions. Entirely unlike the previous practice of 'collective
1998 book, for example) the ideological dimension of Milosevic's motives was neglected, while 'ethnic hatred' was promoted 
as the explanation of his actions. As I argue here, this is entirely inadequate.
81 Already three days after the event, Kniizevne novine published on its cover page a poem 'Hymn in the Fields' by 
Radoslav Zlatanovic: 'But, a young and handsome speaker arrived/ The Falling Sim cuddles his hair/ I will talk to my 
people even in the fields, he says/ In School yards and Gardens' (Gojkovic, 1996:373).
82 These four elements, as described in Chapter Three, were the essence of Tito's personal political technique, which he 
implemented most successfully after the 1968 student demonstrations.
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leadership' within the Party, he now issued orders without asking for advice. It was 'anarchism ' he 
fought against, knowing that -  just like Tito -  he would be more likely to obtain popular support 
by showing that he was in full control and determined to make changes, than by appealing to 
others to act. The time for empty talk had gone, he claimed to his colleagues in the Party 
leadership. 'Opportunistic' behaviour for the sake of false unity should be abandoned for good. In 
a word, Milosevic introduced an 'emergency situation' within the Party leadership.83
Milosevic now asked his Party colleagues to be permanently on the alert when it came to 
opposition. The 'positive programme' of changes should be accompanied with an 'offensive' 
against all forms of nationalism and anti-socialist activities. It was in this context that on 2 May 
1987 Student, the semi-independent newspapers published by the Belgrade University Youth 
Organisation, printed on its cover page an illustration of 'a  Vampire' with the title 'The Dance of 
the Vampires'. Alert to any opposition, Milosevic's ally Dusan Mitevic, the ideologue of the 
Belgrade Party Organisation, now immediately recognised in this illustration an 'attack on Tito' 
and allusion to the traditional mass-celebration of Tito's birthday in a stadium  three weeks later. 
W hat would in other circumstances have been considered as a minor provocation for the regime 
(compared with much more serious articles and books published at the time), now caused a sharp 
reaction from Milosevic's allies in the Party leadership who urged immediate party action, not only 
against the publisher and editor of Student but more broadly -  against similar 'attacks on Tito'. 
However, Dragisa Pavlovic, the President of the Presidency, remained committed to the previous 
policy of keeping a low profile when it came to opposition and simply said that 'there are much 
more important issues to discuss'.
Following the unusual exchange between Pavlovic and Mitevic at the meeting of the Belgrade 
Party Presidency, in the next couple of days the media published 35 commentaries, 34 of which 
either doubted Mitevic's interpretation of the Student cover page, or even openly rejected his 
method of analysis as inappropriate to the 'new  times'. In what was an unprecedented show of 
disagreement amongst the leading Serbian politicians, the Serbian Minister of Culture Branislav 
Milosevic publicly attacked 'dogmatist forces' -  and above all Mitevic -  for their 'reading' of the
83 Milosevic's rule was one of a 'state of emergency', said his critics. Stambolic even hints that 'somebody' 'made sure' that 
at the very moment when Serbia finally agreed with the other republics about die necessity of Constitutional change, the 
SANU Memorandum appeared as a draft in the newspapers with the highest circulation in Serbia; and that the 8th Session 
occurred when Serbia was about to change its Constitution, correcting the mistakes of the 1974 solution. 'Well, you know 
what... Such coincidences, and there are many more, could not occur by chance... Whoever is capable of reading politically, 
could see clearly: to the changes in the federal Constitution one replied with the Memorandum; to the proposal for changes 
in the Serbian Constitution, the immediate shot was the 8th Session; and then you would see clearly the very essence of the 
global political conflict and who was on which side' (Stambolic, 1995:176). Stambolic recalls the old Bosheviks' logic: 'the 
worse - the better', calling these tactics 'a strategy of chaos'. One should, of course, take Stambolic's words cautiously, but 
immediate parallels with Tito's technique of solving political conflicts in the 1967-72 cannot be avoided. Was Ljubicic (KOS, 
the Army Intelligence, etc.) the connection between the two?
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Student cover page. The conflict between Mitevic and B. Milosevic came to the forefront of public 
debate.
On 8 June 1987 Slobodan Milosevic used a half-informal but highly influential political institution 
of 'political co-ordination' to say:
'We are confronted with an offensive of the opposition, and we m ust strike back forcefully. 
The opposition has already taken over many associations, and we are now waging a 
struggle for the press... Wherever differentiation has not been carried out, our offensive is 
weak... These are not 'children's games'. We are slipping into anarchy' (Milosevic, quoted 
in Djukic, 1994:63).
A party commission was set up in the Belgrade Party Committee to investigate all the 
circumstances of the Student case. But at the same meeting, Milosevic for the first time faced 
criticism from Ivan Stambolic. Stambolic (now President of the Serbian state Presidency) said that 
the case caused 'a  repressive atmosphere, an impression of a permanent conflict'. He noticed that 
Milosevic thought it unnecessary to say anything about the SANU M emorandum and that the 
public tension raised in the Student case was much higher than that produced after the 
Memorandum. Stambolic warned that several statements by the Party Presidency of LC Serbia 
only 'added fuel to the fire'.
But Stambolic did not find much support for his views even in the most inner circle of Serbian 
politics. Nikola Ljubicic, the Serbian representative in the federal Presidency, concluded that 'we 
have hesitated too much', and that 'our side was on the defensive, while the opposition was on the 
attack'. Listing examples from the press, Ljubicic (the former Federal Secretary of Defence) said 
that 'our people' were under much heavier attack than the anti-Communists, and that the 
Memorandum in fact created a new party against the regime. 'We should break with this in good 
time,' Ljubicic said.
Although the conflict over the interpretation of what Student really meant and how im portant it 
was, and, consequently, what actions should be taken in response to it, did not result in any 
immediate resolution, it was one of the main events preceding the final clash which brought 
Milosevic to full power in Serbia when its political leaders reconvened after the summer break, in 
September 1987.
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6.5.3. The Paracin Case and its Interpretation
On 3 September 1987 a 20-year old soldier from Kosovo Aziz Kelmendi killed four of his soldier- 
colleagues and wounded six more in a barracks in Serbian city of Paracin. Among those killed two 
were ethnic Muslims (Hazim Dzananovic and Safet Dudakovic), one was a Croat (Goran Begic) 
while the fourth, Srdjan Simic from Belgrade declared himself a 'Yugoslav'. Among the wounded 
soldiers, one was from Montenegro, three from Bosnia-Herzegovina, one from Kosovo and one 
from Slovenia.84 W ithout waiting for any report by investigators, the event was interpreted by the 
media as yet another action of Albanian separatism against Yugoslavia and its nations.85 
Kelmendi's individual crime was now taken as a demonstration of 'w hat could be the price of 
further tension and of the neglect of such a delicate and serious problem as counter-revolution in 
Kosovo.' The Serbian press did not fail to use the tragedy as yet another occasion to say once again: 
the Albanians are not to be trusted, regardless of where they are and how they act.86 The message 
was understood throughout Serbia. In Valjevo, Paracin, Subotica and in various other places kiosks 
and shops owned by local Albanians were smashed up. The members of Kelmendi's family were 
all arrested and interrogated in Prizren prison. His sister Melihata (aged 16) was expelled from 
school. The Partisan organisation in Kelmendi's village Dusanovo asked all the people there to 
isolate his family.87 Aziz Kelmendi's high school tutor Agish Kastrati was expelled from the LCY, 
while five of his teachers got a 'final warning' for failing to make a record of Kelmendi's absence 
from school three years ago, between 2 and 17 April 1984. Kelmendi spent these 13 days in prison 
after being caught attempting to 'flee to Albania'.88 The atmosphere of emergency spread from 
Milosevic's actions and his speeches all over Serbia and - perhaps for the first time - to the whole of 
Yugoslavia.89 The apocalypse described in novels and plays by leading Serbian writers now started
84 Borba, 4 September 1987.
85 See Tanjug's commentary in Borba of 4 September 1987: 'Pucnji u Jugoslaviju' ('Shots at Yugoslavia').
86 In his book (1992) Slavoljub Djukic quotes from an authorised statement of an unnamed journalist of Politika about the 
immediate reaction of Zivorad Minovic, the director of Politika to the events in Paracin: 'Minovic was lively and excited 
when he talked about the Paracin assassination in which "four Serbian soldiers were killed, which was - as he said - 'as 
Manna from Heaven' in the situation as it was... A few minutes later, he shocked me again, when he phoned and told us - 
now clearly disappointed - that 'although not all four of those killed were Serbs, we should give great publicity to this 
event' (Djukic, 1992:150).
87 Borba, 10 September 1987.
88 Interestingly enough, Ore Serbian Writers' Association was among the very few organisations protesting against such 
ostracism. In a public demarche, they called these proposals 'barbaric' and described their authors as being 'deaf to any 
respect for law and human rights'. However, one cannot avoid die impression that the main reason for their protests was to 
emphasise that the attack on the Kelmendis would be a heavy burden on the 'dignity of Serbia and of Yugoslavia' and 
might well be used by Albanian nationalists to 'ante-date' events, so that 'an assassin of innocent soldiers would now  
become a protector of his mother and sister'.
89 I quote here from my personal diary on 7 September 1987: 'In Zagreb, even those people who were so far defending the 
Albanians and were strongly against the Serbian nationalist approach to Kosovo, are now ready to boycott Albanian shops
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unfolding before people's eyes. A pall of fear and uncertainty for the first time began to fall upon 
Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia.
On 6 September 1987, the funeral of Srdjan Simic took place in Belgrade, which thousands of 
people attended. 'Better grave than slave',90 'We want freedom',91 'Kosovo is Serbia', 'We shall not 
give Kosovo away', 'Enough of resolutions',92 they shouted.93 The situation became so tense that 
Simic's father personally asked them to stop violating the dignity of the funeral, but in vain. After 
the funeral, 20,000 participants visited Aleksandar Rankovic's grave in the same cemetery, singing 
the Yugoslav national anthem.94
The Party leadership were now facing their most dangerous challenge since Tito's death. 
Assassination in a barracks, stones thrown at kiosks, inflamed language in the press and mounting 
worries throughout Yugoslavia about the situation in Serbia95 simply forced them to respond. But 
how?
in Zagreb. No one trusts them any longer.1 On 18 September 19871 recorded my conversation with Stipe Oreskovic, a friend 
of mine who was then the closest political associate of Stipe Suvar. 'Stipe [Oreskovic] argues that both Milosevic and 
Stambolic are nationalists, but MiloSevic is better because his policy leads to a civil war in Kosovo immediately, while 
Stambolic would bring us there in a year or so. He says that if it has to be, let it be now, rather than later, because the Party 
is rapidly weakening, and the whole system is falling apart. Strange! He is now obsessed with a possibility of a war 
breaking out. In fact, he speaks as if there is no other option at all!'. Oreskovic, at that time a member of the Federal Youth 
Organisation Presidency, was well informed about events within the leadership.
90 This was the most famous slogan of the 27 March 1941 Belgrade demonstrations which overthrew the Yugoslav 
Government two days after signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany. A symbol of resistance not only to the world powers, 
but also to domestic governments co-operating with them. The other famous slogan of 27 March 1941 was: 'Better War than 
Pact' ('Bolje Rat Nego Pakt'). Both re-appeared among Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s and in Serbia during the NATO attack on 
Yugoslavia in Spring 1999.
91 Various Communist institutions debated for months before September 1987 on whether this expression was 'nationalistic' 
or not, if expressed by Serbs and Montenegrins only, and in Kosovo. Freedom for whom and from whom? Was freedom not 
secured in 1945 once and for all?
92 In this context, 'resolutions' mean party conclusions which have not been implemented, but remained 'a dead letter'.
93 Borba, 7 September 1987.
99 It happened that I was in Belgrade at the time of the events, working briefly as a journalist in Borba. This information I 
heard from a reporter that attended the funeral and recorded it in my personal diary (7 September 1987).
95 In a commentary published in the Zagreb daily Vjesnik. Ivkica Badic asked: 'Have we really come to the point that to the 
madness in Paracin we react with revenge towards juveniles and entire families?' She warned about ideas of 'collective 
guilt', and 'badly thought out1 actions under sponsorship of the political bodies' which could well 'bring us even deeper and 
lower... to a point without any hope' (Vjesniic, 12 September 1987).
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6.6. Institutionalists vs. Revolutionists - Towards the Last 'Palace Putsch' in Yugoslavia
In answering this question, the Serbian political elite split into 'institutionalists' and 'revolutionists'. 
As in previous cases of intra-elite conflicts (for example, in 1967-1972, or in 1981 in the Minic- 
Markovic case) this one was also an intra-Serbian division on the issue of reacting to opposition 
activities. But it involved much broader issues, such as: how to approach the Kosovo crisis, 
whether all nationalisms were equally dangerous, what were the internal party principles for the 
resolution of the conflicts (including the meaning of 'democratic centralism'), to w hat extent should 
the public be involved in political decision-making, how should the achievements of previous 
Serbian leaders be assessed, how should one rate the Kosovo issue in comparison with economic 
problems, etc. Here we map out the main arguments of both sides.
6.6.1. The Institutionalists
An open conflict between the two groups began only eight days after the Paracin case (11 
September 1987), when Dragisa Pavlovic, the leader of the Belgrade Communists, held a meeting 
with the directors, editors and heads of Communist organisations in the Belgrade media. 
Obviously worried about the possibility of the situation moving out of control, he attacked them 
for spreading panic and promoting Serbian nationalism after the Paracin case.
'The overall situation in Kosovo, which is indeed not improving with the necessary, 
desirable, or, even less with the lightly promised 'urgency7, is creating a dangerous 
atmosphere in which it seems as if every single word against Serbian nationalism is 
understood as tolerance of Albanian separatist nationalism... The question we are now 
facing is not only whether we, united in the struggle against Albanian nationalism and 
separatism, should neither pause nor hesitate; it is also a question of whether we all believe 
that this struggle should be conducted only within the policy laid down in the Programme 
and the Statutes of the LCY, through the existing institutions of the system and on the 
principles of democratic socialism...'
Insisting that the leadership should not accept, still less organise populist politics, Pavlovic said:
'Unbalanced words only create a hysterical mood, which makes things worse, without 
resolving any problem. The space for a resolution of the Kosovo problem is now so limited 
that even the smallest mistake - whatever the intentions of those who made it may be - 
could only be tragic for the Serbs and for Montenegrins in Kosovo, for the Serbian people 
and for overall stability in Yugoslavia. To argue that one can do anything one pleases 
because of the situation in Kosovo - even make mistakes, which m ight be corrected later on 
- is the classic logic of pragmatic and bureaucratic politics on the basis of which we would 
move from applause today to great troubles as early as tomorrow. The hands of 
applauding Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo are now starting to form into fists, and this 
is the boundary over which every further step could be drawing us into a tragic
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development of events. Who today needs blood for our 'solutions'?... W hat might happen 
before we understand that the trigger on a gun is also pulled by unbalanced, hysterical 
words in the public arena, sometimes even by one single line in a newspaper?1 (Pavlovic, 
1988:94-9).
Pavlovic then went on to explain what he saw as official Serbian policy towards Kosovo, saying 
that 'the struggle against Albanian nationalism today is a task which should be performed without 
any wavering or hesitations/ However,
'Accompanied by intolerance and hatred against the Albanian nation, which is the case in 
some media, this struggle is becoming more and more distanced from socialist principles 
and closer and closer to nationalism. The editorial boards and journalists in the media who 
do not want to understand that today's struggle against Albanian nationalism means 
permanent struggle against Serbian nationalism, in effect promote the kindling of 
nationalist passions as their main policy' (Borba, 1987:2).96
The idea of Communists fighting nationalism in their respective nations and leaving other 
Yugoslav Communists to do the same with 'their' respective nationalists was widely accepted by 
all previous Serbian leaders, regardless of their other significant differences (Perovic, 1991, and 
Markovic, 1988). Only when and if Serbian Communists fought Serbian nationalists could 
Albanian Communists in Kosovo be successful in defying Albanian nationalism.97 To Pavlovic, 
these were two 'halves of the same coin' - there could be no success on only one 'front line'.
In his speech at the session of the Presidency of the LC City Committee of Belgrade on 17 
September 1987 Pavlovic interpreted his words in the following way:
'Arguing in favour of the toughest action against the Albanian separatists, I advocated also 
Communist resistance to Serbian nationalism and everything that could cause and 
encourage it. In certain articles in the media as well as in some public speeches, I have seen 
such encouragement. I underlined how important constant action against Serbian 
nationalism was... Every day there are new statements, even among some Communists, [in 
which it is argued] that Serbian nationalism is only reactive, and that therefore it is less 
dangerous, and will vanish from the scene once the reasons that generated it vanish as 
well. W hat these statements neglect is that the most successful way of preventing
96 This and many further quotations about the case are taken from the special edition of Borba on 28 September 1987 (here 
and after referred as Borba, 1987:pg) .
97 An example of this could be found in speeches by Stambolic and Vllasi, leading politicians of Serbia and Kosovo 
respectively, in Kosovo Polje in May 1986. Stambolic (a Serb) told a crowd: 'Do not let a handful of Serbian nationalists 
acting from Belgrade manipulate you - they do not do this because of us. Their slogan is: 'worse is better' - better of course 
for them' (Stambolic, Viesnik. 06 April 1986). Vllasi said the same but about the Albanian nationalists: 'They pursued a 
policy of 'the worse for you - the better [for us]... This is the reason why they permanently seek support from nationalists 
everywhere in order to set us against other Yugoslav nations, above all against Serbs and Montenegrins. We must always 
remember Tito's words, that separated and divided we will be no one and nobody... And this is what the nationalists want: 
to confront us each against the others, to divide us, to destroy Yugoslavia and to open the doors to a tragic future for each of 
our nations and nationalities.' (Vllasi, Viesnik, 31 May 1986).
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nationalism in Yugoslavia is to prevent it in one's own environment, in one's own nation, 
and that the clash of one nationalism with another, regardless of their alleged provocation, 
leads to fratricidal hatred, even to fratricidal war. Finally, one may ask: is it possible to 
provoke nationalism in someone who is not ready to accept nor waiting to express such 
nationalism?' (Borba, 1987:2).
However, Pavlovic soon found that the old formulas had lost some of their previous appeal not 
only amongst the people and in the media, but within the political elite as well. This became clear 
w hen the day following Pavlovic's meeting with party chiefs and the media a commentary on 
Pavlovic's meeting with the press appeared in the Belgrade daily Politika Ekspres under the title 
’Dragisa Pavlovic's Shallow Opinions1.98 The text accused Pavlovic of using 'complicated sentences, 
full of allusions, warnings and unnamed accusations', and of 'using unbalanced words such as 
'arousing passions', 'heated words', 'hysterical words' and 'hysterical atmosphere'... 'inappropriate 
words which pull the trigger on the gun' (perhaps in the Paracin barracks?!), etc.99 But, more 
importantly, Pavlovic was asked - 'to whom he directed' his criticism of the media: to Serbian 
nationalists or to the legitimate Serbian Communist leadership? 'Who 'lightly' promised a rapid 
change of the situation in Kosovo?,' asked Politika Ekspres. For the commentator(s) it was clear 
that such promises were given 'not by Serbian nationalists but by the Central Committee of the 
League of Communists, which was supported by the whole people.' Pavlovic's attack was, 
therefore, an attack on Serbian communists, not on nationalists.
The difference in these two interpretations was indeed important. It was legitimate to criticise 
nationalists, but not to imply that the leadership was 'soft' on nationalism. Milosevic's words from 
December 1986 expressed the beliefs of the Party majority in Serbia:
'If we have been determined and united in anything from the Liberation until now in the 
Serbian leadership, then it is in the struggle against our own nationalism. When 
nationalism has been on the agenda, we have been neither weak nor selective, we have 
shown no weaknesses not even to the most distinguished people in science, the arts, 
politics and society in general. Neither shall we be selective, as far as the struggle against
98 Politika Ekspres, 14 September 1987: 'Olake ocene DragiSe Pavlovica'. Slavoljub Djukic in his biography of Slobodan 
Milosevic reveals that the text was only signed by Milanovic, while it was written in the Milosevics' flat the night before. 
Interestingly enough, Pavlovic himself, being the president of the Belgrade Party Organisation, used to write polemical 
cuticles under a pseudonym. In 1991 Borisav Jovic, then President of the Yugoslav Presidency did the same. In his article 
(under a false name) he attacked the federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, using details from private talks and meetings 
he had had with him (Jovic, 2 August 1990; 1995:173).
99 One needs to stress here that the whole debate between them concerned what Pavlovic meant when he said what he did. 
The debate was much more like a 'philological seminar' than a normal party meeting (Bogdanovic, 1988). The three most 
important party institutions in Serbia (the Presidency of the Central Committee, the Central Committee itself and the 
Presidency of the City Committee of Belgrade) debated for more than five days (between 17 - 24 September 1987) about the 
'true1 meaning and consequences of Pavlovic's words. Paradoxically, in a situation in which the main Serbian intellectuals 
openly attacked the regime in thousands of 'heated words', three words by the Belgrade Party Secretary had ultimately 
brought the Party to an open crisis. But, the real power still lay in the party. And, both sides in this conflict firmly believed 
that ihe Party was the key to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis.
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nationalism is concerned, in the future, whether with institutions or individuals' 
(Milosevic, 1989:127).
To accuse the Serbian leaders now of being 'weak' on nationalism meant supporting those who 
saddled Serbian communists with a 'complex of Greater Serbian nationalism'. Serbia wanted to 
make a final break with this complex.100
Furthermore, if Pavlovic criticised the 'legitimate party leadership' his action amounted to 
underm ining 'party unity'. Since Pavlovic was President of the Belgrade party organisation 
(230,000 members), and was supported by the majority of its leadership, his action could restore 
'factionalism'. As factionalism was not tolerated by Tito, therefore it could not be tolerated by his 
successors. Pavlovic's 'attacks on the Serbian party leadership' were therefore an anti-Titoist act, 
which endangered Party unity. It was not only that unity was at the very heart of Milosevic's 
political rhetoric, but this all happened in what was seen as a dramatic moment of economic and 
political crisis, above all for Kosovo.
W hat was more, bearing in mind Milosevic's passionate appeals for the unity of the LCY and his 
promises given to the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo Polje five months earlier, Pavlovic's 
criticism seemed to be directed precisely at Milosevic and the loyalists. This was a clear violation of 
the 'democratic centralism' that Milosevic wanted to restore in the Party.
The whole affair became even more serious when Pavlovic (now firmly backed by Stambolic, the 
President of the Serbian State Presidency) decided to convene a session of the Belgrade Party 
leadership in order to secure support. What started as a conflict over 'heated words' and their 
interpretation, was now clearly shown as a deep split in the interpretation of Serbian political 
reality. The Eighth Session of the Serbian Central Committee, convened by Milosevic to discuss the 
'case of Dragisa Pavlovic' was the last 'palace putsch' in socialist Yugoslavia, to 'borrow1 this phrase 
from Vaclav Havel.101 Its long-term consequences were so important that many w ould see them
100 As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, Serbian leaders always felt uncomfortable with accusations of the 'Greater Serbian 
complex'. This was one of the main factors in their acceptance of the 1974 constitutive concept.
101 In Havel's words, big social conflicts could not remain forever ignored by the elite. Regardless of the veil the elite drew 
over them, they continued in the 'hidden sphere', growing somewhere under cover to the point where they burst forth onto 
the political scene. At such moments 'life vents itself where it can -  in the secret corridors of power, where it can insist on 
secret discussion and ultimately on secret competition'. But, the authorities, being unprepared for any recognition of the 
reality of life, start panicking. 'Whereas before every man in authority had spoken the same language, used the same 
cliches, applauded the successful fulfillment of the same targets, now suddenly the monolith of power breaks down into 
distinguishable persons, still speaking the same language, but using it to make personal attacks on one another. And we 
learn with astonishment that some of them -  those, that is, who lost in the secret struggle for power -  had never taken their 
targets seriously and never successfully fulfilled them -  far from it -  whereas others -  the winners -  had really meant what 
they said and are alone capable of achieving their aims' (Havel, 1975/1991:76-7). The whole political history of post-war 
Yugoslavia was full of ’palace putsches', such as were, for example, the Djilas case (1954), the Rankovic case (1966), the
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today as the 'beginning of the end' of Yugoslavia - a sufficient reason to follow the debate further 
in this chapter.
6.6.2. The Eighth Session of the LCS Central Committee (24-25 September 1987): Victory for the 
Revolutionists
The Eighth Session of the Serbian Central Committee was characterised by a clash between 
revolutionists and institutionalists within the Serbian leadership. The revolutionary character of 
Milosevic's supporters was best expressed by Rados Smiljkovic, Political Science Professor from 
Belgrade, who duly replaced Dragisa Pavlovic as the new President of the Belgrade Party 
organisation. In his speech at the Eighth Session, Smiljkovic opposed Pavlovic's appeal for patience 
and 'cool heads' when debating Kosovo. 'What does it mean to invite us to be patient, to wait, to 
keep cool heads in a situation in which there is blood and when corpses of sleeping soldiers and 
bodies of raped girls and women (including old women), are rolling on the ground?,' asked Rados 
Smiljkovic, situating Pavlovic's words in what he saw as their context. This context was 
characterised by the Paracin case.
'Comrade Pavlovic said that 'unbalanced' words pulled the trigger, or that they could pull 
the trigger, with regard to his assessment of the press. The trigger has been pulled in 
Paracin...102 The League of Yugoslav Communists adopted the political stand that there 
was a counter-revolution in Kosovo, and the crime in Paracin convinced us once again that 
the LC conclusions are correct. What does it mean in this context when one emphasises 
primarily non-revolutionary ways of struggle?'103 (Borba, 1987:6).
Using metaphors which had not been heard in Yugoslav politics since the war time, Smiljkovic 
warned that 'in war there were situations when brothers stood against each other, and we shot 
people for minor mistakes'. He reminded Pavlovic of an old popular saying: 'Vicious herbs for a
'Croatian Spring' (1971), the removal of the 'liberals' in Serbia (1972), the 'Markovic case' (1982), the 'Suvar - Spiljak conflict' 
(1984-1986), etc. This was only the last.
102 Now it is clear why Ivan Stambolic thinks that 'Paracin was the crucial moment in Milosevic's march to power7 
(1995:181). 'Up until then, we managed somehow to 'lean' on the media not to stoop to revenge ... [But now]... in Politika a 
really hysterical obsession appeared... Even if Milosevic himself planned a more convenient motive and moment for a 
turning point, he could not have thought of anything better than the Paracin incident. Now he had the Serbian nationalists 
at his service. MiloSevic accepted the hand which was offered by Greater Serbian nationalism. His road to unlimited power, 
after this incident, was wide open.' (Stambolic, 1995:189). The 'Paracin case' also made the Army - especially those factions 
within it influenced by the former defence secretary Nikola Ljubicic, who was now Milosevic's sponsor, much more inclined 
towards Milosevic. For the role of Politika in these years, see Nenadovic (1996).
103 Smiljkovic used the dichotomy 'revolution' - 'counter-revolution' to express the irreconcilable difference between 'us' 
and 'them'. If the difference is really unbridgeable, any 'relativisation' is unacceptable. It is not even important whether the 
action was taken in a legal way, according to the party statute or not, as Smiljkovic emphasised later in discussions. In his 
words, it was better to make a mistake than to fail to act and be a victim of counter-revolution.
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vicious wound', suggesting that such should be a reaction to 'counter-revolution'.104 A non­
revolutionary speech, the revolutionists like Smiljkovic argued, helps counter-revolution and 
defies Party action. This is how Smiljkovic (and as will be shown at the end of this debate - the 
majority of members of the Serbian Central Committee) understood the consequences and 
m eaning of Pavlovic's words. A political speech, Smiljkovic argued, 'is not about what is said', but 
'about w hat the speech itself produces' (1987:6). Once the 'woven form' of Pavlovic's words 
(Sokolovic, in his opening speech, 1987:9) was analysed - it was 'clear' that Pavlovic 'expressed 
resistance to the course of the League of Communists' (Borba, 1987:9).
It was on this occasion that the old language of Stalinism suddenly re-appeared, indicating that the 
time of show-trials and 'unanimous' condemnations of leaders that were accused of wrong-doing 
had not been left entirely in the dark past.105 Using another (very Stalinist) metaphor, a member of 
the Central Committee Radivoje Marinkovic, said:
'As this debate continues, it seems that the masks are gradually falling away and that the 
true faces are appearing in front of us. And in fact, the dropping of these masks, at least to 
me, illuminates and reveals what was the real aim of Comrade Pavlovic's performance in 
front of the editors-in-chief and party secretaries and the press' (Borba, 1987:29).
And then, of course, another question arose: was Pavlovic 'one' or 'tw o' personalities, one with a 
mask and another behind it? What Pavlovic wanted to say was not the same as what 'went out to 
the public', said one of the pro- Milosevic members (Predrag Zivanovic). His words might have 
been comprehensible for Pavlovic, but his 'allusions... were obvious and they provoked confusion 
and anger' (Sokolovic, 1987:9). And, of course, asked Marinkovic:
1(H In an interview I conducted with him for Polet (later reprinted in Politika! on 6 March 1989, Smiljkovic (then already 
President of the Belgrade Party Organisation) said: 'Many people simply do not want to take into account a very simple 
fact: that it was as early as in 1981 that the supreme leadership of this country declared that a counter-revolution had 
occurred in Kosovo. Could the counter-revolution be suffocated by a cross and flowers? It could not. Then, of course, 
people react saying: 'Well, give us weapons then! We are ready to fight against the counter-revolution!' So, one should not 
condemn people- workers, students...'
%
105 The language of the Eighth Session was analysed by one of the CC LCS members, the former Mayor of Belgrade -  
Bogdan Bogdanovic. In a letter he sent to the CC members after the session, Bogdanovic warned that Milosevic's fraction 
demonstrated 'an almost unbelievable fear, real panic of polysemia, of the pluralist meaning of words and speeches, even in 
describing obviously pluralist events' (1988:20). This was, Bogdanovic said, nothing else but an 'obsessive intention to 
reduce reality itself to clear and unilinear occurrences' (1988:20). In Stalinism there were no doubts and no complex 
situations. Monolithism is the ultimate value. There is no clear line between myth and reality, between death and life, 
between past and future, he said. Bogdanovic concluded that 'the cleansing of language precedes effective cleansing' 
(1988:23), since 'oppressive speech' needs to be directed against the other. However, in attacking the other, one heads 
towards 'auto-destruction'. Serbia, Bogdanovic concluded in his letter (later published in his 1988 book 'The Death Knots -  
the Mental Traps of Stalinism1) , was facing 'a crisis of its political consciousness, and maybe even, a crisis of consciousness 
in general' (1988:30). Bogdanovic's letter caused an outrage in Milosevic's camp, not only because it was the first case of a 
member of a Central Committee rejecting the authority of the CC in 'linguistic issues'. After failing to attend sessions of the 
CC for a whole year, Bogdanovic was excluded from its membership in June 1988 as 'inactive'.
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'Did Comrade Dragisa Pavlovic really act on his own conviction, on his own behalf, or was 
he, perhaps, only a spokesman, who only said what had already been agreed upon 
elsewhere, who was there only to perform a task given to him. It seems to me that he was 
there in this latter role' (Borba, 1987:39).
In revealing Pavlovic's 'true face', that was 'hidden' by his 'm ask' in his 'allusions', the Party 
justified its existence. It was there to be 'awake' and 'awake' it was.
But, how did they know that Pavlovic was criticising his Party and not nationalists? Was Pavlovic 
not, as Shefchet Mustafa (member of the CC from Kosovo) said, still alive, sitting amongst them? 
Why did they not take Mustafa's advice: 'talk to him, see what he thinks, and not interpret him as 
we wish' (Borba, 1987:23).
The answer to this question should again, I argue, be found in ideology. The party knew what 
Pavlovic m eant because it was, by definition, able to understand what Pavlovic was really saying 
better than Pavlovic himself. The party was invited to reveal the 'real meaning' because the Party 
saw further and knew better than any of its members. Perhaps the best description of this thinking 
is given by the one who was now accused: Ivan Stambolic, the President of Serbian Presidency. 
Eight years after the 8th Session he said that even then, back in 1987, for all communists of his 
generation, 'a  conflict with the Party was heresy, hugely so' (1995:247). The supreme ability of the 
Party to define the project of a perfect world was never to be challenged:
'I only know that, as a party official, I was driven by a firm belief that the world would 
become better when we, Communists, gave life to our ideological project of making people 
happy. And the world, alas, was still organised wrongly only because it happened that we 
hadn 't yet managed to make it to the end. I had not the slightest doubts that - despite the 
world's imperfection - we might not be able to essentially improve the world and man, that 
we could - on the contrary - maybe even make it worse' (Stambolic, 1995:38).106
But although all communists accepted that the party had the right to define its 'line', many argued 
that some degree of internal pluralism within the Party should be allowed. Kardelj's notion of 
'non-party pluralism ' was used to legitimise this position. On the other hand, the revolutionists 
now argued that there was only one 'true' meaning while others were false interpretations 
(revisionism). Smiljkovic (and, of course, Milosevic) believed that they knew w hat Pavlovic really
1 0 6  Stambolic said that his decision not to launch any action in his state function (as the President of the Serbian Presidency) 
against the Party which denounced him was motivated by his still firm belief that it was simply impossible to oppose the 
Party. He also saw real obstacles to this in his understanding that the state was more about the economy, while the Party 
was about ideology. Formulating ideology and interpreting it, as I argue in this dissertation, was the main political activity 
in ideological societies. The state - as an institution projected to wither away - was of subordinate importance to the Party. 
This explains why both sides in this conflict saw the Party as the main battlefield, and not - for example - parliament or the 
state presidency. It also explains why Milosevic wanted to control the Yugoslav party rather than the state institutions in the 
first place. Until 1989 he was only a party president, not a state official.
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meant, since the concepts were clearly comprehensible, even when covered by metaphors and 
allusions.
As a good Communist (indeed one of their most prominent leaders) Pavlovic himself accepted - at 
least initially - that the Party had the final say over what he really meant. Like so many 
Communists before him, he in fact accepted the rule that any member could be wrong, but the 
Party itself was always right.107 This is why this debate between Pavlovic and the others was in fact 
still an intra-party affair, which did not introduce any methodically new situation in the Yugoslav 
political space. It was a debate about who was the 'true ' interpreter of Party policy and not only 
about who was the 'true' interpreter of Pavlovic's words. Pavlovic argued that his interpretation of 
Party policy was right and that the media bosses were deviating from the party line. He was not 
attacking the Party, but - on his understanding - was implementing its policy of rejecting [Serbian] 
nationalism. He portrayed himself as a true defender of Titoism:
'I attempted and will continue to engage all my efforts in the realisation of the 
programmatic goals of the League of the Yugoslav Communists, on the clear road of Tito's 
revolutionary and realistic policy' (Borba, 1987:15).
But his opponents said the same about themselves. It was they who understood w hat Titoism was, 
while Pavlovic had failed to implement the Party line in defending Tito. He had failed to act 
against Student and its 'Vampire Dance' cover page, and therefore he 'blocked the political action 
which was launched by the Presidency of the Central Committee' (Sokolovic, 1987:9). This in fact 
meant that although in words he might have been a true Titoist, in action he was showing 
opportunism. And the essence of Titoism, they argued, was that words were inseparable from 
action. For a true Marxist and a revolutionary - such as Tito was - it was not about interpreting the 
world, but changing it. Words were weapons only when they came into people's 'possession'. 
Anyone who did not understand this message, was not a Titoist.108 Thus, not only was Pavlovic not 
a true defender of Titoism, but he was one of the main obstacles in this struggle.
These two conflicting interpretations of the meaning both of Tito's work and of Pavlovic's words 
made their actors incapable of finding a compromise, even of understanding each other. Stambolic 
today recalls the situation at and immediately after the 8th Session:
1 0 7  Even Khrushchev's interpretation of Stalinism was based on this notion: Stalin might have been wrong, but not the Party 
as such. The notion of self-criticism originates here: self-criticism is confirmation of the Party's supreme role. True believers 
in Communism, such as - for example - Bukharin in the purges of the 1930s, Slansky in 1952, or Djilas in 1954 all accepted 
self-criticism even when it was clear that it would not 'save' them from exclusion or even death at the hands of the Party.
io» Milosevic insisted on this message in almost all of his 1984-1987 speeches. For him, it was clear that words without action 
had no importance. On the contrary, they might have only negative effects, since they weakened trust in the Party 
leadership (Milosevic, 1989:91-4).
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'There was simply no communication any longer. They would have either not understood, 
or ignored i¥ (Stambolic, 1995:248).109
This is how comrades came to the point of a 'dialogue of the deaf', in a debate in which they were 
talking different languages. And it was not surprising that at one moment it looked much more 
like a talk between 'us ' and 'enemies' than between 'us ' and 'our comrades'. Only the enemy 
speaks a 'different language'. He does not understand 'us' and even less does he attem pt to do so. 
No dialogue can occur between 'them ' and 'us'. His words do not mean anything to us, since we 
do not understand them .110
'Do not translate (sic) this speech as if it were smuggled in here by the enemy, or as if it 
were written in a foreign language. And [do not] infer from this translation allegations that 
political forums were attacked, or that some leaders [were attacked]', said one of the 
participants in the debate (Mitrovic, Borba, 1987: 21).
They were talking 'different languages' because they simply did not share the same meanings 
regarding the same words. Since words should be inseparable from actions, one needed to achieve 
'unity of understanding' first in order to achieve 'unity of action'. Since ideas became weapons 
once they were accepted by the masses, it was the struggle for the formulation of the right set of 
ideas that politics was really about. This was why it was so important to win in a battle over the 
'true ' meaning of words. This is also why it was so important that in a monolithic society no 
alternative explanation of reality was allowed.111
To undermine 'unity ' means to undermine the whole community, because community is not much 
more than a 'communicative unity'. Being central to his understanding of politics, the notion of 
unity was placed above all others in Milosevic's programme. But, in defending the principle that 
there was only one true explanation of Pavlovic's words (and that this did not necessarily need to 
be his own) Milosevic did in fact not only renew the monist principle within the Communist part 
of society but spoke a language many others in society understood as theirs. His message about
1 0 9 As an example, Stambolic described his talk with General GraCanin who replaced him as President of the Serbian 
Presidency in December 1987. When Stambolic asked him if he did not see that Chetniks were gaining strength in the 
media, Gracanin replied: 'For God sake, Ivan, didn't we destroy them 50 years ago?' (Stambolic, 1995:248).
1 1 0 On the importance of words in what he calls 'post-totalitarian systems' see Havel's essay 'A Word About Words' 
(1989/1991:377-89), and his 'Power of the Powerless' (1978/1991:125-214).
111 As Havel wrote in his essay 'A Word About Words' (1989): 'Yes, I do inhabit a system in which words are capable of 
shaking the entire structure of government, where words can prove mightier than ten military divisions, where 
Solzhenitsyn's words of truth were regarded as something so dangerous that their author had to be bundled into an 
airplane and shipped out.' (1989/1991:380). This was possible, he argues in ’The Power of the Powerless1 because in 'post- 
totalitarian1 societies the ideology forms the glue of the whole political structure. I share this view.
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unity was, therefore, heard and accepted well beyond the party itself, and principally by the 
nationalist and traditionalist ranks of the Serbian nation which shared the monist understanding of 
reality too. It was also well received by the egalitarian lower ranks of society, which now protested 
against injustice and inequality. From this to the full unity of the nation -  without respect to their 
various political affiliations - was just one step.
6.6.3. Milosevic's Interpretation of Titoism: Return of the Third Yugoslavia (1945-1966)
In promoting the concept of 'unity' and 'revolution', Milosevic in fact presented himself as a real 
Titoist. As we explained in Chapter Three, the concept of 'brotherhood and unity' was successfully 
marginalised only when Yugoslavia entered her fourth (Kardelj's) constitutional phase. Unlike 
Kardelj, Tito remained committed to 'brotherhood and unity' and Yugoslavism, which he 
mentioned on several occasions throughout the 1970s. But, constitutionally and in practical politics, 
neither the phrase, nor the policy of 'brotherhood and unity' was preserved. Milosevic now offered 
to 'bring Tito back in', in order to 'replace' Kardelj.112
Milosevic offered his interpretation of Titoism at a 'memorial (Seventh) session' of the CC LCS 
which celebrated the 50th anniversary of Tito's succession to the post of Secretary General of the 
CPY in 1937. It happened (certainly not as a coincidence) that Milosevic convened that session at 
the same time as the Eight Session itself. The heated debate at the 8th Session was, therefore, 
interrupted early in the evening, to allow Milosevic to install himself as the true interpreter of 
Titoism not only within the party leadership but in the eyes of the general public in Serbia.
In his speech Milosevic first said that Tito's opus 'did not belong to the past',113 and that he 'carried 
in himself a deep and forceful sense of energy, confidence and optimism'.114
'He did not fear battles, conflicts, enemies, risks. He was not afraid to lose - although he 
entered every battle to win - perhaps because he was inside deeply convinced that he was
1 1 2  The others in Yugoslavia saw this as 'bringing Rankovic back in'. As we have already demonstrated here, both many 
members of the public and the dissidents now regarded Rankovic as a positive, rather than negative historical figure. By 
emphasising the pitfalls of the post-1974 era, Milosevic earned respect from Dobrica Cosic. As explained in Chapter Three, 
back in 1967 Cosic opposed Kardelj's concept and argued in favour of the third constitutive concept of Yugoslavia. 
Milosevic now offered a direct link with this period. His wife Mira Markovid, as well as the Yugoslav Defence Secretary Gen 
Kadijevic later openly stated that the Yugoslav problems began in the 1962-1966 period. By this 'silent' rehabilitation of 
Rankovic, Milosevic certainly earned support among many Serbs.
11 3 Quotes are taken from text of the speech as published in Milosevic's book Godine raspleta (1989) under the title: 
'Nevertheless, the future will be beautiful and it is not far away' (1989:165-9).
11 4 As already explained, the word 'optimism' was one of those most frequently used in his vocabulary at that time.
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fighting for a right, great thing, for the greatest idea of his time115 and that this idea would 
win with him or with someone else later, but win without any doubt... These 
characteristics of Tito, which were manifested at the worst historical moments of our 
revolution, m ust today forge the hearts of a generation which does not live at ease, but 
which needs to know that life and the future belong to honest and brave people,116 and that 
for their ideals they must fight resolutely and without compromise' (1989:166).
An example of such bravery, to which he summoned the new (post-Titoist) generation of 
Yugoslavs, Milosevic found in Tito's 'refusal to kneel in front of fascism or to bow down before 
Hitler's terrible Army'.
'His dignified and resolute no to humiliation, injustice, to all that was not in the interest of 
his people, Tito voiced again,117 to be remembered forever by his people and by the whole 
world.'118
Milosevic then said that Tito showed that 'theoretical blueprints and spiritual dogmatism' were 
foreign to him.
'As a man who had the courage to be free on all occasions,119 Tito managed to develop 
socialist practice and to enrich Marxist theory by bringing new ideas and new solutions at 
a time when the Marxist idea was exposed to pressure from the dogmatic spirit on one side 
and from revisionism on the other.'
However, the main key to the successes of Tito's Yugoslavia was in the unity of her nations, which 
Tito promoted his whole life:
'At this moment of Yugoslav reality, unity is the condition for freedom and for peace, the 
unity which made us winners of battles, which has entered textbooks, history, and the 
collective memories of the people. The sufferings in fascist prisons, the slaughter by the 
Chetniks and Ustashas, the Hell of Sutjeska, the almost insane bravery in the battle for the 
wounded at the Neretva, the apocalyptic killings in Kozara, the cleansing of every single 
hum an being who was not an occupier or a traitor in Srem - we survived all this, because
11 5  Meaning - socialism. MiloSevic explicitly defined socialism as the 'most beautiful and the most progressive idea of our 
tune' in his speech in Valjevo in September 1986 (1989:102-3) and in his toast to Gorbachev in March 1988 (1989:198-200).
11 6 References to 'bravery' in past historical battles also very often occurred in Milosevic's speeches.
1 1 7  This is an obvious reference to Tito's refusal to accept Stalin's criticism in 1948. The event is widely known as 'Tito's 
historical no' and for a Serbo-Croat speaker needs no explicit explanation.
11 8  This interpretation of Tito by Milosevic needs to be remembered if one wants to understand why Milosevic argued the 
same regarding international sanctions against the FR Yugoslavia in 1993, and again on the occasion of the NATO 
bombardment in 1999, and why he was successful in securing support for his policy of 'refusal to kneel' in front of the 
world powers.
11 9 The idea that one should be courageous to be free should also be remembered. It would have been well understood by a 
Serbian audience, 'bombarded' by novels, plays and documentaries on the First World War bravery of Serbian soldiers.
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we were united.120 The whole horror of the four-year war bears in itself one large, eternal 
and imperishable light: the war was survived and brought to a victorious end by the 
combatants and the whole people, because they were united and unanimous... In this part 
of the revolution which we are now making [sic!], there are new battles waiting for us. To 
end them victoriously, we need to be together and united as we were then. This is the 
meaning of Tito's work, this is the essence of the Yugoslav revolution, this is the condition 
for a future which will nevertheless be beautiful and which is not that far away.'
It was by this speech and his subsequent actions that Milosevic was recognised as the new Tito by 
the Kosovo Serbs and many others, who now added his poster to that of Tito's throughout the 
Province, only to remove Tito's three years later.121 However, the complex sub-text which 
underlined Milosevic's assessment of Tito, allowed for an alternative interpretation: that he was, as 
Dobrica Cosic said, the most deserving Serb for the task of the destruction of the Titoist legacy. He 
was understood in the same way by many other Yugoslav leaders, who were sharply divided 
when debating his rhetoric and actions in the years to come. These divisions within the elite led to 
the break-up of the elite consensus and resulted -  in the 1991 -  in the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
However, before we come to this point, a question needs to be answered: why did so many of his 
colleagues in Serbia but also in the Yugoslav leadership support his actions? This will be discussed 
in the next section of this Chapter.
6.7. Why Did the Others Support Milosevic?
At the end of the 50th anniversary session which marked Tito's elevation to the party throne, the 
members of the Serbian Central Committee continued their Eighth Session. However, the stage 
was set: Milosevic's victory was clear. In fact, the vote showed that only eight members of the 
Central Committee still opposed the proposal of the Presidency that Dragisa Pavlovic should be 
expelled from the Presidency. Eighteen others, most of whom came from Kosovo and Vojvodina, 
abstained from the vote for reasons which will be explained. Milosevic's appeal for unity had 
worked. But, Milosevic said in his concluding speech at the Eighth Session, this did not mean that
1 2 0  All the listed examples are from the Partisan struggle in WWII. Three notes about them: 1) Milosevic continues Tito's 
and Kardelj's matrix of the Partisan struggle as the basis for Yugoslav unity; 2) as a good Serbian Communist, he mentioned 
Chetniks first, Ustashas second; 3) the examples are, however, places where the Serbs suffered most - with the exception of 
Jasenovac, which was not a battlefield but a concentration camp in the Independent State of Croatia. Therefore, to many 
Serbs these places were not just empty Partisan symbols, but bore a heavy emotional reminiscence of the days of bravery 
and martyrdom that resulted in 'victory in wars but defeats in peace'. By using this matrix, Milosevic in fact did the same as 
Danko Popovic in his Book About M ilutin, only using cases from the Second World War, rather than from the Great War. 
This difference is, however, important: Serbian nationalists exploit the myths of a once strong and independent Serbian 
state, while Communists show a preference for Yugoslav Partisan myths.
121 Already in 1988, a song was heard: 'This time the people are asked/ who would replaced Tito for Us?/ We know who is 
the New Tito/ Slobodan of the Name of Pride.' Yugoslav leaders on many occasions demanded that Milosevic oppose this 
'replacement', and he indeed publicly asked the population to stop it, but in vain.
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there would be any unity with Serbian nationalists. In one of the most explicit criticisms of Serbian 
nationalism in his career, Milosevic said:
'Serbian nationalism today is not only intolerance and hatred of another nation or other 
nations; it is indeed a snake in the bosom of the Serbian nation, which has always in its 
history tended to be united with other Southern Slav nations, and whose most progressive 
force, the working class, has been the bearer of the spirit of brotherhood and unity, 
solidarity and equality with all nations and nationalities on Yugoslav soil - before, during 
and after the war. Moving away from this, Serbian nationalists w ould create the greatest 
damage for the Serbian nation by what they offered as allegedly their best: isolating it in 
reality from others to whom we would become intolerant and suspicious. Economically, 
politically, socially and culturally - how could the small Serbian nation live alone and on its 
own and free when even bigger nations cannot do so in this world in which nations and 
people are more and more inter-linked and more and more cannot be free with regard to 
each other when alone and on their own?' (1987/1989:171-2).
This was, in Milosevic's opinion, Pavlovic's main misunderstanding. The latter could not 
distinguish between the intentions of the Serbian leadership to 'solve the problems in Kosovo in 
the interests of all the people who lived there: Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins; in the name of their 
equality, their unity, the unity of Serbia and the unity of Yugoslavia' (Borba, 1987:40), and, of 
course, Serbian nationalism. It is in his plea for unity before the divided Serbian Central Committee 
that one m ust start looking for the reasons for Milosevic's success. To many, he sounded like a 
saviour. By defending Tito, Milosevic's speech sounded very seductive to the older generation of 
Serbian partisans and to the Army officers, many of whom were Serbs or Montenegrins, as 
Milosevic was himself.122
'H e reminded them (the oldest generation in the Party) of a time w hen they were young, 
firm and resolute. They liked his energy, sharpness, the easily recognisable style of a 
revolutionary,' explains Stambolic.123
12 2 Milosevic's parents were from Montenegro, but he was bom in Pozarevac (a city south-east of Belgrade, in Serbia). His 
brother Borislav (a diplomat with a distinguished career as Head of the Non-Aligned Countries Unit in the Yugoslav 
Foreign Ministry in the last years of Tito's life, while Josip Vrhovec was the Foreign Secretary; since 1998 FRY ambassador 
to Russia) considered himself a Montenegrin, unlike Slobodan Milosevic who is a Serb. His Montenegrin origins played a 
role in inspiring and realising closer links between the two republics for which he once (in January 1989) said that they were 
'two eyes in one head' (1989:324). Milosevic does not deny the existence of a separate Montenegrin nation. He even objected 
when the protests of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo were criticised as 'uni-national': 'One needs to ask the question: 
to which of these two nations do the critics deny nationhood, by claiming these were uni-national rallies?' (1988/1989:260). 
At a joint session of the Serbian state and Party Presidencies on 5 September 1988, Milosevic used the example of the rallies 
in Vojvodina to conclude they were not uni-national. 'If anything is uninational', Milosevic claimed, 'then it is counter­
revolution in Kosovo' (IB CKSKS. 8/88:15). In October 1988, at its 13th Session the CC LCS issued a Statement which clearly 
classified denied of the existence of Montenegrin nation as 'reactionary' and as an 'act of an enemy' (IB CKSKS 9/88:161.
1 23 Stambolic also said that Milosevic was very polite and kind to the generation of revolutionaries. 'He remembered, for 
example, birthdays, and he attended celebrations, of course, with gifts... When he stood for the presidency of the Party, they 
were all massively with him' (Stambolic, 1995:147). A direct link with the 1941-45 period was also something they might 
have liked, since many of them felt that their ideals had been betrayed and that the state was ever more bureaucratic. Some 
of them were displeased with the tiny minority of 'successful' comrades who - as they saw it - exploited their four war years 
in order to keep power for the next 40. The 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' which swept them away was, therefore, very 
much welcomed by the 'genuine revolutionaries', even in other Yugoslav republics, such as (for example) Svetozar 
Vukmanovic Tempo (Montenegro) and Jakov Blazevic (Croatia). For Tempo's position see Nin, 15 January 1989.
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Moreover, by his resolute and somewhat radical rhetoric, which was in obvious and sharp 
opposition to the phrases everyone had got used to during the post-Titoist period, Milosevic could 
have quite easily been seen as the hope for Serbs with higher education. To the younger generation 
he offered immense optimism, a 'future which will be beautiful and is not far away'.124 To the 
workers who organised 75 strikes with 13,000 participants in Belgrade just in the nine months 
preceding the Eighth Session, Milosevic brought hope of a resolute break with 'bureaucracy1.125 To 
those who were tired of listening to the same phrases and endless description of the situation, he 
offered a new rhetoric of short and simple sentences.
By opposing 'bureaucracy' (in his anti-bureaucratic revolution), Milosevic became 'the People's 
Prince',126 putting himself at the head of the popular discontent. It was not only because of his 
strong language against the 'counter-revolution' but also because of his opposition to bureaucracy 
that he mobilised not only the Kosovo Serbs but Serbs in general. The point was explained by a 
Kosovo Serb interviewed by a Slovene researcher in 1989:
'I watch these members of the League of Communists in my commune, for example the 
President of the Municipality who has two houses and many more, while I ride my bike to 
go shopping every day. It is like this everywhere else. But, now, with the arrival of 
Milosevic, it has become possible for me to overthrow this president of the municipality 
with his two houses, to question whether his property was legally acquired or not. Hence, 
we have more hum an rights than ever before, since Milosevic came to power. This is what 
is happening in other cities as well, and this is why the people like him ' (Gaber and 
Kuzmanic, 1989:251).
A sense of inequality mobilised many.127 This motive for social action survived even w hen the 
ideology of Communism had already collapsed elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In October 1990, 
30.3% of the Serbian population agreed with a typical egalitarian understanding of justice: 'the
1 24 One needs to notice here that the socialist idea, as presented by Milosevic, was still attractive to many in 1987, and indeed 
in the next couple of years. While the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe were anti-socialist and directed against the elites, 
the Serbian 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' was supportive of Milosevic's socialist rhetoric, and directed against the 
'bureaucrats', not against the Party or socialism as such.
1 25 According to Suvar's report at the Seventh CC LCY Session in April 1987, in 1986 there were 927 industrial actions 
(strikes) with 93,794 participants in Yugoslavia (1988:129).
1 26 To use James Cow's description of Tito (1997:35-60).
1 2 7  More about economic, political and ethnic inequality, especially among Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, has already been 
said in previous chapters. One needs to notice that the LCY hesitated to promote equality, and openly argued against 
'uravnilovka' (radical equality in society). As Vesna Pesic points out in her 1988 research on equality, the very term 
'equality7 was mentioned only once in the LCY Programme, and not even once in the Resolutions of the Fifth (1948), 
Seventh (1958), Eighth (1964), Eleventh (1978) and Twelfth (1982) Congresses of the LCY. Only once was the term 
mentioned in the Resolutions of the Sixth (1952) and Ninth (1969) Congresses, and three times at the 1974 Tenth LCY 
Congress (Sekelj, 1990:120). This was in sharp contrast to the high acceptance of egalitarian values among the population 
and also with Tito's frequent use of egalitarian rhetoric in the whole post-war period.
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state ought to make sure that everyone in society has about the same and lives in a more or less 
equal way' (Obradovic, 1996:495). At the same time, only half of this number (18.3%) believed in a 
libertarian understanding of social justice: that 'the state ought not to limit wealth, but should 
allow anyone to have as much as he/she is capable of producing and earning'. Almost half of the 
population (49.8%), however, felt 'betrayed and cheated', since reality was entirely different from 
w hat was promised, and 52.2% believed that personal links, and not personal qualities, were the 
main means for success in society. If these were the results of a survey in 1990, one could safely 
assume that in 1987, at the time when Milosevic launched his 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' people 
felt even more inclined to an egalitarian and less to a libertarian understanding of social justice, 
and felt even more 'helpless' than after three years of his rhetoric of optimism.
To the Serbs in Kosovo, Milosevic's sharp action against 'the bureaucrats' demonstrated that their 
complaints did not fall on deaf ears. To them, Milosevic was the first who understood and accepted 
the sense of the urgency of change, that they had been trying to convey to political leaders in the 
last two decades. Milosevic was talking for them when he said in October 1988:
'Almost everyone who speaks about Kosovo accepts that the situation is difficult. But then 
they immediately warn us that such a situation cannot be resolved overnight. I have been 
listening to this phrase for at least the last six years. And I ask: should we invite here 
Yugoslav and world geographers, meteorologists and astronomers to explain to us how 
one night can last for six years? The longest night scientists know of is of six-months 
duration and is confined to the Polar areas' (1988/1989:270).
For young politicians in the lower ranks of the party leadership, Milosevic's opposition to 'the 
Stambolics',128 whose influence in Serbian politics had lasted more than 40 years, was a good 
chance for promotion. For some Serbian politicians, however, the conflict between Stambolic and 
Milosevic was the last chance to extend their political lives.129 For those Belgrade intellectuals who 
opposed the 1974 Constitution (such as Mihajlo Djuric), for the Praxis Professors (such as Mihailo 
Markovic,130 Ljubomir Tadic, etc.), and even for Milovan Djilas, Milosevic was a new chance. In his
1 28 The term refers to Petar Stambolic, a Partisan leader in Serbia who became one of the most influential postwar politicians, 
and his nephew Ivan, but it symbolically goes beyond the two and includes the whole generation of post-1972 Serbian 
leaders. The same meaning in the new post-Eighth-Session Serbian vocabulary is given to the term 'drazijanstvo' (origins in 
Draza, the nickname of Dragoslav Markovic), invented by a young Serbian revolutionist - Zoran Todorovic Kundak- just 
before the 8 th session.
1 2 9  The whole generation of old politicians - such as Dobrivoje Vidic, Dusan Ckrebic, Nikola Ljubi£ic - feared an inevitable 
retirement. By supporting Milosevic, they secured a few more years in politics: especially Ckrebic in the Federal Party 
Presidency (until the end of the LCY in January 1990) and Ljubicic in the Yugoslav Federal State Presidency (until May 
1989).
13(1 Mihailo Markovic soon joined the Socialist Party as Vice-President and chief ideologue. However, following the SPS's 
close links with Mira Markovic's neo-communists in the Yugoslav United Left, and the ousting of Cosic in 1993, Markovic 
withdrew from politics. For Markovic's Praxis engagement and his philosophy, see Crooker, 1982.
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'anti-bureaucratic revolution' they saw the realisation of their long-standing claims that Yugoslav 
society had formed 'a  new class' of bureaucratic rulers and practically abandoned the Marxist 
vision of a self-managing society. Although he remained critical of his politics, Milovan Djilas later 
admitted he was 'soft on Milosevic'; it was under the latter's government that he was allowed to 
speak in public for the first time since his ousting from office in 1954.
Finally, although they disliked what they saw as yet another Stalinist intra-party conflict, the 
Serbian nationalist intelligentsia welcomed the removal of Stambolic and Pavlovic, whose attacks 
on the Memorandum a year before were seen as a betrayal of national interests.131 Although 
Serbian nationalists really could not know what to expect from Milosevic (for whom nationalism 
was 'a snake in the bosom of the Serbian people') they certainly welcomed his promises to resolve 
the Albanian discontent in Kosovo and his appeals for unity. Moreover, Milosevic made every 
effort to convince the Academicians that Stambolic met open opposition w hen he wanted to draw 
Serbian Communists into an ideological (and even legal) fight with them. His aides simply quoted 
all those speeches in which Milosevic opposed 'ideological struggles', while 'hiding' his proposals 
to the Party Presidency earlier in 1987. The opponents of the regime, most of whom had 
participated in the 1941-1945 revolution, now finally became allies in the new, 'anti-bureaucratic' 
revolution which was to annul all the mistakes of the post-Rankovic period when they themselves 
were marginalised and criticised.
The provinces within Serbia and the other Yugoslav republics did not oppose Milosevic either. 
From the position of the provinces, Stambolic's constant attempts to change the Serbian 
constitution were seen as no less dangerous than Milosevic's 'Titoist' rhetoric. Stambolic was, as 
one of the leading Vojvodina Communists, Zivan Berisavljevic said,132 a prominent participant in 
post-1981 Serbian politics, which was 'centralistic and nationalistic' all the way through. Also, they 
treated the conflict as an 'internal1 Serbian matter, in which they should not be involved since they 
wanted the same autonomy in their internal matters. 'Many topics on the agenda were mostly or
131 w hen I asked him in April 1996 to recall the reactions of the Serbian intellectuals in the SANU after the Eighth Session, 
Antonije Isakovic said: 'Milosevic shared our belief that it was no longer possible to accept the situation as it was; he was 
equally determined to end the period of Serbian inequality in Yugoslavia. I cannot say whether his thoughts at that time 
were exactly the same as ours, nor to what extent they were the same. But, to be perfectly clear: the Croats and Slovenes 
conceptualised the Constitution in this way because they saw it as the only way of keeping control over the Serbs once Tito 
had gone. The Serbs needed a very long time to break with this policy. The main responsibility for this lay with the Serbian 
traitorous politicians. Therefore, of course, we had every reason to be happy seeing someone who was committed to 
breaking with this practice.'
1 32 Berisavljevic (1997): http://www.rferl.0 r g /b d /ss /8 .html/ pg. 5 of 11.
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entirely about Belgrade/ explained Bosko Krunic, a Vojvodina politician who was the then 
President of the Yugoslav Party Presidency.133
The Kosovo Communist representatives on the Serbian Central Committee also abstained from 
taking sides in this conflict. Azem Vllasi, who was then President of the Kosovo Provincial LCY 
Committee recalls:
'W e in Kosovo differed from the Serbian leadership about the situation in Kosovo a long 
time before the Eighth Session. Therefore, we did not feel invited to help Stambolic's 
faction. And even if we had wanted to help him, this would have only speeded up his 
defeat, since the extremists would have taken this as an argum ent against Stambolic and 
Pavlovic to accuse them additionally/
Vllasi believes that even if Stambolic had won at the 8th Session, 'the whole thing would have been 
only delayed for a month or two, for some other occasion, but the penetration of nationalism, 
chauvinism and Stalinism into the political leadership of Serbia could not have been stopped/ 
Vllasi also says that - as Albanians - they were simply not a factor in the power struggle in Serbia, 
and that in this respect, Vojvodina was to be blamed more. 'In the end, they were Serbs 
themselves.'134
The same applied to the other Yugoslav republics. The main Croatian daily, for example, wrote 
that 'the public can hardly see any essential political difference between those who remain in the 
Serbian leadership and those have left'.135 When Ivan Stambolic was replaced by the Titoist General 
Petar Gracanin as President of Serbia, Vjesnik wrote:
1 3 3 Krunic was a political victim of Milosevic's 'anti-bureaucratic' revolution in October 1988. In his account of the events 
given to Radio Free Europe in October 1997, he said that Vojvodina 'refused to accept the methods of 8 th Session... but 
abstained from voting since everything was finished anyway... and their vote would not have changed anything.' As 
president of the federal Party Presidency, Krunic allegedly phoned Milosevic and told him that 'the Presidency was worried 
and disturbed' about the Eighth Session, asking him 'to stop it7. 'Of course, they rejected it, both he and Ljubidic and asked 
us to leave them alone...' (Krunic, 1997: http://www.rferl.0 r g /b d /ss / 8 .html; p 8  of 11). However, when asked, Stipe Suvar, 
a member of the same Presidency, said he knew nothing about Krunic's alleged phone call. Suvar said Krunic was certainly 
not authorised by the Presidency to intervene in such a way (interview with Suvar, January 1998).
134 Vllasi, in his interview to Radio Free Europe in September 1997. Vllasi's comment indicates that for the first time he felt 
that the ethnic affiliation of members played a significant role. It was certainly true that the public mood in Serbia (as 
described above) was such that the Kosovo Communists had no other choice but to agree with whatever the majority of 
Serbian CC decided or to face a 'Ceausescu scenario'. In fact, the crowd almost stormed the building of the Vojvodina 
Provincial Committee during the 'Yoghurt Revolution' on 8  October 1988. It was only after they had resigned, that the 
leaders were allowed to leave building, being stoned by the crowd. To a large extent this was what some members of the 
federal leadership had in mind when they suggested that the CC should convene in other places, rather than in Belgrade. 
They knew that the revolutionist Milosevic, unlike them, could mobilise the population in his support.
1 35 Plese, Vjesnik, 16.December 1987. As Josip Vrhovec explained in interview with me, Croatian leaders believed that 
Serbian nationalism was a permanent characteristic of Serbian leaders.
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'His reputation as a man who has been Tito's soldier all his life, who could have clearly 
accepted the Titoist vision of the humane socialist society, his experience as a revolutionary 
and a long-term party worker, will without any doubt contribute to the stabilisation of the 
situation in Serbia. And, without a peaceful and stable Serbia there will be no strong 
Yugoslavia'.136
Not only did politicians in other Yugoslav republics refuse to intervene in Serbian politics (the 
Kardeljist concept suited everyone)137 but some of them saw change as positive. Stipe Suvar, a 
Croat member of the Yugoslav Party Presidency in charge of the Serbian Party at the time of the 
Eighth Session, saw it as 'a promising awakening of a new generation of leaders, who were 
claiming they were Titoists'. Suvar - who would only a year later become the leading opponent of 
Milosevic's anti-bureaucratic revolution - thought that even if open Serbian nationalism increased 
as a consequence of the 8th Session, this would still be better than ' Stambolic's latent nationalism 
for which he could not be criticised or opposed in the federal leadership', as he said in an interview 
conducted in October 1997.138 Suvar also believed that Kosovo really was the crucial Yugoslav 
problem, which could 'blow up not only Serbia but Yugoslavia as well.' He shared Milosevic's 
belief (which was also the official party line) about the 'counter-revolution' and the secessionist 
intentions of many among the Kosovo illegal groups. Suvar also liked Milosevic's opposition to 
attacks on Tito, and saw him as a 'Communist who would fight Serbian nationalists'.
'I thought that the only way to save Yugoslavia after the Memorandum was to leave it up 
to the Serbian Communists to clear them up. And in Milosevic's Titoism I saw such an 
intention.'
1 3 6 The leading article in Vjesnik, written by an author who was also the highest party official in the Vjesnik publishing 
house, indicated that this was 'the semi-official' view of the Croatian party leadership.
1 3 7  BoSko Krunic said that 'some members of the Presidency of the CC LCY believed that we had no right to interfere in the 
work of any republican Central Committee; that we would not be doing the same in any other case and thus why should we 
intervene this time, why should we put ourselves on one or another side. [They also believed] that we must leave the 
Central Committee of Serbia to be responsible to its membership and not to the LCY Presidency' (Krunic, 1997: 
http://www.rferl.0 r g /b d /s s / 8 .html; 8 ).
1 3 8 Although many today assume that Milosevic's victory at the 8 th session meant victory for a nationalist, Stambolic himself 
spoke against such a conclusion: 'One should not forget that he (Milosevic) was at the beginning of his career, and also at 
the 8 th Session, not a nationalist. He still was in his ascent to power (...) he defended Tito from us 'liberals' and 'nationalists', 
and this was how the provinces treated us, and how - for example - the Bosnian leadership saw us. So, should they then 
have supported us and not Milosevic, after his speech on Tito?,' asked Stambolic rhetorically (1995:229). One should also 
remember that despite nationalist action taken by many participants in politics, not even in 1990 was nationalism the 
favourite ideology amongst the Serbian population, as 1990 research demonstrates. As Obradovic points out (1996:494), 
despite a long and aggressive campaign, only 18.5% of the population expressed explicit nationalist views, while the 
majority remained committed to 'brotherhood and unity'. This is why later many Serbs simply could not understand 
accusations of them being ethnic nationalists. Milosevic was again speaking for them, when (in an interview to the BBC on 
25 September in 1995) he said: 'We wanted to stay in Yugoslavia. It was absurd that in view of such developments, we here 
were subsequently accused of being nationalists. It turned out that those who had seceded from Yugoslavia forcibly, with a 
view to establishing their national, or putting it better, nationalist states, were given support by the international 
community and treated like democrats, while we -  who were striving for the preservation of die multi-ethnic Yugoslavia, 
and who have preserved the multi-ethnic Yugoslavia and remained to live in the country we lived in before -  were accused 
of being nationalists. These two things can in no way go together. That is so obvious... What happened was that those who 
had seceded from Yugoslavia forcibly were rewarded, while those who had decided to stay in Yugoslavia and preserve it, 
were punished/
272
In another interview conducted in January 1998, Suvar said:
'My stand on Milosevic was also very close to that of the two Montenegrin members of the 
Presidency: Zarkovic 139 and Orlandic140, who later had to w ithdraw before Milosevic's 
attacks. We concluded that Milosevic might really become tough and 'rough', but that he 
would not attack Tito and would oppose a wave of Serbian nationalism/
In addition, he saw in Milosevic a potential ally in the event of the Croatian intra-party conflict in 
which he was fighting against Stambolic's Croatian counterpart Mika Spiljak. Stambolic and 
Spiljak, Suvar says, created a 'daily alliance' against him.
'After the White Book, the Serbian opposition accused me of Croatian nationalism and 
Stalinism. The Serbian nationalists and their media launched a campaign against me. It was 
all under the protection of Ivan Stambolic, while Mika Spiljak found a common language 
with him, not with me.'
Suvar was convinced that the Stambolic-Spiljak alliance tried to undermine his election to the 
federal Party Presidency at the 13th LCY Congress in 1986.141 Among the political reasons, Suvar 
listed Stambolic's interview with Nin in 1987.
'H e suggested that the president of the Yugoslav Presidency - or even the president of 
Yugoslavia - should be elected for a four or five year term of office.142 To me, and to many 
others in Croatia, it sounded as if he already saw himself in that position. And I did not 
like it because I thought that in such a situation, when the Serbian nationalists evidently 
had become the main promoters of de-Titoisation, a president of Yugoslavia on a four- or 
five-year term should not be a Serb from Serbia. Stambolic's idea came as a surprise to 
everyone. At that time we were all against any attempted emergence of 'new  Titos'. When I 
analyse this from today's perspective [in January 1998], this was certainly stupid. Today I 
think that the five year term mandate might have been a good idea, but only if the person 
elected had not been a Serb, Croat or Slovene. For example, I would have endorsed a 
Macedonian president elected for a five-year term. But, this was entirely impossible, since
13 9  Vidoje Zarkovic, Montenegrin top politician between the late 1960s and 1989. He 'survived' Tito's massive attacks on 
republican leaders in the early 1970s. He was the Montenegrin representative in the Yugoslav state and in the party 
presidency 1974-1984, then President and member of the Yugoslav party presidency. He resigned in 1989 since he opposed 
Milosevic's revolutionist supporters (Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic) in Montenegro, being closer to (Croatian) 
Suvar than to them and to Milosevic. For Zarkovic's assessment of the events, see his interview with RFE/RL, 19 October 
1997.
1441 Marko Orlandic, member of the LCY Presidency from Montenegro. He also stood close to Suvar until he was forced to 
resign after the January 1989 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' in Montenegro, together with Zarkovic and the whole 
Montenegrin leadership.
141 In what was in fact an unsuccessful attempt to repeat 'the Markovic case1 with another target, Spiljak's supporters in the 
Croatian delegation and Stambolic's in the Serbian voted against Suvar.
14 2 This idea of Stambolic was much commented in the press, see Borba, 13 May 1987.
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in Yugoslavia the three main nations were dominant - especially in the army, in the police 
and even in the party. So, who then would elect a M acedonian?/143
But perhaps the most important factor in Milosevic's victory at the Eighth Session was the Army, 
symbolically present in the former Yugoslav Defence Secretary (1970-1982) Nikola Ljubicic.144 
Milosevic treated him at the 8th Session as only Tito would have been treated.145 This is what 
Ljubicic wanted.146 Ljubicic was very experienced in 'secret and conspirational action' (Stambolic, 
1995:163) and his control over the Military Intelligence had never ceased. Being in disagreement 
with many members of the Army (including with his successor in the post of Defence Secretary, 
Admiral Mamula,147 who was suspected of being pro- Stambolic148), Ljubicic saw the perfect chance 
to renew his strength. Apart from controlling Military Intelligence, Ljubicic had an overwhelming 
influence over the Serbian state security apparatus.
'Ljubicic was safely drawing on instruments of power which he had built up  over decades.
They proved to be very efficient and decisive for the realisation of a state Putsch/149 says
Stambolic.
1 43 Interview with Suvar, April 1998.
144 After serving three terms as Federal Secretary of Defence, LjubiCic in 1982 became President of the Serbian state 
Presidency, and in 1984 (until 1989) the Serbian representative in the Federal State Presidency. The Ljubicic- Milosevic 
victory - at least for a short time -  cemented Ljubicic's influence in Serbia. His comrade-in-arms Gen. Petar Gracanin was 
elected President of the Serbian Presidency after Stambolic. In 1989 GraCanin became the Yugoslav Interior Secretary in 
Ante Markovic's government. Despite his original plan to be re-elected to the Federal Presidency in 1989, LjubiCic retired in 
1989.
1 45 Ljubicic was the first speaker in the debate. Milosevic took up his defence when Pavlovic said something against him. 
Stambolic also quoted from Ljubicic when expressing his views.
1 4 6 In Suvar's view Ljubicic was so convinced that he would be a new Tito, that he even imitated Tito in his gestures and 
construction of sentences. Slavoljub Djukic, a biographer of Milosevic, mentions one episode: 'When he once entered a 
meeting, and no one clapped to support him, he stood in front of the first row and start clapping himself until they 
responded' (Djukic, 1992:49).
1 4 7  On the conflict between Mamula and Ljubicic see Stambolic (1995). In an interview for this thesis Suvar and Vrhovec also 
confirmed that Mamula and Ljubidic disliked each other and that they had different concepts of defence. Mamula was 
elected Defence Secretary in 1982 with strong support from Slovenia and Croatia. 'This was support against our principles, 
since in fact Mamula wanted to abandon the Titoist concept of people's self-defence and introduce a centralised Army. But we 
played on his conflict with Ljubicic and supported him, only because it suited us to get rid of Ljubicic,' said Josip Vrhovec in 
an interview on 10 January 1998. The Slovenian leadership, media and public entered into an open conflict with Mamula in 
1986, forcing him out of the government in 1988. Gen. Kadijevic, Mamula's successor as Defence Secretary (1988-1992) 
intended to realise his plan, but it was already too late.
14 8 After Stambolic's removal Mamula met him in secret and guaranteed his personal safety, offering him protection by 
Army Intelligence. He also showed 'signs that he supported' Stambolic, but Stambolic said: 'I could not have ever accepted 
such support for any - let's say - counter-attack. To be on one side in an armed conflict with my own people? No way!' 
(Stambolic, 1995:244). The duality between pro- Milosevic (pro- Ljubicic) and anti- Milosevic (pro-Mamula) military staff 
lasted right up until the end of Yugoslavia, though it was deeply hidden from the public.
1 4 9 One may notice here that both sides used the word 'Putsch' to describe the events. The Milosevic supporters said that 
Stambolic's letter to the Party Presidency in support of Pavlovic was an attempted Putsch, while Stambolic - as state 
President - thought that the Party action against him looked like a Putsch. Since communist reasoning places the party 
before the state, Milosevic's interpretation of 'Putsch' is more accurate. A 'Putsch' is an overthrow of a real, rather than 
symbolic power.
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Ljubicic's decision to support the 'revolutionist' and Titoist7 Milosevic and not the 'liberal' 
Stambolic came at a moment when his opponents (Mamula and others) were speechless - after the 
'Paracin' case. Being worried about the possibility of his removal after Paracin, Mamula sharpened 
his position in a speech to the Conference of Communists in the Army, which was published on 
the day of the 8th Session. His speech had a significant influence on the overall atmosphere that 
day. Politika, now firmly in the control of Milosevic, made sure it was published under the title: 
'Today's Crisis has Endangered the State's Integrity and Its Social System.' In their sub-title, the 
main Serbian newspapers quoted Mamula as saying that 216 illegal terrorist groups with 1,435 
members - all Albanians - had been discovered within the Army between 1981 and 1987. Mamula 
was talking about 'water poisoning', 'assassination of officers' and 'diversions', only as an 
introduction to a description of the context in which all this was happening. This context was one 
of nationalism, whose main target was Yugoslavia and its army. It was also a context of political 
crisis which had not been dealt with properly. He pleaded for resoluteness: 'W hatever is feeding 
our youth with nationalist hatred must be cut out at its root,' said Mamula, voicing his views on 
Yugoslavism.
'Only in a nationalist, deviant and bureaucratic consciousness do Yugoslavia and 
Yugoslavism today appear150 under the guise of unitarism beneath which nationalism is 
hidden'.151
Mamula then pledged to ensure 'order and implementation of the law7 in Kosovo. Otherwise, he 
said, the conflict in Kosovo would put a question mark over the security of the whole country. 
Unusually openly for an army leader, Mamula accused the Kosovo administration of failing to 
provide relevant data on the 3,792 Albanian soldiers, including Aziz Kelmendi, the assassin of the 
Paracin soldiers. 'The Army cannot allow itself to sit on such a mine and to fear another Kelmendi 
setting it off.' So, Mamula said, something should be done, but it could not be done without the 
resolute action of 'others in society'. In order to be successful and safe, the Army needed political 
allies in Yugoslavia. This is when Mamula almost openly supported Milosevic's arguments:
'A  resolute break with existing practice is unavoidable and urgent... It is a moment for 
everyone in their own place to show determination and criticism in re-examining their own 
responsibility. The cadres placed in the main positions bear a double responsibility: for 
what they have done and for what they haven't but should have done. The only alternative
15 0 Mamula used the Croatian/Serbian word 'prividjati' which is usually used for ghosts - 'to appear'.
151 Here he refers obviously to the identification of Yugoslavism with Greater-Serbianism. In his defence of Yugoslavism, 
Mamula was speaking Milosevic's and not Kardelj's language. At this time, Milosevic was very clearly advocating 
Yugoslavism, which was his probably most visible difference from the 'old' Kardeljist vocabulary.
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to this would be continuing the situation as it is: which means sinking into an ever deeper 
crisis with entirely unknown consequences... I am convinced that the LCY is the only 
instrument by which we can find the whole chain of solutions we need/
And these changes were not only 'a  break with existing practice' but also changes in the 'social 
system, which in order to be successful, must be based on w hat is realistic and not what is a 
desirable state of consciousness in society.'152
After concluding that the LCY 'is on the margins of society and [its] role is ignored' Mamula 
offered a solution:
'The LCY m ust pu t itself in the vanguard of democratic energy which is today expressed 
by the masses everywhere around us, and it m ust not allow this energy to be diverted in a 
destructive direction.'
In saying this, Mamula in fact explained why the Army supported Milosevic's action. He saw 
Milosevic as the person capable of controlling and directing the masses, sufficiently strong in his 
beliefs not to allow them to be 'm isused' for 'destructive' purposes, such as nationalism. Milosevic, 
a Yugoslav and a proponent of Yugoslav unity, a strong communist who sought changes in the 
system, a forceful critic of Albanian and Serbian nationalism and Kosovo's and Serbia's inefficient 
administration was a logical choice to implement this programme.153
In the end, it is not surprising that the federal Yugoslav leadership silently and w ithout a single 
word 'sanctioned' Milosevic's victory at the 8th Session. Not only did the Yugoslav leaders not have 
any real means to stop him, but they actually either agreed with him or ignored what happened. A 
few days after the Eighth Session of the LC CC Serbia, the Slovenian party president Milan Kucan 
asked Milosevic to inform the Federal Party Presidency of the results of the Session when it ended 
(under the last item on the agenda: 'Current Questions'). 'There is some uneasiness in certain party 
organisations in Slovenia about this Session,' said Kucan, justifying his question to Milosevic. 
Milosevic replied that there was no need for it, and continued:
1 5 2 This was an important statement in which Mamula basically asked for a new Constitution and an entirely new approach 
- a much more realistic one - in Yugoslav politics. One may, of course, ask what he meant by this. Did he mean that the 
ideological society should come to the end? Did he plead for 'representation of what is' instead of 'what ought to be'?
1 53 Stambolic now says that the army itself was developed as an ideological creation: 'In the minds of the army, Yugoslavia 
was cemented as an ideological creation above all, and - ideologically speaking - Milosevic was an orthodox Communist... 
For the defence of Yugoslavia as an ideological state, Milosevic recommended himself as leader' (Stambolic, 1995:30). Again, 
this explains much about the army staying with Milo§evic to the end. In Borisav Jovic's memoirs one can find elements to 
support Stambolic's conclusion on the ideological elements of the army. The problems appeared when Jovic and Milosevic 
proved to be less ideological than the army expected. Still, a different interpretation is also possible: Mamula demanded 
more realism and fewer ideological dreams in his speech of September 1987.
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'First, a huge step has been made in accordance with LCY policy. As the majority of 
participants concluded, this was a fierce battle with our own opportunism, which was 
making the LC incapable of leading an energetic campaign for the implementation of its 
own policy. Second, the fears that the LC Serbia would split up  proved to be unfounded. 
We have seen that our Central Committee is united and that it shares the views of the 
people. Thirdly, it has been shown that this was not a question of personal conflict, or 
conflict between two groups, but about some individuals' deviations from LC policy. 
Fourthly, the crucial characteristic of this session was its clear and resolute attitude 
towards Serbian nationalism. In general, I think that this session, together with that of the 
Committee of the LCY in YPA, and especially Comrade Mamula's speech, strengthened the 
League of Communists' policy in a public and in a democratic way' (Djukic, 1994:89).
In a reply to Milosevic's explanation, the chairman of the Yugoslav Party Presidency Bosko Krunic 
said only:
'Thank you, Comrade Milosevic. Are there any questions, or any suggestions? There aren't. 
Well, then OK, let us finish' (Djukic, 1994:89).
6.8. The Aftermath: Towards the 'Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution'
The victory of the revolutionists at the Eighth Session was followed by consolidation of the Party in 
order to secure its unity. The leading 'revolutionist' -  Rados Smiljkovic -  replaced Dragisa Pavlovic 
as Belgrade Party President, while Ivan Stambolic resigned his post of President of the Serbian 
state Presidency in December 1987. Throughout the Serbian Party and other political organisations, 
the 'institutionalists' had been removed and replaced by 'revolutionists'.
But, the unity of the Party was only a first (necessary but not sufficient) step towards the final 
objective: the unity of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Milosevic's vision of Yugoslavia included its re­
integration on grounds which were similar to the pre-1974 (the 'third ', as I call it in this thesis) 
constitutive concept of Yugoslavia. The same determination he displayed in fighting for the unity 
of the Party, he would soon demonstrate in his actions towards achieving this goal. Between 
September 1987 and June 1988, a new -  'anti-bureaucratic' revolution -  was conceptualised and 
prepared. In December 1987, the Belgrade Committee summed up the long debates within the 
Party membership at the Eighth Session: 'The Members think that we have reached a 'turning 
point' (preokret) w ith regard to our political life and behaviour and that this is a chance for 
mobilisation which should not be missed.'154 Borisav Jovic, who became Milosevic's main aide, 
claimed that party members had to 'show revolutionary determination' when fighting
1 54 Politika, 7 December 1987.
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inefficiency.155 This mobilisation, they concluded, would not only solve the economic and political 
crisis, eliminate the Kosovo problem and democratise political life in Serbia, but would also change 
the status of Serbia in Yugoslavia. 'Serbia should not be constitutionally un-defined... It should be 
in the same position as other republics. Some individuals do not see, or do not w ant to see this,' 
said Slobodanka Gruden, a leading Belgrade Communist.
In a series of speeches, the new leaders of Serbia were optimistically promising fast and radical 
change as a result of the newly achieved unity. At the same time, their sharp action against 'the 
opportunists' and 'bureaucrats' introduced an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty, contrasting 
sharply with the 'anarchic' situation in which the Yugoslavs had lived not only in the early 1980s, 
but also during the last decade of Tito's lifetime (Doder, 1978).156 Living in the culture of 
apocalypse, feeling the sense of historical injustice presented by the leading members of the 
'opposition' movement, being pessimistic about the economic and political crises that were 
becoming deeper and deeper, the (Serbian) population now became vulnerable to the action 
proposed by Milosevic. To the fears he himself spread, he proposed hopes for a new, brighter 
future. This combination -  fears and hopes -  became the main building block of his politics, not 
only in 1987 but for longer afterwards.157 Even to those who feared the new 'revolution', Milosevic 
was now the only alternative to even worse and more radical chage: to open Serbian ethnic 
nationalism.
1 53 Although he became critical of Milosevic's policy and retired in 1995 (after publishing his revealing diaries in a book, 
1995), Jovic persists in maintaining that the Eighth session was 'an escalation of democratism in the Party': 'In 1987 we did 
not talk about Milosevic, Jovic, Peter or Paul - we talked about the interest of the Serbs... I do not know what else we should 
have done... At the Eighth Session we started the process of uniting Serbia, we clearly said that we in Serbia wanted to 
decide about Serbia, and that no one outside it would decide on it' (Jovic, 1997).
1 36 The depth of the change is nowhere described better than in Richard West7s book on Tito (1994). West, himself a frequent 
visitor to Belgrade since 1945, writes: 'For the first time since I had known Belgrade [so, since 1945!], I was warned by 
friends against careless talk in public places, and still more on the telephone. People were keeping their voices down in the 
cafe of the Moskva Hotel. Outside the hotel, one of the dissidents selling the student magazines said he had twice been 
arrested and was now out of a job. This man, who was in his forties, said he was thinking of leaving Serbia for one of the 
more enlightened republics, and eighteen months later I met him again in Zagreb, selling his dissident magazines in the 
tunnel beneath the railway station. When I asked him what were his politics, he once more replied: simply 'communist'. 
Friends I had known for thirty years were talking of going to Slovenia or even to the United States to escape what they 
called a 'Fascist Regime" (West, 1994:345). The loyal supporters of the 1974 Constitutional compromise felt especially 
threatened by the new revolutionary rhetoric of pre-1966 socialist Yugoslavism and ethnic nationalist rhetoric that spread 
throughout the media. The Eighth Session marked the beginning of the final defeat for the supporters of the Constitutional 
compromise in Serbia -  in less than a year they would lose their political position and -  sunk in fear -  cease to be a 
significant political factor.
1 3 7 It is here that one needs to start looking for the background of violence, which to those who committed it looked like 
pure self-defence. And it is precisely here that one must begin the journey towards understanding contemporary Serbia 
(and FR Yugoslavia): the migrations of its anti-nationalist youth, as well as the almost insane obsession with 'global 
conspiracies', which are believed by too many people in Serbia to be the main reason for their personal and state's tragedy. 
In October 1990, only 3.1% of Serbian population did not feel 'worry' or 'fear' for their personal future and that of their 
families, while 66.4% had a 'Messianic attitude' described in a sentence: 'I am afraid, but I think we can find a way out, if we 
are united'. This attitude is exactly what authoritarian leaders prefer to hear (Obradovic, 1996:494). About the role of fears in 
Serbian politics under Milosevic, see A. Djilas (1993).
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Belgrade, once the stronghold of the critical intelligentsia, was now becoming something else, the 
capital of a new, anti-bureaucratic, revolution whose first victims had already appeared. The fears 
forged by this revolution spread fast first throughout Serbia, then all over Yugoslavia. Already in 
1988, physical force by demonstrators (openly supported by the new Serbian leadership) 
overthrew the political leadership in Vojvodina. When the emergency situation was introduced to 
Kosovo (following a new wave of protests in Autumn and Winter of 1988/1989), the unity of 
Serbia was finally achieved. In March 1989 the Serbian Constitution was finally changed, making 
Serbia 'equal to other republics in Yugoslavia'. Any opposition to these changes, and especially to 
that expressed by Kosovo Albanians in the Winter of 1988/1989, was crushed by the brutal force of 
not only the Serbian but the Federal state. Although he lost a lot of his supporters in other 
republics, Milosevic's actions were still tolerated, as long as they remained confined to Serbia and 
its provinces.
However, in October 1988 Milosevic declared that Serbia 'd id  not achieve this victory only to sleep 
on the wreath of glory'. The unity of the Serbian leadership was not achieved so that the leaders 
could spend their term in office 'in  harmony and privileges' (IB CK SKS 7/1988:15). On the 
contrary, as Milosevic explained in April 1989, a month after the new Serbian Constitution was 
accepted:
'Those who expect that now, when she has finally become a Republic, Serbia would join 
the defenders of the status quo and oppose changes to the 1974 Constitution, are deluding 
themselves. They will soon have a chance to see how wrong they are. Serbia did not 
become a state to sleep on the wreath of glory, but -  now strong and open towards others -  
to forcefully initiate democratic changes in order to make Yugoslavia a strong community 
of equal nations and nationalities, able to break with the crises, poverty and humiliation in 
which she lives now. Of course, those who do not care for Yugoslavia claim that our 
intentions and plans are 'unitarist' and 'hegemonistic'. But, they should have no illusions 
that we would - only because of what they say and because they do not agree with us - 
give up Yugoslavia and socialism, and democratic processes which no one can stop any 
longer.158 We have no time to elaborate our policy to every single person, and especially 
not to those who are malevolent towards us. The results of our actions will speak for 
themselves. We can promise them that' (IB CK SKS, 4/1989:10-1).
is* w hen I interviewed Rados Smiljkovic on 6  March 1989 for Polet, he told me: 'We are not criticised by the workers in 
'Koncar' nor by those in 'Crvena Zastava'. We have been criticised by the Slovenian and Croatian leaders, and such 
criticism we shall not take into account.. /  He was as bitter at the Slovenian and Croatian leadership as Milosevic: 'I do not 
want to say that this was the Slovenian or Croatian leadership, but somebody needed the tragedy of the Serbs and 
Montenegrins in Kosovo...' Then he proceeded: 'We must want Yugoslavia. If we do not want it, let us then stop 
pretending that we do. In this case, one should clearly say: We do not w ant Yugoslavia any more; we Slovenes or w e Croats w an t 
to live alone!. All right, Comrades! All right! Do only we, Serbs, need Yugoslavia, damn it!? But, we think that there is no 
other option for us than Yugoslavia.' When I asked him whether he was not possibly exaggerating the anti-Yugoslav 
feelings of others only because they criticised the Serbian leadership, he resolutely replied: 'Oh, no, no, not at all! It is not 
that all of us want Yugoslavia. The forces which would like to destroy Yugoslavia are very strong. They are maybe not 
dominant in the country, although they are not weak either. But, the forces which Yugoslavia does not suit are strong 
abroad. And if we are disunited from within, in our economic and political system... then a great danger is threatening us.'
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It was the unity of Yugoslavia that Milosevic now declared as his goal. Seeing little difference 
between being a Yugoslav and a Serb, Milosevic simply attempted to transpose the means of 
achieving Serbian unity to Yugoslavia. He demanded unity within the Party in order to change the 
Constitution, defeat 'bureaucracy' and remove 'separatists' from all public posts throughout 
Yugoslavia. It was at this moment that he confronted the others in Yugoslavia. The 'defenders of 
the Constitution', among whom Slovenia had the most prominent position, forcefully opposed 
such an attempt.
The clash between the two groups (often classified, not sufficiently precisely, as a conflict between 
Slovenia and Serbia) characterised the final phase of the Yugoslav drama. Unlike the main political 
conflicts in the Fourth Yugoslavia, the new political conflicts were no longer confined to the 
political elites, but they involved the masses, and even (formerly) 'dissident' segments of 
population. Instead of the anti-state rhetoric of 'self-managing socialism', Milosevic now promoted 
a statist program which had elements of both the pre-war 'national unity' and of the pre-Brioni 
conceptions. The state was to be de-bureaucratised (i.e., cleansed of the old bureaucrats and re- 
ideologised) but also re-established on new grounds. The idea of the 'withering away of the state', 
the main notion of the Kardelj concept, now vanished from the official rhetoric of the Party. On the 
contrary, changes were introduced so that Serbia would become a state 'equal to all the others'. 
This 'strong Serbia' would be the main pillar of a new 'strong Yugoslavia'. Instead of the notion of 
the 'completed nation', Milosevic now insisted on the unity of Yugoslavia, which would, 
effectively, create a Yugoslav nation. Milosevic's rhetoric was now openly anti-Kardeljist. His 
attack on 'bureaucracy' was in fact an attack on the institutional structure of Kardelj's Yugoslavia, 
defended by the 'Defenders of the Constitution'. While his predecessors in office, Draza Markovic 
and Ivan Stambolic, had tried to 'interpret' and 'implement' the Constitution in a way which suited 
interests of Serbia (as perceived by them), Milosevic inspired a revolutionary and populist wave of 
'extra-institutional pressure'. As he explained at the 13th CCLCS Session in October 1988, 
'institutions should function in accordance with the interests of the people'. For the people of 
Serbia, he said, there was no greater interest than to live united in Serbia and Yugoslavia. This 
should be changed - 'within the institutions and outside them; by the masses of population or by 
individuals; w ith anger or w ithout anger; amongst the leadership and amongst the people - but 
unity [w ill/should be achieved] - that's for sure!1 (IB, 9/1988:11).
This shift signified the effective end not only of the Fourth, but - as it would become obvious only 
three years after the Eighth Session - of any Yugoslavia. In the last chapter of this thesis, we analyse 
the conflict between the 'Defenders of the Constitution' (in Slovenia and Croatia) and the
280
revolutionists in the new Serbian (and later: Montenegrin) leadership in the last two years before 
the break-up of the Yugoslav state.
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Chapter Seven:
Slovenia and Serbia: the Final Years of 
Yugoslavia
(1988-1990)
'Those who expect that now, when she has finally become a Republic, Serbia would join the 
defenders of the status quo and oppose changes to the 1974 Constitution, are deluding 
themselves. They will soon have a chance to see how wrong they are. Serbia did not become 
a state to sleep on the wreath of glory, but -  now strong and open towards others -  to 
forcefully initiate democratic changes in order to make Yugoslavia a strong community of 
equal nations and nationalities, able to break with the crises, poverty and humiliation in 
which she lives now. Of course, those who do not care for Yugoslavia claim that our 
intentions and plans are 'unitarist' and 'hegemonistic'. But, they should have no illusions 
that we would - only because of what they say and because they do not agree with us - give 
up Yugoslavia and socialism, and democratic processes which no one can stop any longer. 
We have no time to elaborate our policy to every single person, and especially not to those 
who are malevolent towards us. The results of our actions will speak for themselves. We can 
promise them that' (IB CK SKS, 4/1989:10-1).
Slobodan Milosevic 
April 1989.
'When we think about the idea that a majority vote should be introduced in a multi-ethnic 
federation, we ask: is this anything else but a denial of the equality of the peoples, a denial of 
their sovereignty and of their right to self-determination as an inalienable human right.... 
Yugoslavia is our common state, which we created voluntarily, through a democratic 
agreement with other nations. Nobody accepted us into it, and nobody can discharge us 
from it. And we shall not give up our right to it... [However] we do not want to live in a 
country in which we would be subjugated to political and national supra-power, to 
economic exploitation, or forms of political, economic and cultural and other dictates.'
Milan Kucan 
Speaking in Tacen, 17 June 1989.
7.1. Constitutional Changes and the 'Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution' (1988-1989)
After consolidating his control over the Central Committee in September 1987, Slobodan Milosevic 
declared constitutional changes (both in Serbia and in Yugoslavia) to be his main goal. Already in 
January 1987 (hence, to a large extent as a result of a decade of Ivan Stambolic's efforts) the Federal 
Presidency agreed to open a public debate about constitutional changes. In February 1987, the Party
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Presidency approved a debate on 130 amendments to the 406 articles of the 1974 Constitution. But 
the beginning of the debate only revealed deep differences between the republics and provinces, 
especially over the central issue of Serbia and its two provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo.1 It was 
Milosevic's first goal to silence the opposition to his proposals, which originated in the two Serbian 
provinces, especially in Vojvodina. As has been demonstrated earlier in this thesis (Chapters Four 
and Five), Vojvodina's leaders opposed any attempts to centralise Serbia and Yugoslavia, 
launching a strong campaign against Serbian 'nationalism' and 'unitarism '. The opposition only 
continued after the Eighth Session, and even intensified in the first half of 1988. Milosevic and his 
main aides on several occasions clearly stated their opposition to Serbian nationalism,2 and 
repeated their guarantees that no substantive rights would be denied to either Vojvodina or 
Kosovo. However, they warned both Provinces that the time for empty talk had expired now when 
the Serbian Central Committee had achieved unity and was supported by 'the people'. 
'Bureaucratism and dogmatism are today the main obstacles to changes in society and in the 
League of Communists,' said Dusan Ilic, member of the Serbian Party Presidency. The leaders of 
Vojvodina and Kosovo, as well as the others who opposed the radical changes proposed by the 
Serbian Party, were these 'bureaucrats'.
Milosevic's criticism of bureaucracy corresponded well to the dem and of the rallies of Kosovo 
Serbs, but also to those of the dissatisfied public in Vojvodina and throughout Serbia. Following the 
conclusion that 'bureaucracy in the Provinces' was the main obstacle to the resolution of the 
Kosovo problem, the Kosovo Serbs organised a series of rallies in Vojvodina and elsewhere in 
Serbia, trying to 'wake up' the local population and organise it against the local 'bureaucrats'. Just 
as before, when they went to Belgrade to 'raise awareness' of the Kosovo problem, now they went 
to Novi Sad and other cities in Vojvodina. The leaders of the Province, however, considered their 
demonstrations nationalistic and anti-socialist and tried to prevent them by all means. They also 
accused the Serbian leadership of organising and directing the public protests.3 In turn, this
1 The titles of the reports on this decision in the various republican dailies illustrate these differences. 'Viesnik' (Croatia): 
'The proof of the continuity of the revolution'; 'Nova Makedonija' (Macedonia): 'Changes in favour of labour'; 'Rilindja' 
(Kosovo): "The basic principles not to be touched'; 'Politika' (Serbia): 'Relations should be resolved resolutely and in a 
principled manner'; 'Dnevnik' (Vojvodina): 'The serious work is only beginning'. These titles (all published on the same day 
- 20 March 1987 -  and quoted by Borbal revealed how different were the expectations of the republics and provinces 
regarding the outcome of the constitutional reform. Croatia and Macedonia were concerned with the preservation of the 
ideological basis of the system. Serbia insisted on changing 'relations within Serbia', to which both provinces were opposed. 
Finally, Vojvodina openly announced its intention to obstruct any significant change in the Constitution.
2 Andjelkovic IBCKSKS 9/1987:12-15; Ilic, 5/1988:5-10, Milosevic, 7/1988:14-5.
3 In fact, the new Serbian leadership originally tried to prevent the Kosovo Serbs from demonstrating in Vojvodina, but 
unsuccessfully. When the leaders of the Kosovo Serbs told Milomir Minic, the Executive Secretary of the Serbian Central 
Committee, that they would demonstrate regardless of the Party recommendations, the leaders took a neutral stand: they 
neither prevented nor publicly supported the march (Kerdov, 1989:228). This was a demonstration of how much the 
situation had changed - the leaders could no longer control events at their own will, but had to accommodate themselves to 
them. Marko Orlandic, the highly popular Montenegrin leader who failed to support the rallies, was immediately put on the 
'black list' of the demonstrators and was finally ousted together with other Montenegrin leaders in January 1989.
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outraged large segments of the local population, who joined demonstrations against less than 
popular local political figures. Further encouragement came from the Belgrade media, by then 
already firmly under the control of Milosevic loyalists, who portrayed these events as 
demonstrations of the people against the bureaucratised leadership of Vojvodina.
In the three and a half months between 9 July and 21 October 1988, the rallies of support for the 
Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins turned into demonstrations against the Vojvodinian leaders and a 
most powerful support for Milosevic's new course. It was estimated that 578,000 people 
participated in 28 rallies in the Province. In a survey of participants at some of these rallies, 72% of 
demonstrators said they were motivated by desire to change the 'untouchable bureaucracy7, while 
78% assessed the Vojvodina Party organisation as 'highly bureaucratised'. On the other hand, only 
9.3% thought the same of the new Serbian Party leadership. They also expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the Federal Party leadership (led by Stipe Suvar), which 59% thought was 
'highly bureaucratised' (Kercov, 1990:100-1). For 69% of participants, the protests were the way to 
'express a general revolt against the situation in the country7; 62% came to 'fight against the 
bureaucracy in Vojvodina'; while only 7% demonstrated primarily against the economic situation 
in the country. Significantly, it was an even smaller percentage who demonstrated against the 
current state of inter-ethnic relations in the country.
The demonstrations in Vojvodina divided the Yugoslav Party leadership along republican lines. 
Vojvodina's representatives demanded condemnation of the 'pressure of the street'. The Slovenian 
leadership warned Milosevic that Vojvodina and Kosovo were not only parts of Serbia, but also 
constitutive elements of Yugoslav federalism, and that therefore his action underm ined the federal 
character of Yugoslavia. The leaders of Kosovo insisted that demonstrations of Serbs should be 
treated in the same way as demonstrations of Albanians, and therefore should be declared 'counter­
revolution' and stopped, if necessary by force. The Croatian and Bosnian leaders feared they would 
worsen inter-ethnic relations in their republics and cause a new wave of 'anarchy' to which the only 
response could be a 'firm hand' by 'Stalinist' and 'centralising' forces. For all these reasons, the 
Party Presidency of Yugoslavia, in which Serbs were again becoming isolated, demanded that all 
Party leaderships in the republics should act against the demonstrations.
Milosevic, however, rejected this demand, and in September 1988 finally publicly endorsed the 
protests as an expression of democracy at work. They were, he said at the joint session of the 
Serbian state and party presidencies (5 September 1988), not only an expression of solidarity with 
those who were being terrorised in Kosovo, but they marked an end of people's patience with the 
inefficiency of the state and their own representatives. They were also 'a  democratic, honest and
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expected reaction' to years of inactivity when it came to Kosovo. They were also, at least, a 
realisation of many proclamations about 'self-management7 and 'people's rule'. Everything that the 
leadership in many declarations had claimed it represented, Milosevic said, was now here: 'the 
people, democracy, freedom of expression and the public! Yet, all of a sudden, this is labeled as an 
undesirable and dangerous thing, to which we should put an end' (Milosevic, IB 8/88:14). 
Milosevic denied the criticism that the people's protests were in fact destroying the institutional 
structure of Yugoslavia: people wanted these institutions to work and would stop protesting when 
the institutions started working properly. He also denied that the protests were uni-national.4
'People can gather only on those grounds on which they feel attacked and endangered. 
They are attacked as Serbs and Montenegrins, they are leaving their homes as Serbs and 
Montenegrins, and therefore they defend themselves as Serbs and Montenegrins. They 
cannot defend or gather as Dutch or as Protestants, or as cotton plantation workers, since 
none of them is threatened for being any of these', Milosevic argued at the joint session of 
the Serbian state and Party Presidencies in September 1988 (IB, 8/88:14).
The Communists could not and should not distance themselves from the people -  that would be 
their end.5 On the contrary, they should always be with the people if they wanted to re-gain their 
trust.
By opposing the demand of the Federal Party Presidency, the Serbian leadership pu t itself in the 
unique position of being both an opposition (to the 'bureaucrats' at the local and federal levels) and 
the government (of Serbia). This ambiguity only helped Milosevic to establish himself as a powerful 
alternative to institutions that were losing public support. It was Milosevic's League of 
Communists that now seemed convincing when talking about the 'Party 's separation from power7 
and its being a true representative of 'the people'. Milosevic now became both the promoter of a 
strong and efficient state and an advocate of 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' by the masses. While he 
was pledging strong action against 'anarchism', at the same time he supported mass rallies, which 
were - he claimed -  a spontaneous action of the people. Being on both sides at the same time, 
Milosevic in fact offered a platform to many others, both within the political elite and amongst the 
population. Members of the elite now followed his example, becoming -  almost overnight -  
'representatives of the people'. On the other hand, by putting himself at the head of the protests,
4  This was the main criticism by the other Yugoslav republics. There was no doubt that most of the demonstrators really 
were Serbs: as Ker£ov argues (1989:83) Serbs were 62%, and Montenegrins 14% of demonstrators, while together they were 
56.5% of the total population of Vojvodina. Among the speakers in these rallies, 75.2% were Serbs and Montenegrins from 
Vojvodina, 11.7% Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo, while 5.6% were Hungarians. Hungarians made up 18.9% of the 
population of the Province, but only 3% of demonstrators. Still, the fact that one of the leaders of the public discontent was 
Mihail Kertes, an ethnic Hungarian secretary of the LCY Committee in Stara Pazova, was much used to display the 'multi­
ethnic' character of the protests.
5  'The place of Serbian Communists is to be with the people,' the leadership of Serbia claimed in September 1988. And there 
they were.
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Milosevic enabled many of the disappointed but not anti-communist members of the public to join 
the protests.
On 8 October 1988, a crowd of about 100,000 demonstrators surrounded the Vojvodina Party 
headquarters demanding the resignations of the whole leadership of the Provincial Committee. The 
leadership resisted the 'pressure from the street' for the whole day, only to finally resign under the 
combined pressure of stones and yoghurts and Milosevic's public support for the demonstrators. 
The 'Yogurt revolution' removed the main opponents of many initiatives by Serbia's leaders, from 
the 'Blue Book' of 1977 onwards. Radical change now made Vojvodina the most stubborn supporter 
of Belgrade, changing the balance of power in the Yugoslav federation. The message Milosevic sent 
to the others was clear:
'The refusal of certain leaders and some individuals to respect the voice of the people, so 
clear and powerful, not only reveals their bureaucratic and undemocratic habits, but it also 
feeds anger, an escalation of which could result in endangering the safety of all people in 
the country' (Milosevic, Speech at the 13th CC LCY Session, IB 9/88:10).
When it came to 'wars between the people and some leaders', it was not im portant whether the 
change of politics came through institutions or in an extra-institutional manner: what was 
important was the unity of the people and its leadership.
It was unity, not institutions that Milosevic wanted to 'save'. The old communist slogan, that the 
place of the party was among the people, while the state was 'withering away', now came back in 
his revolutionary actions, which linked populism with socialism. It inspired both those who 
demanded radical changes and those who were not excited by them; those who wanted to see 
communist leaders finally overthrown and those not ready to abandon socialism yet disappointed 
by existing 'bureaucratic' politics.
A few days after the 'Yoghurt revolution', similar protests occurred in Montenegro, with the same 
demands for the republican leadership to resign as being 'bureaucratic'. In October 1988 the 
leadership managed to defend itself by using police force against the demonstrators, but the 
protests -  supported by the media in Belgrade -  continued until January 1989, when they finally 
succeeded in ousting the whole Montenegrin leadership.
The October protests in Montenegro, however, met with a powerful reaction from the Slovenian 
Central Committee, which accused Serbia of organising protests in the other Yugoslav republics. 
Slovenia's protests were a reaction to Milosevic's straying outside of Serbia's borders. As long as it
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was confined to Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo included), the other Yugoslav republics did not 
actively oppose the 'anti-bureaucratic revolution'. But Montenegro was a sovereign republic within 
Yugoslavia. The precedent followed in one case could be used in another, and why not in 
Slovenia?6
The Federal Party leadership also supported the Montenegrin leaders, but this only extended the 
list of 'bureaucrats' whose resignations were demanded by the demonstrators in Serbia and 
Montenegro. On the other hand, the Serbian Party Presidency declared its public support for the 
'justified demands of the workers and citizens of Montenegro... their socialist character and 
orientation to brotherhood-and-unity' (IB 9/1988:16). The Serbian Party Presidency demanded 
investigation of the Slovenian claim that Serbia had organised protests in another republic. They 
denied that Serbia had any territorial claims on Montenegro, or that it questioned the existence of 
the Montenegrin nation or republic. But, at the same time, it pointed out that the history of the two 
nations was full of examples of co-operation and 'common will'. The Slovenian attem pt to accuse 
Serbia of organising protests against the Montenegrin leadership, Milosevic said, was yet another 
attem pt to create inter-ethnic problems and destabilise Yugoslavia. In its declaration of 11 October 
1988, the Serbian Party Presidency warned Slovenia's leaders that they in fact were accepting the 
rhetoric of anti-socialist and anti-Yugoslav groups and that Serbia's population w ould not seek 
approval for their rallies from Slovenia's bureaucratic leaders. In a clear message to Slovenia's 
population, the Serbian leadership emphasised the difference between 'the brotherly Slovenian 
people' and its bureaucratised leaders. It was, however, at the same time an indirect invitation to 
Slovenes to replace their 'bureaucrats' with real representatives of the people. In other words -  to 
organise an 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' themselves.
7.2. Slovenia and Serbia: Divisions Between the Intellectual Elites
Milosevic's criticism of the Slovenian political leadership in the last quarter of 1988 followed a long- 
lasting public dispute between Slovenian and Serbian intellectuals over the future of Yugoslavia. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, Ljubljana and Belgrade had been the two centres of anti-regime 
actions, but they had failed to create a united, all-Yugoslav opposition. Despite fairly developed 
personal links between the Slovene and Serbian intellectuals, and the high regard that they had for
6  Slovenian 'dissident' intellectuals, such as Spomenka Hribar (Nova Revija. 80/1988:1992-8) showed more sympathy for the 
Montenegrin protests than Slovenian political leaders. Hribar accused the Slovene Party of supporting the 'Stalinist1 
leadership of Montenegro, instead of siding with the 'legitimate claims of the people'. 'To be perfectly clear -  the demands of 
the demonstrators in Titograd were entirely legitimate!,' said Hribar.
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each o th er/ several initiatives by Serbian dissidents (the most famous of which was the meeting 
between representatives of Cosic's Committee for the Protection of the Freedom of Artistic 
Expression and the editors of the Ljubljana-based journal 'Nova Revija' in November 1985) ended 
in failure.8 Private letters exchanged between several Slovenian and Serbian intellectuals 
contributed little to their m utual understanding.9 Public debate between them, also in the form of 
letters, had an even more negative effect.10
It was in this context that another episode showed how deep the disagreements were between 
Yugoslav intellectuals. In 1986, a Serbian candidate was to be elected to the one-year rotating post 
of the President of the Yugoslav Writers' Association. The Serbian Writers' Association (UKS) 
proposed Miodrag Bulatovic, but his candidacy was rejected by the Slovenian, Kosovan,
7  Since the early 1980s, many Slovenian intellectuals had joined the Serbs in signing various petitions and publishing articles 
and interviews in the liberalised Belgrade media. Ljubljana's 'Nova Reviia' (founded in 1982, at the time when 'Tavnost' was 
blocked by the Belgrade politicians), published Serbian authors. This was in sharp contrast to the coldness that opposition 
activities met with among Zagreb intellectuals, whom both Belgraders and Ljubljaners suspected of 'nationalism' and with 
support for the 1984 'White Book'. The 'special relations' between Serbia and Slovenia were, Dobrica Cosic argued, forged 
by 'the sameness of our national destinies [in WW II] and our brotherhood in suffering and struggle, which did not occur to 
the same extent with other South Slav peoples' (6 osic, 5-6 Oct 1987; Knjizevne Novine, 15 November 1987:17). It was the 
historical suffering and common 'anti-German' sentiments that made the Slovenes a potentially close ally in the eyes of the 
Serbian intelligentsia. These 'special links' were to some extent acknowledged by Milosevic himself. In May 1987, speaking 
to Slovene painters, he said that the Slovenes and Serbs were divided by their historical destiny, but had created bridges 
between themselves, forming an example of brotherhood-and-unity at work. 'The past has already entered the national 
memories of both nations' to be passed from generation to generation and 'never to be forgotten' (1987/1989:151). The fact 
that Milan KuCan began his life as a refugee in Serbia made him rather popular in Serbia. But, it also deepened the sense of 
'betrayal' once Slovenia went independent.
8 The sense of disappointment was described by Dobrica 6 osic (Djukic, 1989:268). From Cosic's later recollections of the 
meeting, it appeared that the main conclusion of the Slovene intellectuals was that 'the Slovenes have nothing to expect from 
Yugoslavia' (Cosic, 1992:71), and that one should 'once and for all reject any internationalism and universalism' (1992:72). 
They also argued that 'the Slovenes have always compared [themselves] with Europe, never with Yugoslavia' (1992:72). The 
Serbs, on the other hand, argued that the failure of the Party ideology should not necessarily be the end of the Yugoslav 
idea, pointing out that the Serbian national question would be widely re-opened if Yugoslavia ceased to exist.
9  Following the meeting in 'Mrak', Dobrica Cosic exchanged several letters with the Slovene writers Niko Grafenauer, Taras 
Kermauner and Spomenka Hribar. In the letter to Grafenauer, Cosic complained that the Slovenian intellectuals 'failed to 
recognise.. .the enormous development of Slovenia which was possible only in Yugoslavia'. They also underestimated 'the 
anti-Bosnian, which means anti-Serbian atmosphere in Slovenia'. But worst of all was the indifference towards 'the 
humiliating position of the Serbian nation in the existing, Brioni Yugoslavia', and especially in Kosovo. 'I am saddened by 
seeing how uninformed you are about the Albanian genocide of the Serb population in Kosovo and Metohija, and how little 
you care about this, much less than we cared for the Slovenian Coast and Carinthia [after WWII]' (Cosic, 23 November 
1985/1992:76-9).
1 0  'Letter to a Serbian friend' by Taras Kermauner was published first in the Serbian literary magazine 'Knjizevnost' in 1986, 
then in 'Borba' on 24-26 June 1987. Kermauner accused the Serbs of being anti-Albanian and anti-Slovenian and led by 'a 
blind anger... against anything that is different, anyone who tried to think and behave as h e / she liked, against anybody 
who was not willing to subject themselves to a model of brotherhood-and-terror'. Raising for tire first time the issue of 
separation, Kermauner asked: 'Why would it be of any concern to you if I (we) wanted to secede? Civilised behaviour is one 
of the main conditions of civil society. If the partners in a marriage are no longer interested in living together, they can 
divorce. There is no personal freedom without the possibility of divorce/ said Kermauner. He reminded the Serbs that if 
they felt exploited by the Slovenes (as they had argued in the Memorandum) they should not object to a separation. 
Kermauner concluded that the Kosovo Serbs, unfortunately, did not demand more democracy and lawfulness, but the 
renewal of the brotherhood-and-unity policy. This is why tire Slovenes could not support them (Borba, 24-26 June 1987). 
Commenting on the effect of Kermauner's letter, Dobrica Cosic said: 'This letter, by its Slovenian bias, provoked huge 
discontent and disappointment in cultural circles in Belgrade and Serbia... It was from Taras Kermauner that the Serbian 
public realised what Slovenia thought of the Serbs and Serbia, and what were Slovenian intentions: in one word -  
secessionism' (1992:73).
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Montenegrin and Croatian organisations, who claimed that Bulatovic's views were hostile to other 
Yugoslav nations. The four constitutive members of the YWA managed to block the Serbian 
appointee, causing a stalemate from which the Association would never recover. Serbia saw 'the 
Bulatovic case' not only as a sign of the strong links between these four organisations and their 
respective Party elites, but also as an example of another humiliation and intervention in its 
internal affairs. As Dobrica Cosic explained:
'The national key principle is respected in every case and for everyone, except for the Serbs. 
Every national donkey can be the Yugoslav President, except the Serbian donkey!'
In an open letter that followed the 'Bulatovic case', the UKS accused the Slovenian Writers of 
'agitating openly and militantly' against the Serbs.
'Slovenian writers must know that Serbian writers will never accept any Diktat... and will 
reject with contempt a language of provincial maliciousness, which does not respect their 
partners... They should know that Serbian history, both ancient and recent, provides... a 
holy writ and a reminder, that the Serbian nation has preserved its national identity and 
integrity only by resisting aggression.'11
The Serbian Writers also expressed their determination to prevent the Yugoslav Writers' 
Association from becoming 'an instrument by which militant and aggressive minorities might 
impose their selfish will, which originates in... their nationalist schizophrenia, on the others'.
'O n this issue [of the election of Bulatovic], there will be no compromise, even if the price is 
the break-up of the YWA.... A community of any type can only exist if principles of 
equality in rights and in duties are respected, and if everyone obeys the rules previously 
agreed upon. Otherwise -  its existence is not necessary7 (Nova Revija, 1986:811).
The Bulatovic case, like the 1982 'case of Draza Markovic' within the LCY (described in Chapter 
Five) demonstrated that the Serbs -  just like all the others -  were unwilling to accept defeat, even if 
this was the result of the procedure that they had previously agreed upon. The confederalist 
principle of 'appointm ent', not of 'election', suited them in order to introduce the candidate they 
preferred, regardless of how acceptable he was to the others. But, once others rejected it, they 
simply did not recognise the legitimacy of the procedure.12
11 Nova Reviia. 1986:811.
1 2 In fact, the Yugoslav Writers' Association never fully recovered from the stalemate caused by the 'Bulatovic case', 
becoming the first Yugoslav institution to effectively disintegrate under the pressure of divisions within Yugoslavia. The 
official break-up of all links between the two associations (Slovenian and Serbian) happened on 28 February 1989, as a 
consequence of the Slovenian Writers' Association's participation in a pro-Albanian meeting in Ljubljana (Belie and Bilbija, 
1989:6). The break-up was uni-lateral. In its letter to the UKS, the Slovenian Writers' Association said that they 'absolutely 
and in no way' wanted to break relations with the UKS (Borba. 2 March 1989).
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The collapse of the Yugoslav Writers' Association (whose acronym in Serbo-Croatian is the same as 
that of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia -  SKJ) preceded by four years the dissolution 
of the Party. Taking into account how much the writers' associations were already influenced by 
both their local political elites and by ethnic nationalism, this could hardly be surprising. The event, 
however, had grave consequences, since it in fact demonstrated that not only the institutions of the 
state and the Party were disunited, but that it was difficult to expect an emergence of an all- 
Yugoslav opposition movement. The republican/ethnic fragmentation of the opposition, at the 
same time that the LCY was rapidly disintegrating on the same lines, left little space for the 
democratic transformation of Yugoslavia. It also indicated that the further democratisation of the 
country would in fact go hand in hand with its fragmentation into republican/ethnic components. 
A democratic and united Yugoslavia was becoming as improbable as a Communist-led united 
Yugoslavia.13 As Dobrica Cosic noticed, 'the case of Miodrag Bulatovic was... only a new metastasis 
of the Yugoslav cancer, which had only one possible outcome' (Cosic, 1986/1992:80-3).
7.3. The Slovene National Programme (1986-1987)
It is today often argued that the Serbs were the ones who started the circle of ethnic nationalism, of 
which the SANU Memorandum was normally taken as the main example. In most of the existing 
literature, however, the role of Slovene nationalism in the disintegration of the Yugoslav 
Communist ideology is significantly underestimated.14 Here I argue that the nationalist idea, 
similar to those developed in Serbia, had at the same time emerged among Slovenian intellectuals. 
It is in the interaction between the two nationalist movements rather than in one of them 
exclusively that one needs to look for the roots of the final phase of the Yugoslav conflicts.
The Slovenian opposition scene in the 1980s had two pillars: (1) the 'civil society' concept, 
promoted by the Association of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia (ZSMS) and its magazine 'M ladina', 
and (2) the Slovene national programme, created by the Slovene intellectuals assembled in the 
literary review 'Nova Revija'. While the first concept insisted on the de-militarisation of society,
13 Not many, however, realised this until very late. For example, as the last US Ambassador to Yugoslavia (1988-1992 Warren 
Zimmermann writes, the US Government believed that 'unity and democracy were the Siamese twins of Yugoslavia's fate... 
the loss of one meant that the other would die' (1995:6). The same was argued by the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante 
Markovic, the most liberal member of the Yugoslav political elite. However, both Markovic's term in office and American 
policy towards the Yugoslav crisis ended in failure precisely because they attempted to explain actions from a different 
ideological context than the one in which the events really happened.
14 An exception being Susan Woodward's 'Balkan Tragedy' (1995), and to a certain extent James Gow (1992) and Aleksandar 
Pavkovic (1996).
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establishing various NGOs linked to the ZSMS, the latter attempted to formulate the main 
Slovenian national interests. In 1988 they moved close to each other, seeing the national question 
and the democratic transformation of Slovenia as conditional upon the destruction of the Yugoslav 
Communist state.
Within the concept of 'civil society', the national question was treated simply as a part of the 
'democratic question' and within the context of the de-militarisation of society. It was first raised by 
Janez Jansa, the leading figure of the 'civil society' concept (formerly a member of the ZSMS 
Presidency, resigning after criticising the Army in 1984) who called on the Army to make no 
exception to other federal institutions when it came to equality of the three official languages in 
Yugoslavia. In a paper written in 1986, Jansa reminded the Army of the fact that the Slovene 
Partisan units during the WW II spoke the Slovenian language, and that Tito himself promised 
Slovenes that they would never again be forced to speak a foreign language in their military force.15 
Jansa argued that the Yugoslav Army in fact was violating the federal Constitution. In reality, it 
had never wanted to accommodate to the political trends of de-centralisation which started after 
the fall of Rankovic in 1966. The main reason for this was its 'paternalistic distrust' for certain 
Yugoslav nations, as a result of which it also rejected any idea of having ethnically homogeneous 
(i.e., Slovene, Serb, Croat, etc.) military units. Jansa argued that the Army had never abandoned its 
ambition to play the role of the 'educator of Yugoslavism', and that it had never really accepted the 
existence of republics as states (Jansa, 1986:263). For most of the 'civil society' authors (such as 
Gregor Tome, Tomaz Mastnak, etc.) the national question was, therefore, treated not as a separate 
issue -  it was an inalienable part of the general democratisation of the country.16
Somewhat different was the approach of those Slovene intellectuals, who (in 1981) established the 
literary monthly journal 'Nova Revija'. In 1985, at the same time as the Serbian Academy of Science 
and Arts started preparing its 'M emorandum', the editors of the Nova Revija (Niko Grafenauer and 
Dimitrij Rupel) invited contributions to a special issue on the Slovene national question. In Autumn 
1986 the issue was ready to be published. But, when the Memorandum met with a strong reaction
15 By the Federal Constitution, three languages -  Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Macedonian were official on the whole territory 
of Yugoslavia, while the languages of minorities, such as Albanian, Hungarian, Italian, etc. were made spoken in official use 
in areas with a significant presence of these ethnic groups. Federal documents were issued in all three languages, but Serbo- 
Croat (spoken by about 16 out of 23 million Yugoslavs) was widely used as the lingua-franca in oral communication. In the 
Army, Serbo-Croat was declared 'the language of command', being, therefore, singled out as the official spoken language. 
Although the regulations provided for other languages to be used in the reserve forces of the Army (composed of the local 
population), this rarely materialised. Until 1988, even in Slovenia, for example, the names of the barracks were written only 
in Serbo-Croat, while Slovene officers and Slovene soldiers were using Serbo-Croat in official communication. Serving my 
military service in Slovenia (1986-1987), under tire command of a Slovenian officer, I have personal experience of how  
damaging this was for the relations between soldiers and tire local population.
16 For more on this concept, see Mastnak (1986) and (1990), Fink Hafner (1992), ArzenSek (1986), JenSterle (1987) and Tome 
(1986).
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in Serbian and Yugoslav politics, they decided to postpone publication of the issue to January 
1987.17
i
The 57th issue of 'Nova Revija' was the first publication that debated ways and methods of 
changing Slovenian public opinion in order to win support for Slovenian independence. Slovenia 
was at a crossroads, facing the most important issues of her identity in the new ('informational and 
cybernetic') era. As one of the authors (Tine Hribar) explained, there were three ways ahead, and 
Slovenia had to make a clear choice between them. First: she could disappear as an autonomous 
political subject, defeated by 'Yugoslavism' or 'Yugoslavianism',18 of either a Communist or a 
democratic character. Either of these two 'Yugoslavisms' would make Slovenians only a minority 
within a unitary state. This choice was clearly unacceptable. The real choice was, therefore, between 
the two following options: either Slovenia would preserve its status of a sovereign nation within 
the modernised Yugoslav federation (which would recognise her sovereignty not only in words but 
in practice); or she should declare full state independence, separating from Yugoslavia.
Debating this dilemma, most of the authors of 'Nova Revija' argued in favour of full 
independence.19 However, they were aware that not only international political reality but also 
Slovene public opinion was not yet ready to accept such a radical solution. True, the public opinion 
survey in 1987 (SJM, 1987) demonstrated that the Slovene population had begun to think that the 
state independence of Slovenia was not entirely undesirable. 53% of the respondents in a survey 
conducted by the University of Ljubljana claimed that outside Yugoslavia, as an independent state, 
'Slovenia would increase its chances to develop' (in an economic sense), while only 18.9% said 
Slovenia would 'have no chance to develop' in such a case (SJM, 1987:58). More respondents than 
ever before (43.2%) claimed that Slovenian politics was 'not sufficiently independent7, while an 
additional 7% said 'it was not independent at all' (SJM, 1987:58). A large majority of Slovenes 
(65.5%) claimed the Slovenian language was endangered (SJM, 1987:59). 59.1% said that the
17 It is now widely believed that the 'Contributions' were only a reaction to the Memorandum, which was leaked to 
newspapers in September 1986. This is, however, incorrect. Spomenka Hribar, one of the editors of Nova Revija said that the 
special issue was initiated a year and a half before it was actually published. The Slovene and Serbian national programmes 
appeared independently of each other and at the same time. The Serbian writers, such as (tosic, today accept that they 
started thinking of formulating a national programme only after the meeting in 'Mrak' in November 1985. If this is true, one 
can conclude that the Memorandum was in fact a reaction to an already existing (though unwritten) Slovenian national 
programme, not vice versa. Cosic says that he was impressed on seeing how well thought out the Slovene concept was.
18 In Hribar's use of these two terms (in Slovenian: 'jugoslovanstvo' and 'jugoslavijanstvo'), they are not synonymous. 
Yugoslavism is used to describe ethnic, while Yugoslavianism -  political (civic) affiliation. For Hribar, both are equally 
unacceptable.
19 Viktor Meier's conclusion (1999: 58) that 'in this programme, the existence of Yugoslavia was nowhere called into question1 
was perhaps more a product of his overt sympathies with the Slovenian position, for which he (at that time as correspondent 
for Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitungl was criticised in an official Statement by Serbian LC CC at its 13lh Session, 11 October 
1988 (IB 9/88:16) than of his reading of 'Nova Revija'.
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republics and provinces should be 'more independent than they are', and only 8.9% were in favour 
of the 're-centralisation' of Yugoslavia.
At the same time, however, none of these findings was sufficient to initiate any great dissatisfaction 
with Slovenia's political leadership, which was 'fully supported' by 37.8% of the population, while 
an additional 42.0% said that they 'in  principle' trusted them. Nor did they undermine the socialist 
orientation of the majority of population. In 1987, 42% of Slovenes believed in the prospect of 
socialism in the world. True, fewer than ever before said that LCY politics 'entirely' or 'generally' 
reflected the interests of the majority, but it was still a high percentage (57.2%) who said so (in 1971: 
76.2%; in 1976: 66.4%; in 1980: 72.0%; in 1984: 68.5%, etc.). The survey, hence, confirmed that the 
Slovenes really faced a crossroads: they did not any longer rule out the possibility of being 
independent, yet they had not lost confidence in the Communist leadership either. They opposed 
the re-centralisation of Yugoslavia, but they were not yet ready to support anything else bu t a 
programme that would somehow preserve socialism, while increasing at the same time Slovene 
national independence. They were less than ever knocking on the doors of the LCY to become 
members. Yet certainly they did not really believe that developed socialism, a democratic 
Yugoslavia and a highly autonomous Slovenia were incompatible objectives.
In this context, the authors of 'Nova Revija' understood their role as one of convincing the 
Slovenian public that a Slovenian state was a viable option, and should be the primary aim, ranked 
higher than either socialism or Yugoslavia. They had to break the 'Slovene paradox', which the 
Slovene philosopher Tine Hribar described as the Slovene lack of desire to have an independent 
state. '[Slovenes] are afraid of their unconditional sovereignty', and of statehood, 'since they are 
afraid of the very image of a state', he said in his article in Nova Revija 57.
'Since we have so far had only the experience of living in foreign states, those that were not 
ours, we have built a perception that a state is [merely] an instrument of coercion.20 We do 
not think of a state as a legal state (Rechtstaat), which would be a guardian of the space of 
liberty and protector of human rights, but as an enforcer of duties and obligations, an 
instrument of intrusion and even as terminator of our rights' (Hribar, 1987:25).
It was, therefore, the notion of the state that had to be changed first.21 Hribar argued that the 
democratisation of the state was a pre-condition for Slovenes to begin thinking of their own, 
Slovenian state. Furthermore, he argued that the democratisation of Yugoslavia would necessarily
211 One could perhaps add this explanation to the list of motives for Kardelj's (himself a Slovene) anti-statist notion, based 
also on the concept of the 'withering away of the state'.
21 In this respect, the Slovenian national program was 'statist' too.
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lead to an independent Slovenia. The main target of democratisation was the 'ideology of violence 
in the name of the [communist] Idea'. Without changing the ideology on which the state was 
created, the expression of preferences would not be possible. But, as soon as this ideology was 
defeated, the very essence of Yugoslav state came under question.
For the Slovene intellectuals around Nova Reviia (almost all of whom  later played a leading role in 
DEMOS, the coalition of anti-communist parties in the 1990 elections), the democratisation of 
Yugoslavia was not an aim in itself, but the independence of Slovenia was. They understood the 
democratisation of Yugoslavia as a means to this end. While Serbian nationalists remained divided 
between their 'Yugoslav' and '(Greater-)Serbian' options, the Slovenes now (as early as 1986) 
established the clear aim of full independence.
However, the Slovene intellectuals were also aware of political reality. Even if the whole project of 
Slovenian independence did not succeed, Hribar argued, even if the Slovenes freely decided to 
remain part of Yugoslavia, there was still a bottom line that they should never cross: they should 
never agree to be treated as a minority, regardless of how small their share of the Yugoslav 
population was. The Slovenes were a sovereign nation, and as a sovereign nation they had an 
absolute right to decide about the form of state in which they should live. The existing 1974 
Constitution guaranteed this 'bottom line' and it was, therefore, absolutely unacceptable to change 
it for anything but full independence.22 If the Slovenes, therefore, decided to secede from 
Yugoslavia, Peter Jambrek argued in his article in the 57th issue of Nova Revija, this w ould be 
perfectly legal. The potential conflict that might follow such a decision would not be between a 
sovereign state (Yugoslavia) and its secessionist part (Slovenia), but between two independent and 
sovereign states. In such a case the right of self-determination would certainly support the Slovene 
side.23
In a series of articles published in Slovenian academic journals and the media, the legitimacy of the 
Yugoslav state was questioned.24 'From a strictly legalistic point of view,' the Slovene lawyer 
France Bucar argued, 'the Slovene nation was brought into a political system about which it has
22 The Constitution guaranteed the right to self-determination ('including secession', as the Slovene intellectuals often 
emphasised) by the first article of its Basic Principles, which declared Yugoslavia to be a federal republic of free peoples 
equal in rights' whose decision to associate was based on 'the right of every nation to self-determination, including also the 
right to secession' (Jambrek, 1987:166).
23 This argument is still used by Slovenia when issues such as succession of the property and rights of the SFRY are debated. 
While Serbia (FR Yugoslavia) insists that Slovenia and other republics seceded from Yugoslavia, the Slovenes argue it was 
partition of the federation, not secession.
24 Kardelj's anti-statist concept, which recognised republics as states, and Yugoslavia as a 'community' of state-republics, 
was now also used to support this argument.
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never had a chance to express its opinion freely' (1987:154). The Slovenes had never had a 
referendum on Yugoslavia, but were 'guided' by the policy of the uncontrollable Communist Party. 
Only by exercising their right to decide freely on possible links with the other (Yugoslav) nations, 
could the Slovenes legitimise the state they lived in. As the next step of their political activism the 
Slovene intellectuals would, therefore, propose a referendum on self-determination.
Many articles in ' Nova Revija' pointed out that Slovenia's independence was neither unrealistic nor 
impossible. Apart from its historical development25 which made Slovenia much stronger and self- 
confident than it had been ever before, the geopolitical position and ethnic structure of its 
population were (still) favourable to this option. Not only did almost all Slovenes live within the 
borders of Slovenia, but the borders also separated Slovenes from other Yugoslavs in linguistic, 
cultural and historical terms. Economic arguments were also used to support the prospects for 
independence. Slovenia, whose population made up 8% of the Yugoslav total, contributed 15-17% 
of the total funds for under-developed Yugoslav regions, produced about 15% of total Yugoslav 
production, while its share of Yugoslav exports had reached 20% by the mid-1980s. Quoting these 
figures, the Slovene intellectuals concluded that the 'ideology of egalitarianism' (so popular in 
other parts of Yugoslavia) was certainly not in the interest of Slovenia.
Subsequently to Hribar's demand that the ideological paradigm of the Yugoslav society should be 
destroyed, several authors in the 57th issue of Nova Reviia openly criticised the ideological use of 
concepts, such as, for example, nationalism. In an article which the political elite subsequently 
criticised more than any other, the Slovene philosopher Ivan Urbancic promoted a Slovene 'positive 
nationalism', which would take the nation out of 'entropy, apathy and fears', developed not only 
by recent crisis, but throughout their history.26 Without its own nationalism, the Slovene nation was 
'sentenced to disappearance' because even those who promoted 'internationalism ' (like Yugoslav 
unitarists) were in fact only 'Yugoslav nationalists' themselves.27
25 'One should not underestimate the positive national and psychological effects of the recognition of the possibility to 
secede and become an independent state [provided] by die 1974 Constitution itself (Urbancic, 1987:44).
26 As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, rarely did any other term have a more negative meaning in the rhetoric 
of the regime than nationalism. Nationalism was what the Communists fought against, not only in the Partisan War, but 
also throughout the entire period of their 35 years in power. The label 'nationalisf would bring on those so labeled a total 
ban on public appearances, political purges and, in the most drastic cases, imprisonment. The concept of 'brotherhood and 
unity' was invented as the antipode of (separatist) nationalism and formed one of the main elements of the regime's 
legitimacy. It was in Urbancic's article that this pillar was undermined.
27 Almost all 'Nova Revija' authors shared this conclusion. For instance, Ale§ Debeljak (1986) claimed that Yugoslavism was 
an 'outdated' nationalist concept and, as France BuCar said, belonged to the 19th century (1987).
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Although Urbancid accepted that certain positive changes had been introduced immediately before 
the 1974 Constitution,28 it was still the case that the League of Yugoslav Communists, by the very 
fact of being the real sovereign of Yugoslavia, remained the main promoter of unitarism. The fact 
that no mechanisms for conflict resolution between republics and provinces were provided 
illustrates that conflicts had not been expected, since they should have always been prevented by 
the Party in advance. The Yugoslav 'federation' was nothing more than the 'objectivisation' of LCY 
rule.29
'Regardless of the federal character of Yugoslavia and despite rhetorical claims that the 
1974 Constitution recognised and even created the statehood of the republics, the federal 
state still preserves its supremacy in homogenising society in a political sense' (1987:36).30
Ideological and political homogenisation under the LCY had produced a de facto unitary state. The 
Army's refusal to promote languages other than Serbo-Croat was only an illustration of this. But, 
the use of the 'Serbian'31 language in the Army and state apparatus did not mean, Urbancic said, 
that the Serbs (as Serbs) really dominated in Yugoslavia. The federal administration was nation­
less; it was an ideologised instrument of imaginary class interests, not a representative of any, 
including of the Serbian, nation. The Slovenes, Urbancid said, should never confuse Serbian 
nationalism with Yugoslav unitarism. While Serbian nationalism was a legitimate political doctrine, 
Yugoslav unitarism was not. Not only Urbandic, but also many other Slovenian writers expressed 
this conclusion. For example, Spomenka Hribar (1988b) also concluded that Yugoslavia was not 
dominated by the Serbs but by Proletarian Revolutionaries.
'The Yugoslav army is not a national army, which means - not Serbian either. Even if all its 
members, to the last one, were Serbs, this would still be primarily an Army of the Party. It 
is a political, 'class' army, which a priori disregards nationalities and peoples as nations. 
This is why the Army is convinced that it is logical that its Commander in an area does not 
belong to the nation that has a majority in this area. It is not only logical, but also necessary 
for Bolsheviks, since the national feelings of the Commander should not coincide with the
28 Urbancic analyses in details these positive changes in his 1989 text in Nova Revija 11989:789-8171.
29 Spomenka Hribar pointed out the difference between reality and formal constitutionality in the Yugoslav case in her 
inspiring article in Nova Revija 57 (1987). Paraphrasing her terminology, one could conclude that Yugoslavia was in reality a 
LCY -ruled unitary state, while in form it was a federation of republics. The difference between rituals and reality in socialist 
states is described in Vaclav Havel's essay: 'Power of the Powerless' (1978).
10 In his article in the 57th issue of 'Nova Revija' (1987) France Bucar argued that federation was still only a form of unitary 
state -  and that every unitary state develops a state language, state ethnicity and state identity. As examples, Bu£ar used the 
USA and Germany. After the first democratic elections in 1990, Bucar became president of the Slovene Parliament.
31 Serbian writers noticed that the Slovene nationalists deliberately avoided the fact that the Croatian variant of the Serbo- 
Croat language was also treated as 'official', not only the Serbian. This was true. Both Tito and the Defence Secretary at the 
time Admiral Mamula spoke the Croatian, rather than the Serbian variant of the Serbo-Croatian language. Even Gen. 
Ljubicic, Mamula's predecessor, used many Croatian words, imitating Tito's gestures and speech.
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feelings of the population. Of course, it is the same with ordinary recruits, which should be 
sent to other areas, like -  in our Slovenian case -  Kosovo/
Finally, on these grounds the Slovene intellectuals showed more understanding for the Serbian 
nationalists than, for example, the Serbian Communists. In 1989, at the height of the conflict 
between the Serbian and Slovenian leadership, France Bu£ar wrote:
'The Serbs have a right to their national state... In the 'AVNOJ Yugoslavia', this right was 
denied to Serbs, as it was to the other nations. The Republic of Serbia was not shaped as a 
state of the Serbs, and certainly not by a procedure in which they could participate; a large 
proportion of Serbs remained outside their nation-state. By the 1974 Constitution, the 
autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo were practically outside Serbian 
jurisdiction, having -  at the same time -  sufficient prerogatives to block any law in Serbia. 
This impossible and irrational situation was unsustainable' (1989:1497).
Not without a sense of solidarity with Serbian demands, Bucar admitted that they had lost Kosovo 
because of the high birth rate of the Albanians and real-socialist policy of urbanisation, which 
moved them (the Serbs) from Kosovo to the cities -  mostly to Belgrade.
'The result of all this was a general national frustration: [the Serbs] are losing their national 
territories, their living standards are decreasing; the economy is more or less bankrupt; and 
their real power is much below the power of their total numbers. The Serbs are perhaps the 
biggest victim of real-socialism in Yugoslavia' (1989:1497).
But, while the 'Nova Revija' authors did not in general object to Serbian nationalism, they 
demanded that their Serb counterparts should clearly dissociate themselves from any trace of 
Yugoslav unitarism. The complex relationship between the two strongest opposition groups in 
Yugoslavia (as will be demonstrated later in this chapter) was determined by this demand. The 
SANU M emorandum was, Urbancic concluded, in this respect still a confusing mixture of Serbian 
nationalism and Yugoslav unitarism, but was nevertheless a positive step forward towards an open 
discussion (1987:39). On the other hand, it is almost needless to say that Milosevic's Yugoslavism 
was entirely unacceptable to the Slovene intellectuals. The new Serbian leader was indeed the 
embodiment of everything they criticised.32
The Slovene nationalist opposition had less consideration for other Yugoslav nations, with the 
exception of the Croats. As Urbancic explained in his article in the 57th issue of 'Nova Revija', the 
Yugoslav federation consisted of three types of nations. The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes belonged to 
the first category of 'old nations'. Although they were too weak to remain independent, and thus
32 It is perhaps here that one needs to notice that -  in this respect - in the brief military conflict in summer 1991, the opposing 
sides were not Serbs and Slovenes: it was Yugoslavia that Slovenes fought against. And it was the vote of the Serbian 
representatives in the federal Presidency that in fact brought about Slovenia's independence.
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decided to create a common state in 1918, the 'old nations' existed before Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia 
they had 'grow n up' to the point at which they had become mature enough to create their own 
states. On the other hand, the Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins and Macedonians were 'new  
nations', whose separate identity was recognised only after 1945 (in case of the Bosnian Muslims 
even later -  in the 1960s):
'These nations were created by the national state-creating force, which was the Communist 
Party, at the expense of those nations that emerged in its own historical national 
movement, and were therefore also capable of their federal self-sustainability' (Urbancic, 
1987).
The third category had only one member -  the Kosovo Albanians, who had not been recognised as 
a nation (but as a 'nationality') although they had formed a genuine national movement and a 
strong sense of identity (Urbancid, 1987:45-6). In Yugoslavia, all nations -  old and new alike -  had 
strengthened their identity and increased their chances of survival as independent states.33 
Yugoslavia should simply recognise this change, and allow everyone to express a dem and for full 
independence if they wished to do so.
As Urbancic argued, the problem of Yugoslavia was not that the nations wanted to be independent, 
but that some of them were not confident enough of their ability to sustain themselves. This lack of 
self-confidence was manifested in the Yugoslavism of the 'new  nations'. The newly created nations 
(and not the Serbs, Slovenes, or Croats) were therefore a pillar of Yugoslav unitarism. They were 
the main allies of the federal state, which found its main raison d'etre in favouring the least 
developed at the expense of the most-developed nations in Yugoslavia. This was also why even in 
the 40 years of 're-distribution' the differences between 'strong' and 'weak' nations in Yugoslavia 
had not disappeared: it was not in the interest of the Yugoslav Communist elite. In Urbancic's 
interpretation, if anyone was to be blamed for unitarism, then this should be the 'new ' nations, 
rather than the Serbs. Not only did they make Slovenia less developed than it should have been, 
but they kept the Yugoslav state functioning.
The existence of such a federal state, in which the weakest nations did not improve their economic 
situation, created an additional problem for Slovenia: the wave of emigration of ethnic Slovenes 
from Slovenia to the West, and a large immigration to Slovenia from the other, predominantly from 
'new7 Yugoslav nations. Urbanci£ claimed that 200,000 'members of other Yugoslav nations' had
33 Urbandic compared the new nations with the former colonies: 'When one gives a form of statehood to somebody, 
regardless of how this statehood came to be created, it would necessarily lead to nationalist forms of behaviour when it 
comes to the national question, and it would create a nation, even if no trace of any genuine national movement existed in 
this place ever before' (1987:47).
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moved to Slovenia since 1945, mostly for economic reasons, while (for the same reason) 600,000 
Slovenes had left their country in the last hundred years and had never returned.
'This means that the population of Slovenia had not decreased in its size, but only if we 
neglect the 'unim portant' fact that the (ethnically) Slovene population is declining' 
(Urbancic, 1987:55).
The change in the ethnic structure of the Slovenian population is a 'time-bomb that is ticking in our 
lands' (Urbanci5, 1987:5s).34 Among other threats to Slovene national identity, Urbancic included 
the increasing number of ethnic 'Yugoslavs' in the 1981 census, the notion of Slovenia being a 
'multi-ethnic society7, bi-lingualism ('which would make Slovenes a national minority in 
Yugoslavia1), and -  again -  disrespect for the Slovenian language in the Army.35
'It m ust be very clearly stated: we, the Slovenes, did not associate with other Yugoslav 
nations in the common state to lose our autonomy and national identity, but to preserve 
it.36 Therefore we reject all those elements of our common federal state, which would, 
sooner or later, lead to or support unitarism. And it is up  to us, the Slovenes, to 
autonomously decide what these elements are' (Urban£i£, 1987:52).
Two years later, Urban£i5 would conclude that his expectations that the Yugoslav state would 
democratise in this direction had been naive.
'Yugoslavia as a state is a historical accident; it is without any indigenous must, without an 
idea of itself. Yugoslavia cannot exist, because she does not have any interior necessity... 
Yugoslavia as a unitary and centralised nation-state is -  as has been demonstrated in 
practice -  impossible.' (1989:814).
It was impossible because it did not follow 'the demands of the epoch'. For the Slovenes, the 
authors in 'Nova Revija' argued, there was only one way out: an independent Slovenia.
34 One can here hardly fail to notice that Urban£i£'s fear of a 'time bomb' was very similar to the fear of the Serbian 
nationalist intelligentsia for the fate of the Serbs in Kosovo. The higher birth rate of Albanians in Kosovo was paralleled by 
the higher birth rate of the Bosnian Muslims, the largest group of immigrants in Slovenia. For the Slovenes' fears of 'the 
Bosnians' see Meznaric, 1986.
35 'There is no military or defence justification for Slovenes to join the Army in a foreign environment and under foreign 
command, as was the case in earlier periods of our non-independence, or for the fact that on their territory there are 
stationed troops which do not obey Slovenian orders' (Urbandic, 1987:56).
36 This argument was heard at the 14th session of the LC CC Serbia in May 1968, when Petar Stambolic argued that Dobrica 
Cosic and Jovan Marjanovic misunderstood the meaning of Yugoslavism for the other Yugoslav nations. For this debate, see 
Chapter Three.
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7.4. Reaction of the Slovene Political Elite
The 57th issue of 'Nova Reviia' posed a similar challenge to the Slovenian political leadership, as the 
M emorandum did to the Serbian. Although the new Slovenian party leadership (since 1986 led by 
Milan Kudan) engaged in open criticism of the Slovene National Programme,37 they -  following the 
same pattern as Stambolic and Milosevic -  saw potential benefit in a reconciliation with its main 
authors. Like Milosevic, in the criticisms of the Nova Reviia and Mladina (the youth magazine that 
since had 1982 promoted liberal views, opening its pages to many 'nationalists', 'liberals' and 
others excommunicated in earlier times) they saw themselves coming under pressure. But, while 
the Serbian opposition criticised political institutions in general (including those in Serbia), the 
criticism from Slovenia was directed at federal institutions, including the Army. It was not other 
Slovenes, but the 'dogmatist1 and 'centralist' forces in the Party and state federal leadership that the 
Slovene elite feared most. This brought a new dimension to the whole problem.
As several opinion polls indicated in the mid-1980s, the discontent with LCY policy was stronger in 
Slovenia than in any other Yugoslav republic. Consequently, 38.9% of the Slovenian electorate in 
the 1986/1987 survey, carried out by Slovene sociologists on a sample representing the whole 
Yugoslav population, agreed that 'the LCY should be only one of the political parties in our society, 
and it should be up to each individual as to which party he/she would support'. 27.7% replied: 'do 
not know', which meant that less than 25% Slovenes opposed introduction of multi-party 
democracy. The level of acceptance of such a possibility was, therefore, higher than in any other 
republic (30.4% in Croatia, 28.3% in Montenegro, 25.6% in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 25.2% in Kosovo, 
23.5% in Macedonia, 22.9% in Serbia Proper and 22.8% in Vojvodina) (Goati, 1989:96).
On the other hand, however, the same survey showed growing support for the 'firm hand policy' 
throughout the country. The proposition by which the level of authoritarian inclinations was tested 
was: 'A  firm hand, which knows what it wants, would be of much more use to our society than any 
empty talk about self-management'.38 Surprisingly, acceptance of this statement was again highest 
in Slovenia (61.1% in favour, with 19.6% neutral), while (with the exception of Kosovo) there was 
not much difference between the regions with regard to their level of economic development. The 
authoritarian statements were acceptable for about the half of the population in all the Yugoslav 
republics: in Serbia Proper 53.4%, Croatia 53.1%, Bosnia-Herzegovina 52.7%, Montenegro 50.3%, 
Macedonia 48.0%, Vojvodina 46.8%, and in Kosovo 24.7%.
37 For the official position of the Presidency of the Slovenian LC CC see document 'Current ideo-political situation in society 
and the LCS', unpublished, 39 pages, typescript. The document was commented on by Rupel in Nova Reviia 61-62/1987.
38 The authors of the survey found out that this was a typical statement by an authoritarian person at that moment.
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These two possible outcomes: multi-party democracy and the 'firm hand policy' now appeared as 
the main alternatives to the crises of leadership. This conclusion could be well supported by a 
survey of party membership conducted in 1985 by the Party leadership itself. When asked the 
question: 'W hat is, in your opinion, the main value that should be promoted by our socialist 
society?', 41% replied: 'social equality' and 19% 'freedom and democracy'. In all the Yugoslav 
republics the Communists valued 'equality' more than 'freedom and democracy7, and in all of them 
the number of those choosing 'equality' rose when compared with previous surveys: in Slovenia 
39.1%, compared with 24% in 1978; in Serbia 41.6%, compared with 34% in 1978. But, while in 
Serbia the 'freedom and democracy7 was in 1978 the choice for 13% and in 1985 for 17%, the 
number of Slovenian Communists who selected 'freedom and democracy' first grew more rapidly: 
from 16% (1978) to 28% in 1985 (Goati, 1989:69). In general, the survey showed that the 
Communists in the more developed regions of Yugoslavia had started shifting their emphasis from 
advocating 'social equality' to promoting 'freedom and democracy7 while those in the least 
developed areas remained committed to 'social equality'.
All surveys conducted in Yugoslavia in the mid 1980s showed that the LCY was becoming a 
heterogeneous organisation, whose members differed much more between themselves than with 
non-members in their own republic/province. This was another important indicator of 
disintegration, and it went against any trends in other countries in crisis, for example in Poland. 
While in Poland the surveys showed that the gap between members and non-members of the 
Polish United Workers Party was rapidly widening (Wiatr, 1988:13, quoted in Goati, 1989), in 
Yugoslavia the gap between the Communists of different republics was growing, at the same time 
as the differences between Communists and non-Communists in each republic were getting smaller 
(Goati, 1989:82).
Another important conclusion was that the crisis of the system was deepest in Slovenia, where the 
support for the system among the elite was highest. It came as no surprise, therefore, that both the 
percentages of the Slovenes willing to join the LCY and the actual membership of the Party had 
sharply decreased by the mid-1980s. It was only in Slovenia that less than ten percent of the adult 
population were members of the Party (9.1% in 1981, while in Yugoslavia it was 13.4%).39 As a 
consequence, the Slovenes, already under-represented in the LCY, now rapidly faced a further 
decrease of their share in the Party. As long as 'democratic centralism' and party unity were the
19 Details see in Burg (1987). The Slovenian LC had 126,437 members in 1982. The Slovenes made up 5.2% of the Party, less 
than any other constitutive nation in Yugoslavia (including the Montenegrins, four times smaller in total population). This 
share was now further decreasing.
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dominant principles of intra-party structure, this meant that the Slovenes would need to follow 
decisions over which they had less and less control. Consequently, this would create a vicious 
circle, in which the support for the party in Slovenia could simply vanish. On the other hand, the 
Serbs and Montenegrins, whose share in the LCY membership was larger than their share of the 
population, as well as the Muslims and Albanians (whose share was growing rapidly because of, 
amongst other reasons, demographic trends) felt that the share of influence in the party should 
follow success or failure in attracting the masses in each republic to join the LCY. While the state 
Constitution established equal representation of republics in the federal structure, the Party was 
not meant to be federalised, even less confederalised. Yet, the (con)federal principles of 
organisational structure guaranteed an equal number of Slovenian representatives (20) in the 
Yugoslav Central Committee and in its Presidency (three) equal to that of much larger party 
organisations. The Slovenes saw no guarantees that the principle of 'one member one vote' (still 
implemented when it came to the selection of delegates for the Party Congresses) would not make 
them a small minority in the Party. There were only two ways out of this deadlock: first, to prevent 
'minoritisation' by reforming the Party so as to abolish 'democratic centralism' and transform it into 
an 'alliance of republican Leagues of Communists'; an d /o r - as a minimal demand - to legalise 
'factions' and promote the rights of intra-party minorities. Without either of these two changes, the 
Slovene Communists could well be forced to act against their own beliefs and interests of Slovenia, 
thereby additionally losing their influence in the region. Control over the Party mechanism would, 
through democratic centralism, in fact introduce firm control over the Slovenian republic. In turn, 
this would be the final evidence to confirm what the 'Nova Reviia7 authors argued: that Slovenian 
sovereignty in Yugoslavia was only a form, while in reality somebody else took the decisions. The 
rejection of the initiatives of the Slovene Youth Organisation (ZSMS, the umbrella organisation for 
many newly established non-governmental organisations and newspapers such as 'Mladina') at the 
Federal Youth Organisation Congress in June 1986 demonstrated how high were the risks of the 
democratisation of Yugoslavia at that particular moment.40 The fear of becoming a minority both 
within the Yugoslav party and in Slovenia moved the Slovene leaders to start thinking of reforms, 
which they had so forcefully tried- to prevent before 1985. This is how the Slovenes started arguing 
for changes in the Party: but these changes had a different and opposite direction from the one 
proposed by the Serbian Communists.
4(1 The Yugoslav Youth Organisation Congress in 1986 rejected all four Slovene proposals put forward by the ZSMS: to stop 
the Stafeta Mladosti manifestations, to propose alternative forms of national service, to abolish the death penalty, and to 
abolish Article 133 of the Criminal Law (the 'verbal delict'). Of 1,402 delegates, only 72 voted for public debate on the death 
penalty, while 126 votes were cast for a debate on Article 133 (Politika, 15 June 1986).
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As the pressure for centralisation of the Party increased, the Slovenian Party became the main 
advocate of minority rights.41 The same principle of minority protection in Yugoslavia made them 
more tolerant to political 'minorities' in Slovenia. Under the pressure of the 'Alternative' (as the 
Slovene critical intellectuals preferred to call themselves), and faced with the apathy and 
indifference of the Slovene population towards the Party, the Slovenian leaders started tolerating 
moderate democratic reforms in Slovenia, while firmly protecting the achieved level of Slovene 
autonomy in Yugoslavia.42
Several reasons facilitated the rapprochement between the Party and some groups within the 
'Alternative'. Unlike their colleagues in Serbia, the Slovene leaders faced a relatively heterogeneous 
network of 'alternative' organisations, many of which operated under the umbrella of the official 
Youth Organisation. To the young Kardeljist Kucan, such a development of a broad and pluralist 
organisation was in fact a realisation of Kardelj's vision of the 'pluralism  of self-managing socialist 
interests'. And the Communists, he argued, should be at its head. In addition, the Slovene leaders 
were not exposed to permanent 'suspicion' for their attempts to 'dom inate Yugoslavia', as the 
Serbian leaders were. It also took some time until the others realised what was in fact developing in 
Slovenia under the protection of the Youth Organisation. Newspapers critical of the regime, like 
'Mladina', regardless of how popular they were in Slovenia,43 were still accessible only to (not more 
than 2 million) Slovene-speaking readers. Regardless of how strong its criticism of the system was, 
it could still have only a limited effect on the political situation in Yugoslavia. These reasons (some 
of which were purely pragmatic, while others were ideological), in fact much facilitated the new 
politics of tolerance between tire Slovene leaders and the growing forces of 'civil society'.
41 See Kufian's position on this in 1988. The writers around 'Nova Reviia', such as Dimitri] Rupel (1988), criticised Kucan's 
'minority' tactics. Rupel saw four problems with this position: 1) Slovenians were not known for tolerating minorities in 
Slovenia (Italians, Hungarians, Bosnian Muslims, etc.); 2) it would not make Slovenia popular in the less developed regions 
of Yugoslavia; 3) both the Party and Slovenia were minorities -  which would enable Serbs to say they were against them 
both; and 4) the Party formed a minority in society, especially in Slovenia. By promoting the 'rights of the minority7, Kucan 
in fact was justifying Party rule in Slovenia. Rupel repeated Tine Hribar's argument that Slovenes should not treat 
themselves as a minority, but as a sovereign nation. In fact, as Hribar said, Slovenes should never accept the status of a 
minority in Yugoslavia (1987).
42 By October 1987, as Rastko Mofinik, the Deputy Rector of Ljubljana University said, the Slovene party leadership 'made a 
move that accommodated the Party to the demands of the time'. The Party, Mocnik admitted, realised that some of the new 
initiatives, primarily those coming from 'civil society', were not unacceptable, since they did not come from a priori hostile 
groups, such as was, for example, the Catholic Church in the case of Poland. But they were still cautious and very selective 
when it came to various groups within the opposition. "The new social movements and the Youth Organisations are a much 
more convenient and open-minded partner when it comes to the Party, than the various writers' associations and the Nova 
Revija/ concluded Mocnik. Delo (17 October 1987, quoted from Nova Reviia, 1987:1716).
43 The popularity of 'Mladina' indeed grew fast between 1984 and 1988. While in 1984 it was read ('regularly', 'often', or 
'occasionally') by 19.7% of the Slovenian population, four years later 49.3% of the population in Slovenia said they read it 
'regularly' (12%), 'often' (11.6) or 'occasionally' (25.7%) (SJM, 1989:301). In comparison, the official Party weekly 'Komunist' 
was 'never read' by 79.8% of the population (SJM, 1989: 298).
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However, even if the Slovene leadership tolerated tire ZSMS's initiatives, it did not approve many 
of them. On many occasions, Kucan publicly condemned the 'extremism' of 'Mladina', while less 
popular and more critical student publications were even banned. The Slovene public prosecutor 
did not hesitate to raise charges against leading 'Mladina' columnists.44 But, nothing like the trial of 
the Belgrade Six or the Seselj trial in Sarajevo ever took place in Slovenia 45 On the contrary, Matjaz 
Kmecl, a member of the Slovene Party Presidency, openly declared that the imprisonment of 
political opponents in other parts of Yugoslavia, such as the Croatian nationalist Vladimir Seks and 
others, was something that belonged to the 'Middle-Ages', and thus 'was not acceptable in a state 
that is based on self-management and democracy' (Nova Revija, 1986:1530).
Furthermore, the Slovene leaders defended the right of the alternative organisations and 
newspapers such as 'Mladina' to broaden the scope of the public agenda by addressing issues that 
were previously restricted to the political elite only. They defended the Slovene Youth Organisation 
against attacks from 'Belgrade' and other republics. 'It does not make any sense to say that these 
initiatives [of the Slovene Youth Organisation] are almost an anti-state activity, and that one should 
not discuss them. Why would we not discuss them?', asked rhetorically the Slovenian member of 
the LCY Presidency, Franc Setinc.
'Of course, it does not mean that we should immediately agree with them, or accept them. 
But we should have a chance first to see what it is all about, to analyse the good and bad 
sides, to hear the pros and cons, before we take a decision. When I read various Yugoslav 
newspapers, I wonder what makes people more disturbed -  the actual initiative of the 
Youth Organisation, or the articles in which it is argued that their initiatives are an attack 
against the system, against the Army, that they aim to weaken our defence and to help the 
enemies of this country, that the peace movement arises from the ashes of the Army, etc. I 
believe that it is exactly these malignant interpretations of their initiatives which should 
upset us more.1 (Setinc, Borba 5 July 1987).
Needless to say the statements to this effect, made by leading Slovenian politicians, led the Slovene 
leadership into open confrontation with the Army and other republics in Yugoslavia. Subsequently, 
the Slovene leadership in the mid-1980s slowly but surely slipped into an isolation similar to that in 
which the Serbian leadership found itself, and for similar reasons. The Army and the remaining 
Titoists accused them of tolerating political opposition and ignoring (if not even supporting) 
Slovenian nationalism. Still, the fact that an official organisation of the system -  such as the Slovene 
Youth Organisation -  provided an 'umbrella' for and became in fact an organiser of the
44 Such as Tomai Mastnak, for an article published in Mladina in which he opposed the election of Branko Mikulic, the new 
Yugoslav Prime Minister, in 1986, on the grounds of his ideological rigidity. However, no serious consequences occurred 
and Mastnak continued to publish in the Slovenian media.
45 The Slovene Interior Minister Tomai Ertl pointed out this fact in his 15 July 1986 letter to the Slovene 'Alternative' (Nova 
Reviia. 1986:1529).
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'alternative', made an open attack on the Slovenes less viable than the one on the Serbian 
opposition. The Army was aware that this would only add fuel to the already existing flames. Janez 
Jansa would finally be able to demonstrate what he had already argued - that the Army was the 
real 'sovereign of Yugoslavia'. A direct confrontation with not only the Youth Organisation, but 
potentially with the Slovenian Party leadership as well, would have only increased the opposition 
to the regime in Slovenia.
Kucan understood this position and put himself in between the demands for more liberalisation 
(expressed by the Slovene 'Alternative', but also within the ZSMS and LC Slovenia) and the Army 
demands for an effective political action. His programme of 'socialism on a hum an scale' 
(promoted at the LC Slovenia Conference in 1988) was still arguing against 'foreign ideologies' and 
was in favour of self-managing socialism. But it was by now much more moderately socialist in 
form and moderately democratic in context. His position of a necessary mediator and protector 
enabled Kucan to remain in full control. But, as his close colleague Sonja Lokar said, when 
interviewed in 1988, it was 'back home' that the Slovene Communists 'w ould fall if [they] had to 
fall, rather than in Belgrade'.46
The federal leadership and the Army (openly attacked ever since 1986) expected KuCan to 'p u t an 
end' to the 'anti-socialist' actions of the Slovene Youth. Similarly, as in the case of the 'Belgrade Six', 
when the republican leadership declined to stop the 'opposition activities', the federal institutions 
(this time the Army itself) took direct action.
7.5. The 'Slovene Spring' in 1988: Army vs. Slovenia
The decisive move was taken by the Army, which on 31 May 1988 arrested the leading critic of 
militarism, Janez Jansa, and in the next few days a columnist and the editor of M ladina: David 
Tasic and Franci Zavrl, and a YPA junior officer Rajko Borstner, charging them with illegal 
possession of classified Army documents. Prior to the arrests, Tasic and Jansa had published 
commentaries on a heated discussion at the session of the LCY Federal Presidency on 29 March 
1988. The debate followed a session of the Military Council four days earlier, at which the Army 
leadership had declared recent events in Slovenia to be 'counter-revolution' and 'psychological 
warfare' and ordered the Commander of the Ljubljana Military District, Gen. Svetozar Visnjic, to 
approach the Slovene leadership and seek their help in crushing the 'counter-revolution' (Grakalic,
46 I interviewed Sonja Lokar, the executive secretary of the CC LC Slovenia in September 1988 for the Croatian Youth 
magazine Polet.
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1988:24). The General met Slovenian leaders a few days later, claiming that he had been ordered to 
discuss issues of security in the event of Army intervention. At a closed session of the Party 
Presidency, Milan Kucan sought an investigation into the whole affair, claiming that the Military 
Council was not authorised to 'organise a coup d 'etat' in Slovenia.
'H e [the General] asked [the Slovenian Minister of Home Affairs] whether or not we were 
able to keep under control the situation which would follow the arrests, because it was 
expected that people would protest on the streets and they would be defending 
themselves, the barracks and military personnel, but were also ready to help us. Our 
Comrades, the Minister and his Deputy told him they could not debate these issues 
without us [political leaders]. Then they found us, and we spoke to them -  myself and 
Stane [Dolanc]. Of course, we refused to discuss these issues, since we said we knew 
nothing about the whole thing,' Ku£an said at the session of the CC LCY Presidency 
(Grakalic, 1988:27).
Kucan also asked whether it was true that neither the President of the Party Presidency (Bosko 
Krunic, Vojvodina), nor the President of the State Presidency (Lazar Mojsov, Macedonia) knew 
anything about the conclusion of the Military Council. The minute from the meeting, which was 
classified as a 'state secret', was leaked,47 and Mladina wrote a comment on the whole affair. An 
Army officer, Borstner (himself also a Slovene), passed on copies of the Army plans related to 
possible unrest following the action. This is when the Army prosecutor raised charges against the 
author and the editors of Mladina, as well as against the military person that forwarded the 
classified document to them. But the real attack was directed at Ku5an himself, since the Army 
(especially after the first 'Jansa' affair in 1982) suspected the Slovenian leaders of being unreliable 
when it came to state secrets.
The arrest of the main critic of 'militarism1 (Jansa) and the editor of Mladina (Zavrl) provoked a 
wave of public demonstrations in front of Army barracks throughout Slovenia. The arrest of 
civilians by the Army intelligence services; the trial of Slovenes in Slovenia by a Serbo-Croat­
speaking military court for possessing documents linked to alleged Army intervention in Slovenia: 
this all proved that the danger of 'unitarism ' was rea l48 Unexpectedly, even for the 'Nova Revija'
47 In his book 'Premiki' Jansa claims that one of his friends, Igor Bavdar, simply took the minute from the desk of the then 
President of the Slovene Socialist Alliance, Joze Smole, while visiting him on official business. Smole, who was 'a bit drunk' 
did not even notice it. The Army was, however, convinced that one of the three Slovene members of the LCY Presidency 
(perhaps even Ku£an) gave the minute to 'Mladina'. One of the aims of the court case was to prove they were right when 
saying that the Slovene 'counter-revolution' was in fact organised by the Party leadership of Slovenia (Jansa, 1993).
48 The essence of the problem was summarised in the diaries of one of the 'Nova Revija' editors, Dimitrij Rupel. '1. The 
military court tries civilians; 2. This military court is in Ljubljana; 3. Neither the Presidency, nor the Parliament of Slovenia 
have any authority over this court; 4. That means that somebody else is sovereign in Slovenia, not only when military 
persons, but also civilians are concerned; 5. The Slovenian leadership invited people to be patient, instead of organising 
resistance; 6. This is all happening simultaneously with Constitutional changes, which mean more centralisation; and 7. The 
main documents for which Jansa and others were imprisoned remain secret. This is not only a conflict between civil society 
and the military, but also an 'anti-Slovenian intervention' by those who do not even speak Slovene' (1988).
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authors, the arrest was now a practical confirmation that Slovenia's sovereignty (in the 1974 
Constitution) was no more than just a 'dead letter'. The military coup d'etat was not about 
marching on the streets, but about military logic having the upper hand over the political, said 
Spomenka Hribar (1988:1329). The Slovene leadership was now invited to react fast; in order to 
protect Slovenia's sovereignty, or to admit that there was no sovereignty left to her. But, at the same 
time as it was criticised, the Slovene leadership recorded enormous support for any evidence of its 
opposition to federal centralism. The Slovenian public identified with its leadership, which was not 
only clearly un-involved in the whole affair, but also strongly opposed federal institutions.49 To a 
similar degree to Milosevic, Kucan now styled himself as 'opposition' and 'government' at the same 
time.
But, unlike its Serbian counterparts, the Slovene leadership was now defending Slovenia from 
intervention from outside. This was in sharp contrast to the Serbian rhetoric of changing 
Yugoslavia by introducing the model of 'anti-bureaucratic revolution'.50 By 'defending' Slovenia 
and opening up to the opposition, Kucan reversed the negative trends for the Party in public 
opinion and, by the end of 1988, secured a similar level of support to what Milosevic had in Serbia. 
According to a survey conducted by Ljubljana University, the support of the Slovene population 
for Kucan increased in the six months between April and October 1988 from 26.9% to 65.5%. While 
in 1987 he ranked the third most popular Slovenian politician (behind the President of the Slovene 
Socialist Alliance, Joze Smole, and the member of the SFRY Presidency, Stane Dolanc) with only 
11% of the 'votes', within 12 months he had multiplied his score almost six times. On the other 
hand, Dolanc, a representative of the old politics, strongly criticised by 'Mladina', was now the first 
choice for only 5.1% of the population (SJM 1988/1989:334). Kucan's main supporters, such as Joze 
Smole, the President of the Socialist Alliance, and Janez Stanovnik, the President of the Slovenian 
Presidency, also increased their support rates to 53.4% and 58.3% respectively. Before the arrest of 
Jansa 26.4%, while after 57.8% of Slovenes believed that 'the present policy of the Slovenian 
leadership represents people's interests better than was the case before'. At the same time, the 
number of those who considered the Slovene leadership less concerned with the interests of the
49 On several occasions later, JanSa accused Kucan of being in compliance with the Army (Meier, 1999). KuSan, in fact, 
applied the same strategy as Stambolic and Milosevic in Serbia: he supported public protests, but also aimed at isolating the 
'opposition'. Just like Milosevic, he believed he could direct public protests towards his 'socialism on human scale' (the 
Slovenian movement against 'bureaucracy').
50 The defensive character of Slovene nationalism was somehow as natural as was the expansive character of Serbian 
nationalism. This was the difference between the nationalism of a 'big' and that of a 'small' nation, in Yugoslav 
circumstances. 'While the Serb nationalists thought of everyone in Yugoslavia as Serbs, the Slovene nationalists argued that 
no one else was 'qualified' to be a Slovene or even similar to Slovenes', as Stipe Suvar, the Yugoslav Party President, now  
caught between the two open fires of Belgrade and Ljubljana, half-jokingly explained the difference. KuCan, who recognised 
in the Army action (which paralleled the 'anti-bureaucratic revolution' and the Kosovo protests of the Serbs and 
Montenegrins) an open 'great-statist tendency', had very little choice left but to tolerate and try to control the new coalition 
of the various branches of Slovenia's public, including ethnic nationalists.
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people halved (from 24.2% in April 1988 to 12.6% in May 1989) (SJM 1988/1989:336). It was clear 
that the leadership found strong support among Slovenes.
Slovenian public opinion almost unanimously opposed the trial of Jansa and the others: 68.9% said 
it was 'a  political show-trial'; 63.3% believed it was unlawful, while 86.2% assessed the whole affair 
as 'lim itation of the sovereignty of the Slovene people' (SJM 1988/1989:331-2). Anger was directed 
against the federal state, the Army and especially against the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic. In 
1988, Milosevic was singled out as the Yugoslav politician whose politics was most unacceptable to 
60.7% of the Slovene respondents. No other politician reached even a tenth of his unpopularity 
(SJM, 1988/1989:372).
Slovene public opinion sent, however, an ambiguous message to Slovenian leaders. On the one 
hand, they were popular as never before. Were they to be forcibly replaced under the accusation of 
'nationalism ', 18.2% of Slovenes would 'oppose this regardless of the consequences', and a further 
57.5% would be 'outraged, and would oppose this as much as [they] could'. At the same time, and 
very much unlike in Serbia, more people than ever before argued that the 'LCY has fulfilled its role 
and needs to exist no longer'. While in 1986 only 18% of Slovenes favoured this conclusion, in April 
1988 it was 40.5% and in May 1989 53.3% of the population who shared this view. For the first time 
ever, in April 1988 the majority of Slovenes agreed that 'the LCY should remain as just one of many 
political parties, and it should be a matter of personal choice which party should be voted into 
office.' In fact, by May 1989 only 6.9% of Slovenes opposed this idea, while 75.1% supported it 
(SJM, 1988/1989:265). While the leaders themselves were popular, the Party was losing its appeal.51
Three elements that had characterised the Serbian situation in 1987-1989 now appeared in Slovenia. 
First, a homogenisation of the Slovenes took place to a similar extent to w hat had occurred in 
Serbia. Secondly, Kucan, the Party leader, was as popular as Milosevic was in Serbia. Thirdly, a 
mixture of fear and hope entered people's hearts, and moved them to act together, 'as one'.52 These 
fears were not produced by some foreign power, as was often the case in previous years. In April 
1988, only 1.5% of Slovenes believed Yugoslavia was endangered from the West, and 5.9% saw 
danger in the East, while an additional 25.8% said the potential danger came 'from  them both'. If 
one takes all those who saw any danger from any of these sides together, it was still the case that
51 This trend continued in the following year. In April 1990, Milan Kucan easily won the first free elections for the office of 
President of the Slovenian Presidency, while his party (renamed to the League of Communists - Party for Democratic 
Reforms) failed to secure a majority of seats in the Slovenian Parliament.
52 The trial of JanSa dramatically increased fears among Slovenes. While in April 1988 (before the trial), 25.4% of Slovenes 
said they felt 'fear and hope at the same time for the future of the country and/or themselves' and 26.1% felt 'fear and worry 
only', these figures rose to 33.9% and 36.2% respectively by October 1988 (after the arrest). 'Fear' was, therefore, the word 
which 70.1 % of Slovenes used to describe their feelings on the eve of 1989 (SJM 1988/1989:132).
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two thirds (66.2%) of Slovenes saw no danger at all from anywhere outside.53 The source of fear 
was inside the country, but outside Slovenia - in Belgrade.
In order to protect the achieved level of freedom and autonomy of Slovenia, an ad hoc Committee 
for the Protection of Janez JanSa was created in May 1988, and in June it was renamed the 
Committee for the Protection of Human Rights. The Committee provided a forum for various 
branches of the Slovene opposition, representing a new institution of 'civil society'. It was also 
recognised by the Socialist Alliance, and thus provided a link between the Alternative and the 
government. The Slovenian media -  openly siding with those arrested -  whipped up 'anti-Army 
sentiments' throughout Slovenia. Public protests were held every day in front of the Military Court 
in Ljubljana. Rallies of support for them were an open provocation to the Army and a sign of 
defiance by Slovenia's population.
Finally, the Slovene leadership, although not openly supporting the protests, carefully called for 
'co-habitation' between the opposition and the Party (Rupel, 1988:1309). Sharing the same 
discontent with the Army intervention in 'internal Slovenian affairs', the Party played the role of 
mediator between 'the radical right' and the federal leadership.54 It criticised 'provocations that are 
directed against socialist democracy', and which had an 'anti-Yugoslav and anti-socialist character'. 
But it praised as civilised actions by the Committee and the Youth Organisation.55 Kucan's politics, 
said Spomenka Hribar, was a politics of equilibrium: in his actions at the federal level he was 
'defending the national interests of the Slovenes'; while in Slovenia he was a guarantor that 'anti­
socialist forces' would be ultimately prevented from taking over (1988a:1332).56 The politics of 
'equilibrium' situated Kucan at the centre of Slovenian politics. It was around him, with him at its 
core, that a new Slovenian pluralism was rapidly emerging.
51 As public opinion surveys repeatedly showed in the 1969-1989 period, Slovenes never really believed Yugoslavia was 
seriously endangered, especially not by the West. The share of those who sensed danger from the West was highest in 1976 
(after the delicate negotiations with Italy over Trieste) - 6.4%, while in all other 12 surveys conducted in these 20 years it was
lower than five percent. The Slovenes (like other Yugoslavs) always feared the Soviet Union more, but with the 
understandable exception of 1969 (25.9% in year after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) it was less than 13% of the Slovenian
population that sensed exclusive danger from the USSR. In these two decades, between a quarter and a third of the 
Slovenian population believed Yugoslavia was endangered by 'both sides', while between 34 and 55 percent clearly said 
they did not see any danger at all (SJM, 1988/1989:238).
54 MatjaZ Kmecl, a member of the Slovene Party Presidency, told Dimitrij Rupel in June 1988 that there were three factions in 
Slovenian politics: 1) the radicals around Mladina and tire Committee, and -  of course -  Nova Revija; 2) the moderate Party 
leadership led by Kudan; and 3) 'tire monolithists' among Slovenes in the Army (General Tominc, Admiral Brovet, etc.). 
Kudan was the natural choice for those who wanted a compromise (Rupel, 1988:1298).
55 Milan Kudan's speech at the 20th session of the Slovenian Central Committee, quoted from Delo, 23 April 1988.
56 Janez Stanovnik, the President of the Presidency of Slovenia, used this argument when seeking release for the four at the 
session of the Federal Presidency on 31 May 1989. 'If you do not listen to us now, the next time you will find yourself 
speaking to separatists here,' he told members of the Presidency (Dmovsek, Nin, February 1999).
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The Army sentenced the three civilians relatively mildly: one and a half years in prison for Jansa 
and Zavrl and five months for Tasic, while the military officer Borstner was sentenced to four years. 
But when they came under the authority of the Slovene prisons, the political elite used all available 
legal means to release them, without violating the existing legal procedure. Although it in fact 
demonstrated that the Army was not a 'paper tiger1, the whole affair ended as the first political 
defeat for the Yugoslav Army in one of the Yugoslav republics. The real war -  in which the 
emerging Army of Janez Jansa -  who in 1990 became the Slovene minister of defence -  fought the 
Yugoslav Army until it decided to withdraw from Slovenia three years later (July-August 1991) 
was only the last battle in the war between Slovenia and the Army, which started with the 'Jansa 
Affair'.
7.6. The Consequences of the 'Slovene Spring' for the LCY
This turn-about of the Slovenian and Serbian Party organisations with regard to their local 
electorate produced the real pre-conditions for the disintegration of the LCY. The Kardelj concept 
was no longer a framework in which the new politics operated. No longer did the Party leaders 
discuss the meaning of the same concept: there were at least two rival concepts and one non­
concept (that of the Suvarites) that now competed for support. Both in terms of their content and 
from the methodological point of view, this was a new situation - very unlike anything that 
belonged to the ideological politics conducted by the LCY in previous years. The unity of the elite 
was now created at the republican, not the federal level. But the elite also invited others within 
their republics to join them. All-Slovene and all-Serbian programmes had already been formulated 
in 'Nova Reviia' and the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts. By 1989, the two republics were 
highly homogenised and Kucan and Milosevic were their clear leaders.
The two republics now argued against each other, claiming that the other was deviating from the 
socialist path by concluding pacts with the nationalist opposition. The Slovenes argued against the 
'homogenisation' of Serbia, but Milosevic replied that he saw nothing wrong in this 
'homogenisation', since it had been created on socialist grounds. On the other had, it was, he 
argued, anti-socialism and anti-Yugoslavism which motivated the 'homogenisation' in Slovenia. 
The year and a half between the summer 1988 and January 1990 were characterised by endless 
disputes between Serbian and Slovene leaders about the character of politics in these two republics. 
Lacking a normal parliamentary space, the two politics clashed at the sessions of the Central 
Committee of the LCY, which were broadcast live to the Yugoslav public. The shocking experience
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of Party leaders openly fighting each other, however, only further contributed to the sense of 
anarchy and fear, already deeply engendered by the Serbian protests, Army arrests in Slovenia and 
Slovenian unilateral actions in changing the Constitution. In addition, the various segments of the 
Yugoslav population interpreted very differently what they saw at the sessions of the Central 
Committee. The Serbian leaders used them as an example of disunity and bureaucratism, of 
clandestine support for the Albanian 'counter-revolution', and of a forum for 'a  non-principled 
coalition' to outvote their republic. The Slovenes saw them as evidence that no united Yugoslav 
Party was possible any longer, and that efforts should be made to transform the LCY into a 'League 
of the Leagues', a loose coalition of republican party organisations. The principle of democratic 
centralism should be abandoned, while minorities within the Party ought to be fully protected. To 
this the Serbs replied negatively, arguing that 'no factions within the LCY should be allowed.'
However, there was a third group within the Central Committee, that led by Croat Stipe Suvar, and 
supported by the Army, the Bosnian leadership, and on some occasions by Albanian members from 
Kosovo, a large section of the Croatian members and about a half the Macedonians. This group of 
'Kardeljists' attempted to eliminate both 'extremes' -  Slovenes and Serbs equally -  and to oppose 
changes either in a confederalist or in a centralist direction. But this group of members, although 
not insignificant in number, was not supported by public demonstrations, nor did it have its own 
media. It was also not internally as homogeneous as the Serbs and Slovenes. The third group (the 
'Suvarites', Suvarovci) was strong enough to prevent either of the two combating groups from 
'hijacking' the federal Central Committee. But, it was too weak to do much more. In fact, its action 
caused a perm anent stalemate in the Party leadership at the moment when everyone wanted a 
quick and radical resolution of the conflict. The stalemate in the Party leadership, however, turned 
out well for both the Slovenes and the Serbs. Neither of these two groups had to fear intervention 
from the federal Central Committee, and both could blame it for the growing crisis in the country. 
Without a clear programme of their own, and without much popular support (at least visible), the 
Suvarites were seen more as a problem than as a solution. However, the stalemate in the Yugoslav 
Central Committee, the potential vehicle of Milosevic's control over the federal institutions and 
other republics, was acceptable to the Serbian leaders only for as long as they did not secure a clear 
majority within it. But, in the long term, just as he demonstrated in Serbia, Milosevic needed the 
Party to 'unite the country'.
7.7. The Final Battle: Changing the Rules of the Game
In spring 1989 the Vojvodina Party organisation held its Extraordinary Conference, consolidating 
the power of the new leadership of the Province. In what was a precedent in Party history, the
311
Conference demanded a vote of confidence in Yugoslav Central Committee President Stipe Suvar 
and initiated an Extraordinary LCY Congress. While Suvar survived the (secret) vote of confidence 
at the Central Committee, it had no other possibility but to accept the proposal for an Extraordinary 
Congress. According to a highly confederalised Party Statute, a Congress had to be convened even 
if only one of the member-organisations (any republic or province) demanded it. The tool invented 
to prevent the domination of any group within the Party (and especially, the 'greater-statist 
tendencies' linked to Serbia) was now used to change the rules and to oust 'the bureaucrats' and 
'separatists'.
Vojvodina's move was the crucial step in Milosevic's attempt to take over the federal Party and -  
subsequently -  the state. Unlike the Central Committee (which had the equal number of members 
from each republican party organisation), participants in the Congress were elected proportionally 
to the num ber of members in each republic. The Serbian Party organisation with more than 850,000 
Party members57 could, therefore, safely count on almost 40 percent of the votes at the Congress. 
Together with Montenegro's representatives (who accounted for seven percent of the membership) 
and with a little help from some Bosnian, Croatian, or Macedonian delegates, many of whom were 
Serbs, Serbia counted on an easy victory. A majority at the Congress would change the Statute of 
the Party, effectively eliminating any trace of the confederalised structure. The new majority would 
then be able to impose its decisions on all members, using the principle of 'democratic centralism'. 
It would also be able to control a fifth vote (in addition to its own, two of its provinces and the 
Montenegrin one) in the Yugoslav Federal Presidency, whose ninth (ex officio) member was the 
President of the Party Presidency. In fact, the majority of the Congress would then control all 
Yugoslav institutions, including the Army. The whole action was to be legitimised by a simple 
democratic argument.58
But such an argum ent would clearly make the Slovenian party a tiny minority in the LCY, taking 
away from it any possibility to veto decisions. The only way out was to propose further 
confederalisation of the Party. The Slovene Communists, therefore, proposed an entirely different 
concept of Party reform, - an 'Alliance of Republican Leagues of Communists'. According to 
Slovenia's proposal, the LCY would follow the state in its decentralisation, accepting the autonomy 
of the republican Leagues of Communists, which would be only loosely linked together under the
57 On 31 December 1988, the LC Serbia, inclusive of its two provinces, had 855,400 members (Milenko Petrovic, 26 April 
1989; IB 5/1989:7).
58 The Serbian Party ideologue Ratomir Vico said on 12 April 1989: 'Taking decisions by majority vote in an organisation of 
similar-minded people, in which a balance between the whole and its parts is achieved, in which the autonomy of these 
parts does not endanger but strengthens the whole... this is not a domination of the strongest, but a normal procedure in 
democratic organisations' (IB 4/1989:6).
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umbrella of the LCY. If this project could not secure support from the others, the Slovene 
Communists were ready to leave the organisation.
Throughout 1989 the conflict between the two programmes of reform in Yugoslavia -  Slovenian 
and Serbian -  developed both within the constitutional debate59 and within the Party. It was in this 
context that, on 21 February 1989,1,350 Albanian miners in Kosovo locked themselves in the largest 
mine in Kosovo - at Stari Trg, demanding from Serbia the abandonment of the constitutional 
changes they perceived as hostile to the autonomy of the Province. They also demanded the 
resignations of three pro- Milosevic Albanian leaders: the newly elected President of the Kosovo 
Party Rahman Morina, the President of Pristina Committee Husamedin Azemi and the Kosovo 
political Veteran Kole Shiroka. Six days later (27 February 1989) while the miners were still in the 
mine, the Federal Presidency declared 'emergency measures in Kosovo'. When Serbian leaders 
appeared persistent in their refusal even to talk to the miners, the Slovene Alternative organised 
public protests in Ljubljana's 'Cankarjev Doin' Hall of Culture on 28 February 1989. The entire 
political leadership of Slovenia, including Milan Kudan, joined the Slovenian opposition on this 
occasion, which gathered around 2,000 figures from Slovenian public life. Some speakers, including 
the ZSMS President Joze Skoljc, compared the sufferings of the Albanian miners with the 
Holocaust, indirectly accusing the Serbian regime of Nazism.60 The Youth Organisation introduced 
a badge with the Jewish national symbol (six-pointed star) and the text: 'Kosovo - My Homeland'.
'Today, the Albanians are excluded from society as 'lazy', 'violent', and 'murderers'. Yet, 
tomorrow this could happen to us, the Slovenes, to Croats and Montenegrins, to everyone,' 
said Skoljc (Tanjug, 28 February 1989, in: Belie and Bilbija, 1989:24).
Milan Kucan himself pointed out that the miners in Kosovo should not be treated as 'Albanians' or 
'Serbs' but as workers, 'people forced to organise Gandhi-like resistance protests to oppose 
injustice'.
'Yugoslavia, [which guarantees] the equal status of every republic and nation, including 
Slovenia, is what is now being defended in Stari Trg. This is why we all feel that the 
tragedy of the miners would be our defeat as well. This would be a very clear 
announcement that the minority nations and nationalities will first be pushed to the 
margins, and then out of the country, abroad or who knows where... We, Slovenes are not 
accidental travellers in AVNOJ Yugoslavia... [and would therefore not allow] ... a silent 
turn-about that would certainly change the very nature and essence of AVNOJ 
Yugoslavia... Slovenian communists and the LC Slovenia do not want to take part in the
59 Slovenia amended its Constitution on several occasions between 1987 and 1989, always extending the scope of rights she 
was taking out of federal responsibility. Serbia changed its Constitution in March 1989, despite the continuing protests of 
Kosovo Albanians.
60 Nin, 12 March 1989.
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creation of such a [new] Yugoslavia... In order to preserve the SFR Yugoslavia we should 
develop democracy and self-management. Because, if we lose the federative character of 
Yugoslavia, together with socialism, then we shall lose our history, from which we have 
learnt that the freedom of every nation is a condition for the freedom of us all' (Belie and 
Bilbija, 1989:30).
Other speakers in the Cankarjev Dom pointed out that 'the politics of greater-Serbian Yugoslavism 
has brought the country to the edge of civil war' (Franko Juri). Some (like Igor Bavcar) also linked 
Serbian attempts to change the Constitution with the events in Kosovo.
The meeting in the Cankarjev Dom outraged not only the Serbian leaders, but also the broad 
masses of the Serbian population. When a report on the event was shown on Belgrade Television 
later that day, the students of Belgrade University organised the largest ever rally in Belgrade since 
the liberation of the city in 1944, demanding that the Slovene leaders be treated as 'counter­
revolutionaries' and 'traitors to the homeland'.61 The crowd of more than 700,000 people did not 
respond to Yugoslav State President Raif Dizdarevic's promises. It was only when Slobodan 
Milosevic addressed them after more than 24 hours of protests that they agreed to leave for home. 
On this occasion, 28 February 1989, Milosevic promised the arrest of Azem Vllasi 'and  others who 
have m anipulated with people's lives', and declared that Yugoslavia would never disintegrate, 
because 'the people would not let it disintegrate/62 The crowd responded, shouting for the first 
time: 'Slobo, the Serb, Serbia is with you!'.
As a consequence of Slovenia's solidarity with 'counter-revolutionaries', the Belgrade media 
launched an unprecedented anti-Slovenian campaign. The Serbian Writers' Association 
immediately cut off any formal relations with their Slovene counterparts for their participation in 
the meeting at the Cankarjev Dom. One of the leading Serbian writers, Matija Beckovic, said:
'For years and years our hand was offered to the Slovenes -  only to remain in the air, 
untaken. We tolerated indifference, suppressed our pride, accepted that it was all only 
misinformation. Our best efforts produced only the worst results. We are looked down 
upon from their heights and shown a permanent disdain for our truths. It is not noticed 
how much we desire to have [the Slovenes as] friends. Instead, they do not care if they 
w ound us; they spread Serbophobia and make jokes about Serbian saints and sufferings. 
Six hundred years after the Battle we must declare: Kosovo is Serbia, and this fact does not 
depend on the Albanian birth rate or on the Serbian mortality rate. There is so much 
Serbian blood in Kosovo, that even if no Serb remains there, Kosovo will still be Serbian
61 Among slogans at the Belgrade rally were: 'Slovenia is lying'; 'Slovenia is a traitor'; 'We don't want divisions'; 'Serbia is 
Kosovo'; 'Serbia is rising'; 'We will give up our lives, but not Kosovo'; 'Down with nationalists of all colours'; 'Yugoslav 
peoples are brotherly people'; 'Slobo -  the Serb -  Serbia is with you'; 'Down with the traitors to Yugoslavia'; 'Arrest [Azem] 
Vllasi'!', etc.
62 Nin, 5 March 1989.
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land. Serbia, the republic that does not exist, can have no aims more important than that it 
becomes a republic/63
In a formal letter to the Slovenian Writers' Association, their Serbian counterparts accused them of 
'betraying the traditional and historic friendship between our two peoples'. At the same time, in 
protest at the break-down of the relationship with the Slovenes, the Albanian members left the 
Serbian Writers' Association. 'Serbian writers are not interested in democracy, but in the repression 
of the Albanian people, against all hum an norms and values,' they claimed. The Serbian Academy 
of Science and Arts condemned the Cankarjev Dom meeting: 'In  its entire history, nobody has ever 
insulted the Serbian people so much,' they concluded. Slovenian support for the Albanians in 
Kosovo is an 'unlikely alliance between representatives of a civilised, Central-European society and 
representatives of oriental violence', they said. At an emergency session of its association on 4 
March 1989, the Serbian writers concluded that 'anti-Serbism is spreading widely in Kosovo, 
Slovenia and Croatia,' and that 'the Cankarjev Dom meeting is an expression of Slovene Serbo- 
phobia that has lasted the whole decade.' One of the speakers, Vuk Draskovic, went even further, 
proposing the solution for 'anti-Serbism' in changing the borders of Serbia:
'If the division of Yugoslavia occurs, where should be the Western borders of Serbia? Those 
borders were decided by Ante Pavelic; they are where the Serbian graves are. It is up to the 
Serbian national programme to mark them... Croats should be aware that, if Yugoslavia 
collapses, its borders will not remain as they were determined at AVNOJ or Brioni, and 
that -  in such a case -  Jasenovac, Jadovno64 and all other graves of us Serbs, would get a 
right to vote. Also, all the Serbs once evicted or forced out of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, 
Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Kordun, Lika and Banija65 after the War will be asked to vote as 
well' (Borba, 5 March 1989).
The Slovene Writers responded with a no less strong condemnation of the Serbs:
'The Serbian political leadership has ignited Greater-Serbian nationalism, and has by now 
occupied half of Yugoslavia by brutal pressure, defamation, blackmailing and using coup 
d 'etat methods. The federal leadership has agreed on the Serbian rules of the game. Anti- 
Albanianism has become the official policy... We find themselves in a most absurd situation 
in which the Albanians are declared 'counter-revolutionaries' only because they want to 
preserve the 1974 Constitution, especially those provisions of this Constitution that protect 
civic and ethnic liberties. Those who demand the overthrow of the Constitution and of all 
the legal institutions of the system have imposed their logic even on the Presidency of the 
State. It is a basic ethical duty to protect the Albanian people from the pogrom that is 
knocking on their doors!' (Nin, 5 March 1989).
M Beckovic, Nin. 12 March 1989.
64 Jasenovac and Jadovno are places of concentration camps in WWII Croatia, in which Serbs were the main victims.
65 By dividing Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina for this purpose into their historical regions, Draskovic in fact implied he 
would not respect the very existence of these two republics as political entities, at least not in their post-1945 borders.
315
Finally, some Serbian writers (like the pre-war surrealist and Partisan legend Oskar Davico) asked 
the Serbian population to boycott all products that came from Slovenia. The media accepted this 
demand and soon the boycott took on significant dimensions.66 The Serbian government declared a 
ban on 'importing' Slovenian goods into Serbia. An act that was clearly unlawful met with the 
approval of the Serbian population.
In March 1989 'a  state of emergency' was officially declared in Kosovo, and the units of the Federal 
special police prevented further demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians. The Serbian Assembly was 
given rights of directing control over courts, police and the selection of government officials in 
Kosovo. Kosovo was stripped of its veto over Serbian constitutional amendments. Azem Vllasi, the 
Communist leader of Kosovo was expelled from the Central Committee of the LCY (by a majority 
of three votes more than required), arrested and put on trial for organising 'counter-revolutionary' 
demonstrators -  the Kosovo miners.67
On 30 March 1989 the Slovenian Parliament sent an open letter to other republican parliaments, 
proposing a dialogue to resolve the political crisis. The existing model of socialism was in deep 
crisis and it should be reformed towards 'democratic political pluralism', not towards 'forced 
unity'. The Slovenian Assembly rejected accusations of 'Slovenian counter-revolution' and its 
support for 'Kosovo irredentism'.
'We do not oppose reforms in Serbia which are in accordance with the amendments to the 
Yugoslav Constitution, and the will of the Serbian people and all other nations and 
nationalities living in Serbia and its provinces. In Slovenia, there is no organised action to 
undermine the Constitutive role of the YPA or the federative structure of Yugoslavia,' 
explained the Slovenian Assembly (Belie and Bilbija, 1989:151-5).
But it also added that 'there is nothing to add to or amend what was said in the Cankarjev Dom.'
Following this initiative by the Slovene Parliament, the Presidency of Slovenia on two occasions 
between March and May 1989 invited the Serbian Presidency to discuss problems. But all the 
Slovenian initiatives met with rejection from Belgrade. Serbian politicians first claimed that any 
political dialogue concerning the future of Yugoslavia should be conducted within existing federal
66 Immediately after Cankarjev Dom, sales of 'Gorenje1, the Slovenian firm producing household equipment decreased by 
28%, tire textile industry 'Mura' lost 20% of its Serbian market, etc.
67 One should here, however, notice that it was all done with the consent of the federal institutions, and - indeed - with the 
agreement of the Kosovo representatives in them, including of the Kosovo Assembly itself. This fact, which is emphasised 
by Meier (1999), was much used by Milosevic in his later explanations of the situation in Kosovo.
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institutions. They additionally accused Slovenia of issuing ultimatums to others in Yugoslavia, and 
of being intolerant when it came to the position of others, mainly of Serbia. In his speech in Novi 
Sad on 22 May 1989, Milosevic said the time for empty talks was over and a decision on the future 
of Yugoslavia should be taken. This decision, he said, m ust be 'in  favour of Yugoslavia, in favour of 
a new socialism, of a wealthier and more democratic society that will belong to Europe'. He said, 
however, that Serbia 'does not want to enter Europe as a servant, wanting to please Europe by 
mocking its own country, attacking its own institutions, including the Army and insulting other, 
allegedly non-civilised nations'. Slovenian politics, Milosevic said, was anti-democratic:
'There is so much talk [in Slovenia] about hum an rights. Yet, they support separatists in 
Kosovo, who use terror against the Serbs and Montenegrins and violate their hum an rights. 
There is so much talk [in Slovenia] about pluralism -  but they are aggressive and intolerant 
towards those who think differently, for example -  towards us in Serbia. Everyone who 
opposes them is exposed to threats and pressure... There is no civilised country in the 
world, where such behaviour would be treated as democratic. Their vengeful behaviour is 
especially incompatible with the culture of contemporary Europe, which they would like to 
join. In fact, those fascist-like expressions of irrational hatred tell us only how deep the 
crisis is and how dangerous it would be if it deepened further...' (Milosevic, 22 May 1989 in 
Belie and Bilbija, 1989:180-3).
The Slovenian Parliament and Presidency again protested against Milosevic's words, again 
proposing a meeting. Slobodan Milosevic replied in his letter of 1 June 1989.
'O ur doors are open to you. However, if you are honestly interested in achieving a result, 
you should be aware that this is possible only if you change your views about Kosovo and 
if you bring them into line with Yugoslav and LCY politics.68 We hope you would then stop 
deliberately underestimating your anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav attitudes, such as those 
expressed in the Cankarjev Dom, which -  and especially the view of Yugoslavia defended 
in Stari Trg -  represented the lowest kick in Serbia's back, at a moment when Serbia has 
introduced Constitutional amendments and become a republic, equal to the other Yugoslav 
republics. Also, we think that our talks could not really succeed, if you continue to 
misinform the public about the situation in Serbia... and if you continue to shape [intervene 
in] Serbia, and especially Kosovo. When you finally realise that you should not be asked 
about politics in Serbia any more than we are asked about politics in Slovenia, then we will 
be happy to welcome you in Belgrade, to talk about our common interest, about Yugoslavia 
as our common homeland.' (Politika, 2 June 1989).
Milosevic's reply was an open humiliation of the Slovenian leadership. On 2 June, the Slovene 
Presidency replied:
68 In his diary, on 1 June 1989, Borisav Jovic, the Serbian representative in the Yugoslav Presidency (Vice-President in 1989- 
90; President in 1990-91) said: 'We had great difficulty in convincing Milosevic to mention [in his letter] that this was also the 
LCY and Yugoslav policy. Privately, he thinks this is our policy, and that Yugoslavia and the LCY could not reject it - they 
would be too ashamed, and he is simply hurt when we mention them. In reality, he is right; but by mentioning Yugoslavia 
we are in fact strengthening our political position' (1989/1995:16-7).
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'SR Slovenia is a sovereign state of the Slovenian people... She has both the right and the 
responsibility to take decisions on political issues concerning our common life and the 
future of the country, exactly because we live in our common homeland. This is also the 
case where the situation in Kosovo is concerned' (Politika, 3 June 1989).
The Slovene leaders said that dialogue would not be necessary if the two sides had the same views, 
and would be impossible if one side wanted to impose its views on the another. The public dispute 
between Milosevic's and Kucan's Presidencies further endangered the functioning of federal 
institutions. On 15 June 1989, the president and secretary of the Federal Youth Organisation, 
Branko Greganovic (Slovenia) and Anita Bara (Croatia) resigned in protest over the speech of the 
Kosovo representative Rexhep Hoxha, who accused the Slovenes of anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav 
politics. On the same day, the Slovenian writers denied the rights of the Yugoslav Writers' 
Association to represent them abroad, since it had become an instrument of Serbian politics. The 
Yugoslav institutions were now on the verge of collapse and paralysis.69 At the same time, as the 
Radio Free Europe reported on 17 June 1989, ’the Yugoslav orientation was still very strong among 
the population.'70
On 17 June 1989 the Slovenian Parliament proposed a new group of amendments to the 
Constitution, in which the right to self-determination (including secession) was emphasised. 
Speaking in Tacen (near Ljubljana) the same day, Milan Kudan said:
'W hen we think about the idea that a majority vote should be introduced in a multi-ethnic 
federation, we ask: is this anything else but a denial of the equality of the peoples, a denial 
of their sovereignty and of their right to self-determination as an inalienable hum an right.... 
Yugoslavia is our common state, which we created voluntarily, through a democratic 
agreement with other nations. Nobody accepted us into it, and nobody can discharge us 
from it. And we shall not give up our right to it... [However] we do not want to live in a 
country in which we would be subjugated to political and national supra-power, to 
economic exploitation, or forms of political, economic and cultural and other Diktat.' 
(Borba, 19 June 1989).
In his speech, Kudan said that the 'individual' was at the centre of the new Slovenian politics, and 
that 'w ithout the sovereign individual there is no sovereignty of the nation, and no workers' self­
management, and these are the main pillars of our communist movement' (Belie and Bilbija
69 There was no surprise that the first gaps occurred in the main organisation of the opposition (such as the Yugoslav Writers 
Association), and in the most liberal organisation of the system (the Youth Organisation).
70 RFE, 17 June 1989 (Stojan Novak), quoted in Belie and Bilbija (1989:219-20). Indeed, even Slovenian leaders (such as Janez 
Stanovnik, Joze Smole and even Milan Kucan) repeatedly stated in their conversations with Meier (1999:68) that they 'could 
not imagine' a Slovenia outside Yugoslavia. The same statements they repeated to the US Ambassador Zimmermann, to 
whom Stanovnik said: 'Secession would be suicide for Slovenia... But to survive, Yugoslavia has to be democratized, a 
market economy has to be created, and the rights of all nationalities have to be respected' (1996/9:32). Kucan even said: 
'Nobody sees a future here for Slovenia outside Yugoslavia. But Milosevic's imperialist arrogance can only make Slovenes 
wonder whether this is the kind of Yugoslavia they can live in' (1996/1999:31).
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1989:228). While he clearly introduced certain elements of political liberalism into his rhetoric, 
Kucan still remained convinced that the main question was -  'w hat type of socialism we wanted'. 
The democracy that the Slovene communists were introducing, was 'democracy for all, which 
means -  democracy for socialism'. Kucan promised he would never again offer his hand to those 
who rejected dialogue (the Serbian leadership) and said that it was a disgrace that 200 years after 
the French Revolution there were still political prisoners, and demanded release for all those 
'isolated' in Kosovo.
On 21 June 1989, the Presidency of the Slovenian Central Committee clearly opposed the 'one 
member -  one vote' principle of voting in the LCY. If at the 14th LCY Congress the principle of 
majority voting was introduced, the Slovenian organisation would 'immediately initiate an 
extraordinary congress, and either suspend the principle of democratic centralism, or decide in 
favour of the full organisational independence of the LC Slovenia'. In the programmatic conclusion 
of this session, the Slovenian Party leadership concluded that 'nations can exist without socialism, 
but socialism cannot exist without nations.'
The day after, the Presidency of the Serbian Central Committee for the first time demanded that 
'those parts of the nations and nationalities in all our republics [which live outside their own 
republic] obtain the right to their full national affirmation, and the preservation of their national 
and traditional characteristics, as well as of their national identity7. At this moment, the Serbian 
Party leadership said, 'it is not realistic to expect that socialism in Yugoslavia could survive without 
a strong progressive ... factor such as the LCY. Equally... the existence of Yugoslavia is also 
impossible without socialism based on self-management.' The main political battle in Yugoslavia 
was, the Serbian leaders said, between the national bureaucracies and the progressive forces of self­
management. Never before had the Serbian leaders so explicitly said that the AVNOJ principle of 
'national equality, brotherhood and unity and federalism' should be preferred to 'the model in 
which Yugoslavia was only what the republics as national states agreed upon' (Belie and Bilbija, 
1989:249). This was a clear rejection of the Brioni Yugoslavia for the Yugoslavia of AVNOJ.
On 28 June 1989, a large crowd of Serbs gathered in Gazimestan to celebrate the 600th anniversary 
of the Battle of Kosovo, the central national myth of the Serbs. Slobodan Milosevic used this 
occasion to present himself as the true leader of Yugoslavia. In what was a manifest gesture, he 
placed himself before the President of the Yugoslav Presidency Janez Drnovsek (Slovenia) and the
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LCY Presidency Milan Pancevski (Macedonia) on all ceremonial occasions.71 Before a large crowd 
of Serbs and Montenegrins he said:
'If we lost the Battle, then this was not only the result of the social superiority and military 
advantage of the Ottoman Empire, but also because of the tragic discord at the head of the 
Serbian state... The discord and betrayal at Kosovo have followed the Serbian people like 
an evil fate throughout its entire history. In the last war, this discord and betrayal led the 
Serbian people and Serbia to agony, the consequences of which were both in a historical 
and in a moral sense more damaging than those of the fascist [aggression]. And also later, 
when socialist Yugoslavia was created, the Serbian leadership remained divided in this 
new country, always ready to compromise against its own people. The favours many 
Serbian leaders granted to others, while disadvantaging their own people, would not be 
acceptable in either an historical or a political sense, to any other people in the world... The 
disunity of Serbian politicians harmed Serbia, while their inferiority humiliated Serbia. This 
has been so over decades, for years. We are here today, on the Field of Kosovo, to say that 
this is not so any longer. There is no better place in Serbia than the Field of Kosovo to say 
that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to Serbia and to the Serbian people and to all its 
citizens, regardless of their national or religious affiliation' (Politika, 29 June 1989).
The crowd responded:
'N ow  we know / now we see/ who is the new Tito/ Slobodan, Slobodan/ a name of 
pride.'72
In July 1989 the Serbs in Knin (Croatia) organised their own celebration of the Kosovo battle. The 
leaders of the newly created anti-communist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) claimed that the Serbs 
were 'assimilated', since 'every day there are more and more 'Yugoslavs', and the Cyrilhc is under­
represented...'73 They demanded that 'the centralist-Comintern cadre in Croatia, including 90 
percent of the Serbian cadres in Split and Zagreb, be replaced' and 'that the Croatian people should 
rise against its own bureaucracy.' Simo Dubajic, one of the popular leaders of the Krajina Serbs, 
said he would 'easily settle these problems with Tudjman, but he would not talk to the Central 
Committee of the LC Croatia'.74 The Croatian government replied with the arrests of several leaders 
of the protests in Knin, which -  in turn -  caused an outburst of anger in the Serbian media. The 
issue of the relations between Serbs and Croats in Croatia was now widely open for public debate.
71 Borisav Jovic described this gesture by Milosevic in his diary of 29 June 1989: 'Eight in the morning. We are getting ready 
for going to Gazimestan. Voja Vu£icevic, the chief of the Federal Protocol came to me, to ask if I could use my influence to 
make a change in the wreath-laying order. The Protocol of Serbia want: Serbia first, [then] the Federation, [then] the Army. 
He appeals for the Federation to be first. I called Slobo, who was at home. He was getting ready for Kosovo. He did not want 
even to hear about this.. He said: 'Ask them if tire Slovenes would accept anyone else but them to lay a wreath first at their 
national holiday.' But, I managed to persuade him to a compromise: all three wreaths to be laid at the same time: the Serbian 
in the middle, the Federation's on the right, the Army's on the left' (Jovic, 1989/1995:29).
72 Start, 8 July 1989.
73 Dragan Dobrota, Start, 22 July 1989.
74 Simo Dubajic, Start, 22 July 1989.
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The Croats felt seriously endangered by both the Belgrade offensive and the Knin demands for an 
'anti-bureaucratic revolution' against Zagreb. The inability of the Croatian leadership (still divided 
between pro- and anti-Suvar factions) to formulate a clear policy for Croatia, now increasingly 
'sandwiched' between Slovenia and Serbia, gave rise to Croatian anti-communist nationalism, 
which was now represented by newly created parties, most notably by Franjo Tudjman's Croatian 
Democratic Community.75 At the 26th session of its Central Committee, the Croatian Party m ade a 
surprising about-turn, claiming that 'political pluralism is -  contrarily to what is often argued -  not 
a tool to homogenise but to de-homogenise national communities... It is a tool of political 
segmentation, not national homogenisation. This is why it is in fact a tool against the emergence of 
monopolist national programmes and national mass movements.'76 It was now Croatia, not just 
Slovenia, that moved towards a pluralist political system.
Finally, in October 1989 the Serbian leadership also moved to accept the possibility of party 
pluralism.77 In a speech at the Central Committee session Balsa Spadijer finally abandoned the idea 
of reforming the 1974 Constitution by endless amendments. Serbia now sought 'radical changes', 
based on the 'introduction of the citizen as the basis of the system'. They demanded a two-chamber 
federal assembly, with a democratic principle of 'one-member-one-vote' to elect a House of 
Citizens (as the lower chamber) (IB 10/1989:22-5). The principle of consensus should be still 
respected, but for a rather limited range of essential issues. Slovenia was again seen as the main 
obstacle to such reforms.
On 27 September the Slovenian Republican Assembly amended its constitution to describe Slovenia 
as 'an  independent, sovereign and autonomous state' with the right to self-determination and 
secession. Before this, the federal Presidency asked the Slovenes to withdraw their constitutional
75 The initiative meeting of the CDC was held on 28 February 1989, the same day when the Slovenes organised the 
Cankarjev Dom meeting, and the Serbs reacted at the mass rally in Belgrade. It held its first Congress in February 1990 in 
Zagreb.
76 Celestin Sardelic, Start. 22 July 1989.
77 Already in July 1989, Borisav Jovic argued in favour of legalising political organisations outside the Socialist Alliance of 
Working People, if these organisations were Yugoslav (and not republican or separatist). 'Serbia is the last republic to fear 
this. The LC in Serbia has wide support, and we do not fear we would lose power... I believe the LCY has had in almost 50 
years of power enough time to create its own basis, and that no one is to be blamed if it had failed. Many people accepted 
my arguments, but it seems to be too early for the final decision' 0ovic, 1989/1995:36) On 13 October 1989, Jovic presented 
the same arguments to MiloSevic, who agreed, but said there was also a 'state reason' for scepticism. 'In this case, an 
Albanian party would be created in Serbia. There are almost 2 million of them. Whatever they call their party, they would 
win power in almost all areas, and we would lose Kosovo... Our strategy should be to secure, not only in words, but in 
practice, full democracy for the Serbian intelligentsia, in a non-party pluralism, so that they do not attack us severely... 
Taking into account the multi-ethnic character of Yugoslavia, he thinks, the West will understand our country even if we 
secure democratic non-party pluralism. This is a much stronger guarantee of the survival of Yugoslavia than the multi-party 
system, which could partition it' (Jovic, 1989/1995:62). Jovic thought Milosevic's arguments were logical, but was not sure if 
the West cared so much about the existence of Yugoslavia as during the Cold War. 'They maybe care more about the 
destruction of the 'regime' than about the existence of Yugoslavia!,' he said.
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amendments, but they failed to obey. On 22 September the Federal Defence Secretary Gen. 
Kadijevic told the Vice-President of the Federal Presidency Borisav Jovic (Serbia) that he was ready 
to prevent the Slovenes from proposing their constitutional amendments on the grounds of 'the 
protection of constitutional order', for which the Army was authorised by the Constitution (Jovic, 
1989/1995:53). However, three days later, Kadijevic withdrew on the advice of the Army legal 
experts who thought 'the action would be on the edge of legality' (Jovic, 1989:1995:54). The Serbian 
leaders now realised that the Army was not a reliable ally and that the Federal Prime Minister Ante 
Markovic was still influential when it came to federal institutions. They concluded that 'the historic 
opportunity' to stop the Slovenes had been missed (Jovic, 1989/1995:55).
In October 1989, the Serbian leaders decided simply to ignore the Slovenes 'as if they did not exist7, 
and to prepare constitutional changes relying on the majority they still commanded in most federal 
institutions.78
On 30 November 1989, the Slovene Ministry of the Interior banned a Serb rally scheduled to take 
place in Ljubljana on 1 December, the day when Yugoslavia was created in 1918. The Slovenian 
leaders were not worried that the (as they called it) ’export' of the anti-bureaucratic revolution 
could succeed in their republic, but they feared incidents between the domestic population and 
Serb protesters, which could eventually provoke the Federal Army to intervene against Slovenia. 
On 4 December the Croatian Republican Assembly (Sabor) decided to support Slovenia against 
Serbia. The demonstrators gave up, but the Serbian leadership decided to cut off all official 
relations with Slovenia. An economic boycott of Slovenian goods was now official policy. At the 
same time, the Montenegrin League of Communists supported Serbia.
In December 1989, Milosevic declared the Slovenian leadership to be the 'protector of conservatism 
in Yugoslavia and one of the last defenders of conservatism in socialist countries in general'.
'This conservatism of Slovenia is confronted with forces of progress in Yugoslavia, and 
especially with progressive economic and political changes in Serbia, and hence reacts 
aggressively and brutally... The aggressive reaction of these bureaucratic forces... insults 
the dignity of other people. And today's politics of Slovenia not only insults our dignity, 
but it threatens the very basic human rights of other Yugoslav citizens in the Slovenian part 
of the Yugoslav state. The bureaucratic, arrogant and aggressive Slovenian leadership have 
cut all links with the people in Serbia, and we have taken this decision of theirs seriously. 
We shall remain consistent in this serious response, as long as the forces of conservatism, 
aggression and violence are not replaced by a democratic, peaceful and brotherly attitude 
in Slovenian politics' (Borba, 12 December 1989).
™ Borisav Jovid on 2 October 1989 (1989/1995:60).
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At the same time, the newly established Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian political parties expressed 
radical views about the future of Yugoslavia. The Serbian National Revival party (led by Vuk 
Draskovic) demanded a restructuring of Yugoslavia towards a confederation of Serbs, Slovenes and 
Croats, in which the Serbian state would include Macedonia, Montenegro and -  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina. The Croatian Democratic Community of Franjo Tudjman (initiated on the very day of 
the Cankarjev Dom meeting and the Belgrade rally against the Slovenes) also demanded more 
(although not yet full) independence for Croatia. The new Slovenian parties (which appeared in the 
form of various 'Associations', later to be renamed 'Parties') followed the programme of Nova 
Revija. In all three cases, the members of the intellectual elite who opposed the regime now became 
directly involved in party politics. The LCY, although still the only recognised political party in the 
country, was far from being in full control of events.
7.8. The LCY Membership Divided
The two political options -  Slovenian and Serbian -  divided not only the leadership but the whole 
membership of the LCY and the population itself. A survey among 5,000 LCY members, 
commissioned by the Federal Party Central Committee in its preparation for the 14th Party 
Congress (conducted by Ivan Siber in November 1989) demonstrates that the LCY had practically 
split on all the main issues of the debate.
On the issue of consensus or majority vote within the Party: 67% of members in Slovenia were in 
favour of the former, while 73% of the Serbian Party favoured the latter option. The Croatian and 
Kosovo organisations were closer to 'consensus', while more than 50% supported a majority vote in 
Montenegro (66%), Vojvodina (65%), Macedonia (57%) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (52%) (Siber, 
1989:15).
On further autonomy for republics and provinces: 85% of the members in Slovenia were in favour 
of 'more independence for republics and provinces', while 90% in Vojvodina argued the opposite -  
for 'm ore unity in the federation'. Slovenia was, in fact, the only republic in which more members 
argued in favour of 'more autonomy' than 'more unity'. Even among the Croatian and Kosovan 
members 49% and 45% respectively favoured 'more unity', as opposed to 38% and 40% for 'more 
autonomy'.
On the direct representation of the two Provinces in Federal bodies (as it was in the 1974 
Constitution) -  only 30.9% of all respondents in Yugoslavia were now in favour of it, while 61.7% of
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respondents preferred them to be represented in the federal institutions only as integral part of the 
Serbian delegation. The differences were again great between various parts of the LCY: direct 
representation was favoured by 71% of the LC members in Kosovo, 67% in Slovenia and 48% in 
Croatia. At the same time, 88% in Serbia, 76% in Montenegro, 74% in Vojvodina (!), 68% in 
Macedonia and 51% in Bosnia-Herzegovina were for indirect representation through the Serbian 
delegation.
The 'state of emergency' in Kosovo, introduced in March 1989, was supported by 81% of the LCY 
members, but only 28% in Slovenia and 40% in Kosovo. The level of support in other republics and 
Vojvodina varied from 72% in Croatia to 97% in Serbia outside the Provinces.
Mass rallies were supported as the 'm ost suitable form of expressing political views' by 53.3% of 
LCY members. This was a clear approval of the ongoing demonstrations of the Serbs and 
Montenegrins that had already forced leaders in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro to resign. Not 
surprisingly, the level of support was highest in Serbia (87%), Vojvodina (76%) and Montenegro 
(72%), but high support for these protests in Macedonia (56%) indicated that this republic could be 
next in line for 'revolution'. Just like their leaders, the LCY members in other republics, however, 
were much less supportive: in Bosnia the mass rallies were supported by 37%, in Kosovo by 22%, in 
Croatia by 19% and in Slovenia by 11% of LCY members.
In another evidence of the strength of the Serbian position, 70.1% of the respondents expressed 
themselves in favour of 'democratic centralism' in either the existing (35.1%) or in an even stronger 
form (35%). In Slovenia, however, 73% of those interviewed demanded that this principle be 
abandoned in favour of consensual decision-making in the Party. In fact, 'democratic centralism' 
had more supporters than 'the consensus principle' in all republics with the exception of Slovenia: 
in Serbia 81%, Montenegro 78%, Vojvodina 77%, Bosnia-Herzegovina 76%, Macedonia 68%, Kosovo 
66% and Croatia 64% of members favoured it. Furthermore, in all these republics, except in Croatia, 
more members declared for further strengthening of 'democratic centralism' than for mere 
preservation of the principle in its existing form.
The centralising tendencies were to be seen in the demands of 46.2% of LCY members to abandon 
any republican/provincial 'key' in the elections to the Central Committee of the LCY. As many as 
60% of the members in Serbia supported the conclusion that 'the best candidates should be elected, 
regardless of the republic/provinces they come from'. In Slovenia, on the other hand, 52% said the 
elections of the CC members 'should be entirely left to each organisation in the republic/province', 
thus not even requiring formal 'confirmation' by the federal Party Congress. This radically
324
'confederalist' principle was supported by only two percent of members in Vojvodina and 
Montenegro, and nowhere outside Slovenia did it secure more than 20% support. Similarly, while 
62.7% of the entire sample argued that the Yugoslav Central Committee should have the final say 
if/w hen  two republican organisations disagreed, 71% of the members in Slovenia refused to accept 
any arbitration 'since each organisation should have the right to its own opinion'. The differences 
were so great that one wondered if it was still the same party.
The survey showed that the Party elites of Serbia and Slovenia enjoyed the almost unanimous 
support of their respective membership on the issues of the 'three reforms': of the economy, the 
political system and the Party. In Slovenia, 95% of members assessed the Slovene programme of 
economic reform the best in Yugoslavia, 94% thought the same of the programme of political 
reforms proposed by Slovenia, and 93% for the programme of Party reform. Just a slightly lower 
level of homogeneity was achieved in Serbia: 93% put the Serbian programme of economic reform 
first, while 72% favoured the Serbian programme of democratisation and 79% the Party reforms 
promoted by the Serbian leadership. The same level of support (77%, 63%, 73%, respectively) for 
the Serbian programme was reached in Vojvodina. There could be no doubt that the Slovenian and 
Serbian leaders spoke for their members. Consequently, the Serbian accusation against the Slovene 
leaders of being 'bureaucrats' (i.e., cut off from their members) proved to be unconvincing. The 
strong support for the Serbian leaders in Vojvodina demonstrated that the 'Yoghurt revolution' in 
this province (unlike the cadre changes in Kosovo) was genuinely supported by the (largely Serb) 
Party membership.
In other republics, however, many members preferred either the Slovenian or the Serbian 
programmes of the three reforms to those proposed by their local leadership. In Montenegro, 63% 
of LCY members favoured the Serbian programme of economic reforms (compared with 19% for 
the Montenegrin, and 13% for the Slovenian). However, the members from Montenegro supported 
their new leadership more than any other (including Serbia's) when it came to political reforms and 
the LCY reform (61% and 68% respectively). In Macedonia, about 40% chose the Macedonian 
programme on all three counts, while about 20% favoured the Serbian and Slovenian programmes 
on all three issues. Small deviations from these percentages indicated that more Macedonian 
members favoured the Serbian programme of Party reform, at the same time showing more 
support for the Slovenian programme of political democratisation.
It is also for this reason that one should be careful when arguing that the conflict followed lines of 
republics/provinces. The party was in fact still divided on two camps, with many left in between 
them. The main line of divisions was still the one between the 'defenders of the Constitution' and
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'reformers of the Constitution', but both of them now moved further away from a compromise, and 
towards constructing their own narratives, rather than debating the one previously existing - the 
Kardelj concept.
For example, the Slovenian programme of economic reforms was favoured by 45% of the members 
in Croatia. The Croatian members were, however, more sceptical about the Slovenian proposal of 
political reforms (33% ranked Slovenia first), and the Party reforms (23%). However, the Serbian 
programme did not have any significant support in Croatia. Although almost 25% of the LCY 
members in Croatia were ethnically Serbs, only between 4% and 6% favoured the Serbian proposals 
over all others. Following the pattern of the whole post-war period, political behaviour in the LCY 
did not strictly coincide with the ethnic affiliation of its members. It often did not strictly follow the 
lines of republics, as the preferences of many Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Bosnian 
members for either the Slovenian or Serbian programmes demonstrated even in 1989. However, 
Serbia and -  especially -  Slovenia now became exceptions to this rule. The almost exclusive loyalty 
of the Slovenian members to their own organisation, closely followed by the similar level of 
support for Serbian programmes by Serbian members (not in an ethnic but a political sense!) 
polarised the Party around two diametrically opposite positions. The others, unwilling or incapable 
of formulating a third alternative (as the failure of Suvar and Markovic clearly demonstrates) were 
driven to support one side or the other. Or to perish.
In some cases, such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was not easy to make a choice. The 1989 survey 
shows that more members from this republic supported the Slovenian than the Serbian proposals 
for economic and political reforms (37%:24%; and 22%:14% respectively), while the opposite was 
the case with the Party reform (18%:14% for the Serbian programme). In other cases, such as in 
Kosovo, the choice was less complex. Unlike their new leaders (imposed by Belgrade, and shielded 
by a ban on demonstrations following the 'state of emergency7 in the Province), the large majority 
of LCY members in Kosovo supported the Slovenian political (66%), economic (55%) and even 
Party reforms proposals (55%) more than any other on offer. These figures were much higher than 
those for the Serbian economic (34%), political (24%) and Party (26%) programmes of reforms. The 
survey, hence, confirmed that, unlike in Vojvodina or Montenegro, the 'unity7 between Kosovo and 
Serbia was reached only between the two leaderships, but not among the membership of the Party. 
One could safely assume that support for the Serbian initiatives among the general population in 
Kosovo was even lower. Slovenia was, Milosevic had argued earlier, to be 'blam ed' for this.
In general, the 1989 survey of Party membership, showed the following level of support for the 
Serbian and Slovenian options in the other Yugoslav republics and provinces:
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Table 7.1. Acceptance of Serbian and Slovenian programmes, 1989.
Serbian Slovenian Difference
(Serbian - Slovenian)
Vojvodina 70.9 12.4 Serbian + 58.5
Montenegro 33.7 10.1 Serbian + 23.6
Macedonia 20.5 20.3 Serbian + 0.2
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
18.7 24.5 Slovenian + 5.8
Croatia 4.9 33.6 Slovenian + 28.7
Kosovo 28.5 58.6 Slovenian + 30.1
Yugoslavia 40.2 24.3 Serbian +15.9
Source: Siber (1989: 75).
Hence, on the eve of the 14th Extraordinary Congress, the Serbian Party had secured much greater 
support among the LCY membership than the Slovenes, especially when it came to intra-Party 
reforms (38.9% in favour of the Serbian approach, 18.0% for the Slovenian). However, it had still 
failed to secure a clear winning majority of 50% of the votes among the Party members. The 
support of 24% of Party members in the country as a whole for the Slovene programmes exceeded 
by almost four times the Slovenian share in the LCY membership. It was certainly clear that the 
Slovene programme of reforms was unlikely to win the vote at the 14th LCY Congress. It was, 
however, less clear whether the Serbian proposals would secure sufficient support for changes of 
the Statute in order to centralise the organisation. From the point of view of both sides, it was 
crucial to gain the support of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia on the main issues on the 
agenda. But, the Macedonian and Bosnian party membership were split down the middle on every 
single im portant issue debated.
The prospects for victory for the Serbian approach on the eve of the 14th Party Congress were 
confirmed by the fact that (only?) 30.7% of the LCY Party membership identified Slobodan 
Milosevic as the person who 'expressed political views closest to [their] own'. Although the level of 
personal support for Milosevic was almost 10% lower than that for the Serbian programmes of 
reforms, his personal popularity among LCY members was almost five times greater than that of 
his main competitor, Milan Kucan (6.2%). The other two potential candidates for the top post, Stipe 
Suvar (former Party President, Croatia) and the newly elected Yugoslav Prime Minister, Ante
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Markovic (also Croatia) followed him closely at 5.2 and 4.9% respectively. Support for Milosevic 
varied from 0.6% in Slovenia (and only 1.9% in Croatia, despite the large number of Serb members!) 
to 71.6% in Serbia. Ku£an scored 62.8% of the 'vote' in Slovenia and 18.5% in Kosovo, while no 
Votes' at all in Serbia. Two Croatian politicians of different political orientations ('the Kardeljist' 
Suvar and 'liberal-reformist' Markovic) fell victims to their refusal to 'mobilise' Croatia behind 
themselves. Torn apart by deep personal rivalry and led by a Serb, Stanko Stojcevic (1986-1988) and 
Party bureaucrat Ivica Racan (1989-), the main constructors of the politics of the 'Croatian silence', 
the Croatian Party had no leader to match Kucan and Milosevic. Suvar was the first choice for only 
12.5% of the Croatian members, while -  except in Bosnia-Herzegovina (10.3%) he was only 
marginally supported elsewhere. Markovic was more popular amongst the general population, but 
he -  as Yugoslav Prime Minister -  deliberately stood outside Party politics.79 Markovic believed the 
programme of economic reforms he introduced in 1989 would unite Yugoslavia around his 
government. But the Party was still the main political battlefield. The lack of a Croatian leader was 
one of the further reasons for polarisation within the Party. Having no third partner in traditionally 
Slovene-Serb-Croat-led Yugoslav politics, neither Kucan nor Milosevic were forced to 
accommodate their claims to a potential 'coalition' partner from Croatia. Yugoslav politics now 
became polarised, rather than coalition-seeking.
The lack of credible Croatian, Bosnian and Macedonian communist politicians in this crucial year 
resulted in the growth of anti-Communist and nationalist leaders in these three republics. The 
survey revealed that 40.8% of the whole Yugoslav LCY sample did not identify with either of the 
LCY leaders. These percentages were, however, significantly higher in Croatia (54.8%), Bosnia- 
Herzegovina (56.8%), and Macedonia (58.3%), the three republics in which the Party finally lost the 
first democratic elections to the opposition parties less than a year after this survey was conducted. 
The Croats simply could not wait for Markovic and Suvar to turn nationalist and to homogenise 
them against Milosevic. Suvar and Markovic were, however, convinced that -  as Suvar said in an 
interview for this thesis in April 1998 -  'it was easy to become a nationalist leader, nothing was 
more simple than this -  what was difficult was to lead a civil war against each other, if you still 
believed in Yugoslavia.'
The same logic, to some extent, led Milosevic and Kucan to put themselves at the helm of their 
republics and nations. It is too easy today to accuse these two politicians of supporting and 
organising the nationalism that finally really led to civil war. True, one can have little doubt that 
they bore great responsibility for what happened. However, it is still likely that -  had they not
79 Support for Markovic was at 15.3% in his own Croatia, but he was popular neither with Slovenian Party members (3.2%) 
nor in Serbia (1.1%).
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accepted this role -  somebody else would have done. Slovenia and Serbia would perhaps have 
followed the Croatian, Bosnian and -  to some extent even Macedonian -  path of electing Tudjman- 
like 'genuine' nationalists. In acting as they did, both Ku6an and Milosevic believed they would 
prevent the most radical nationalist elements in their republics from winning the elections: people 
like those in Nova Revija and Vuk Draskovic respectively. The leaders of the last generation of the 
communist elites in Yugoslavia, faced a dilemma which they just simply could not resolve while 
remaining true to their long-standing personal beliefs. They had to 'ride the tiger of nationalism, if 
they did not w ant to be eaten by it', as David Owen (1995:129) metaphorically explained. And they 
were powerless to choose, however powerful they seemed. Finally, they had to realise that much 
more than power was at stake: their personal beliefs, peace in the country, and even their personal 
lives.80
In 1989 Milosevic and Kudan did not yet command the unconditional and full support of their 
ethnic groups, not even among Party members, who would naturally be supportive of their leaders 
in any case. One m ust notice that even in the last months of 1989 the ethnic homogenisation behind 
Milosevic and KuCan was still incomplete, as far as the members of the LCY were concerned. 
Although Milosevic, for example, was speaking for 54.6% of the (ethnic) Serbs in this survey, the 
remaining 45.4% of the members of the LCY of Serb ethnic origins did not identify with him first (in 
fact, 40.3% did not identify with any politician at all). In Kucan's case, he was the first choice for 
67.9% of the Slovene members (significantly higher than Milosevic among the Serbs), yet a third of 
the members failed to support him. Suvar and Markovic together were favourite choices for only 
30% of the ethnic Croat members. The level of ethnic homogenisation, therefore, was in all cases 
(even in the Slovenian or Serbian) lower than the level of homogenisation between the members 
from the same republic.
While Milosevic was the first choice for 71.6% of the members in Serbia Proper, only 54.6% of all 
(ethnically) Serbian members of the LCY 'voted' for him. Taking into account that 45% of the 
Montenegrins supported him, as well as (only) 25.2% of those declared 'Yugoslavs'81 one could 
safely conclude that the support for Milosevic was significantly lower among the Serbs outside
80 Borisav Jovic quotes General Veljko Kadijevic, who feared 'being hung in public' if the anti-communists took over in 
Serbia (19 January 1990). He sincerely feared revenge against communists in Croatia, after Tudjman won the elections in 
1990 (26 April 1990). Borisav Jovic also feared Albanian revenge against the Serbs in Kosovo if they were not prevented from 
'taking over our institutions' (Jovic, 1995).
81 The fact that only a quarter of the 'Yugoslavs' supported Milosevic is significant for two reasons: (1) it shows that the 
'Yugoslavs' were not only 'reserve Serbs'; and (2) raises the question of Milosevic's 'Yugoslavism'. If those who declared 
themselves Yugoslavs did not recognise him as tire protector of Yugoslavism, how could then the Slovenes, Croats and 
others?
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Serbia than in Serbia itself.82 This explains the gap of more than 15% between the share of the Serbs 
in the LCY membership (45%) and the 'vote7 for Milosevic (30.7%). It was precisely because of the 
'uncompleted' homogenisation of the Serbs in the LCY membership that Milosevic could not yet -  
despite a higher share of the Serbs in the LCY than in the general population - with safety count on 
overall and unconditional victory at the Party Congress. He still needed full control over the 
Kosovo delegation, which seemed likely to be more defiant in secret ballot than its leadership was 
in its public endorsement of Serbia's new course. It was also important to discredit the leading Serb 
members of the Croatian and Bosnian Party leaderships, who were still committed to the old Party 
line of criticising nationalism only within their own nation. In the last few months prior to the Party 
Congress, the Serbian Central Committee, media and demonstrators launched a strong campaign 
against Serb Communist leaders from Croatia, such as Dusan Dragosavac,83 and from Bosnia, such 
as Bogie Bogicevic. In turn, this only inflamed Serbian anti-Communist nationalism in these areas, 
especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, it was of crucial importance to homogenise ethnic Serbs 
in the LCY and in the population in general behind Milosevic.
7.9. The Last Hours: the 14th (Extraordinary) LCY Congress
The final clash between the two political positions occurred at the 14th Extraordinary Congress of 
the LCY on 20-22 January 1990, which was in advance considered by both sides to be a potential 
turning point in the history of Yugoslavia.84 The Congress had 1,457 elected members, 564 of whom 
were from Serbia (333 from Serbia without Provinces, 94 from Kosovo, and 137 from Vojvodina), 
and 114 from Slovenia.85
82 Subsequently, in all but one of the 14 municipalities with a Serb ethnic majority in Croatia, the (Croatian) League of 
Communists won elections in April 1990. Only in Knin was the radical nationalist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) elected. 
Public opinion polls conducted by me and my associates and published in Danas in summer 1990 showed that only when 
the LC Croatia -  Party of Democratic Change supported Tudjman's new Constitution, did the Serbs start to support the 
Serbian Democratic Party. During the summer the SDS forcibly took over the administration in the municipalities in which 
the LCC won elections. More in my article in Ljetopis 1996.
81 Dragosavac attacked Milosevic's politics at several sessions of the CC LCY in 1989. He later complained that somebody 
wrote a graffito 'Dragosavac - The Traitor' on a street in Belgrade where the CC had its building. Bogie Bogicevic, the Serb 
who, since May 1989, represented Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Federal Presidency, voted against Serbia in the crucial vote on 
the state of emergency, proposed by the Army in March 1991 (Silber and Little, 1995). Needless to say this vote was against 
Milosevic too. In an interview I conducted with him, Bogicevic talked about the pressure by Serbian leadership on him.
84 As Borisav Jovic described after his talks with Slobodan Milosevic on 20 June 1989, 'the LCY Congress was the critical 
moment for changing the Constitution. If things were ready by then, the Constitution would be changed. If not, everything 
would remain the same until die next Congress' (Jovic, 1989/1990:25).
85 Other republics were represented proportionally to their share in the Party membership: Bosnia-Herzegovina 248, Croatia 
216, Macedonia 141, and Montenegro 99, while 68 members represented the LCY in the Army and seven the federal party 
organisations. The ethnic structure of elected members also closely matched the Party structure: 545 delegates were Serbs,
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The main aim of the Serbian delegation, as formulated at an informal meeting between Slobodan 
Milosevic, Petar Gradanin, Bogdan Trifunovic and Borisav Jovic (10 January 1990) was 'to preserve 
the existence of the LCY as an organisation, to preserve democratic centralism, at least in the terms 
of the Statute. The aim [was] also that the Slovenes remain isolated, and that Croatia and 
Macedonia, or even Bosnia-Herzegovina, do not join/ The Army representatives accepted the role 
of the front-runners for this policy, 'so that the Croats and Macedonians are not pu t off from it' 
(Jovic, 1989/1995:88).
In two days of debate, the Slovene delegation opposed the main tone of the proposed declarations, 
including the new, amended Statute of the LCY. However, the delegates of the Congress were 
unwilling to accept any of the Slovenian amendments. The Slovenian proposal that the LCY should 
be defined as 'an  organisation of republican organisations of the LC, which are equal in rights and 
associate with one another in the LCY' was rejected by 1,156 votes against 169. Two Slovene 
proposals, aimed at the immediate suspension of all political trials in Kosovo (including those for 
'counter-revolutionary endangering of social order; hostile propaganda; and insulting the highest 
institutions of the state1), were supported by only 236 and 399 members respectively. The proposal 
that all economic sanctions introduced by Serbia on Slovenian goods should be immediately lifted, 
was supported by 755 delegates, while 589 voted against. However, this was still about 70 votes 
less than the required majority. The amendment proposed by the president of the Slovenian 
Parliament Miran Potrd, that the Party documents should clearly identify that 'the peoples 
associated in Yugoslavia exercise their sovereignty within republics, having the right to freely 
decide which of their sovereign rights should be realised through democratically elected 
institutions in Yugoslavia', was supported by 526 delegates. At the same time, the Serbian 
amendment that the new federal Constitution should clearly define Yugoslavia as a state 'w ith full 
legal and state subjectivity', was accepted with 955 votes.
Although not all Slovene amendments received the same level of support (ranging from very low 
support for any confederalisation of the Party, to higher support when it came to further 
decentralisation of the state), it was nevertheless clear that none of them secured sufficient support 
at the Congress. At the same time, almost every Serbian proposal was accepted by a convincing 
majority. The Congress was on the verge of becoming a crucial triumph for Milosevic's programme.
This was the moment when Slovenia's delegation decided to leave the Congress and declared 
Slovenia's League of Communists an independent organisation, not subject to any 'democratic
195 Croats, 137 Macedonians, 128 Yugoslavs, 122 Montenegrins, 114 Slovenes, 95 Bosnian Muslims, 63 Albanians, 21 
Hungarians, etc.
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centralism' by the federal Party organisation. Staying in the LCY under the new rules of the game 
would mean losing any support in Slovenia and subjecting its Party organisation to perm anent out­
voting by the Serbian-led majority. The Slovene Communists simply could not accept this. While 
they were leaving the stage, the Serbian delegates at the Congress applauded. Milosevic 
immediately proposed that the Congress should establish a new 'quorum ' by recognising that the 
114 delegates from Slovenia were no longer part of it, and continue as if nothing had happened. 
This was opposed by the Croatian members, who argued that the LCY without the Slovenes was no 
longer a Yugoslav organisation, and warned that they themselves would 're-examine' their 
participation in it. The Congress, therefore, 'postponed' its final session, as would become clear -  
indefinitely.
7.10. The End of the Party and of the State
The Serbian communists, as well as those in the Army and most of the other republics, claimed 
before the Congress that the existence of the LCY was a conditio sine qua non of the existence of the 
Yugoslav state. Its disintegration was now 'the beginning of the end of any possibility for 
Yugoslavia to function'.86 The same belief was shared by the Slovenian and Croatian opposition. 
The Slovene Communists, however, claimed that the disintegration of the Party m ight not 
inevitably lead to the collapse of the Yugoslav state.
'The disintegration of the LCY is not a fatal event for the future of Yugoslavia. Because, the 
future of Yugoslavia does not depend on the two integrative factors that certain politicians 
always tend to connect with each other: that is - the Party and the Army. The fate of this 
country depends on the real interests of its peoples, on how we answer the question: 
should we be able to work and live like the rest of the civilised world... I even think that 
we are now closer to a democratic solution of the crisis. The LCY was a mechanism which 
those who created undemocratic politics in Yugoslavia have manipulated. If it is destroyed, 
then this is certainly a step forward to the faster democratisation of society. I w ould link 
this process with further pluralisation and reforms, which should be even more radical 
than those proposed by the Federal Government,' said Milan Kucan immediately after the 
Congress (KuCan, Danas, 30 January 1990).
KuCan, however, admitted that it was not easy to accept that the LCY had come to an end.
'It was very difficult, although I knew it would happen. All my life, and especially my 
youth, was linked to the Party. I have been influenced by these ideas through my family, 
and even if the Party is now clearly not what it once was, it is still not easy to say goodbye.
86 Borisav Jovic in his diary on 24 January 1990 (1990/1995:93).
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I am perhaps also responsible for this, since I am still strongly emotionally attached to the 
Party' (Kucan, Danas, 30 January 1990).
While Kucan's emotional attachment to the Party had gone by now, he was still in a state of 
disbelief when it came to the disintegration of Yugoslavia as state. In January 1990, he described 
himself as 'non-separatist':
'I can hardly even think about the possibility of Slovenia leaving Yugoslavia. Personally, I 
have never been for it. I cannot come to terms with this possibility. But, Yugoslavia as it is 
now is good for no one. If the Helsinki declaration and the way of thinking in Europe, 
which is now hostile to any amendments of the borders, change -  and I am not sure that 
[Europe] will remain committed to this view after all that has happened in Germany and in 
the countries of the East -  then we Slovenian non-separatists, would face a very difficult 
situation. Of course, it all depends on what Yugoslavia would look like/
Kucan was still trying to convince others in Yugoslavia that he was the least nationalistic partner in 
Slovenia. By refusing his proposals, the others in Yugoslavia in fact underm ined his position at 
home. The Slovene communists felt misunderstood, unsupported, and even humiliated by their 
Party colleagues from Serbia.87 Their decision to leave was taken without enthusiasm, but it was 
clearly seen as necessary.
In Slovenia, the majority clearly supported Kucan's brave decision, but many feared a reaction by 
the centralisers. Kucan's prediction that separatist ideas would now gain new ground among the 
Slovenian population proved accurate. Janez Jansa, the leading opponent of Belgrade, declared the 
14th Congress 'the last congress of the Party, but also the end of the Yugoslav state, as it is now '.88 
Another Slovenian opposition politician, the Christian Democrat Lojze Peterle, also believed that 
'this is yet another proof that the Second Yugoslavia has come to an end, and that a state should be 
re-established on new grounds.'89 These new grounds should be found in the confederal model of a 
commonwealth of Yugoslav states, said Joze Pu£nik. Confederation was now seen as a means to the 
full independence of Slovenia. It would include full recognition of its statehood, and almost 
entirely destroy the authority of federal bodies.
Similarly, confederalist options became stronger in Croatia, where Franjo Tudjman, the president of 
the newly established Croatian Democratic Community, commented:
87 Sonja Lokar, the secretary of the LC Slovenia, cried as she left the Congress stage. But her tears met with humiliating 
applause from her victorious Serbian colleagues. Slobodan Milosevic believes the Slovenian action was planned well ahead. 
As shown earlier in this Chapter, the Slovenian LC indeed announced they would leave LCY if 'outvoted' on the main 
issues.
88 Danas. 30 January 1990.
89 Lojze Peterle, Danas, 30 January 1990.
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'This is not only the ideological and organisational disintegration of the LCY. The LCY has 
been identified with the overall construction of the SFR Yugoslavia as a state community. 
The failure of the LCY is therefore a sign of the ideological and organisational collapse of 
the existing AVNOJ Yugoslavia' (Danas, 30 January 1990).
Tudjman concluded that Yugoslavia should be 'thought out again', since it faced not only a state 
crisis, but a crisis of inter-ethnic relations.
Although the newly established Serbian Renewal Movement (led by Vuk Draskovic) proposed a 
three-member confederation in Yugoslavia, in which the Serbian unit would include Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and large parts of Croatia, the confederalist option for the 
Serbs meant in fact separatism. Similarly to the Czechs in the case of Czechoslovakia, the Serbs felt 
con-federation was the worst of all the options on the agenda. They already felt Yugoslavia was 
partitioned to the level of disintegration. The new proposals, to them, in fact meant the 
disintegration of the country. There was, therefore, no surprise, when Borisav Jovic concluded:
'The Congress was the last chance for those who sincerely hoped that the course of events 
in Yugoslavia could be redirected for the better, towards unity and the solution of the 
constitutional problems... I am afraid that this is the beginning of the end of any possibility 
of agreement, and also of the functioning of Yugoslavia. A general confusion and 
uncertainty is created' (Jovic, 24 January 1990,1995:93).
And it was even less surprising that the Army felt 'totally disappointed', as the Defence Secretary 
Kadijevic conveyed to Borisav Jovic, the Vice-President of the Yugoslav State Presidency:
'He [Kadijevic] said that many communists had become scared under the wave of anti­
communism. They had become entirely lost. They do not fight, do not react, as if they do 
not care about what is happening. And what is happening leads us directly to a civil war, 
to bloodshed. He analysed the Western strategy towards Yugoslavia... The tragedy is that 
they [the West] do not understand that in this way [by introducing multi-party democracy] 
they are in fact destroying Yugoslavia and pushing it to a civil war. They do not 
understand that parties like these will not resolve the Yugoslav problem, because they do 
not understand the national question in Yugoslavia. For Yugoslavia, for its existence and 
re-birth it is necessary that the LCY exists and that is re-born in competition with other 
parties.'90
90 Borisav Jovic, talk with Gen. Kadijevic, 26 January 1990 (1990/1995:94). While Kadijevic remained committed to his 
communist vision of Yugoslavia, Jovic was soon moved to argue that Yugoslavia could be preserved even as a multi-party 
democracy.
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7.11. The Last Hope: Ante Markovic's Attempt to Unite Yugoslavia Without the LCY
Immediately after the collapse of the LCY Congress, the Federal Government of Ante Markovic 
took the initiative to transform Yugoslavia into an economically prosperous and politically viable 
Federation. Just like his predecessors Milka Planinc and Branko Mikulic, Ante Markovic faced 
opposition from the Party in his attempts to reform the Yugoslav economy and political system. 
This is why he saw the disintegration of the Party as the final chance to take a free initiative.
Markovic was elected Yugoslav Prime Minister on 19 January 1989, when Yugoslavia faced not 
only political conflicts (such as those between Slovenes and Serbs, or in Kosovo) but also inflation 
of about 25,000% p.a. (Zimmermann, 1996/1999:49). His programme of economic reforms, 
supported and advised by American economist Jeffrey Sachs, was launched in December 1989, 
showing the first results at the beginning of 1990. The value of the national currency was fixed to 
the Deutsch-Mark at the 1:7 level. The Yugoslavs were for the first time allowed to buy foreign 
currency in banks. Inflation sharply decreased and confidence in the new government rapidly 
grew. But, the new economic programme (accompanied by Markovic's idea of 'new  socialism') 
favoured export-oriented firms, most of which were in Slovenia and Croatia. The Serbian leaders 
saw this as the 'robbery of Serbia' in favour of the more developed Western republics.91 Serbian 
industry, oriented more to the collapsing market of the Soviet Union, suffered a lot. At the same 
time, the Slovenes' refusal to agree on a federal budget left federal funds half-empty. The Army, 
already extremely critical of Slovenian politicians, now joined Serbia and the under-developed 
regions against Slovenia and Markovic. The Federal Government, although generally popular 
among the population, faced enormous opposition from Serbia and Slovenia, on several issues 
joined by other republics and Kosovo.
91 On 12 June 1989 Borisav Jovic spoke to Slobodan Milosevic and Borisav Srebric about Markovic's programme: 'We 
concluded that this was exactly the policy we were afraid of: the policy of redirecting income to Croatia. The bill will be 
paid by everyone, but to the benefit of the exporters, mainly from the developed regions of the country... Finally, the benefits 
for those who export to the USSR, which means mainly the Serbian economy, have been drastically cut -  which means that 
our markets are now limited... The general line of our politics is based on the fact that Serbia cannot survive under this 
burden, unless new taxes are introduced at the federal level. And it is impossible to introduce new taxes. Thus, we have to 
confront this policy, which is very cunning indeed: it reduces the revenue paid to the federation by the more developed 
republics, and increases contributions from the less developed. On the average, there is indeed, as they claim, some 
reduction of the budget; but this does not mean anything to those who give more. This policy inevitably will lead to new  
tensions between republics, and indeed between nations, and is not inspired by good intentions.' (Jovic, 1995:22). On 27 June 
1989, Milosevic asked Jovic to warn Markovic that Serbia could 'overthrow him much sooner than he could overthrow 
Serbia' (1995:29). On 2 August 1989, Milosevic concluded that Serbia was about to get 'robbed' by Markovic's economic 
policy. 'This is a deliberate action against the Serbian leadership/ wrote Jovic in his diary (1995:60). Yet, on 31 October 1989, 
Jovic saw that 'Slovenia attacks Markovic even more than we do in Serbia' (1995:64). On 17 November 1989, Milosevic and 
Jovic concluded that Markovic should be replaced by somebody else, preferably by General Veljko Kadijevic, the Defence 
Secretary. 'It is important to have a candidate who is in favour of Yugoslavia and socialism. Ante is not for either of these.' 
(1995:69). An accommodation with Markovic was reached only between January and March 1990, when Serbia tried to get 
out of the isolation it found itself in in Yugoslavia. Soon, however, the Serbian leaders returned to an anti- Markovic 
position.
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Trying to find a way out, Ante Markovic attempted to rely on the support of the general public 
(using the media more than any other communist politician before), Western economic support and 
his own cabinet. On all three fronts, however, he faced hurdles. The media were already under the 
control of his opponents to such an extent that he decided to launch a new - Yugoslav - TV station. 
When he did it, the local (republican) TV stations both in Slovenia and Serbia refused to transmit its 
programme through 'their' transmitters. In the West, Markovic found a genuine political support, 
but his financial pleadings remained unanswered. Finally, at least two crucial ministers in his 
cabinet (the Interior Secretary Graianin and the Defence Secretary Gen Kadijevic) wavered between 
loyalty to him and to Serbia's President.
As the results of a survey, conducted in June 1990, of 4,232 respondents in Yugoslavia 
demonstrated, the Yugoslavs were already deeply polarised on the functioning of the federal state 
and the powers of the federal government.
'The respondents from all republics and provinces were in favour of a market of 
commodities, capital and labour, a uniform tax system and an end to the present method of 
providing aid for underdeveloped regions. On all other topics views [were] divided. At one 
end of the scale, the respondents from Serbia proper, Vojvodina, Montenegro, and to some 
extent Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, would like to see a stronger government 
with powers to intervene and impose repressive measures: they are in favour of 
maintaining the current level of expenditure for the Yugoslav People's Army and of 
promoting investment programmes in underdeveloped regions. At the other end of the 
scale, the public in Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo call for a federal government whose 
functions would be only to take initiatives, maintain co-ordination, and mediate; they want 
the army budget reduced and are in favour of giving underdeveloped regions professional, 
cultural and research assistance but not monetary aid, or would even go so far as to abolish 
all forms of a id /92
The differences on this polarised scale are shown in the following table:
Table 7.2. Approval and Disapproval of Markovic's Reforms, May-June 1990.
Measure Yugoslavia
Approval:
disapproval
Highest support Lowest
Support
Reforms in general 66% : 7% Macedonia 81% Slovenia 32%
Market economy 56% : 2% Croatia 66% 
Bosnia 66%
Kosovo 28%
Greater legal powers for the federal 
government
58% : 21% Bosnia 72% 
Vojvodina 72%
Slovenia 26%
Funding a new political party 41% : 28% Bosnia 65% Slovenia 23%
92 Yugoslav Survey, 3/1990: 3-26. The survey was conducted by a consortium of several Yugoslav Universities and Institutes 
between 20 May and 26 June 1990 in all Yugoslav republics.
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Slovenia and Kosovo were the two regions of Yugoslavia in which Markovic's government found 
least support. Whereas 49% of the Yugoslav sample expressed 'complete agreement with the 
policies advocated by Ante Markovic', this percentage was as low as 16% in Slovenia and 13% in 
Kosovo. Even on specifically economic issues, such as Markovic's programme of market reforms, 
Slovenia and Kosovo placed themselves next to each other on the two lowest positions on the scale 
of support. In the most developed Yugoslav republic, Slovenia, Markovic's market reforms were 
supported by 38% and in the least developed, Kosovo, by only 28% of the population. In another 
example, Kosovo and Slovenia were the two least optimistic regions when it came to Markovic's 
anti-inflation programme (only 15% in Kosovo and 5% in Slovenia were confident that Markovic 
would succeed in bringing it under full control; compared with 28% on the Yugoslav average). 
These data clearly demonstrate how little economic factors (such as the level of development) 
influenced political decisions in the last years of Yugoslavia. They also show how difficult, almost 
impossible was Markovic's position. He was accused by Serbia of favouring the developed western 
regions in the country. But it was in Slovenia that he found the greatest opposition to his policy. He 
was seen as a 'cunning non-Yugoslav' by the Serbian leadership -  yet in the ethnically 
heterogeneous regions of the country (such as in Vojvodina, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
he had the most support.
The results of the survey demonstrate that Markovic was a much greater threat to Milosevic than to 
Kucan. In Slovenia -  the public was already sceptical about Yugoslav initiatives, even when they 
came from a liberal reformer and a Croat. By contrast, a large share of the Serbian population 
supported Markovic's initiatives, many of which aimed at establishing an effective federal state. 
Markovic's 'new  socialism' was also seen as a veritable alternative to the 'bureaucratic leadership' 
that sank after the collapse of the LCY. In Serbia proper, 44% of the population was 'in  full 
agreement', while an additional 41% was in 'partial agreement' with Markovic's policies. The 
survey showed that 56% of the respondents had improved their opinion of Markovic when 
compared with when he was elected six months earlier. It was no surprise, therefore, that Milosevic 
needed to make a great effort to portray Markovic as an 'enemy of Serbia'. Borisav Jovic personally 
contributed to the anti-Markovic campaign by writing a long article in Politika against Ante 
Markovic:
'I wrote a series of three articles 'The Truth about Ante Markovic' and sent it to Slobodan. 
He gave them to Politika. They will be published on 5, 6 and 7 [August 1990] under 
somebody's pen-name. We have to unmask him, because people are under many illusions 
about who and what he is. Many see him as a saviour, but he is just a common cheat and an 
enemy of the Serbian people,' wrote Jovic in his diary on 2 August 1990 (1995:173).
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The articles, subsequently published in the main Serbian daily, were a unique case of a member 
(Vice-President) of the State Presidency attacking his Prime Minister under a pen-name.
But the most serious threat to Milosevic's and Jovic's politics came from the popularity which Ante 
Markovic enjoyed within the Yugoslav People's Army. Many in the Army, including those in the 
highest positions, were dissatisfied with Milosevic's politics in Serbia. On 26 February 1990, 
General Blagoje Adzic, the Chief-of-the-Staff of the YPA (himself a Serb) conveyed this 
dissatisfaction in a conversation with Borisav Jovic:
'H e [Adzic] attacked Serbian politics in the strongest terms. He says Serbia is now isolated 
and opposed by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and half of 
Montenegro; and that also half of Serbia is against the Serbian leadership... The 
unintelligent Serbian leadership is responsible for all of this. They [the Serbs] make mistake 
after mistake. All their actions had played into the hands of the western republics, and in 
fact helped them to realise their aims: anti-Yugoslavism and anti-Communism.'
Specifically, Adzic complained to Jovic that the Serbian leaders did not need to antagonise the 
Slovenes by refusing dialogue with them, and had to distance themselves from the Greater-Serbs in 
Knin (Croatia). Adzic also criticised Serbian attempts to send 100,000 Serbs to Kosovo as a 
'provocative and unrealistic' action. In Kosovo, Adzic said, dialogue with the Albanians would give 
better results than repression. 'It was a mistake when Azem Vllasi was removed. He was a suitable 
person to work with...,' he said to Borisav Jovic. General Adzic, the highest-ranked Serb in the 
Army leadership, was not only verbally dismissive of Milosevic's politics: in January 1990 he 
refused to obey the Serbian request to use tanks against demonstrators in Kosovo (Jovic, 1995:95).
In fact, even General Veljko Kadijevic, the Federal Secretary for Defence (himself of mixed Serbo- 
Croat ethnic origins, from Croatia), was for a long time an unreliable ally of Milosevic and Jovic. He 
also tried to avoid the involvement of the Army in Kosovo and he stopped short of intervening 
against the Slovenian Constitutional amendments in September 1989. But, the main problem the 
Serbian leaders had with Kadijevic in this period was his loyalty to Ante Markovic. Although the 
Army and Serbia had 'the same objectives', as Jovic noticed after spending holidays with Milosevic 
and Kadijevic in August 1989 (1995:45), Milosevic was aware that 'Veljko might try to convince us 
to support Ante Markovic a little bit more.' Milosevic warned Jovic to 'beware of this'. For the 
whole crucial year between August 1989 and August 1990, the Serbian leaders suspected that 
Kadijevic's hesitant behaviour in fact originated in his 'split loyalty7 between them and Markovic. 
In December 1989, Kadijevic openly supported Markovic's new reforms and tried to convince the 
Serbs to accept them in exchange for Markovic's later support of the Serbian position in changing
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the Constitution.93 Jovic thought this proposal was 'naive' and wondered 'how  can Veljko not see it7 
(1995:79). In January 1990, Kadijevic saw Markovic's programme as the potential core for the 
unification of the country:
'H e thinks that Croatia will be with Ante; that Bosnia will be with Croatia, and that 
Macedonia would not dare to risk her own future... On these grounds one should make a 
deal with Serbia... I warned him to think again. I do not share his position. The concept of 
Ante Markovic aims at survival, not a resolution of the problem, and this is what plays into 
the hands of anti-Yugoslavia forces' (Jovic, 1995: 92).
It was only in February 1990 that Kadijevic became 'disappointed with the Federal Government'.94 
Until then, he was, as Borisav Jovic said, 'under the obsession that Ante fought for Yugoslavia' 
(1995:118). It was only on another summer vacation, in August 1990, that Kadijevic fully agreed 
with the three main Serbian leaders (Slobodan Milosevic, Borisav Jovic and Bogdan Trifunovic) that 
'Ante Markovic is totally unacceptable and unreliable.' In a note in his diary of 10 August 1990, 
Jovic described their conversation:
'No one any more doubts that he is a direct US stooge aiming at the destruction of the 
system and the removal from power of everyone who even thinks of socialism... He is 
playing the dirtiest possible traitors' game... One needs to finish with him, in any case... 
Veljko [Kadijevic] calls him 'a  son of a bitch'. He regrets that he saved him several times 
from his mistakes that could have compromised him, but he has no intention of repeating 
it... We should do anything to drive Markovic and all others who are destroying the 
country mad...' (1995:177).
Yet, even then, Kadijevic disagreed with Milosevic on ideological and several practical issues. 
Between 1990 and 1991 the Army still argued that the existence of Yugoslavia depended on the 
renewal of the LCY, and it sent this message to various foreign representatives, including the main 
European armies they visited. For a significantly longer time, the Army remained committed to the 
old ideological paradigm that the existence of Yugoslavia depended on socialism, whereas the 
Serbian leaders in November 1989 moved to the argument that 'the first problem is the dissolution 
of the country, while the nature of the social order is only a secondary issue' (Jovic, 16 November 
1989,1995:68). The gap between the two interpretations only widened after March 1990, when the 
Serbian leaders decided to create a new Party out of the Serbian and Montenegrin LCYs and 
Socialist Alliances if their attempts to renew the LCY failed. In March 1990, Milosevic twice met 
Dobrica Cosic. After their first (three-hour) conversation, Milosevic was 'pleased', although neither
93 In one of his first reports to Washington, Warren Zimmermann concluded that the Army was a stabilizing, thus a positive 
force (1996/1999:86).
94 The motive for Kadijevic's anger at Markovic was its ideological commitment: he accused the Prime Minister of being an 
agent of Western capitalism. Kadijevic was less pragmatic and more dogmatic than Milosevic.
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he nor Jovic shared Cosic's belief that Yugoslavia was not worth fighting for. However, it was in 
March 1990 that the Serbian leaders started thinking of Yugoslavia w ithout Slovenia.95
'We agreed that we need to make a new Constitution, regardless of whether the Slovenes 
agree or not, and that then they should be left with the option of either being in Yugoslavia 
or out... We fear Croatia -  they might leave the whole story and spoil it all. I hope the 
Croats are aware that this would create problems they could not resolve, and maybe even 
armed conflicts' (21 March 1990,1995:125).
After the second meeting with Cosic, Milosevic promoted a new Serbian position at the meeting of 
the 'Co-ordination' Committee in Serbia, on 26 March 1990.
'We have concluded that the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia is under way, in a 
manner similar to that of the LCY. It seems this cannot be halted. Serbia will sincerely try to 
preserve the federal Yugoslav state, but would also be prepared to live without Yugoslavia. 
If Yugoslavia disintegrates, we count on unity with Montenegro. We will not beg 
Macedonia [to join]. If they want to join, they will have to seek forgiveness for what they 
did to the victims of the First World War, who are still treated as occupiers. Our aim is to 
avoid bloodshed, to form a territory within which there will be no war. Outside these 
borders, war will be impossible to avoid, since Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot survive as a 
state, and it is hard to imagine a struggle for territory without blood. Serbia will not agree 
to confederation. The only possible way to accept it, but this is impossible to realise, would 
be contract-like guarantees of the rights of Serbian people in the other Yugo-states. Since 
this would be a provocative demand and unrealistic, and since the Serbs would be cheated 
even if everyone agreed on this, in reality Serbia has no reason to accept a confederation. 
No one can impose it on us... Serbia has decided to immediately prepare a new 
Constitution, which would be able to 'cover' the new independent Serbian state' (Jovic, 26 
March 1990,1995:132).
The results of the first democratic Croatian elections in April 1990, in which Tudjman's CDC 
secured a majority in the Sabor (winning about 42% of the total vote and 56% of the seats) made any 
future agreement on Yugoslavia very unlikely. Additionally, Tudjman's openly anti-Serb rhetoric 
only poured oil onto the flames of Serbian nationalism. On his election as President of the State 
Presidency on 15 May 1990 Borisav Jovic for the first time mentioned the need to introduce a Law 
on Secession, in order to enable any nation to leave Yugoslavia. In June 1990 the Serbian leaders 
announced that a Socialist Party of Serbia would be created. This decision 'confused and 
disappointed' General Kadijevic.
93 The shift in Serbian politics was mirrored in die main Serbian media. Milorad Vucelic, the journalist closest to Cosic and
Milosevic, wrote in Nin (18 March 1990) that the LC Serbia decided to move away from the 'idea that Yugoslavia is a non­
contested project'. The last session of the CC LC Serbia, Vucelic said, had come to the conclusion that Yugoslavia was still a 
rational and desirable project, but that 'no one should be begged to be with us in a united Yugoslavia and LCY.' On 25 
March 1990, the main creator of the new Serbian Constitution Ratko Markovic said that a referendum was the most suitable 
means to establish whether a nation wanted to remain in Yugoslavia or to leave (Nin, 25 March 1990). 'Serbia should not 
force anyone to remain in the federation... She must protect her dignity. She must not humiliate herself to save Yugoslavia, 
since she has the longest state tradition of all the Yugoslav countries, she has the richest constitutional history and the 
greatest international reputation...'
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'H e believes that this is the final end of Yugoslavia, and that the Americans have succeeded 
in their aim in Serbia -  removing the LCY from the historical stage. He thinks the Serbs 
should have preserved the name 'Communist'. All their plans had now sunk without trace. 
It will be much more difficult, maybe impossible to preserve the country.... He is especially 
disappointed that Slobodan Milosevic did not tell him about the Socialist Party of Serbia, 
they had spoken only two days before about further work within the LCY. He cannot 
recover from this. He has lost his 'point of balance',' Jovic reported the reaction of Kadijevic 
(1995:152-4).
In June 1990, Slobodan Milosevic still doubted if the Army was willing to follow the Serbian plan of 
'cutting off' all the non-Serbian parts of Yugoslavia in the west of the country.96 By then the Serbs 
had already decided to make new borders for the new state. It was then that Milosevic and Jovic 
finally left the Yugoslav option behind and favoured the 'Greater Serbian' alternative instead. 
Referendums of the local population (especially the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
would in fact draw  the new borders.
'H e [Milosevic] agrees with the 'expulsion' of Slovenia and Croatia, but he asks if the Army 
was willing to execute such an order? I told him they have to execute it, and that I have no 
doubt about this, but the problem is what to do with the Serbs in Croatia, and how to 
secure a majority in the SFRY Presidency for such a decision. Sloba had two ideas: first, to 
'cut o ff Croatia in such a way that the municipalities in Lika and Banija, and in Kordun, 
which had created a community, remained on our side, and that people later decided by a 
referendum if they wanted to stay here or to leave; and -  secondly -  that the members of 
the SFRY Presidency from Slovenia and Croatia were to be excluded from deciding on this 
decision, since they did not represent the part of Yugoslavia which made this decision. If 
the Bosnians vote in favour, there is then a 2 /3  majority. Sloba wants us to make this 
decision in a week's time, if we want to save the state. W ithout Croatia and Slovenia, 
Yugoslavia will have 17 million inhabitants, which is enough for European standards' 
(1995:161).
The Army was still hesitant to accept the end of Yugoslavia. General Kadijevic originally agreed 
with the Serbian new policy, but then withdrew, showing 'an  incredible instability' (1995:163). The 
Army still wanted to 'defeaf the Croatian and Slovenian nationalists and to preserve Yugoslavia's 
unity. On the other hand, the Serbian leaders now accepted Cosic's argument, that this was no 
more than 'plain nonsense which would came back on us like a boomerang' (1995:169).
In May 1990 over 100 people were injured in fighting between the football supporters of 'Dinamo' 
(Zagreb) and 'Crvena Zvezda' (Belgrade) at a Zagreb Maksimir stadium. On 30 May, Franjo 
Tudjman, the head of the Croatian Democratic Community, was elected President of the Croatian 
Presidency, while his party formed the first democratically elected Croatian Government. The
96 Jovic on 27 June 1990 (1995:160).
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Serbian leaders, but also the Serbs in Croatia, perceived him as 'alm ost insanely anti-Serb'.97 The 
media in Serbia compared Tudjman's party with the war-time Ustasha regime.98 On 2 July in a 
referendum in Serbia, 86% of voters voted in favour of a new Serbian constitution. At the same 
time, 114 Albanian members of the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo an independent republic. 
On 3 July 1990, the Slovenian Republican Assembly passed a declaration on Slovenian sovereignty. 
Two days later, Serbia suspended the Kosovo Assembly and seized the radio and TV stations in 
Pristina. On 25 July 1990 the Croatian Assembly (Sabor) approved 12 constitutional amendments, 
removing the word 'Socialist7 from the name of the Republic, introducing a new flag with the 
Croatian check-board coat of arms and 'de-recognised' the Cyrillic alphabet in areas where it did 
not predominate. In a last minute change, several other, more radical proposals (such as to define 
Croatia as the 'nation-state of the Croatian nation', instead of a state of its citizens) were 
withdrawn. The former Communists, now renamed the 'Social-Democratic Party of Croatia', voted 
for the changes. The Serbs, who massively voted for the SDP at the April elections, now moved 
their support to the more radical Serbian Democratic Party, whose leaders denounced the changes 
and declared the sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbian people in Croatia, and their right to 
'determine with whom and under what regime their people would live, and how they would 
integrate with the other nations in Yugoslavia'. In August, they held an unofficial referendum on 
the 'Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina', and took over several police stations and other 
governmental offices. The Croatian government was prevented from intervening by the Yugoslav 
Army, who moved in between the Serbs and Croats, in order to 'protect the villages of the ethnic 
Serbs from discrimination'. Although the Army claimed they were only playing a peace-keeping 
role between the Serbs and Croats, they in fact were marking the new borders of the 'Serbian unit7, 
just as Borisav Jovic and Slobodan Milosevic had planned two months earlier.99 The Army was now 
fully engaged in protecting one ethnic group against the other - even if, despite itself, it was still the 
case that the Army was no longer protecting the constitutional order as it was defined by the 1974 
Constitution: this order simply did not exist any longer.
97 Borisav Jovic, 22 August 1990,1995:182.
98 Milorad Vucelic in Nin on 25 February 1990. Many statements by Tudjman and his closest political aides only poured fuel 
on this interpretation. The President of the Croatian League of Communists Ivica Radan also warned that the CDC was 'a 
Party of dangerous ambitions' (Nin, 4 March 1990). Croatian journalists, such as Jelena Lovric (Danas, 6 March 1990) 
compared Franjo Tudjman with Vojislav SeSelj. Both of them expressed their ambitions to extend Serbia/Croatia to the 
Bosnian territories. Both the Serbian and Croatian press compared Tudjman not with Milosevic and Kucan, but with the 
Serbian extreme nationalists such as Vuk Draskovic and Vojislav SeSelj. Unlike them, Tudjman won an election in Croatia, 
becoming the first genuine ethnic nationalist to come to power in a Yugoslav republic.
99 Still, General Kadijevic was 'appalled' when he saw that the radical Serb nationalists supported him' (Jovic, 1995:179). It 
seems that he did not see that by then there was little difference left between the official Serbian position and that of the 
Serbian extreme nationalists.
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7.12. Conclusion
August 1990 could be taken as the effective end of the Yugoslav state and the beginning of the war 
for the territories of the new successor states. By then, no elements of the Yugoslav federation (as 
legally established by the 1974 Constitution) had been left intact. The LCY did not exist any more 
and new parties had been legalised in all republics. Slovenia and Croatia ceased to be 'socialist 
republics' and were for the first time run by anti-communist parties and coalitions. The borders of 
the republics were contested, primarily by the Serbs, but also by the Croats (in Bosnia) and 
Albanians (in Kosovo and Macedonia). Ethnic homogenisation was for the first time taken as the 
basis of politics in all republics without exception. Socialism as an ideology was either openly 
rejected (as in Croatia and Slovenia) or ranked second to nation-state formation (as in Serbia). No 
one any longer wanted to 'reform' the system and no one tried to convince the others that Kardelj's 
concept meant something different from what happened in political reality. The Yugoslav 
institutions had either already collapsed or were completely ignored. New 'entities' had been 
declared in Kosovo and the Serbian parts of Croatia (Krajina).100
Finally, nothing was left intact of the narrative of Brioni (or indeed of any 'Titoist') Yugoslavia. In 
Serbia, just as in Croatia, the new narratives were based on a clear opposition to the previous 
interpretations of history and identity. These narratives were at the same time incompatible with 
each other -  they blamed the other for the historical injustice done to 'us'. The internal cohesion of 
the emerging nation-states was now based on the difference between them and their neighbours. 
When these differences were small (as in case of language between Serbs and Croats), they were 
deliberately enlarged by state intervention. History was re-interpreted in such a way that all 
examples of co-operation were eliminated and 'forgotten'. 'Ethnic hatred' and 'ancient conflicts' 
now emerged as the main preoccupation of Serbs and Croats living next to each other.
This, of course, did not have to happen. Had the Yugoslav nations had more responsible political 
leaders, not only at these crucial moments but in previous times as well, the chain of events might 
have been quite different. The leaders played the most important, decisive role in w hat happened 
to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was, I argue along the lines of many others,101 destroyed from inside and 
from the top of the social and political pyramid down.
1,10 This would be later followed by the declaration of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina', the 'Croatian Republic 
of Herceg-Bosna' and the Albanian Republic of 'Ilyrida' in Macedonia.
1,n Such as, for example, Zimmermann (1996/9:VII), Perovic (1993), Goati (1995) and Sekelj (1990).
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Saying this, however, one needs to understand why the Yugoslav politicians behaved as they did. 
Why did they behave in an 'irrational', and 'irresponsible' manner? Why did they take the 
decisions they did? Were they simply incapable of understanding the real interests of their peoples? 
Were they simply irrational? The main argument of this thesis is that they acted on their beliefs, in 
the ideological context in which their actions made perfect sense to them and to many other people 
who -  tacitly or actively -  legitimised their actions. To the leading Yugoslav communist leaders in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Yugoslavia made sense as long as it was conceptualised as a socialist self- 
managing federation of republics and provinces. Once they realised that this concept was no longer 
viable, or was not the best possible, they needed to find another narrative to preserve and reform 
Yugoslavia, or to allow others to do so. To those who found themselves there it proved impossible 
to agree on any alternative narrative that would keep Yugoslavia together. Yet, still less did they 
want to allow 'anti-socialist1, 'statist' or any other 'hostile' forces to replace them. They simply could 
not allow that, since they still believed in the very narrative they themselves had created. 
Yugoslavia, thus, became a victim of its own narrative, whose elements had been collapsing for 
decades, pulling the Yugoslav institutions after them.
Despite the optimistic predictions of Ante Markovic (shared by most of the Western analysts of the 
Yugoslav crisis) that the disintegration of the LCY would not necessarily lead to the collapse of the 
Yugoslav state, but would even strengthen democracy in the country, the opposite happened. The 
League of Yugoslav Communists was not only the ruling party, but was the core, the essence of 
Yugoslavia, as defined in the 1974 Constitution and within Kardelj's concept that created it. 
Furthermore, the concept claimed that Yugoslavia (in the only form in which it deserved to exist) 
was created by the Party, and that it would -  as a state -  'w ither away' once the Party succeeded in 
making a state-less, self-managing society. Ultimately, the Party was more important than the state 
itself. While the state was to wither away, the Party was expected to lead society towards the final 
objective: communist self-management. Without a real state, and now without a Party to replace it, 
there was little left to bind the Yugoslav republics together.102
As a result of a chain of events in Yugoslav history by 1990 no common beliefs, no ideology, no 
narrative were left to keep Yugoslavia together. And, while the common beliefs of the communist 
elite made almost impossible compromises (such as that of the 1974 Constitution) viable, the lack of 
common beliefs now made much more viable options impossible. The fate of the Yugoslav Army, a 
real force that started crumbling once the ideological glue that held it together disappeared, 
demonstrated that without common beliefs even the most powerful institutions become powerless.
11)2 The Army was first to feel the consequences of the lack of a federal state. It soon became, as Gen. Kadijevic said in the title 
of his book - 'an Army without a State1.
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The state, the most powerful of all institutions, now simply collapsed: despite the unwillingness of 
the great powers to recognise it; despite its powerful law-enforcement agencies; despite even the 
emotional attachment she commanded from its leaders (even of Kucan and Milosevic) and m any of 
its citizens.
Left without its ideology, Yugoslavia now became unsustainable.
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Conclusion
8.1. The Main Argument
The disintegration of Yugoslavia was the result of many factors, not of a single one. But the 
main one, I argue, was the break-down of the ideological consensus within the Yugoslav 
political elite during an extended period of 15 years preceding the actual disintegration of 
Yugoslav institutions. In this thesis I have analysed the emergence (1967-1974), implementation, 
crisis and the breakdown of the fourth constitutive concept of Yugoslavia (1974-1990).
This ideological consensus was based on Edvard Kardelj's interpretation of Marxism (Chapter 
Two) and on a fragile but viable compromise reached between the various sections of the 
political elite during the 1967-1974 Constitutional debate (Chapter Three). The main notion 
behind the new concept was the Marxist idea of (direct) democracy, which included the gradual 
replacement of the state with social self-management in the transitional period from capitalism 
to communism ('socialism'). In this process the role of the political elite was exceptional. Its 
main objective was to formulate a vision of the future, and - through the League of Communists 
-  to lead society towards it. The Party was not legitimised in elections (as in representative 
democracy) but in its own mission, based on Marx's (and Kardelj's) understanding of the 
General Laws of History. The politics of the Fourth Yugoslavia was politics of its elite. It is, 
therefore, of crucial importance to understand the motives and reasons behind the decisions 
taken by the elite. I argue that without focussing on elite's perceptions of reality, one cannot 
understand Yugoslav politics in this period. Although 'objective' factors, such as economic 
crisis, ethnic structure of the country, international politics, processes of modernisation and 
globalisation, etc., provided the context in which the elite operated, it was the elite's perception 
of these problems that decisively influenced their decisions. W ithout focussing on the 
subjective, we would fail to explain the action itself. The main aim of this thesis has been to map 
out the elite's perceptions in order to emphasise this point.
By saying this, I do not argue that the elite could or even wished to neglect reality, nor that it 
was insensitive to public discontent, the activities of 'dissident' circles, international pressure, 
the ethnic complexity of Yugoslavia, or its economic and political crises. On the contrary, both 
the constitutional debate in the 1967-1974 period and the actual period of the Fourth Yugoslavia 
demonstrate that the Yugoslav elite recognised the existence of these elements and debated on 
how to react to the problems it faced. Nor have I argued that their personal interests or interests 
of certain social groups they belonged to (such as nations, republics, etc.) did not play any role 
in their actions. As the evidence presented throughout the thesis demonstrates, members of the
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elite were concerned with the interests of their social groups (i.e., republics), in the way they 
perceived them. However, these interests were always interpreted from the Marxist (Kardeljist) 
viewpoint. Although many members of the elite argued in favour of abandoning certain 
elements of the narrative, the majority (especially in the Party leadership) was in favour of 
minimal (if any) changes to the Kardelj concept, and successfully blocked any significant 
deviation from it. This commitment to Kardelj's concept kept the Yugoslav elite together, 
although internally divided about the right interpretation of the model, until the model itself was 
challenged in the 1986-1987 period, primarily in Serbia.
The Kardelj concept was a genuine attempt to respond to re-emergent national and other social 
questions by introducing the notion of anti-statism and de-centralisation. It was not only 
because they were aware of the potential explosiveness of the national question in a multi­
ethnic federation, but also because they wanted to offer a viable alternative to both the inter­
war doctrine of 'national unity' and to the previous centralised model of socialist 'brotherhood 
and unity', that the Yugoslav elite agreed on Kardelj's ideas. This was especially the case with 
the Serbian leaders in the 1967-1974 period, who felt unjustly suspected of 'centralism ' and 
'unitarism '. In Kardelj's views de-centralisation was the pre-condition for self-management, 
which was an alternative to statist politics. Anti-statism was also an alternative to Soviet 
socialism, which they identified as the main potential danger for the future of Yugoslav 
socialism. The Yugoslav elite aimed at demonstrating that its model was a viable alternative to 
both representative (liberal) democracies and mono-party political systems modeled on Soviet 
example.
Once agreed upon by the political elites, this ideological consensus was codified into a complex 
legislative and political practice, becoming the constitutive concept of the last (fourth) 
Yugoslavia. As demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five, this constitutive concept was, 
however, permanently contested both from within the elite and from outside. Controversies 
about the relation between reality and ideology characterised Yugoslav politics in the whole 
period I here analyse. Various segments of the elite argued over what its main creators (Kardelj 
and Tito) really meant and intended when proposing one or another legal or practical solution. 
For as long as the two leading figures of the Yugoslav federation were alive (until 1979 and 1980 
respectively) they were the supreme arbiters of the meaning of the constitutive concept. After 
the deaths of Kardelj and Tito the 'impartial' and supreme position of the federal state 
disappeared. Political conflicts in Yugoslavia in the 1980s took the form of a struggle for the 
'correct' interpretation of the meaning of the constitutive concept.
The impossibility of either imposing one interpretation by simple majority voting, or of 
reaching a new compromise between the sections of the political elite, caused a perm anent 
stalemate in federal institutions, leading to disintegration. The final push aimed at occupying
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the power vacuum was attempted in the 1987-1990 period, when the two dom inant 
interpretations of Kardelj's concept ('defenders' and 'reformers' of the Constitution) evolved 
towards two separate (and mutually irreconcilable) programmes: one which insisted on unity 
in Yugoslavia (often identified with Serbia and its party leader Slobodan Milosevic), another 
proposing further confederalisation (the Slovenian, identified with Milan Kucan). Unable to 
reach any compromise between the two options, and pressed by public protests and 'dissident 
activities' in both republics, the Serbian and Slovenian communists gradually moved from two 
different interpretations of Kardelj's concept to constructing new concepts based on a separate 
national, not an all-Yugoslav consensus. New participants (such as the media, intellectual elites 
and spontaneously emergent groups of citizens) entered politics. Although originally neither 
Milosevic nor Kucan aimed at supporting nationalist movements but - on the contrary, at 
reducing nationalist influence on public protests - they de facto acted as shields and promoters 
of Serbian and Slovenian nationalism.
The shift from the principle of communist solidarity against nationalism to the populist 
principle of 'national reconciliation' (i.e., co-operation of all groups within a nation, which 
included not only communists but also their opponents) made a new compromise within the 
elite impossible. The Yugoslav institutions, based on highly ideological grounds, collapsed as 
the result of the collapse of the ideological consensus upon which they had been built. At the 
same time, the differences between various segments of the 'opposition1 were equally great, if 
not even greater than those within the elite itself. This prevented the emergence of a non­
communist compromise for a fifth Yugoslavia. The 'anarchy', in which the divided elite failed to 
react to the 'culture of apocalypse' promoted by nationalist circles within both the intellectual 
elite and the leaders of popular discontent, created a situation of fears and uncertainties, in 
which the most extreme options became possible.
The rapid change of the context in which Yugoslav politics operated in its last years m ade even 
the most radical changes possible. Public protests of Albanians, Serbs and Montenegrins in 
Kosovo and the growth of alternative concepts among the intellectual elite (analysed in 
Chapters Six and Seven) exposed the weaknesses of the Yugoslav elite and challenged the 
legitimacy of the constitutive concept, both in its lack of democratic content and in its approach 
to the national question. When the Cold War was over and the Berlin Wall had fallen the 
existence of Yugoslavia, just like that of Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia or the Soviet Union, 
was no longer guaranteed per se. International forces demanded its democratisation, i.e., a new 
constitutive concept for Yugoslavia, one that would make it a 'democratic and united country'. 
But such a programme was unacceptable to the main Yugoslav participants.
This thesis is focussed on the prelude to the actual disintegration of the Yugoslav state, which -  I 
argue -  m ust be studied in order to understand the disintegration itself. Contrary to those who
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have argued that the collapse of Yugoslavia was the result of the 'revolutionary' changes in 
Eastern Europe, or of a sudden change of mind (almost 'overnight') of its population and 
leaders, or of the accession to power of one or another political leader, here I demonstrate that it 
came as an end of a long process, in which all the instruments of this collapse had already been 
previously 'tested'. Political leaders, such as Milosevic and Kucan (and, indeed, others) did not 
enter Yugoslav politics from somewhere outside of it: they represented the already existent 
trends within it. Once in power, however, they influenced the course of events, acting from 
their own perceptions of reality. It was my intention to reconstruct these perceptions to the 
greatest possible extent, not only of these two leaders, but of others who influenced Yugoslav 
politics in its last phase.
Currently accessible sources suggest that none of these leaders (including Milosevic and Kucan) 
intended to destroy Yugoslavia. To many of them, as to the majority of the Yugoslav 
population, to almost all analysts from within the country, and to many outside it, w hat 
happened came as a surprise. To them, it looked as if they would save Yugoslavia, in one or 
another form. It turned out that they were wrong. Viewing reality from the ideological position 
they shared, they certainly could not foresee that the 'old world' of capitalism, nationalism, or 
'statism' would ever come back. To them, socialist revolution and its achievements were 
irreversible: the only question (though by no means unimportant) was which type of socialism 
would win. Had they not been committed to their own visions and beliefs, even when it was 
almost obvious that these visions contradicted reality, the events would perhaps have taken 
another direction, as they finally did, once the ideological beliefs of the leading members of the 
elite (such as those of Milosevic and Kucan) had been shaken.
Yugoslavia certainly did not have to disintegrate. There are no inevitable events in politics. 
Politics is a highly subjective activity, not a pure physical reflection of everlasting social 
divisions. It is up to the relevant participants to decide which course of events will prevail. In 
socialist systems, the political elite was this relevant participant. Therefore, as Goati argues 'it 
was the attitude of the ruling political elites that decided which of the following courses events 
would take: democratic integration of the country, peaceful separation of the republics, or war' 
(1997:456).
At the same time, however, at one moment it looked as if the elites themselves faced a situation 
of no exit, in which no decision could improve the situation. Whatever they did seemed to them 
a mistake, or -  at its best -  the least bad decision. This was felt most directly by the Yugoslav 
Army, paralysed between its unwillingness to take firm (but anti-constitutional) measures and 
its strong opposition to further divisions in the country. As the political elites lost full control 
over events, they found themselves in the position of having to choose between representing 
the interests of their 'electoral constituency' (i.e., republic/province) and being defeated. In
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Slovenia and Serbia (and from January 1990 in Montenegro), the elites decided to take up this 
challenge, putting themselves at the head of national movements. In Croatia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Macedonia, they rejected this option and were -  consequently -  defeated in 
the first democratic elections in 1990. The shift from the attempt to create a cross-national intra­
elite consensus to creating a consensus within their respective nations was the real turning 
point in the history of Yugoslavia's disintegration. This thesis focused more on those who 
achieved this new consensus (Slovenia and Serbia) rather than on those elites which failed to 
transform themselves from communist to nationalist concepts. I admit that this was somewhat 
'unfair' to all those in other segments of the elite (such as the Macedonian, Bosnian, and 
Croatian leaders) who stubbornly refused to accommodate their position to nationalist trends in 
their republics, even if they knew they would lose elections to ethnic nationalists. Paradoxically, 
the most loyal Kardeljists now became, as Zimmermann (1996/1999:32) argues, 'closer to the 
culture of Western political moderation than members of many noncommunist Yugoslav 
political groupings'. But they did not manage to prevent nationalist leaders from taking over in 
their republics too.
I argued in this thesis that the collapse of Yugoslavia was not the result of 'ethnic hatred' 
among its constitutive nations. Indeed, the main political conflicts within the Yugoslav elite 
were not between 'representatives' of Yugoslav ethnic groups, and not even between republics. 
Even in its last phase, when the two new rival concepts were identified with Slovenia and 
Serbia, the 'coalitions' around them crossed the borders of these two republics, dividing 
Yugoslavia into two halves. Subsequently, the wars that followed the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia were not 'inevitable' either. As Zimmermann (1996/1999:VII) convincingly 
illustrates, they were the result of neither 'ancient ethnic or religious hostilities' nor of the 
collapse of communism at the end of the cold war, not even of the failures of the Western 
countries. In fact, as he says, it was 'amazing how many Yugoslavs resisted, and continue to 
resist, the incessant racist propaganda' developed by ethnic nationalists in the last years of 
Yugoslavia and the first years after the break-up. While Yugoslavia disintegrated because of the 
lack of a new constitutive concept which would glue together the differences within it, the wars 
were the result of other narratives, other ideologies (the ones of ethnic nationalism), which 
attempted to create other types of unity from the top down in a more or less similar manner 
(though with different substance) to the old communist elite in the immediate post-WWII 
period. They needed the other, the enemy to consolidate the fragile unity within the new political 
nations. The 'ethnic hatred' was originally generated in a way similar to that by which support 
for the communist narrative had been created in the first years after the socialist revolution: by 
intimidation and elimination to all opposition of the demagogic designs invented by the new 
elites.
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Analysis of these new narratives and their 'constitutive concepts', as well as of the mechanisms 
for creating 'unity ' within the new nations is, however, a topic for another, but no less relevant, 
research project.
8.2. Contributions to the Field and Further Research
There are two major contributions to the field of Yugoslav studies I would hope this thesis can 
claim.
First, this work presents new sources (such as interviews, unpublished documents, 
correspondence, etc.) related to the period and area I have studied. More than any research so 
far, it has aimed at reconstructing the motives and reasons for political actions as expressed and 
understood by the political elite itself. No other research into Yugoslav elite politics has 
presented interviews with so many relevant participants, and in no other work have the diaries 
and memoirs of participants been analysed in such detail. There is, of course, much more to be 
done before the whole picture of this regime-collapse and state-disintegration is completed. 
However, by the time the archives become fully accessible, many of the participants will not be 
able to explain their reasons for acting as they did. Since I define politics as subjective activity, I 
believe their explanations, although certainly not the whole truth, are a necessary and 
important part of the truth. I hope this thesis makes a contribution towards this objective. This 
research -  including further interviews which I plan to conduct in the immediate future - 
represents, I hope, a necessary first step for any further research, which could be completed 
only once the archives are fully accessible.
Secondly, this thesis, I believe, offers in many respects an original interpretation of the 
events which happened in the analysed period. Although several authors have emphasised the 
importance of ideology in Yugoslav politics (Pavkovic, 1997; Wachtel, 1998; Ferdinand, 1991; 
Radosevic, 1996; Vejvoda, 1996, etc.) what they normally understood by 'ideology' was the 
'Yugoslav idea' and its interpretation by various groups of intellectuals, especially in the 1980s. 
The Marxist origins of the Yugoslav official ideology were somehow neglected, perhaps on the 
grounds that ideology was no longer an important element of political life in the 1980s. This 
thesis argues the opposite: that Kardelj's concept was yet another attempt to formulate and 
implement the Yugoslav version of the Marxist ideology, and that this interpretation was at the 
core of political action in Yugoslavia. In this respect, Yugoslavia was perhaps never so 
'ideologised' as in the period analysed in this thesis. Although I do not argue that ideological 
motives played an exclusive role in the actions of the Yugoslav political leaders, I do emphasise 
that the actions themselves cannot be fully understood without their ideological context. As 
Lapenna points out 'the knowledge and study of these theories [the Marxist doctrines of state
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and law] is, irrespective of their scientific value, an absolutely essential element7 in any attempt 
to understand the nature of communist societies (1964:2).
More than other works in this area, this study is focused on the link between elite and ideology, 
on (as expressed in its title) the ideological consensus within the Yugoslav political elite. I 
aimed to map out the beliefs of the members of the political elite and their interpretations of the 
complex reality they found themselves in (economic crisis, international circumstances, ethnic 
complexity, constitutional structure, etc.). I argue that although all these ('objective') factors 
provided the context in which the events leading to the collapse of Yugoslavia happened, it was 
up to the political actors themselves to 'use' them in one or another way. By themselves, neither 
economic crisis, nor ethnic complexity, nor the changed international structure of the world 
would have necessarily led to the break-up of Yugoslavia, although all of them facilitated the 
emergence of new, alternative 'constitutive concepts' which ultimately brought about the 
emergence of new states. Only when these factors became interpreted in certain ways by 
political actors, so as to construct new constitutive concepts instead of the old one, did the state 
collapse. The main novelty of this thesis, I suggest, is in demonstrating the perm anent 
interaction between the objective and the subjective, by following the reactions of the political 
elites to the challenges they faced from outside their ranks. It is the analysis of this interaction 
that I suggest as the most appropriate way of explaining the crisis and collapse of Yugoslavia in 
the 1974-1990 period.
I also hope I have successfully corrected some misconceptions in the debate on the collapse of 
Yugoslavia. Some of them, like the argument about 'ethnic hatred', have -  unfortunately -  
become so frequent and influential that they have already entered the dominant public, political 
and even academic, discourses. I understand my analysis is unlikely to change the firm beliefs 
of those who argue that Yugoslavia collapsed because its nations hated each other from the 
very beginning, from 1918, or indeed from much further back in the past. However, I would be 
satisfied if this thesis has made even a small contribution to displaying how inadequate this 
claim is.
As a historical case-study, this thesis does not pretend to make a general point about why states 
disintegrate or why regimes collapse. It may, however, formulate a hypothesis for further 
research on the collapse of states in general, and communist multi-ethnic federations in 
particular. The hypothesis -  that states disintegrate once their constitutive concepts (based on 
narratives and ideologies) collapse - should be further tested by experts in comparative politics. 
An immediate choice of cases to be included in such an analysis is obvious: the Soviet Union 
and Czechoslovakia, two socialist federations which disintegrated at about the same time as 
Yugoslavia. Bunce's recent comparison (1999) between these three cases could be a good 
starting point, but it should be supplemented with analyses of ideologies, which Bunce failed to
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produce. Another interesting case study would include countries with an 'original' 
interpretation of Marxism, such as Albania, China, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 
Ferdinand's (1991) analysis of three main interpretations of Marxism (Soviet, Chinese and 
Yugoslav) in the light of the events in these three states in the 1980s and 1990s is a good source, 
although his conclusion that because of the ideology these three states were strong, not weak, is 
contested in my research here. The post-doctoral project I intend to conduct at the European 
University Institute in Florence -  on 'Yugoslavia: the state that withered away', should perhaps 
be a good opportunity to broaden and deepen my argument further and to relate it in more 
detail to other case-studies and to analyses within the field of comparative politics.
My hypothesis would not be fully tested before a contrasting case of a non-communist multi­
ethnic state is included, and I suggest the United Kingdom to be this case. If there is anywhere 
in Europe where processes of globalisation clashed with processes of nationalism; where 
loyalties to separate ethnic groups sought a compromise with loyalty to a larger multi-cultural 
state and with the even wider European supra-national entity, then it is in the United Kingdom. 
Only the future will show which way the UK will go: towards further devolution of power 
from the top down (or even to partition) or towards consolidating the British nation as a 'm ini­
globalised society' (to use Giddens' expression). The question: why did Yugoslavia, Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia collapse and the United Kingdom did not (or has not yet!) would 
soon bring us back to the approach I have followed in this thesis: to an analysis of history, 
ideology (especially different notions of the state) and elite perceptions of reality.
This thesis hopes to make a modest contribution to the field of the methodology of social 
science too. Although it is certainly not at its central focus, the thesis demonstrates that 
Skinner's analytical approach could be implemented not only when it comes to medieval 
political ideas, but also when we analyse contemporary political history. Socialist regimes, such 
as the Yugoslav, were created on an ideological basis and remained committed to ideas 
developed by Marx and Marxists. It is for this reason that no analysis of communist politics is 
complete without being a history of ideas too. Even if to an outsider the rhetoric of communism 
seemed as pure ritual, a wooden language without any sensible meaning, for insiders (including 
the population at large), at any rate in Yugoslavia, it was rarely only a meaningless talk.
In most cases, Yugoslav political rhetoric (especially in intra-elite debates) was not pure 
demagogy -  it was an expression of the intentions and beliefs of the political actors, and an 
analyst ought to take it seriously. Although they rarely neglected the importance of the 
structural circumstances they acted within, the politicians were not pure 'agents' of nations, 
classes, their own social status, etc. Even less did they under socialism -  which was not a 
'representative democracy' - represent social groups as they were. They represented their own 
vision of historical necessities. This is why, if we want to understand communism, studying
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these visions has the same importance as studying electoral laws in the case of representative 
democracies. The struggle for the 'right' interpretation of texts, often in forms not unlike 
'philological seminars' was, therefore, if not central, then certainly an important activity in a 
socialist society. This is why the methodology suggested by Skinner, himself a historian of 
ideas, proves to be helpful. In addition, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, the four 
methodological mistakes identified by Skinner {prolepsis, parochialism, ideal type and coherence 
myths) are at the core of the frequent misunderstandings of Yugoslav politics in the 1974-1990 
period.
Yugoslavia was - as Aleksa Djilas said -  a difficult country to understand, perhaps even more 
so for those who lived in it and felt some attachment to it. It was a country of paradoxes. Its 
elite did not fail to use examples from the tragic past to warn about the danger of nationalism 
and chauvinism. Yet, it failed to prevent the past from repeating itself in its new form 45 years 
after the horrors of the civil war within the Second World War. Its leaders jailed 'nationalists' 
and nationalists. Yet they themselves shielded and -  ultimately -  assisted the rise of nationalism 
in Yugoslavia. They thought Yugoslavia could never disintegrate, and should not become a 
country of statism or ethnic nationalism ever again. Yet, it indeed disintegrated, while both 
ethnic nationalism and statism re-appeared in all its parts, in all republics and provinces. They 
constructed a system which was economically the most advanced and politically the most 
'liberal' in the socialist hemisphere. Yet, it all ended up in sky-high inflation and in a war which 
ignored the hum an rights and freedoms of all its citizens, and especially of all minorities. Once 
an example of tolerance between religious and ethnic groups, Yugoslavia became a symbol for 
ethnic violence and intolerance at the end of the 20th century. What is even more paradoxical is 
that those who held in their hands the reins of power in more than four decades of Yugoslav 
post-war politics, now appear like prophets who accurately claimed this could all happen if the 
project of self-managing socialism was defeated. The elite that once looked so powerful, was at 
the same time powerless to stop the process initiated largely by itself. All their good intentions 
ended up in disaster and they could not understand how and why. They found themselves 
surprised, angry, disappointed and misunderstood. And many Yugoslavs felt the same.
Finally: a personal note. Regardless of how much a researcher hies to be 'objective' and 
personally detached from his/her subject, I do not believe this is (always) possible. It would not 
be in accordance with my own thesis if I said I had no personal motives and reasons to 
undertake this research. I was born in Yugoslavia and have been influenced by the events I 
have analysed here. Like so many of my compatriots, I lived through this period, sharing with 
them fears and hopes, disappointments and anger, pride and shame. The events I analysed here 
influenced my life and the lives of all of us born in a country that does not exist any longer. My 
motive was to understand why these events happened. It would be very bold to say I know the
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whole answer. Some things cannot be understood, and never will be. But I hope it would not be 
too bold to say that I have explained at least some of them, and not only to myself.
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